Everywhere Insiders 42: Iran Escalation, Congo Drone Warfare, and Africa’s Supply Shocks

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/04/16

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen interviews Irina Tsukerman on the risks and ripple effects of the current Middle East escalation and related African conflicts. Tsukerman argues that further escalation involving Iran would most likely remain within conventional military frameworks, even as U.S. force buildups preserve limited ground-related options. She warns that eastern Congo’s conflict could widen regionally, with cheap drones making violence more accessible to states and non-state actors alike. Turning to downstream consequences, she links humanitarian strain in Somalia, fertilizer bottlenecks, food-price pressure and insecurity, and African fuel-market shocks to poor planning, weak diplomacy, and overlapping disruptions across major global supply corridors.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: There are reports, based on leaked intelligence and subsequent media coverage, of possible further escalation involving the United States and Israel against Iran. What appears to have been the basis for those indications? What has followed since then? What forms could any further escalation realistically take?

Irina Tsukerman: Based on current reporting, the most significant possible escalation beyond the existing air campaign would involve either attacks on additional strategic sites or some form of limited ground-related operation. However, U.S. officials have publicly signalled that they do not expect a large ground war. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the United States can meet its objectives without deploying ground troops, even as additional U.S. personnel have been sent to the region.

At the time the earlier leak circulated, there was no confirmed large-scale new ground deployment. Since then, reporting has indicated a further U.S. buildup, but the numbers in circulation have varied. Some reports indicate that approximately 3,000 to 4,000 additional U.S. troops may be deployed, alongside more limited confirmed movements such as elements of the 82nd Airborne Division. Larger figures, such as 10,000 troops, appear to reflect contingency planning rather than a formally confirmed decision.

Speculation about Kharg Island has appeared in reporting due to its importance to Iranian oil exports, but there is no public confirmation that U.S. forces are being sent there. That remains within the realm of scenario planning rather than an announced operation.

Israeli operations, however, have expanded to include strikes on nuclear-related infrastructure. Israel has reported strikes on the Khondab (Arak) heavy-water facility and a yellowcake production site in Ardakan, with no immediate radiation release reported. These targets indicate a broader focus that includes elements of Iran’s nuclear program, in addition to military infrastructure.

It is less clear that there has been a definitive rhetorical shift by Prime Minister Netanyahu away from broader political objectives toward purely tactical military aims, as this characterization is not consistently supported across available reporting.

At present, there is no confirmed large-scale escalation in the form of a ground offensive. What is observable is a continued pattern of Israeli strikes on military and nuclear-related targets, alongside a gradual U.S. military buildup that preserves multiple operational options while officials continue to state that a ground deployment is not anticipated.

Operations remain limited for now, largely because the number of deployed forces is constrained. Potential escalation could include strikes on nuclear sites or efforts to degrade elements of Iran’s ballistic missile program in the Zagros region. There is also speculation about targeting additional political or government sites that have not yet been struck. However, some analysts caution that attacking such sites could be counterproductive, as they may be perceived as cultural or symbolic targets, potentially alienating segments of the Iranian population that do not support the regime.

At present, there is no clear indication of any significant deviation from the existing pattern of operations. The intensity of strikes may increase, but there is no verified evidence of new target categories or unexpected developments. As of now, nothing unusual has occurred, even as the day has progressed into the evening in Iran. Any major action, if planned, could occur overnight or early the following day, but there is no confirmed indication of such plans. If preparations are underway, they are being kept operationally discreet, and much of what is circulating publicly remains speculative.

Regarding the nature of the leak itself, it is notable that it appears directed more toward domestic or allied audiences than toward misleading Iran. Public statements, military positioning, and observable developments have already shaped Iranian awareness. The ambiguity surrounding negotiations, ceasefire discussions, and operational timelines may function more as strategic messaging than as direct deception.

The deployment of approximately 3,000 additional U.S. personnel, alongside discussions of potentially larger numbers, suggests preparation for possible escalation rather than immediate de-escalation. While smaller deployments can serve signalling or deterrent purposes, larger troop considerations typically indicate contingency planning for more kinetic scenarios.

From a strategic standpoint, such leaks aim to address domestic criticism regarding unclear objectives and communication, reinforcing cohesion among U.S. policymakers and supporters while limiting the appearance of internal division that adversarial narratives could exploit.

At the same time, signalling the possibility of major action inevitably communicates to Iran that escalation remains on the table, even if specific operational details are unclear. Given current technological capabilities, including predictive modelling and intelligence analysis, there are practical limits to the range of plausible military options. These constraints—geographic, logistical, and force-based—mean that the spectrum of potential escalation pathways is relatively narrow and, to some extent, predictable by all sides.

