The Everywhere Insiders 36: Hybrid Warfare, Intelligence Limits, and Liberal Democratic Legitimacy

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/03/04

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen interviews Irina Tsukerman, a national security and human rights attorney, on the legal boundaries of modern “hybrid” conflict. She separates German debate about expanding BND cyber and technical powers from any blanket mandate for offensive cyberattacks, emphasizing constitutional constraints, oversight, and escalation risk. Tsukerman flags misinformation—such as unverified “sonic device” arrest claims—while noting that intelligence services sometimes pair collection with disruption. Turning to India–diaspora tensions, she contrasts protected advocacy with criminal plotting, situating the Nijjar and Gupta cases within sovereignty disputes and evidentiary tradeoffs. She then links antisemitism in France to Enlightenment-era civic equality and institutional defense.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: This is the German intelligence chief, Martin Jäger, the president of the BND (Germany’s foreign intelligence service). He has been arguing that Germany should strengthen its intelligence services and give them more operational freedom in light of Russia-linked “hybrid” threats such as disinformation, cyberattacks, and sabotage. At the Munich Security Conference, he framed the issue as a shift from passive monitoring to action: do they continue to observe and document developments, or has the situation reached a point where active countermeasures are necessary? My interpretation is that countermeasures are needed because hybrid activity operates in a grey zone and allows Russia to apply pressure while avoiding open, conventional escalation. What is your view?

Irina Tsukerman: There has been a real shift in the German debate and in proposed policy, but it is important to describe it accurately. What we are seeing is political momentum and discussion of draft legislation aimed at expanding intelligence authorities and operational scope, including more robust cyber and technical powers. That is not the same as Germany having broadly authorized offensive cyberattacks across the board.

In the United States, the government has long conducted cyber operations through entities such as U.S. Cyber Command and the intelligence community. By contrast, U.S. private companies are generally not legally permitted to launch retaliatory cyberattacks; their role is largely confined to defensive security measures, incident response, and cooperation with law enforcement.

For Germany, the trajectory under discussion points toward greater flexibility and a more assertive posture, especially in cyberspace, where escalation risks are perceived as lower than in kinetic conflict. Even so, there is a critical distinction between intelligence collection and disruption on the one hand, and sabotage or physically destructive actions on the other. Germany has traditionally been associated more with defensive counterintelligence, counterterrorism operations, and arrests than with overt, confrontational external intelligence campaigns.

The United States also has a history of covert action, including the CIA’s involvement in armed drone strikes during the Obama administration. Whether that represents the best use of intelligence resources remains open to debate. One argument is that lethal operations are more appropriately assigned to the military, while intelligence services should concentrate on collection, analysis, and enabling informed policymaking.

We need to be careful with the factual framing. There has been no publicly verified U.S. operation involving the arrest of Nicolás Maduro using a “sonic device” for mass paralysis. Maduro remains in power in Venezuela. There have been past U.S. indictments, sanctions, and attempted pressure campaigns, but no confirmed arrest operation of that kind. Claims of exotic non-lethal mass paralysis devices tend to circulate in speculative or conspiratorial narratives rather than in verified reporting.

It is true, however, that intelligence services globally—including Israel’s Mossad—have historically combined intelligence collection with operational disruption. Israel has conducted targeted counterterrorism operations against Hezbollah and other groups. Those operations typically involve extensive intelligence preparation, but they are also highly controversial and legally complex under international law.

Could Germany move in a similar direction? Germany operates under strict constitutional constraints shaped by its postwar legal culture. Any expansion of authority for the BND would face parliamentary oversight and judicial review. While more assertive cyber or counterintelligence measures are conceivable, extraterritorial lethal operations or sabotage would raise profound legal and political barriers.

In principle, states argue that asymmetric environments reward those willing to act aggressively in grey zones. The counterargument is escalation risk and blowback. Intelligence agencies that drift into paramilitary roles can create legal exposure and diplomatic fallout. Effectiveness depends not only on capability but on legitimacy and strategic coherence.

Jacobsen: An Indian national, Nikhil Gupta, pleaded guilty in U.S. federal court in connection with a murder-for-hire conspiracy targeting a Sikh separatist activist in the United States. Prosecutors alleged that the intended target was Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a U.S.-based advocate for Khalistan. The charges included conspiracy to commit murder for hire and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The maximum combined sentence exposure is substantial under U.S. law. Gupta was arrested in the Czech Republic in 2023 and later extradited to the United States.

In Canada, the 2023 killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in British Columbia led Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to state in Parliament that Canadian intelligence had credible allegations linking agents of the Indian government to the assassination. India has denied involvement. As of now, criminal proceedings in Canada are ongoing against individuals charged domestically, but a full public evidentiary record tying senior Indian officials directly to the killing has not been judicially established in open court.

Tsukerman: The through line is the globalization of domestic separatist conflicts. When diaspora activism intersects with homeland politics, intelligence services may be tempted to extend operations abroad. That carries severe diplomatic consequences. If evidence substantiates state-directed plots on foreign soil, it represents a significant breach of sovereignty.

