Kyiv War Update: Alex Craiu on Patriot Gaps, Alaska Summit, NATO Aid

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): A Further Inquiry

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/08/29

Part 1 of 2

Alex Craiu lives and works in Ukraine as a war correspondent. He studied in the United Kingdom and California, United States, with a degree in documentary and cinematography production. He works as a freelancer and independent journalist. In 2017, he completed an internship with the BBC in London and later started creating videos for social networks, collaborating with various publications. He travelled to most regions of Ukraine, except those fully occupied, and presented online the current situation in Ukraine, including in conflict zones. Currently based in Kyiv, Ukraine, he analyzes and documents people’s lives during the war.

Kyiv-based war correspondent Alex Craiu details a harsher six months: surging Shahed drone swarms and intensified missile strikes, including upgraded Russian ballistic systems that reduce Patriot interception rates. Germany, coordinating with the United States and NATO, is rushing additional Patriot batteries to Ukraine. On the front, Russia seized Kamianske in Zaporizhzhia; heavy fighting persists around Siversk and the Pokrovsk sector. Civilians strongly oppose any territorial concessions or a frozen front. An August 10 airstrike in Zaporizhzhia injured at least twelve. The Alaska summit produced no ceasefire, while USAID oversight cuts raise corruption fears. Europe strengthens support as prisoner exchanges continue.

Interview conducted August 16, 2025.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Today, we are joined once again by Mr. Alex Craiu. Since our last update, several months ago, several important developments have occurred—including the Alaska summit between President Trump and President Putin.

For today’s discussion, our sources will include Reuters, the Associated Press, the United Nations, and Amnesty International, with the possibility of citing Human Rights Watch if relevant. With that, over the past six months, what would you say have been the most significant developments from a central Kyiv perspective?

Alex Craiu: Kyiv’s air defences remain under critical strain. There has been a stark surge in Russian Shahed-type drone attacks on the capital. Additionally, missile strikes have intensified. According to recent U.S. Defence Intelligence reports, upgraded Russian ballistic missiles with maneuverable trajectories and decoys have significantly reduced the effectiveness of Ukraine’s Patriot air defence systems—Ukraine intercepted only one of seven missiles on June 28, and seven of thirteen on July 9.

Germany has agreed to supply two additional Patriot batteries to Ukraine, under a deal with the U.S.—Berlin will receive upgraded systems first. At the same time, its current stock will be sent to Ukraine within days, with full components arriving in two to three months. That, along with NATO’s supreme allied commander efforts to fast-track more Patriot deliveries, indicates progress.

On the front lines, Russian forces captured the village of Kamianske in southeastern Zaporizhzhia Oblast in July 2025. Meanwhile, intensified combat continues in Donetsk: Ukrainian troops have managed to halt a major two-pronged Russian incursion near towns like Dobropillia—delivering a blow to the offensive. Russian forces also pressed into northeastern Donetsk, advancing in areas like Bilohorivka, Hryhorivka, and the Siversk axis, while Ukraine repelled assaults near Siversk as recently as late July.

Around Pokrovsk, the situation remains acute. The offensive there continues, with Russian forces expanding a salient from the southeast and east. Despite intense fighting, Ukrainian defenders regained ground in areas like Kotlyne and Pischane earlier in 2025—but the front remains highly contested.

For civilians, the toll has been devastating. On August 10, 2025, Russian airstrikes in the Zaporizhzhia region injured at least twelve people, targeting residential areas, a bus station, and a clinic. In frontline communities, especially Zaporizhzhia, residents strongly oppose any proposals for territorial concessions or “freezing the front lines,” fearing permanent Russian control and widespread human rights abuses.

Diplomatically, the Alaska summit concluded without a ceasefire deal. Putin proposed freezing military advances in certain areas in exchange for Ukraine ceding Donetsk and Luhansk—an option Ukraine rejects. President Zelenskyy has ruled out giving up land that could serve as a launchpad for future aggression. Meanwhile, Zelenskyy is set to meet with President Trump in Washington amid growing diplomatic momentum and European leaders offering strong support for Ukrainian security.

Moreover, this, in my opinion, is missing from Donald Trump’s current stance. So, yes, it does not surprise me that he wants Europe to provide Ukraine with as much support as possible, without relying on the United States. From a business standpoint, that may make sense. However, it should be pointed out to Donald Trump that not everything comes down to business—there are geopolitical and security factors that must also be considered.

Jacobsen: Now, the most significant event recently has been the Alaska summit. Trump said—wait a second, yes. President Trump stated that Ukraine should make a deal. The reasoning, in his words, was because “Russia is a big power, and they are not.” Speaking of Ukraine, Putin reportedly demanded more Ukrainian land during the summit. The Russian leader offered to freeze most of the front lines if Kyiv ceded all of Donetsk, the industrial region that has long been one of Moscow’s primary targets. That report was cited as part of the discussion from Trump himself. Any thoughts on this offer, this deal, and the Alaska summit altogether?

Craiu: I have the feeling—shared by many here—that there were not high expectations for the Alaska summit anyway, at least not in Ukraine. I have conducted several interviews and vox pops with people on the streets, and to start with, they did not expect much. Primarily because Ukraine was not invited to the summit, they felt unrepresented. It was essentially a conversation between two leaders of countries that do not own Ukraine and cannot legitimately negotiate over Ukrainian territory.

In terms of ceding territory to Russia, I specifically asked people in Kyiv about that, including the prospect of so-called “land swaps.” It is important to note that if any such deal were made, it would not involve Ukraine gaining Russian land—it would involve Russia withdrawing troops from already occupied Ukrainian territory in exchange for Ukraine ceding other areas still under its control.

