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СокальINFO: Ukraine and Russia’s Corruption Divergence Since 2014

2026-05-29

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): СокальINFO

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/04/30

Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index indicates that both Ukraine and Russia had poor corruption rankings in 2000, with Russia slightly better positioned. After the 2012 methodology change, comparable data from 2014 to 2025 show diverging trajectories. Ukraine demonstrates gradual improvement, particularly after 2022, while Russia shows consistent deterioration. By 2025, Ukraine ranks higher than Russia, reflecting increasing divergence. Despite progress, both countries remain challenged by corruption, underscoring the need for sustained institutional reforms.

Methodology and Comparative Framework

Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index shows poor rankings from Ukraine and the Russian Federation more than two decades ago. Transparency International changed the methodology in 2012. So, the rankings from 2014, 2022, and 2025, are the most readily comparable metrics, while the 2000 ranking (and others near its chronology) give indications. The post-2012 trend suggests modest improvement in Ukraine and marked deterioration in Russia.

Baseline: Year 2000

Back to the year 2000, Ukraine ranked near of the bottom of the 90-country listing, i.e., significant corruption issues based on the ranking and the methodology used in that year. Ukraine ranked 87 out of 90. In 2000, the Russian Federation had better corruption ranking than Ukraine, 82 out of 90.

Early Post-2012 Comparison: 2014

In 2014, at the start of the war, Ukraine improved relative ranking within a longer list of countries while remaining on the lower end of the ranking, 142 out of 175. In 2014, Russia went down in the rankings while still in the lower-middle portions of the ranking, 136 out of 175, while still scoring better than Ukraine. By the time of the full-scale invasion or the “special military operation,” in 2022, Ukraine began to show a healthier trajectory in corruption rankings within a more comprehensive ranking, 116 out of 180. By 2022, the Russian Federation was steadily in the lower-middle portions of corruption globally, 137 out of 180.

Divergence Begins: 2022

By last year, the Russian Federation was solidly in the lower ranks of the index, 157 out of 182. Within a shorter period of time, Ukraine has continued to improve corruption rankings relative to an international metric, 104 out of 182. The indication, therefore, becomes two post-Soviet Union (15 socialist republics) nations remaining not approximately equal, but increasingly divergent in levels of corruption. As time progressed from the original annexation of Crimea into the full-scale invasion or war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the divergence took root beginning in 2022, becoming more amplified and clear in 2025.

Interpretation of Trends

From the perspective of Ukraine’s corruption levels, the healthy point is the pattern of improvement. From the perspective of the Russian Federation’s corruption levels, the unhealthy point is the pattern of more corruption. The big picture is a lower-half ranking for Ukraine and a low ranking for the Russian Federation internationally, respectively.

Conclusion

The war contrast is the increased corruption in the Russian Federation and decline in corruption in Ukraine. The lesson is a significant journey left to travel in anti-corruption efforts in a region marked by high corruption in the contemporary period.

More resources below:

Direct Transparency International

Fighting Corruption in Wartime Ukraine: An Interview With Andrii Borovyk

Oleksandr Kalitenko on Ukraine’s Battle for Transparency

Ukraine’s Corruption Problem Isn’t Convictions—It’s What Happens After

Broader anti-corruption / accountability

Oleksandr Tsyvinskyi: Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Reboot, Economic Security and the Shadow Economy

Anton Zelinskyi on the Judicial Reform and Russo-Ukrainian War

Legal Aid in a War Zone: How Ukraine’s Diplomatic Legal Hub Fills the Gaps

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