Everywhere Insiders 38: U.S.-Iran Strategy, Geneva Talks, and Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/03/23

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Irina Tsukerman about the evolving U.S. posture toward Iran, the strategic role of regional allies, and the ambiguity surrounding Geneva negotiations. Tsukerman argues that force positioning, logistics, and alliance signaling matter as much as battlefield capability, especially in relation to Saudi Arabia, Iran’s proxies, and the limited visible role of Russia and China. She also examines the Trump administration’s shifting rhetoric on nuclear and missile threats, questions the clarity of U.S. objectives, and connects these tensions to broader instability involving Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Taliban, and cross-border militancy in South Asia.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Before we move into the operational details, can you outline the broader strategic context? Specifically, how should we understand the current U.S. force posture in the region in relation to Iran, regional allies, and the ongoing negotiations in Geneva?

Irina Tsukerman: I would like to begin a few minutes into the segment—either at the tail end of the first story or at the start of the second. I will finish the first story.

The United States needs a clear way to distribute and position its forces in preparation for potential strikes. Ships, aircraft, and other equipment must be able to maneuver without creating avoidable bottlenecks. That requires logistics: storage, refueling, maintenance access, and staging support from regional partners.

This also sends a strategic signal to Iran. The United States does not want to enter a confrontation appearing isolated in the region. Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations with Iran in 2023 under a China-brokered agreement, yet it remains a central U.S. security partner and has been designated a major non-NATO ally. That status facilitates closer defense cooperation and expanded military coordination.

That combination—Saudi diplomatic normalization with Iran on one hand and continued defense alignment with the United States on the other—matters strategically. It signals that U.S. regional partnerships remain intact, even if conditional and carefully calibrated.

Russia and China are not visibly present in the operational theater in the same way regional partners are supporting the United States. Their engagement has been more apparent at the diplomatic and informational level rather than through direct, overt military positioning alongside Iran.

Iran maintains proxy networks across the region, but these are non-state actors. They cannot provide the sustained basing rights, diplomatic cover, and logistics infrastructure that sovereign state allies can. That distinction has long-term implications for escalation dynamics.

Regarding the Geneva negotiations and Iran’s statements about progress, such language should not be taken at face value. Diplomatic optimism can be used strategically to shape expectations and increase pressure for concessions. Core disputes continue to revolve around uranium enrichment limits, stockpiles, and related restrictions, while missile capabilities have increasingly become part of the broader security discussion among U.S. and European policymakers.

There have been claims that some of Iran’s longer-range missiles could potentially reach U.S. bases in the region, and possibly beyond. Whether that specific capability exists in the way some officials describe remains debated. However, Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is widely regarded as one of the largest in the Middle East. These missiles have been used directly and through proxy forces, causing substantial damage across the region. In the event of a major confrontation—whether between the United States and Iran, Iran and Israel, or involving proxy actors—the missile issue would be central.

All of this forms part of the broader negotiating process. The next step is reportedly a technical meeting next week. What that ultimately signifies remains unclear. Some analysts argue it may provide diplomatic space for the United States without requiring immediate commitment to a defined course of action.

Additional context includes Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s planned visit to Israel. It is unlikely that major military action would occur during such a visit. If any action were taken before or during that timeframe, it would likely be limited in scope and calibrated to avoid long-term regional disruption. That suggests a continued effort to avoid large-scale escalation.

This raises a broader question: what is the United States’ strategic calculus? What objectives is it attempting to achieve? Those objectives have not been clearly articulated. The recent State of the Union address, which ran close to two hours, provided an opportunity to clarify policy. President Trump referenced the nuclear issue and briefly mentioned ballistic missiles, warning of severe consequences if no agreement is reached. However, the speech did not offer detailed explanation of timing, escalation logic, or strategic end goals.

There is also rhetorical tension. Previous claims that Iran’s nuclear program had been “obliterated” sit uneasily alongside renewed warnings of military action. Some officials have since acknowledged that while setbacks may have occurred, the program was not fully dismantled and continues to present concern. The precise level of risk, however, has not been clearly communicated to the public.

Over the past two months, rhetoric has shifted. Earlier messaging linked potential kinetic action to Iran’s internal repression of protesters. More recently, the focus narrowed to nuclear enrichment, and now ballistic missile development has been emphasized as well. That evolution has not been fully explained.

Several theories attempt to account for the administration’s shifting posture. Some suggest that repeated warnings and deadlines created a narrowing diplomatic lane, leaving limited room for maneuver. Others argue that Iran has not responded with even symbolic concessions and has instead escalated its rhetoric, primarily for domestic political audiences rather than international ones.

