Everywhere Insiders 40: Iran, Cartels, Pakistan, and Papal Politics

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/04/02

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen examines cascading security crises with Irina Tsukerman and Dempsey, from the U.S.–Iran war and regional oil instability to cartel violence in Latin America, Pakistan’s strikes in Afghanistan, and papal moral commentary on leaders who launch wars. Tsukerman argues that ambiguity among international actors is enabling Iran to maneuver despite isolation, while fragmented anti-cartel strategies weaken regional enforcement. Dempsey contends that Pakistan’s campaign reflects a deeper political failure unlikely to produce lasting stability. Together, the discussion explores humanitarian risk, geopolitical incoherence, organized crime, religion, and the dangerous gap between military action and strategic clarity worldwide.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: The United States–Iran conflict is ongoing. It has raised serious human rights and humanitarian concerns across the region, from the initial strikes to the broader escalation involving multiple countries. The international community is right to be concerned about the risk of a wider conflagration. Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, was announced after the killing of Ali Khamenei, and on March 13, 2026, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said Mojtaba Khamenei had been wounded and was likely disfigured. What are your thoughts on this? This may also have implications for oil markets and regional stability.

Irina Tsukerman: Aside from the fact that the story increasingly resembles a villain-origin script, the situation is deeply concerning. More concerning still is that, despite the threat posed by Iran’s response to the U.S.–Israeli strikes, there does not yet appear to be a fully unified international response. Iran has retaliated not only against U.S. targets but also against neighboring states, including reported strikes on civilian infrastructure in Gulf countries. The European Union and NATO have expressed concern, and the European Union formally designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization in 2026. If that designation is to mean anything, then Iran’s attacks on bystanders, neighboring states, and civilian targets must be treated with corresponding seriousness.

It is also still not entirely clear what the United States considers its endgame. Publicly stated U.S. objectives have included destroying Iran’s ballistic-missile capability, degrading its naval capacity, preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and limiting its ability to arm proxy forces. Those goals are clearer than some earlier messaging suggested, but they still leave open the political question of whether Washington seeks only military degradation or also hopes to create conditions that might eventually enable regime change. That ambiguity matters. It can create false expectations among people on the ground, complicate coordination with allies, and generate tension even with partners whose goals overlap only partially.

Israel’s publicly visible objectives appear more narrowly focused on degrading Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities. Israeli officials, including Benjamin Netanyahu, have stated that any regime change would ultimately have to come from the Iranian people themselves. Recent reporting indicates that Israel has conducted operations targeting Iranian security structures using intelligence sources on the ground. However, claims that protesters could directly request AI-enabled surgical strikes are not supported by verified public evidence. The more accurate assessment is that Israel appears to be combining intelligence, technological targeting capabilities, and conventional operations to pressure the Iranian regime’s security apparatus while remaining cautious about overt involvement in internal political change.

The result is a gap in communication, coordination, and expectations among international actors. That gap makes it easier for Iran and its allies to exploit uncertainty, even though Iran is currently more diplomatically isolated than it has been in many years due to its attacks on neighboring countries.

Russia and China can provide limited logistical and intelligence support. They can help Iran circumvent sanctions and obtain supplies such as fuel, but they are unlikely to take part in any direct military confrontation. Iran should therefore be in a strategically weaker position. However, because of the lack of clarity among Iran’s opponents and the absence of a cohesive coalition, that weakness has not translated into decisive pressure. Different actors appear to be speaking past one another and pursuing different goals. As a result, Iran may be able to maneuver its way out of the current crisis despite the self-destructive aspects of some of its responses. In some respects, its strategy appears to be working. Rather than bringing the United States, Israel, and several Arab states closer together around collective self-defense, the situation has generated friction and mutual resentment among various regional and international actors.

Jacobsen: That is interesting. I came across another story that seems unrelated but still touches on organized crime. An individual has been accused of leading what investigators describe as the first major Uruguayan cartel. The organization reportedly operates across multiple countries in South America and Europe and is involved in organized criminal activity, including trafficking and illegal contracting. According to reports, Uruguay’s anti-narcotics chief, Jalil Rashid, said that Bolivian authorities carried out the operation leading to the arrest.

Reports suggest he has been a major figure in transnational trafficking networks. His apprehension appears to be part of a broader multinational strategy to combat organized crime across the region.

Tsukerman: Interestingly, there does appear to be a growing anti-cartel movement among several leaders in Latin America, particularly after recent elections in a number of countries. Even governments that are not politically aligned with the right are becoming increasingly concerned about the influence of cartels on regional stability. In principle, this should align with U.S. priorities under the Trump administration. However, the broader strategy toward organized crime appears inconsistent. Some traffickers are aggressively pursued, while others appear to operate with relative impunity. This creates the impression of a fragmented and selective approach.

