Everywhere Insiders 44: Pakistan, Iran, Gaza, Ukraine, and the New Geopolitics of Ceasefire

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/04/30

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen interviews Irina Tsukerman on Pakistan’s emergence as an intermediary in U.S.-Iran tensions, the strategic overlap of diplomacy and business, the limits of the Gaza ceasefire, Vatican criticism of war, Ukraine’s fragile Easter truce, and shifting U.S. support for Kyiv. Tsukerman argues that ceasefires without enforcement mechanisms or political clarity rarely resolve underlying conflicts, and that Pakistan’s role reflects overlapping pressures from Washington, Beijing, Riyadh, and Tehran, as well as regional instability. 

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: What is your big grand theory as to why Pakistan, of all countries, as the peace-negotiation instigator, makes sense between Iran, Israel, and the United States? 

Irina Tsukerman: Okay, so essentially, first of all, a little bit of background: over the past year and a half, Pakistan has been rising in terms of its geopolitical visibility. First, it concluded a mutual defence pact with Saudi Arabia, which significantly strengthened an already close security relationship and later led to Pakistani fighter jets being sent to Saudi Arabia to bolster the kingdom’s defences. That does not mean Pakistan suddenly became indispensable to Saudi Arabia in every operational sense, but it did align Pakistan more closely with a major Middle Eastern actor and bring it further into the region’s strategic orbit.

Second, Pakistan has used the current crisis to host and convene talks with regional actors, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Islamabad hosted talks with those countries in late March 2026 as part of its effort to broker an end to the Iran war, with discussion focused in part on reopening the Strait of Hormuz. That is a firmer way of putting the point than suggesting a settled bloc or a fully developed ideological axis.

Pakistan also joined Trump’s “Board of Peace” on Gaza. The more precise formulation is that Pakistan was invited to join the Board of Peace and that Pakistani officials later sought clarity from Washington about possible participation in a future Gaza stabilization force, rather than having already committed troops.

As for why Pakistan entered the Iran diplomacy, the clearest fact is that Pakistan emerged as a mediator and host for talks between the United States and Iran. Pakistan helped secure the two-week ceasefire announced on April 7, 2026, and then hosted high-level U.S.–Iran talks in Islamabad that later failed to produce a permanent agreement. The premise that Pakistan served as a diplomatic channel is supported.

It is also fair to say that Pakistan had caught Trump’s attention for reasons that were not purely strategic in the classical sense. On the official side, Washington had signalled interest in cooperation with Pakistan on critical minerals and hydrocarbons. On the commercial side, Pakistan announced a memorandum of understanding with an affiliate of Trump-linked crypto ventures to explore the use of a dollar-linked stablecoin. That provides a factual basis for saying that business considerations and statecraft were overlapping.

The crypto piece should be stated more carefully. Reporting has described a Pakistani crypto promoter helping build relationships with Trump-aligned figures during this period. That captures the dynamic without overstating what can be directly verified.

So a more accurate conclusion is that much of this has been business as much as geopolitics, and access politics as much as formal diplomacy. Pakistan strengthened ties with Saudi Arabia, inserted itself into Gaza-related diplomacy, hosted regional talks with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, and developed links to Trump-affiliated investment and crypto circles. In that sense, Pakistan’s rise as an intermediary was not entirely random, even if it appeared unusual.

The final point also needs nuance. It is not accurate to say Pakistan did not volunteer and was pushed into the role. Public reporting shows both Pakistani initiative and U.S. encouragement. Pakistan itself sought a two-week ceasefire and appealed to both sides, while Trump publicly tied the ceasefire to conversations with Pakistan’s leadership. So Pakistan was not merely a passive deus ex machina; it was an active intermediary whose role also suited Trump’s need for an off-ramp.