One possible interpretation is that the intent is to heighten Iranian uncertainty and induce caution by signalling that escalation could take multiple forms. However, broadly signalling “major surprises” risks undermining operational surprise. Even without specific details, such messaging encourages open-source speculation and scenario-building, which can narrow the range of perceived possibilities rather than obscure them.

There is no credible public evidence that chemical weapons or unconventional crowd-control systems are being considered in this context, and introducing such speculation would not be consistent with established U.S. or Israeli doctrine. More plausibly, the range of options remains within conventional military frameworks: continued airstrikes, expanded targeting of military or nuclear infrastructure, maritime operations, or limited ground-related contingencies.

If such leaks intend to generate confusion, their effectiveness is questionable. Public reporting and expert analysis already track likely escalation pathways, and excessive signalling may instead clarify constraints. A simpler explanation is often more accurate: the United States is still evaluating options and has not finalized a single course of action. This aligns with current reporting that additional troop deployments are intended to provide flexibility rather than signal a confirmed ground invasion.

Operationally, it is also clear that achieving stated objectives—such as degrading Iran’s missile and military capabilities—cannot be accomplished within a matter of days. U.S. officials themselves have indicated the timeline is measured in weeks, not immediate resolution. This implies that some level of escalation or sustained operations remains likely, even if the exact form is undecided.

Political constraints further narrow available options. The administration must balance demonstrating resolve with limits on time, resources, and domestic political tolerance. These factors inherently restrict the range of viable strategies.

From this perspective, the most grounded interpretation is not a highly coordinated deception campaign, but rather an evolving situation in which planning remains fluid. The emphasis on messaging and public discourse may reflect domestic political considerations as much as strategic signalling toward Iran.

Jacobsen: The United Nations has warned that the conflict in eastern Congo risks escalating through the use of heavy weapons and, more importantly, drones. This is not something that Western North American media often emphasizes when covering wars that receive limited attention, particularly conflicts involving African states, militias, or other armed groups. Yet drones are now easily obtainable and relatively inexpensive, which means that not only wealthy states but also poorer states and non-state actors can acquire them.

Because eastern Congo is rich in minerals, the growing use of offensive drones and heavy weapons poses a danger to civilians. Vivian van de Perre, the United Nations’ acting top envoy for Congo, stated at the Security Council on March 26 that, despite the withdrawal of Rwanda-backed M23 rebels and their allies from the town of Uvira under international pressure in January, clashes continue in North Kivu and South Kivu between M23 and Congolese government forces. She said that the situation in South Kivu remains tense and that renewed hostilities have expanded and shifted the front lines, including toward Burundi’s border, increasing the risk of a regional conflagration. What are your thoughts on this conflict, its potential for regional expansion, and, most interestingly, the use of drones? Drones may seem like a footnote, but they are not. They are now appearing across at least three active conflict zones.

Tsukerman: I will start with the war itself. This is one of the wars Trump claimed he would settle permanently—one of eight, nine, or ten, depending on which version of his statements one uses. Clearly, he has not. What has been unfolding is a form of asymmetrical warfare, hybrid conflict, or war of attrition that has persisted for years, in part because of the involvement of non-state actors, who are much harder to bring to the table for any agreement likely to hold. More importantly, the underlying issues involving both non-state actors and regional tensions have not been resolved by anyone. Mediation efforts have also been inconsistent and ad hoc: they begin, fade, tensions rise again, and the United States returns to the table.

Another problem is the shortage of Africa-focused diplomats. The United States has an Africa special envoy, Massad Boulos, who has business experience in Africa, but his knowledge of a continent of 54 countries is necessarily limited. There is simply a shortage of resources for sustained diplomacy, mediation, and conflict resolution across a range of diverse and complex crises. It is therefore not surprising that this issue continues to intensify. The African Union has not been especially effective, and its attention has been divided across multiple major conflicts, including the civil war in Sudan, rising tensions in Ethiopia, and the possibility of renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. There is no alternative power center currently capable of sustained mediation, nor has there been sufficient serious international commitment.

The United States, moreover, has been more focused on securing critical minerals than on resolving the underlying political and security issues. Its mediation efforts are therefore tactical rather than comprehensive. The aim is less to address the conflict durably than to protect access to mineral resources and ensure that extraction arrangements can proceed. That greatly limits what the United States can accomplish in this context.