It is difficult to measure success in such an environment. In some cases, the United States appears willing to pursue cartel leaders with significant intensity, even discussing forms of cross-border operational pressure in places such as Mexico. In other cases, major criminal actors seem to evade sustained consequences. It is also not entirely clear what the ultimate objectives are for either the United States or many of its regional partners. Are they trying primarily to arrest cartel leaders? Are they attempting to dismantle cartel influence entirely? If so, is arresting leadership the only strategy being employed? Are they trying to reduce the financial flows that sustain these organizations, or to disrupt the trafficking networks themselves in order to make communities safer?

If the goal is genuinely to reduce cartel power and protect communities, law enforcement alone will not be sufficient. Cartels now possess broader geographic reach and deeper entrenchment in some local economies than in previous decades, often exercising control over communities in ways similar to traditional mafia structures. At the same time, without addressing the demand side of the drug economy, supply networks will continue to adapt regardless of how many individuals are arrested. Unless governments and communities are prepared to invest in broader approaches—including economic alternatives, governance reforms, and demand-reduction strategies—any progress will likely be limited and temporary.

Jacobsen: Pakistan carried out new airstrikes in Afghanistan, including strikes in Kabul. According to Taliban officials and Reuters reporting on March 13, 2026, at least four people were killed in a residential area in Kabul and more than a dozen were wounded. In eastern Nangarhar province, a mortar shell that Afghan officials said was fired by Pakistan killed two more civilians, including a woman and a child. There were also reports that a fuel depot near Kandahar airport was hit.

Dempsey: Interestingly, Pakistan is now trying to confront forces it helped empower. Pakistan has long been accused of supporting elements of the Taliban through parts of its security and intelligence establishment, particularly during earlier phases of the Afghan conflict. But the current crisis is more specifically tied to Pakistan’s claim that Afghanistan is harboring militants from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, which Kabul denies. That makes this less a matter of simple historical blowback and more a case of an old regional strategy curdling into a fresh security disaster.

Now that the Taliban are firmly in power in Afghanistan and have gained a measure of international engagement, they are less dependent on Pakistan than they once were. That changes the balance. Pakistan, meanwhile, appears to be pursuing a limited campaign of airstrikes and cross-border pressure, but it is not obvious that striking selected targets will resolve the deeper political and security conflict between the two governments. Pakistan says it is targeting militant camps and terrorist infrastructure. Afghan officials and the U.N., however, have reported civilian casualties, which further complicates the legitimacy and effectiveness of the campaign.

The Taliban remain in power, and Pakistan continues to accuse Afghanistan of tolerating or supporting militants who threaten Pakistani security. Even if Pakistan’s immediate aim is simply to reduce the Taliban’s or affiliated militants’ operational capacity, that would at best be a temporary solution. Insurgent movements do not usually disappear because a few sites are bombed. They adapt, disperse, and exploit grievances, which is maddening in the way mold is maddening: ugly, persistent, and weirdly hard to kill. That makes it doubtful that a narrow military campaign alone will produce lasting stability.

I do not think Pakistan has a clear long-term solution, and that may explain why it has chosen a limited campaign that appears more politically manageable than doing nothing. It signals toughness to domestic audiences and may temporarily degrade militant capabilities. But these incidents are unlikely to be the end of the story. They look more like another stage in a longer regional escalation. Reuters has reported that tensions have already intensified into repeated clashes, retaliatory strikes, and failed mediation efforts.

I also do not think the Taliban would be acting with this level of confidence if they believed they were completely isolated. At the same time, claims that Russia has been training the Taliban in camps across the country are not established by the current reporting I could verify, so that point should not be stated as fact. What can be said is that China has attempted mediation, with limited success, while broader regional actors have so far avoided direct military involvement on either side.

Saudi Arabia’s position is also more complicated than a simple alliance frame would suggest. I was not able to verify the claim that Saudi Arabia currently has a defense treaty with Pakistan that is directly implicated here, so that should be removed unless you have a separate source for it. The cleaner, safer formulation is that multiple regional actors have economic and security interests affected by Pakistan–Afghanistan instability, yet none has decisively shaped the outcome so far.

The overall situation is awkward and unstable because many of the interested stakeholders appear unsure of their priorities and unwilling to commit to a coherent solution. That is why this conflict could grow into a broader regional crisis if the underlying political and militant networks remain intact. One small geographic note, though: this would be a crisis in South Asia, not Southeast Asia. Geography is a petty tyrant, but in this case it is right. 