Iran may calculate that the United States is not prepared to pursue regime change or sustained, high-intensity confrontation. If that assessment holds, Tehran’s strategy would be shaped accordingly.

Iran is also testing the administration’s posture. The longer this situation is prolonged, the less appetite there may be in Washington for decisive escalation.

President Trump likely seeks a political victory before the midterm elections. He has expressed concern about the consequences of military strikes. Limited strikes would not necessarily collapse the Iranian government or resolve the underlying strategic issues. That assessment is broadly consistent with historical experience: limited force rarely produces regime change.

A prolonged campaign could be expensive, politically risky, and uncertain in outcome. If the regime were destabilized, the aftermath could be chaotic. It could lead to internal fragmentation, hardline consolidation, or the rise of a different but equally adversarial faction. None of those outcomes guarantee improved conditions for U.S. interests. Given previous campaign promises to avoid prolonged overseas conflicts, the administration would likely prefer a limited, politically manageable outcome.

Another interpretation is that maintaining a prolonged negotiation and escalation cycle delays attention to domestic political challenges. These include criticism over economic conditions such as inflation and affordability concerns, controversy over immigration enforcement and ICE funding debates in Congress, ongoing litigation over executive actions, and foreign policy disputes, including unresolved negotiations related to the war in Ukraine. Public messaging and policy outcomes in these areas have been contested and politically polarizing.

At the same time, the visible movement of U.S. military assets to the region allows the administration to project strength without necessarily committing to immediate action. Military signaling can serve deterrent and political functions simultaneously. Iran, for its part, also employs strong rhetoric while avoiding irreversible escalation, allowing both sides to appear resolute without crossing clear thresholds.

There is concern among some hawkish observers that if strong warnings are not followed by decisive action, U.S. credibility could be questioned. Repeated red lines without enforcement can weaken deterrence. On the other hand, escalation without a clear strategic end state carries its own risks.

Now, briefly on Pakistan and Afghanistan: Pakistan’s government has significantly escalated its rhetoric and cross-border operations against militant groups operating from Afghan territory. The Taliban currently control Afghanistan as the de facto governing authority, though they remain unrecognized by most of the international community. Pakistan historically supported elements of the Taliban movement during earlier phases of the conflict. The current tensions reflect deteriorating relations, particularly over cross-border militancy and security concerns.

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supported several Mujahideen factions during the Soviet–Afghan War in the 1980s, including some of the more hardline Islamist groups. After the Cold War, elements of Pakistan’s security establishment continued to view certain militant networks as strategic assets, particularly in relation to Afghanistan and countering Indian influence in the region.

Over time, some of these militant factions evolved, fractured, or reconstituted themselves, contributing to instability on both sides of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. The Durand Line, which demarcates the border, has long been contested by Afghan governments, and cross-border tribal, ethnic, and militant networks have complicated enforcement and sovereignty issues.

The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 marked a significant shift. Although the Taliban government remains unrecognized by most of the international community, it functions as the de facto authority. For various Islamist movements globally, the Taliban’s consolidation of control over an entire state has symbolic significance. Groups such as al-Qaeda have maintained historical ties to the Taliban, though the Taliban has sought international legitimacy and has at times signaled limits on external operations.

Compared to ISIS, which briefly controlled territory in Iraq and Syria but was never widely recognized as a state and ultimately lost most of its territorial holdings, the Taliban’s sustained control of Afghanistan represents a different model of Islamist governance. That distinction influences how other militant groups perceive its trajectory.

Pakistan now faces increased security challenges from militant groups operating along the Afghan border, including Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is distinct from but ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban. Islamabad has accused the Afghan Taliban of failing to restrain these actors. In response, Pakistan has conducted cross-border strikes and escalated rhetoric. This reflects deteriorating relations rather than formal “open war.”

India has also adjusted its posture toward the Taliban government. While India historically opposed the Taliban and remains wary of its ideology, it has engaged in limited diplomatic contact since 2021, largely to protect security interests and maintain channels of communication. Regional dynamics remain fluid, with each state pursuing pragmatic calculations rather than ideological alignment.

President Trump referenced South Asian tensions in a recent address, claiming prior success in easing India–Pakistan tensions. Such claims are politically framed; while U.S. diplomacy has at times played a role in de-escalation, regional rivalries remain deeply structural and long-standing.

At present, tensions between Pakistan and militant groups operating from Afghan territory raise concerns about sustained cross-border violence. Whether this escalates into prolonged interstate conflict depends on political decisions in Islamabad and Kabul, as well as internal security pressures in both countries.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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