He could not simply say, “Okay, we are done here,” because that would not have been credible after such escalatory rhetoric. What is well supported is that Pakistan proposed or facilitated a two-week ceasefire, that Trump agreed to suspend bombing for that period, and that subsequent talks in Islamabad failed to convert that pause into a lasting settlement.

So it is very clear that Iran was happy with a delay, politically and militarily. Iran did not initiate any of this, and Pakistan did not initiate it on its own for just any reason. This appears to have been part of an ongoing Trump operation in the background. Essentially, Trump was looking to use an actor who was politically convenient for multiple parties in the situation. Pakistan fits that description better than most alternatives because it has, in fact, become an active intermediary in the crisis and has hosted talks related to the war.

Also, the way Trump tends to deal with new and exciting allies—new and exciting in terms of his personal assessment, not necessarily in terms of long-term U.S. interests—is that, on the one hand, he boosts their international standing, but, on the other hand, he demands visible compliance with his preferences, no matter how erratic they may be. In this case, it is almost like an organized crime family test: we give you a great deal, but we also expect a great deal in return, in terms of fealty and a demonstration of dedication to our camp. I think this was a very good example of how that works in practice. That interpretive frame is, of course, an inference, but it does fit the public pattern in which Pakistan gained diplomatic visibility while also being pressed into a higher-profile mediating role.

So, of course, the Pakistani defence minister then responded with a sharply anti-Israel public message, which seems to have helped wake Israel up to the fact that Pakistan may not be the harmless Abraham Accords-adjacent country some may have imagined. Still, Pakistanis and other South Asian officials often communicate in bombastic tones while remaining pragmatic about where they actually stand. That part is more a political reading than a settled fact, but it matches the broader pattern of Pakistan trying to preserve room to manoeuvre among competing camps.

In that sense, Pakistan has a clear advantage in mediating. China also benefits from the arrangement, as Pakistan remains Beijing’s closest regional partner and often serves as a useful proxy for Chinese interests. Reuters has reported Chinese support for diplomacy and peace initiatives involving Pakistan, but the stronger claim is that China benefited from Pakistan’s role, not that Beijing necessarily micromanaged the mediation behind the scenes.

What is more certain is this: Pakistan abstained on the Bahrain-backed U.N. Security Council resolution aimed at protecting commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, while China and Russia vetoed it. That much is established. It is also true that Pakistan is tied closely to Saudi Arabia through a mutual defence pact and has recently sent fighter jets and support assets to the kingdom under that pact. So the awkwardness is real: Pakistan is Saudi Arabia’s defence partner, a beneficiary of Gulf support, and at the same time closely tied to China while also maintaining a complicated relationship with Iran.

I have not found a reliable source confirming the specific claim that the Pakistani prime minister spoke with Mohammed bin Salman that same day and was “explaining himself” over the abstention, so that part should be softened rather than stated as fact. The safer formulation is that Pakistan’s abstention underscored how uncomfortable its position had become. Islamabad was plainly trying to avoid a direct break with Beijing or Tehran while also avoiding a rupture with Riyadh, the Gulf states more broadly, and Washington. That is the real story: Pakistan is trying to please multiple parties whose interests overlap in some places and diverge sharply in others. 

Jacobsen: Allegedly, there has been a marking of six months of a ceasefire in Gaza. Some at AP are noting that this could be seen as a way to offer lessons for the Iran war. Obviously, it is unusual for them to editorialize. The United States and Iran are preparing for high-level talks while Israel and Hezbollah are trading more fire. I love the euphemism of “trading.” It is a very common euphemism.  And the Pope has criticized the Iran war, saying, quote, “God does not bless any conflict.” So we are just going to ignore the war in heaven and the Crusades and continue to a more serious conversation. So what are your thoughts on the commentary around Gaza, Iran, Israel, the United States, Hezbollah, naturally, and the Pope’s statements?