The general sentiment is that Russia does not intend to stop with Donetsk. Its broader goals include taking complete control over Zaporizhzhia Oblast and Kherson Oblast. If the current lines were frozen in Kherson, geographically, it would be more feasible than in Zaporizhzhia. However, in Zaporizhzhia, both logistically and geographically, it is very unclear where a dividing line could even be drawn between Russian-held and Ukrainian-controlled territory.

Jacobsen: In other terms, if a checkpoint or border point were established, would there be a demilitarized area? Moreover, if so, how many people would have to be relocated? How many would lose their homes? What would happen to those who, rightfully, would refuse to leave their houses?

Craiu: From a civilian standpoint, freezing the current lines presents a deeply problematic situation. To implement such a scenario, there would have to be significant movement on the Russian side to establish what they would call a “border” between Ukraine and the territory they claim as Russia. Ukrainians overwhelmingly reject this.

The reasons are straightforward. Beyond legitimizing the aggressor, many people displaced from the easternmost regions of Ukraine still have relatives in near-frontline cities or Russian-occupied areas. What unites them is the hope that Ukraine will push Russian forces back. To leave those territories under Russian control would feel like an act of abandonment. Ukrainians do not want to live under Russian rule, and any such concession would be viewed as a betrayal. This is why Ukrainians firmly oppose ceding land to Russia, even though this remains the only scenario Russia sees as a basis for what it calls “peace.”

Jacobsen: Understood. Shifting to another topic—USAID cuts have been in the news, raising concerns about increased risks of waste and fraud, as watchdog agencies have warned. These cuts reportedly include the termination of third-party monitoring contracts. What are your thoughts on this development?

Craiu: I am not an expert in this area, but I can offer a perspective. Such cuts do carry serious consequences. They come at a time when Ukraine continues to struggle with the chronic issue of corruption. Independent watchdogs and monitoring institutions have been essential in tracking corruption and building public trust.

The fear now is that without these oversight mechanisms, progress made in countering corruption could be undermined. For example, we have already seen controversial legislative proposals that threatened the independence of key anti-corruption bodies, such as NABU. The absence of external monitoring only heightens concerns that these institutions could weaken further, which would be a major setback both for governance and for continued international support.

So yes, anything that disrupts Ukraine’s progress toward reducing corruption ultimately harms the country. That includes situations where watchdogs are not monitoring developments to ensure things are done correctly. Ukraine has a history of corruption, so oversight is essential to keep reforms on track.

Jacobsen: Ukraine has just brought back 84 prisoners of war, including dozens of civilians, in the last few days. At least one of them had been held for more than a decade. What are your thoughts on this?

Craiu: I know exactly what you are referring to. I did not read the specific case of that particular individual. However, Russia has a well-documented tendency to fabricate accusations and charges against people it deems dangerous to its interests. These can include civilians, activists, or journalists.

In this case, the person had likely been detained long ago, perhaps in eastern Ukraine, and then falsely accused. Russia has routinely forced detainees to confess to crimes they did not commit in order to justify their imprisonment. Officially, these are presented as prisons. Unofficially, there is strong evidence that many are detention camps where torture and blackmail are common, with confessions extracted to benefit Russia.

Holding large numbers of civilians and soldiers allows Russia to use them in exchanges, increasing its leverage. It also acts as a deterrent and a means of eliminating individuals who might oppose Russian interests.

When prisoner exchanges occur, they bring both relief and sorrow. Relief, because we see people return—often physically weakened and visibly deteriorated from captivity. However, also sorrow, because many families do not know if their loved ones are included. At exchanges, relatives gather in hopes of hearing news. The joy of those who are reunited is mixed with the anguish of those who are still waiting. What remains in between is hope—the hope that more prisoners will one day follow in the footsteps of those returning across the border to their homeland.

Jacobsen: Any thoughts on Germany and its allies providing major military aid packages to Ukraine through the new NATO supply line?

Craiu: Yes. This is part of a broader effort not only to support Ukraine militarily but also to signal diplomatic unity and consistency from Europe. With the United States showing uncertainty in its long-term support, European allies are making it clear that they will continue supplying Ukraine with the defensive systems and equipment it needs to survive and resist Russian advances.

It is important to note that Europe, as a collective, has a massive interest in Ukraine’s ability to weaken Russia’s military capabilities. There are serious threats to European security. For example, I recently visited the Baltic states, including two important hotspots. One is the Suwałki Corridor, the narrow strip of land between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus, bordering Poland. This corridor is often referred to as NATO’s “Achilles heel”—a vulnerable point that could be targeted in the event of conflict.

Another example is the city of Narva in eastern Estonia, which borders Russia’s Ivangorod. Over the past months and years of this war, Narva has become a symbolic face-off point between NATO and Russia. On the Estonian side, you see Ukrainian, European, and Estonian flags displayed proudly. On the Russian side, propaganda is projected on big screens and amplified with loudspeakers, targeting the large Russian-speaking population in Narva—over 90 percent of the city’s residents, many with Russian heritage. This creates an ideological confrontation as much as a geographical one.

So, Europe has many vulnerabilities. It is in Europe’s collective interest to deter Russia and to send a clear message of consistent support for Ukraine, even if the current American administration withdraws or reduces its support. The consistency we see from Germany and other European leaders reflects this understanding: siding with Ukraine in an unpredictable environment created by shifting U.S. policy.

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