Jacobsen: When the Pope says that Christians who start wars should go to confession, is he speaking symbolically to the Christian world, or could that be interpreted as a pointed message to specific political leaders?

Tsukerman: Hopefully. That is amusing—I will try to find it. I have to say, though, that the jab seems aimed more at J.D. Vance than at Donald Trump, who is not Catholic and is not widely regarded as a particularly observant Christian. Trump identifies as Christian, but few people would describe him as especially devout. Vance, by contrast, has publicly identified as a Catholic convert and speaks openly about his religious convictions. He is also closely associated with the current administration and has shifted from earlier criticism of Trump to becoming one of the administration’s more prominent advocates. For that reason, if the Pope intended the remark as a pointed reminder about moral responsibility in war, Vance would be the most obvious Catholic political figure for whom the message might resonate.

More broadly, the comment could be interpreted as addressing a wider Christian audience. Many conservative Republicans who supported Trump are evangelical Protestants, and confession in the Catholic sense is not part of their religious practice. That means the statement may be directed specifically toward Catholics, reminding them that moral accountability remains central to Catholic teaching even when political loyalties are involved.

At the same time, the message could also be read in a broader geopolitical context. Vladimir Putin frequently portrays himself as a defender of traditional Christianity and Russian Orthodoxy while pursuing military actions that have drawn widespread international criticism, particularly in Ukraine. Although Putin is not Catholic and would not be expected to respond directly to a papal admonition, statements from the Vatican often aim to send moral signals across the Christian world, including to Orthodox audiences. In recent years the Vatican has attempted dialogue with leaders in Orthodox Christianity, so a message framed in universal Christian terms could be intended to resonate beyond the Catholic Church itself.

Of course, in politics and religion alike, people tend to interpret moral statements as applying to others rather than to themselves. That pattern appears in the reactions of some prominent public figures who identify as Catholic but take positions that diverge from those of the Vatican. For example, Kevin Roberts, president of the Heritage Foundation, has advocated positions on foreign policy that differ sharply from the Vatican’s generally strong expressions of support for Ukraine and its calls for peace. Similarly, Candace Owens, who has spoken about her conversion to Catholicism, has been criticized for spreading narratives sympathetic to Russia or hostile to Ukraine.

These tensions illustrate a broader phenomenon within modern Catholic public life. The Church’s official teaching authority—the Pope and the Vatican—sometimes clashes with political interpretations adopted by influential Catholics in media or political movements. Documents such as Nostra Aetate, which reaffirm the Church’s rejection of antisemitism and emphasize respect for Jewish communities, represent formal doctrinal commitments of the Catholic Church. Yet public commentators who identify as Catholic do not always align their rhetoric with those teachings.

What emerges is a small but very visible group of politically influential Catholics—many of them relatively recent converts—who publicly challenge or reinterpret papal guidance on issues ranging from foreign policy to interreligious relations. The Pope, meanwhile, often communicates indirectly through general moral statements rather than direct political rebukes. That creates an unusual dynamic in which tensions build without a formal confrontation.

Whether this develops into a deeper internal dispute within Catholic public discourse remains to be seen. It is a fascinating example of how religious authority, political identity, and media influence interact in the twenty-first century.

Jacobsen: Brazil’s former president Jair Bolsonaro has reportedly been hospitalized with pneumonia. He is in his seventies and has experienced a number of health problems in recent years.

Tsukerman: Yes, Bolsonaro has been hospitalized multiple times in the past, largely because of complications stemming from the 2018 stabbing attack he suffered during the presidential campaign. Those injuries required several surgeries and have continued to cause periodic health issues. At his age, illnesses such as pneumonia are not unusual, whether someone is in prison or not.

Bolsonaro has also sought various forms of legal relief while facing investigations related to his alleged role in efforts to challenge Brazil’s 2022 election results. Brazilian authorities have accused him and several allies of attempting to undermine democratic institutions following Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s election victory. Those legal proceedings are ongoing and have become a major focus of Brazilian politics.

At the same time, members of Bolsonaro’s political family remain active in national politics. His sons—most prominently Flávio Bolsonaro, who serves as a senator—continue to play visible roles in Brazil’s conservative political movement. Any future electoral victory by Bolsonaro-aligned candidates could shift the political landscape in Brazil and potentially influence how ongoing legal matters surrounding the former president are handled.

Whether such a political shift is likely remains uncertain, but the intersection of Bolsonaro’s health, his legal situation, and Brazil’s polarized political environment continues to make him a central figure in the country’s political debate.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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