The expansion of the conflict contributes to growing destabilization across the region. Russia has become increasingly embedded in Congo and nearby areas, competing for access to natural resources while also advancing anti-American, anti-French, and broader anti-Western narratives. Various governments and organizations are helping to fuel the conflict, while often overlooking the fact that Congo has not simply been a passive victim of Rwanda-backed rebel aggression or jihadist activity. There is also clear potential for spillover into Burundi, and related regional tensions heighten that risk. Burundi itself could become the next flashpoint, further widening the conflict. 

Burundi could become a potential flashpoint. There are additional groups, movements, and ethnic conflicts in surrounding regions that could amplify instability across both West and East Africa. There is also a concerning convergence of jihadist groups from both western and eastern parts of the continent moving toward central Africa. None of this is promising for regional security, human rights, anti-corruption efforts, or the management of refugee flows into the Middle East and Europe. These are all developments that require close attention.

As for the expansion of drone warfare, this should not come as a surprise. Drones are becoming cheaper, easier to manufacture, and increasingly effective at lower operational levels. As a result, more actors—including non-state actors—are gaining access to them. This is no longer limited to large military organizations or even major criminal networks. Smaller groups, private actors, and loosely organized entities can now acquire or produce such systems.

This creates a high risk of attribution confusion, accidental escalation, and spillover incidents, alongside more traditional forms of conflict between state and non-state actors with defined interests. The operational environment becomes more fluid, unpredictable, and difficult to manage or resolve.

The proliferation of drones reflects a broader “democratization” of weaponizable technology. If one wants a parallel, social media provides a useful example: tools that were widely accessible and seemingly benign have enabled polarization, disinformation, fraud, and, in some cases, incitement to violence. Now imagine similar accessibility applied to lethal and surveillance technologies, used by actors with comparable motivations. The consequences could be far more severe.

Conventional intelligence, law enforcement, and military frameworks are not fully equipped to address this shift. It will require a fundamental rethinking—not only of counter-drone capabilities and military responses, but also of how conflicts originate, evolve, and are managed in an environment where advanced technologies are widely accessible.

Jacobsen: Could you give a brief commentary on the downstream effects? UNICEF has noted that the war involving Iran could worsen conditions for children in Somalia. There are also reports that it may contribute to a global fertilizer shortage, driving up food prices. Kenya’s flour industry is reportedly losing millions of dollars weekly, while African fuel markets are experiencing shockwaves. At the same time, Gulf investors may continue funding African renewable energy despite the conflict. These appear to be wide-ranging geopolitical ripple effects. What is your assessment?

Tsukerman: Two primary factors are making these consequences more severe than they need to be. First, reductions in U.S. humanitarian aid to parts of Africa have exacerbated already fragile conditions. While other actors, such as Turkey, remain involved in humanitarian efforts in places like Somalia, their capacity is limited, and their involvement introduces additional geopolitical complexities. Turkey itself faces economic constraints, and its support is partly dependent on partners such as Qatar, which may also be affected by broader energy and financial disruptions.

Second, the underlying security situation in Somalia is already highly unstable. Even without external shocks, extremist activity and weak governance complicate aid delivery. Any additional disruption—economic or logistical—will further strain humanitarian operations and worsen conditions over time.

More broadly, many of the emerging shortages—whether in fertilizers, food, or supply chains—are not solely the result of absolute scarcity, but of insufficient preparation. Sudden conflict, combined with unclear strategic objectives, has limited states’ and markets’ ability to adjust in advance. With better planning, alternative suppliers, diversified supply routes, and pre-arranged contracts, some of these disruptions could have been mitigated.

For example, Morocco is one of the world’s leading fertilizer producers and represents a viable alternative supply source. There is also fertilizer production in Latin America and, under normal conditions, in Ukraine. However, scaling production, securing contracts, and rerouting supply chains all require time and advanced coordination. Without prior planning, bottlenecks are inevitable.

Overlapping disruptions compound the broader issue: instability in the Black Sea region affecting Ukrainian exports, ongoing attacks on infrastructure in the Gulf, and risks to energy flows through critical chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. When multiple major supply corridors are strained simultaneously, cascading shortages become much more likely.

At this stage, the priority should be to strengthen defences around key production regions, stabilize supply chains, and accelerate the adoption of alternative sourcing and delivery mechanisms. However, much of the public discourse remains focused on the symptoms—such as rising prices and industry losses—rather than on coordinated logistical solutions. In many respects, this is a failure of planning and rapid response. While some of these outcomes were avoidable, the immediate task now is to adapt quickly and manage the consequences through more effective coordination and forward planning.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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