Tsukerman: The Hamas ceasefire in Gaza is hardly a model for anything. It did not achieve the stated goals of removing Hamas from power, ensuring disarmament, or preventing future attacks on Israel from an offensive standpoint. Instead, Hamas has retained or rebuilt substantial influence. Opposition groups that were anti-Hamas have either been weakened or marginalized. AP reported that core parts of the ceasefire remain unfulfilled, including disarming Hamas, deploying international stabilization forces, and beginning reconstruction in any serious way. 

Hamas rejected the Board of Peace’s disarmament proposal, and there is no clear path to enforcement. The Indonesian, Pakistani, and other proposed peacekeeping contingents that were expected to enter the territory have not been described in credible reporting as forces with a mandate or capacity to disarm Hamas. The more accurate version is that, even if such forces were deployed, they would primarily serve stabilization and monitoring rather than coercive disarmament. That makes the arrangement look more like a peacekeeping buffer than a mechanism for actually changing the balance of power on the ground. (apnews.com)

Meanwhile, Hamas has had every incentive to wait things out and quietly preserve or strengthen its bureaucratic and political influence while Israel and everyone else are distracted by Iran and the ensuing negotiations. So if this is meant to serve as a model for Iran, it is hardly an encouraging one. It certainly does not change the regime in Iran, does not make life better for Iranians, and does not make Israel or anyone else in the region meaningfully safer. That is partly analysis, but it follows from the fact that the Gaza ceasefire has frozen rather than resolved the underlying conflict. (apnews.com)

Because if you have a radicalized regime or armed movement next door, it is only a matter of time before it rebuilds its networks, reasserts itself, and restarts hostilities unless the core political and military issues are resolved. And we are seeing that, despite the ceasefire agreement, the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted, attacks on various countries have continued, and Hezbollah continues firing on Israel. Reuters reported ongoing hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah even as U.S.–Iran talks were being prepared, and also reported that shipping protection in Hormuz remained a live international issue. 

Iran is also not budging much from its initial demands at the beginning of the talks. That is a fair summary of the current reporting, which indicates that the ceasefire created space for diplomacy but did not produce a substantive breakthrough. 

Regarding the role of the Church, I am not especially surprised by the statement. First of all, this particular war was not framed as a purely defensive operation in the way some supporters described the earlier 12-day war, when the United States was more distant from the action until it launched strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and when the goals were presented more narrowly. Now Israel has articulated its goals, but the United States has vacillated in its own agenda. Trump first suggested intervention on behalf of protesters, then said military action would be about nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and later shifted again toward rhetoric about regime change before retreating to language about degrading Iran’s military capacity.

The Catholic Church does recognize the doctrine of just war, but it requires clear cause, right intention, proportionality, and a plausible connection between the means and the ends. Based on Trump’s own shifting actions and rhetoric, it is not clear that this was consistently presented as a pre-emptive action for either humanitarian or security reasons. Therefore, from the Vatican’s perspective, and from a Catholic moral perspective more broadly, without a clear articulation of purpose, it becomes difficult to describe such a war as just. It begins to look more like a contest for regional power. It may have tangential benefits for some actors, but if the just-war goals are not achieved and if much of the conflict is also entangled with oil routes, strategic leverage, and coercive signalling, it is not hard to see why the Vatican would refuse to bless it. 

I am not shocked at this development, and neither should anyone else. The U.S. administration should probably know better than to enter into petty quarrels with the Vatican and alienate a large number of Catholic voters. That is an analytical judgment, of course, but it is grounded in the very public rupture between Trump and Pope Leo, which has become unusually sharp and visible.

