Everywhere Insiders 37: Saudi Enrichment, IEEPA Tariffs, and Indonesia NickelThe Good Men Project

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/03/11

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen presses Irina Tsukerman on three leverage contests: a proposed U.S.–Saudi civilian nuclear deal that may allow domestic uranium enrichment; U.S. sanctions and Kremlin rhetoric around Cuba; and Indonesia’s tightening grip on nickel. Tsukerman argues enrichment is dual-use but manageable with strict U.S./IAEA safeguards, and warns Saudi Arabia could otherwise turn to China or Pakistan. She calls Iran’s advanced program the immediate proliferation risk. On Cuba, she predicts “Venezuela-style” cosmetic change and renewed Chinese influence. They also discuss the Supreme Court’s Feb. 20, 2026 ruling that IEEPA cannot authorize broad tariffs, complicating refunds, future credibility, and trade deals.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: A significant point—though it appears as a minor detail on the AP News page—is that Saudi Arabia could be allowed some form of domestic uranium enrichment under a proposed civilian nuclear deal with the United States, according to congressional documents and nonproliferation experts.

That raises proliferation concerns in the context of U.S.–Iran tensions. For context, Saudi Arabia is a predominantly Sunni state, while Iran is predominantly Shia, and the two have long been geopolitical rivals. A Saudi enrichment capability would not automatically mean Iran receives enrichment, but it could intensify regional threat perceptions and hedging behavior.

This proposed U.S.–Saudi nuclear arrangement is distinct from negotiations with Iran, but it could still affect Iran’s calculus indirectly. Separately, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement on September 17, 2025. Some analysts linked the timing to the regional volatility that followed Israel’s September 2025 strike in Doha, Qatar, which reportedly targeted Hamas political leadership and drew international criticism as an escalation.

With that background, what are your thoughts on a U.S.–Saudi deal that could permit enrichment, the possible second-order effects on Iran’s nuclear posture, and the broader regional signaling?

Irina Tsukerman: I think the issue is often framed imprecisely. Saudi Arabia has sought a civilian nuclear program for years, and U.S.–Saudi nuclear talks have spanned multiple administrations.

Saudi leaders have also publicly suggested that if Iran were to obtain a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would seek to match that capability. That does not prove intent in any specific deal, but it is part of the strategic backdrop that makes enrichment provisions sensitive.

A civilian nuclear program does not automatically translate into a weapons program. The proliferation concern is that enrichment is a dual-use capability: it can support civilian fuel supply, but it also reduces the technical distance to weapons-grade material if a state later chooses to cross that line. For comparison, the UAE’s U.S. nuclear agreement is often described as a “gold standard” because it forswore enrichment and reprocessing.

A slow, monitored pathway—with stringent safeguards, robust verification, and meaningful U.S. and IAEA oversight—is generally preferable to scenarios in which Saudi Arabia turns to alternative suppliers with fewer constraints. The tradeoff is that the United States would need to be deeply engaged in monitoring and enforcement, rather than treating the deal primarily as an export or industrial opportunity.

Without U.S. backing, Saudi Arabia will turn to other, far less West-friendly players to advance its objectives. Is it possible that, down the road, Saudi Arabia will pursue a nuclear weapon, even if Iran is ultimately disrupted? Anything is possible. India and Pakistan surprised the world in the past. There are also periodic allegations about undeclared testing by other powers. Surprises occur. However, there is a balanced way to handle this policy without giving rise to anti-Saudi hysteria on the one hand, while ensuring that a nuclear race does not turn deadly in the Middle East on the other.

That said, the more immediate concern is not a nascent Saudi process but the far more advanced Iranian program. At present, there is no clear solution—short of regime change—for permanently reversing that ambition. Even if the United States were to significantly degrade Iran’s program through sustained strikes, the technical knowledge and the regime’s intent would remain. Those factors make a return to nuclear development likely when circumstances permit. There is also no guarantee that elements of the program are not being supported externally, potentially by actors beyond U.S. oversight.

