Nataliya Plaksiyenko-Butyrska on East Asia, Democracy, and Ukraine’s Wartime Innovation
Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen
Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project
Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/04/29
Nataliya Plaksiyenko-Butyrska is a Ukrainian foreign-policy analyst and East Asia expert affiliated with the New Europe Center. She is the author of more than 100 analytical materials on international relations, especially the Asia-Pacific region, China’s rise, and Ukraine’s ties with Asian partners. Her background includes studies at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, and universities in South Korea.
In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Nataliya Plaksiyenko-Butyrska examine the overlap between East Asian and Ukrainian democratic values, especially resistance to spheres of influence, respect for sovereignty, and the need for alliances among small and middle powers. They also discuss the weakening of global democratic cohesion, the importance of NATO-style cooperation, and the contrast between Ukraine’s wartime creativity and Russia’s greater capacity to scale military innovations.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: In the case of China, if we look at nominal GDP, over time, the concept of a “superpower” becomes less clear. The meaning of the term weakens as power becomes more distributed. So there may be a time limit on what we mean by a superpower, and also a trend toward fragmentation.
Some political developments, including those in the United States, have introduced uncertainty and division into the international system, which can be advantageous for actors like Russia. We also see how global chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz, can affect energy markets and create wider instability. What values in East Asia are similar to those in Ukraine?
Nataliya Plaksiyenko-Butyrska: First of all, democratic values. There are shared principles and common goals among democratic countries.
Another important point is that many of these countries are small or middle powers. For them, it is essential to live in a world where larger powers do not dominate them.
It is very important for many countries—both in Asia and in Europe—to oppose a world order in which a few major powers divide the world into spheres of influence. We cannot say that such a division has already happened, but there are clear tendencies in that direction.
At the same time, countries in East Asia, including ASEAN members, as well as European and Global South countries, have an interest in preventing such a system from emerging. There is still a chance to preserve a more balanced international order.
However, for countries like India, Indonesia, Brazil, and others, it is also important to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy. Even when they are democratic, they often prefer not to align with either side fully.
At the same time, when international organizations are not functioning effectively, it becomes more difficult for countries to coordinate and act collectively. This creates uncertainty and fragmentation in the global system.
That is why, from my point of view, it is very important to strengthen cooperation among democratic countries. A stronger coalition of democratic states could serve as a reference point for Asian democracies, Latin American countries, and others.
In terms of values, we are all looking for a world based on common rules—where both small and large countries have their rights respected. That is why it is very important now for democratic countries to work together to stop aggression and preserve this international order.
In some cases, European countries have shown that they can act collectively when they perceive a strong challenge. For example, they demonstrated unity in supporting Denmark regarding discussions around Greenland, and they have also shown support for Canada in maintaining sovereignty and stability.
These responses reflect broader goals and the willingness of democratic countries to coordinate when necessary. At the same time, in other regions, such as the Middle East and Europe, countries have sometimes taken more cautious or mixed positions, depending on their interests and strategic calculations.
Jacobsen: One broader point is that the modern world appears, in some respects, less democratic than it was twenty years ago. At the same time, many of the most stable, wealthy, and healthy societies are those built on democratic values—particularly systems that emphasize horizontal relationships, cooperation, and shared governance rather than strictly hierarchical structures.
Many countries remain broadly aligned with the United States but may distance themselves from specific conflicts, viewing them as not directly their own. This reflects the complexity of modern alliances and the asymmetrical nature of many contemporary conflicts.
Plaksiyenko-Butyrska: This also sends a signal to political leaders, including in the United States, about the importance of alliances. At times, there have been perceptions that alliances such as NATO are undervalued or treated as less important.
However, experiences like Afghanistan demonstrated that the United States does not act alone. Its leadership has been supported and reinforced by its allies. This is the nature of modern alliances—they are collective, not unilateral.
That is an important lesson for Ukraine as well. The strength of alliances depends on mutual respect and recognition of shared interests.
Jacobsen: Technologically, the Russian Federation inherited a large amount of Soviet-era military equipment. Ukraine, after independence and denuclearization—following agreements recognized internationally, including by Russia—entered the post-Soviet period with reduced military capacity.
By 2014, at the time of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, Ukraine’s military was relatively limited in size and readiness. Since then, especially after the full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has undergone a rapid transformation.
Today, Ukraine has one of the largest and most experienced military forces in Europe. Many of its soldiers came from civilian backgrounds—ordinary professions—and have adapted quickly. Ukraine has also advanced significantly in areas such as drone warfare, battlefield innovation, and modern military tactics, becoming a key example of 21st-century warfare adaptation.
The North Koreans coming in, the Chinese components being used, and even foreign nationals recruited or misled into fighting—many of these forces and methods still resemble 20th-century warfare rather than 21st-century tactics.
Some modern elements are widely used, such as GPS, mobile phones for coordination and surveillance, and drones for reconnaissance and strike capabilities. But the Ukrainians have gone much further in adapting modern warfare.
There also seems to be a difference in values. In Ukraine, every loss of life is treated as a tragedy, and that appears to influence military tactics. Russia, by contrast, has sustained very high casualty rates, with many losses attributed to drone warfare and artillery.
Ukrainian forces have increasingly used drones to target individual units. More recently, they have adapted reusable drone systems that can carry multiple payloads, deploy them, and return for reloading. This approach conserves both personnel and resources—two critical constraints in warfare.
By contrast, Russia relies on larger-scale expenditures of workforce and equipment, supported by significant state spending. So what is your assessment of the effectiveness of these authoritarian-aligned forces operating in Ukraine? There is a gap between the scale of their deployment and the effectiveness of their tactics.
Plaksiyenko-Butyrska: At the same time, you are right to point out that Ukraine has a strong advantage in creativity. Ukrainians have had to adapt very quickly, and this has been essential in resisting a much larger Russian army.
From the first days of the war, even when resources were limited, Ukrainians tried to create solutions—sometimes very simple ones—that could stop or slow Russian forces.
However, Ukraine also faces challenges. It is not always able to scale innovations quickly. There are issues related to bureaucracy and, at times, decision-making processes that slow down implementation.
Russia, on the other hand, is not always as innovative, but it is often faster at adopting and scaling ideas. It studies what works and then produces it in large quantities—for example, with drones.
So while Ukraine leads in innovation and adaptability, Russia often compensates with production speed and scale. This creates an ongoing dynamic in which both sides learn and adjust.
Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Nataliya.
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