Jacobsen: So now Putin declared his ceasefire—a 32-hour ceasefire for Orthodox Easter. Last Easter, it was unilateral, and then each side accused the other of breaking it. So there is not much mystery. I believe it is explicitly stated: Mr. Putin does not like Mr. Zelenskyy. Mr. Zelenskyy does not like Mr. Putin. But the point of a ceasefire need not be personal. It is about geopolitical realities, the civilian population, and mental health, really. So if last Easter saw both sides accusing each other of breaking the ceasefire, the likely consequence of this time’s declarations is another ceasefire violation. If it is even put into place over the next couple of days, that will be the postscript, essentially. Reuters reported that Putin announced a 32-hour Orthodox Easter ceasefire on April 9, 2026, and that both sides later accused each other of violations. Reuters also reported that Zelenskyy had earlier proposed a ceasefire focused on halting attacks on energy infrastructure over Easter.

There is also a side comment around the idea that, well, the United States cannot help Ukraine anymore because it has used up all these munitions and money and national will for foreign wars, further with the Iran war, which is valid in vacuo. The United States has dropped humanitarian aid funding and military aid funding by 99%. So, essentially, it is either zero or almost zero, although some funding is still moving indirectly—through Europe, for instance, and then rerouted into purchases from American arms manufacturers. That is very different from an act of Congress.

So the idea that this Iran war is going to harm American support for Ukraine—I do not know if that is necessarily the case, because there is no longer major direct U.S. support in the older sense. There is still support in terms of logistics and intelligence, and Trump has threatened parts of that in recent weeks, not because of Iran, but because of Russia’s continued demands that Ukraine give up the Donbas, which Russia still cannot fully take by force and is no more likely to take now than a few years ago. 

Tsukerman: At one point, the United States still was the top funder of the weapons going to Ukraine, and there is still that perception in the media and among average Americans. So that is what is being referred to. If there is any hope for a congressional push to authorize additional aid come November or January, the point is that the costs of these expenditures, along with unclear and unresolved additional conflicts, may make that harder because of the combination of Trumpian deception on the subject and additional costs incurred elsewhere. That is what is being referred to. It is not necessarily the case, but it is a plausible concern.

It is also possible that Democrats who are likely to come in may be more anti-war than their predecessors under the Biden administration in its first two years. So it may be that, in addition to all these pre-existing factors, an ideologically more anti-war Congress could, in general, be less willing to be helpful or involved in any military assistance to anybody. That last part is more projection than fact, but it does reflect a real debate within Democratic politics over future foreign military aid.

Jacobsen: And thoughts on the Easter ceasefire?

Tsukerman: This year, the Easter ceasefire was not purely unilateral in origin. It was proposed by Kyiv earlier in the week, and then Putin announced his own Orthodox Easter ceasefire. We will see how long it lasts. I am not optimistic because Russia is clearly looking for new ways to cause psychological damage and disruption. Whether Russia is fully up to that after a very aggressive air campaign over the last couple of weeks remains to be seen. It may also have been looking for its own way to regroup for a couple of days and catch a break.

Nothing will be substantially changed by less than two days of ceasefire in either direction. At best, it may be a very short tactical pause. But again, I am not optimistic about Russia keeping its end of the bargain, because I do not remember the last time it consistently did so. Reuters and AP both reported that the Orthodox Easter truce announced by Putin followed a prior Ukrainian proposal and that both sides then accused each other of violations, which supports the skepticism here.

Jacobsen: What are your thoughts on Mr. Mamdani’s first 100 days overall, in a minute and a half?

Tsukerman: I do not fully agree with the facts as stated there. The facts are not that popular support is falling dramatically. A recent Marist poll found that 48% of New Yorkers approved of Mamdani’s performance, 30% disapproved, and 23% were unsure, which suggests a mixed but not collapsing picture. 

It is also not clearly established that businesses have been fleeing New York in some dramatic new way because of Mamdani’s first 100 days. Mamdani has continued to push transit and affordability initiatives, while critics argue that some campaign promises are being softened, delayed, or reworked.

So the more accurate way to put it is this: He has enthusiastic supporters, visible critics, and a governing record that is too early to reduce to either triumph or collapse. That is a more defensible summary than saying his support is falling dramatically or that New Yorkers have broadly rejected his agenda. 

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina. 

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