Irina Tsukerman on Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Backlash, Thai-Cambodian Border Tensions, and China’s Subtle Regional Influence

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): A Further Inquiry

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/08/11

Part 4 of 4

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and GasCommittee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. 

In this interview with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, national security attorney Irina Tsukerman discusses Ukraine’s political unrest following President Zelensky’s decision to place anti-corruption agencies under executive control, warning of public disillusionment, Russian disinformation, and Western missteps such as delayed Patriot missile deliveries. She also examines simmering Thai-Cambodian tensions sparked by landmine incidents, cultural disputes, and nationalist rhetoric. Tsukerman explains how historical grievances, labour exploitation, and soft power rivalries intertwine with China’s strategic ambitions in Southeast Asia. Her analysis highlights how domestic politics, identity disputes, and great-power competition feed instability, erode trust, and create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by external actors.

Interview conducted July 25.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: That brings us close to the end—one last topic. Ukraine’s anti-corruption chief says his agency has been targeted in a dirty information campaign. What’s happening there?

Irina Tsukerman: There have been growing protests in Ukraine over recent moves to bring anti-corruption agencies under tighter government control. These agencies, while not consistently effective, were designed to be independent watchdogs. But the Ukrainian parliament decided to place them under executive oversight, undermining that independence.

Despite pushback from some U.S. Republican lawmakers, President Zelensky signed the bill into law. The official justification was the arrest of a Ukrainian MP suspected of spying for Russia. Some longtime MPs were frustrated with the anti-corruption agencies—not only because of their perceived ineffectiveness, but because they threatened entrenched interests. Bringing them under government control removes that threat.

Jacobsen: So why did Zelensky go along with it?

Tsukerman: Likely a combination of factors. First, to preserve his working relationship with parliament. Openly defying them could have led to legislative gridlock or rebellion on more urgent issues. Second, from a practical standpoint, he may have calculated that consolidating power would help prevent institutional chaos during wartime.

But that decision has backfired. Even if people weren’t thrilled with the agencies’ performance, they’re even more concerned about what looks like a slide toward executive overreach. The optics of centralizing power—especially in the middle of a war—don’t inspire confidence. It creates the impression that Zelensky is using wartime conditions to suppress accountability, rather than strengthen it.

Russia is taking full advantage of the current standoff between the Ukrainian government and the public. It’sdeploying anti-Zelensky propaganda to highlight his perceived weaknesses, mobilizing those who were never loyal to him, and using the unrest to undermine unity at a time when cohesion is critical for prosecuting the war effectively.

Many Ukrainians are already demoralized. There’s a perception—justified or not—of U.S. betrayal. The prolonged nature of the war, the grinding physical and psychological toll, the absence of a quick and decisive victory, and the daunting challenge of fighting a larger, better-equipped enemy are all contributing to public fatigue.

On top of that, the European Union’s perceived passivity—its inability or unwillingness to take a firmer stance against Russia—has led many to feel they are being used as pawns in a much broader geopolitical game.

All of these factors—real and psychological—are feeding into this climate of disillusionment.

It’s entirely plausible, even likely, that multiple parties are running disinformation campaigns targeting Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies. Russia is the primary suspect, of course—it benefits from confusion, distrust, and the erosion of Ukrainian institutional credibility. But they’re not alone.

There are likely corrupt Ukrainian officials who would rather see these agencies discredited than be held accountable. Rival institutions may be vying for influence and seeking to undermine competing agencies. And some anti-Zelensky political groups may be stoking controversy simply to create instability.

Ironically, even some pro-Zelensky actors could be contributing, perhaps believing they’re helping by shielding him from criticism, when in fact they’re compounding the problem.

Jacobsen: And how has the U.S. handled it?

Tsukerman: Not well. By applying pressure on Zelensky over a sensitive internal issue, the U.S. may have inadvertently pushed him into signing the controversial law bringing the anti-corruption agencies under more centralized control. It’s a classic case of backlash: Zelensky didn’t want to appear weak or like a puppet of a Western partner that, in his view, hasn’t fully delivered on its commitments.

Case in point—Patriot missile systems. Trump promised them, and while some units are reportedly sitting in Poland, they aren’t scheduled for delivery until spring 2026, which is absurd given the urgency on the ground.

All of this—domestic discontent, Western pressure, lack of timely aid, and Russian exploitation—has created a perfect storm of confusion and instability. It’s damaging, it’s demoralizing, and at the end of the day, it serves only one party: Russia.

Jacobsen: Thailand is in favour of direct talks with Cambodia over mediation. It’s not a high-profile issue in the West. Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: It’s under the radar, but significant. There have been several incidents recently that have reignited tensions along the contested Thai-Cambodian border.

Just a few days ago, five Thai soldiers were seriously injured—one of them lost a leg—in a landmine explosion near one of the disputed zones. Thailand accused Cambodia of placing new Russian-made landmines in an area that had been designated as demilitarized. Cambodia, in turn, denied the claim, saying the mines were remnants from previous conflicts.

But this wasn’t an isolated incident. Back on May 27, a Cambodian soldier was killed in a brief firefight near another disputed area. Each side blamed the other for initiating the clash. Ceasefire negotiations since then have failed to stabilize the situation.

Jacobsen: And now Thailand prefers direct talks?

Tsukerman: Yes. Thai leadership has signalled that they prefer bilateral engagement over international mediation—likely because they believe they can negotiate from a position of strength, or because they don’t want third-party pressure dictating terms. Cambodia, meanwhile, seems less inclined to escalate but isn’t backing down from its claims either.

So it’s a simmering situation, and if not addressed, it could destabilize the region. Unfortunately, it’s precisely the kind of conflict that rarely gets international attention—until it explodes. Layered on top of all that, domestic politics in both countries have played a significant role.