Jacobsen: There is ongoing geopolitical complexity, including what some in North America describe as a “bromance” between Trump and Putin. Such relationships tend to fluctuate. President Putin has condemned U.S. sanctions against Cuba. This criticism appears within a broader alignment of interests between the Trump administration and the Kremlin. What are your thoughts on U.S. sanctions against Cuba, and on President Putin’s response? Do gestures of rhetorical support toward smaller states meaningfully affect broader geopolitical trends?

Tsukerman: Any regime change in Cuba would likely resemble the cynical process that occurred in Venezuela. There, an unpopular and ineffective figurehead was removed under the banner of accountability, yet the underlying power structure remained intact. In Venezuela, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez retained authority and continuity of policy under the Maduro regime.

Venezuela has since opened portions of its economy to American and Western business interests. That has benefited the economy in macroeconomic terms but has not necessarily improved conditions for ordinary citizens. If the regime structure remains unchanged, financial inflows may strengthen the leadership and undermine the intended impact of sanctions, which had significantly weakened Venezuela in recent years.

While access to oil and gas may provide economic incentives for engagement, such arrangements carry risks for financial institutions, particularly if sanctions frameworks remain partially in place.

There’s a borderline violation of U.S. policy at the moment. And second, the U.S. could end up empowering people far worse than Maduro himself and far more dangerous. Because of Trump’s predilection for strongmen and skepticism about democratic elections, he may want to remain in control of similar processes in Cuba. The only way to do that is to either cut a deal with the existing regime or replace a figurehead with someone willing to play ball while leaving everything else unchanged. The biggest danger now is that Venezuela has not dismantled any of its intelligence infrastructure; it remains highly dependent on Cuba and still owes significant debt to China. It could be only a matter of time before China decides to reassert itself—not necessarily in a way confrontational to the U.S., but in a way that allows it to reap the benefits of a long-standing relationship. This anti-China disruption may be temporary and renegotiable if China comes to Trump with a deal that looks good from his perspective, including any personal cut he might expect. In that case, he could be amenable to allowing Beijing back into influence in Venezuela, Panama, and other countries he wants under a pro-Western direction.

Jacobsen: On another front, the U.S. Supreme Court has delivered a major ruling on tariffs that will directly impact geopolitics and global finance. In Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, the Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the president to unilaterally impose broad tariffs—an authority that only Congress holds. This decision, released on February 20 2026, effectively ruled that many of former President Trump’s sweeping emergency-based global tariffs were illegal because they exceeded executive power.

The ruling means that tariffs imposed under IEEPA lack a legal foundation, and it immediately halted the government’s ability to collect those duties. It also opens the door for companies and states to seek refunds on billions of dollars already collected, although the process for refunding those revenues remains legally uncertain. Reuters estimates that over $175 billion in tariff revenue could be at risk for potential refunds.

Tuskerman: Legally, the Supreme Court reaffirmed a core constitutional principle: the power to levy taxes and duties resides with Congress, and the executive branch cannot sidestep that by unilaterally invoking emergency law. Tariffs are treated as a form of tax, and the Court emphasized that Congress cannot delegate its constitutional taxing power without explicit statutory authority—something the IEEPA does not provide.

In response, the administration has already moved to replace those struck-down tariffs with a new 15 percent global levy under a different statutory authority (the Trade Act of 1974), which has more limited scope and duration and requires congressional involvement for extensions.

The ruling has unsettled global markets, prompted diplomatic criticism from trading partners like China and the European Union, and raised questions about U.S. trade credibility because of the abrupt legal shift and the uncertainty around refunds and future tariff stability. 

The ruling essentially restores taxation powers fully to Congress. Its implications may extend beyond tariffs to other taxation-related issues. For present purposes, it means that any tariffs imposed by the president must go through Congress. Yet an executive order was announced establishing a global 10 percent tariff without congressional approval.