The broader pattern suggests that hybrid tactics—covert action, deniable proxies, intimidation, targeted plots—are no longer confined to traditional war zones. The challenge for liberal democracies is responding firmly without eroding the legal frameworks that distinguish them from the actors they oppose. Power without constraint may be effective in the short term, but legitimacy is a strategic asset in the long run.

India has long been deeply concerned about Khalistan-aligned separatist activism. This is not “all Sikhs”; it is a subset of political and activist networks advocating for an independent Sikh state, with a spectrum ranging from lawful advocacy to associations—historically—with militancy and violence.

Some individuals and networks linked to Khalistan-oriented militancy have been connected to serious violence in the past, including the 1985 bombing of Air India Flight 182, which Canadian authorities and subsequent inquiries described as a conspiracy conceived, planned, and executed in Canada by Sikh extremists.

From India’s perspective, the problem is not diaspora political speech in itself, but allegations that certain overseas networks have provided funding, propaganda, recruitment, or logistical support for violent activity tied to Indian security concerns. That said, democratic states draw sharp legal lines: advocacy and protest are protected; incitement, financing violence, or operational plotting are crimes.

On Canada–India friction: New Delhi has repeatedly argued that Canada has not done enough against individuals it views as extremists. Ottawa, meanwhile, has stated publicly that it had “credible allegations” of a potential link between agents of the Government of India and the June 2023 killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in British Columbia. India has denied involvement.

It is also important not to overstate claims that have not been established in open court. Commentaries sometimes assert a fixed number of alleged overseas killings, or conflate political representation with organizational culpability. Canada has charged four Indian nationals in the Nijjar killing, and Canadian statements have focused on alleged involvement of Indian agents, but a full public evidentiary record tying the operation to senior Indian leadership has not been judicially proven in open proceedings.

Regarding the “why” of alleged transnational plots: the U.S. case involving Nikhil Gupta (who pleaded guilty in February 2026) shows how these controversies escalate—when a state is alleged to pursue dissidents abroad, it triggers sovereignty, criminal, and diplomatic consequences regardless of the target’s politics.

India’s security establishment sees parts of the diaspora movement as an externalized security threat, Canada frames the issue as sovereignty and rule of law, and the evidence question sits at the center—what can be proven publicly versus what remains protected intelligence.

When governments make politically explosive claims, they face a tradeoff: protecting sources and methods versus providing corroboration that can withstand scrutiny. That tension becomes even sharper when the alleged conduct is a covert operation on allied soil. The strategic risk is not only escalation with the targeted state, but a reputational hit with partners if the case is perceived as under-substantiated or over-politicized.

That failure to substantiate the allegation publicly—at least in a way the public could evaluate—became a major political and diplomatic rupture with India. Since Mark Carney became prime minister on March 14, 2025, Ottawa has signaled an interest in stabilizing relations and resetting channels where possible.

On the U.S. side, the most concrete “edge-taker-off” development was procedural and legal rather than rhetorical: the United States approved and then executed the extradition of Tahawwur Rana to India after the U.S. Supreme Court declined to halt the process, and Rana was transferred in April 2025. That does not resolve the Canada–India sovereignty dispute over alleged Indian-linked operations in North America, but it did demonstrate that—when the legal threshold is met—Washington will move forward on sensitive India-related cases.

The broader point stands: there was no comprehensive, publicly articulated diplomatic framework for handling disputes involving Sikh separatist activism, dual nationals, and alleged extraterritorial operations. Instead, there were case-by-case reactions, intelligence claims constrained by source protection, and political messaging that left key questions unresolved—so the issue predictably resurfaces when new prosecutions, guilty pleas, or intelligence allegations appear.

Jacobsen: Macron has called for stronger measures against antisemitism in France. Government data reported 1,320 antisemitic acts in 2025, accounting for over half of all anti-religious acts. Macron said, “Schools, the justice system, elected officials—everyone must be mobilised,” and added that in a democracy, free speech does not extend to racism and antisemitism. How do you read his framing of the Enlightenment and the boundary he draws for speech—especially compared to the “platform free speech” posture associated with X and Grok?

Tsukerman: Any serious, resourced effort by a head of state to confront antisemitism is welcome—especially when it is tied to enforcement, education, and institutional responsibility rather than slogans.

Where I would tighten the factual framing is on motive and alliances. French politics since the 2024 snap election has involved tactical withdrawals and “republican front”-style coordination to block the far right in some races, not a clean ideological merger of Macron’s camp with Mélenchon’s party. It is also fair to say that parts of the French political ecosystem—including factions on the hard left and hard right—have amplified conspiratorial and antisemitic content online, and that this has contributed to a climate of intimidation and disorder.

Macron’s strongest point here is the linkage: antisemitism is not merely a “minority issue.” It corrodes core liberal rights—freedom of worship, equal citizenship, and public order—then metastasizes into broader conspiracism aimed at institutions, officials, and social cohesion. When states tolerate pervasive bigotry, they tend to discover—late—that the same networks and narratives do not stop with one target.

The political risk is durability. Macron’s term ends in May 2027, so this is the final stretch of his presidency, and follow-through will depend on whether France’s institutions and next leadership keep the same intensity and clarity rather than treating this as an end-of-term messaging campaign.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina. 

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