The situation escalated further when a leaked phone call from June surfaced between the Thai Prime Minister and Cambodia’s opposition leader, Khamphea Jei. She referred to him as “uncle” and criticized Thai military leaders. Thailand’s Constitutional Court suspended her.

Meanwhile, Cambodian officials used the leak to fuel nationalist sentiment, casting Thailand as hostile and illegitimate. There are layers of competing nationalisms and grievances. Cambodian resentment over past Siamese invasions, cultural appropriation, and territorial wars still runs deep. Many Cambodians view parts of eastern Thailand as historically theirs. Conversely, the Thai public is sensitive to such claims and emphasizes its own sovereignty and cultural primacy.

One longstanding flashpoint is the Preah Vihear Temple, a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Although it was legally awarded to Cambodia by the International Court of Justice in 1962, it remains emotionally contested in Thailand. Nationalist politicians in both countries frequently invoke it to rally support.

There’s also the issue of poorly demarcated borders, particularly in rugged, forested, and mountainous areas where both militaries have occasionally maintained informal outposts, making accidental or intentional incursions more likely. While armed skirmishes have become rarer in recent years, they haven’t disappeared. Even civilian border crossings are often flashpoints, especially where there’s smuggling or irregular migration; what might begin as a minor altercation can escalate into a diplomatic crisis.

Jacobsen: And the labour situation?

Tsukerman: Another significant issue is migrant labour and economic disparity. Thailand hosts 100,000s of Cambodian migrant workers, many employed in construction, agriculture, and low-wage service sectors.

There are recurring and credible complaints of mistreatment—wage theft, exploitation, and arbitrary deportations. These issues have inflamed Cambodian public opinion. On the Thai side, migrants are often scapegoated for rising crime or labour violations, especially during economic downturns. Crackdowns on migrant communities are portrayed as security measures.

Of course, there’s the political diversion factor.

In both Bangkok and Phnom Penh, leaders often have domestic incentives to escalate nationalist rhetoric. In Thailand, conservative and military-backed regimes frequently face unrest and use Cambodia as a symbolic enemy, portraying it as an ungrateful neighbour stealing from Thai cultural and territorial heritage. Meanwhile, Cambodia’s Prime Minister, under pressure to match the legacy of his father and assert himself, doesn’t want to appear weak in the face of perceived Thai aggression.

There’s also a soft power component—competing over cultural legitimacy, international recognition, and historical narrative.

Tensions over cultural heritage, language, and even pop culture often spiral out of control and become the basis for more serious diplomatic friction. Cambodians regularly accuse Thailand of appropriating Khmer dances, cuisine, and ancient iconography. The rise of social media has only amplified these disputes.

For example, there was a Thai television show that portrayed certain cultural symbols as uniquely Thai, despite their shared Khmer origins. Then there are influencers trivializing Buddhist merit-making in viral videos. These incidents may seem petty, but they’ve provoked significant cultural backlash.

They reflect more profound anxieties over national identity, prestige, and historical memory. These aren’t just symbolic disagreements—they tie directly into unresolved trauma, post-colonial legacies, and longstanding rivalry.

And finally, let’s not ignore the elephant in the room: China—and the broader regional rivalries surrounding its influence.

China has been deepening its economic and political involvement in both Cambodia and Thailand. Cambodia, in particular, is widely seen as one of Beijing’s most loyal partners in the region. At the same time, Thailand’s position has been more fluid, oscillating between pro-U.S. and pro-China stances depending on the government in power.

We’re talking about infrastructure megaprojects, strategic corridors, and military relationships that are all part of a much larger geopolitical chessboard. While both countries officially maintain good relations with China, they’re also competing with each other for Beijing’s favor—seeking leverage, preferential investment, and strategic autonomy.

It’s also worth considering that China may be subtly encouraging these frictions, not full-scale instability, just enough tension to prevent the region from forming a unified, pro-Western bloc. For Beijing, that’s the sweet spot: strong enough to maintain influence, but weak enough to avoid regional alignment against it.

So, when we look at this latest border flare-up and the preference for direct talks over international mediation, it’s not just about historical grievances or cultural symbolism. It’s also about distrust of third parties. Thailand, for example, fears that outside mediators might favour Cambodia or push it into making concessions. Direct bilateral negotiations, from their perspective, protect national pride and avoid appearing weak on the world stage.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for your time today. 

Tsukerman: Sounds good. Have a great trip back. I hope you get some rest.

Jacobsen: Seriously—thank you so much.

Tsukerman: Take care.

Last updated May 3, 2025. These terms govern all In-Sight Publishing content—past, present, and future—and supersede any prior notices.  In-Sight Publishing by Scott  Douglas  Jacobsen is licensed under a Creative Commons BY‑NC‑ND 4.0; © In-Sight Publishing by Scott  Douglas  Jacobsen 2012–Present. All trademarks, performances, databases & branding are owned by their rights holders; no use without permission. Unauthorized copying, modification, framing or public communication is prohibited. External links are not endorsed. Cookies & tracking require consent, and data processing complies with PIPEDA & GDPR; no data from children < 13 (COPPA). Content meets WCAG 2.1 AA under the Accessible Canada Act & is preserved in open archival formats with backups. Excerpts & links require full credit & hyperlink; limited quoting under fair-dealing & fair-use. All content is informational; no liability for errors or omissions: Feedback welcome, and verified errors corrected promptly. For permissions or DMCA notices, email: scott.jacobsen2025@gmail.com. Site use is governed by BC laws; content is “as‑is,” liability limited, users indemnify us; moral, performers’ & database sui generis rights reserved.