Second, the money already collected should, in theory, be addressed by Congress. Refunds or redistribution to affected taxpayers may be warranted. However, that will be complicated. Some entities that paid those duties have since gone out of business and no longer exist as legal claimants. It remains unclear how Congress will handle that situation. Ideally, the funds would be used in a manner consistent with constitutional authority rather than redirected toward questionable executive initiatives.

The largest unresolved question concerns trade agreements negotiated using tariff escalation as leverage. If the tariffs that created the leverage were unconstitutional, are the resulting deals undermined? Does the system revert to the pre-tariff status quo? If a new tariff is imposed by executive order without congressional authorization, it would raise the same constitutional defect. Litigation is likely.

In theory, prior arrangements should revert to their original baseline. In practice, the situation is complex. Political, commercial, and investment decisions have already been made based on those recalibrations. It is uncertain whether all of that is reversible.

Jacobsen: Another issue, niche but geopolitically significant, concerns Indonesia’s nickel policy. As the United States and China compete for critical minerals—rare earths, advanced AI chips, compute capacity, and energy inputs—Indonesia has consolidated control over its nickel resources. Nickel is central to electric vehicle batteries, defense technologies, and aspects of the green energy transition.

Indonesia accounts for roughly 60 percent of global nickel production as of 2024, up from approximately 31.5 percent in 2020. Former President Joko Widodo banned the export of raw nickel ore to ensure domestic processing and industrialization. Nickel must now remain in Indonesia for refining and value-added production, particularly to support a homegrown electric vehicle sector.

What does this signal? What are the implications for the United States and China?

Tsukerman: Indonesia is positioning itself as a strategic kingmaker in the global race for critical minerals. With both Washington and Beijing seeking secure supply chains for energy, AI, defense, and green industries, Indonesia holds significant leverage.

By restricting exports and requiring domestic processing, Indonesia increases its bargaining power. The move may be industrial policy rather than pure resource nationalism. It could also be a negotiating strategy: restrict supply, assess offers, and extract maximum advantage from competing powers.

The only effective way to test market leverage at that scale is precisely what Indonesia has done—halt unrestricted exports and wait to see which partners are willing to provide the most favorable terms.

The offers Indonesia is seeking may be more complex than a simple exchange of money for exports. For example, Indonesia has positioned itself as a potential contributor to stabilization efforts in Gaza, reportedly pledging up to 8,000 personnel for a peacekeeping or stabilization role. Indonesia is the most populous Muslim-majority country in the world, so such a deployment is within its demographic capacity. Questions remain regarding language, training, and operational coordination, but politically it signals willingness to take a visible role in Middle Eastern diplomacy.

From Indonesia’s perspective, this move offers leverage. It provides political capital, particularly with Washington, since few countries have committed personnel in that context. By making what appears to be a good-faith diplomatic gesture, Indonesia creates room to negotiate parallel economic arrangements, including those related to critical mineral exports.

Indonesia may also be pursuing broader geopolitical ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. The United States has long relied on India as a cornerstone of its regional strategy. Trade tensions and tariff disputes have complicated aspects of that alignment. Indonesia may see an opportunity to elevate its status—positioning itself as a preferred strategic partner. That could involve seeking enhanced trade status, expanded access to U.S. markets beyond nickel, or security cooperation against regional competitors.

At the same time, Indonesia is unlikely to negotiate exclusively with Washington. It may be conducting parallel discussions with China, comparing economic and strategic packages. A troop commitment in Gaza does not preclude deeper economic engagement with Beijing.

Economically, it is difficult to justify permanently retaining all nickel domestically if export revenues are substantial. Limiting exports to promote domestic processing makes strategic sense. Completely banning exports would sacrifice revenue without guaranteed industrial dominance. China already dominates much of the global electric vehicle market, particularly in Asia and parts of Europe. Other emerging producers, including Morocco, are also expanding manufacturing capacity.

It is unclear whether Indonesia can realistically outcompete China in electric vehicles solely by controlling nickel. The export restrictions appear less like a permanent industrial pivot and more like a negotiating instrument designed to maximize leverage in a competitive global environment.

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