Everywhere Insiders 34: Gaza Ceasefire Doubts, Iran’s Strategy, and Balochistan Instability

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/02/12

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman examine whether Gaza’s ceasefire claims mask ongoing strategic conflict, noting reports of deadly airstrikes and the difficulty of enforcing disarmament without credible mechanisms. Tsukerman argues Hamas retains incentives to regroup and politicize pauses in fighting, making “cessation” rhetoric performative without enforcement. They broaden to Balochistan, where Tsukerman describes long-running insurgency dynamics, cross-border instability, and Pakistan’s securitized approach absent political solutions. The conversation also critiques Indonesia’s weak disaster governance and analyzes Iran’s internal decay, sanctions gaps, and the regime’s long-term ideological agenda amid regional rivalries.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: We do not usually touch this topic because, given the nature of the question, it tends to dominate the discussion. This critique is relevant. It raises the issue of other ongoing conflicts, such as Iran, which receives far less attention when people are very loud about Gaza and Palestine.

It is strange to speak about a group in this way, but I will say it directly: children are among the victims when airstrikes hit densely populated areas. It is challenging to speak sensitively about the situation because Gaza has a very young population, and casualty reporting often includes many children. That does not make the moral or humanitarian questions go away.

In late January 2026, Palestinian health officials and civil defence officials reported that Israeli airstrikes across Gaza killed more than 30 people, including three young girls from the same family, and that strikes hit homes, tents, and a police station.

Israel described the attacks as a response to what it called a breach of the ceasefire the previous day, saying its forces identified eight armed individuals emerging from a tunnel in the Rafah area and that it targeted militants and infrastructure connected to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, including commanders and weapons-related sites.

So the dispute becomes this: was this a ceasefire breach that justified strikes, or a ceasefire violation in itself? What are your thoughts on this ongoing saga?

Irina Tsukerman: I never thought it would be an unbreakable ceasefire, because Hamas has consolidated its power since Israel withdrew from Gaza. It was only a matter of time before incidents resumed once Hamas regrouped. It is also clear that not all commanders were killed or forced to stop operating. When a commander is killed, another can be appointed, and recruitment can continue.

Until Hamas is dismantled as an organized entity, this will continue. I do not see anything in the frameworks being discussed that provides a precise enforcement mechanism to prevent armed groups from operating. There are publicly discussed proposals—such as weapons buyback concepts and amnesty or reintegration ideas—but there is no guarantee these measures would work.

If people refuse to go along with a disarmament plan, the only remaining options are coercive: detention and systematic weapons removal. That becomes a large-scale security and governance project, not simply a diplomatic one.

At the end of World War II, Germany and Japan surrendered unconditionally. That did not happen here. What we are seeing is not the end of the war, but a pause in fighting—a truce without a decisive political settlement.

Because Hamas has not admitted defeat, it has little incentive to disarm. It can continue attaching conditions and attempting to shape the post-war political outcome. In that environment, it is rational for all sides to posture and test limits, which is why the process increasingly resembles a charade.

I do not really see this as a genuine cessation of hostilities. What I see instead is an attempt to find a legal way to assert political control. We have seen what happened the last time Hamas was allowed to become part of a governing structure. As soon as they were able to do so, they began killing the political opposition, namely Fatah, in 2007.

They then assumed full political power. From the very beginning, Hamas regarded itself as both a political organization and a military one. I do not understand the logic of the argument being made now. They are already a political party. They are already a political movement. At this point, this entire process is a farce.

I do not see anything changing in the long term until Israel is given a free hand to do what it believes needs to be done. Now that the hostages are out of Gaza, there is no longer the same constraint on military action. There is, of course, a discussion about civilians—children and people who are not fighters. Israel has opened corridors, including through Rafah, to allow those who are willing and able to leave to do so.

But at the end of the day, war is still war, and it is not going to be pretty. If there is any serious intention to reform society and to hold people who were part of a violent and hateful movement accountable for their actions, that process will not be easy or attractive—and it should not necessarily be.

There will not be a durable peace until Gaza goes through something comparable to what Germany and Japan went through after World War II. There is currently no incentive structure for peace, and no social framework that sustains it. And just because Hamas has become unpopular in Gaza for various reasons does not mean that Gazan society as a whole is ready to live side by side with Israel. Philosophically, nothing fundamental has changed.

What we are seeing is backlash against Hamas’s mistreatment of Gazans, not a profound shift in attitudes toward Israel itself. I do not see an affirmatively pro-peace mass movement. Unfortunately, this situation is likely to continue until Trump and others understand that when a society has been indoctrinated for decades, physical reconstruction alone is not enough. What is required is a profound change in mindset.

Jacobsen: Another critical issue is Pakistan. Since the killing of ninety-two militants following attacks in Balochistan, Balochistan is a region with long-standing instability. The Balochistan Liberation Army claimed responsibility for the attacks that took place on Saturday, January 31. The Pakistani military’s media wing issued a statement attributing the attack in Noshki to what it described as Indian-sponsored militants, claiming that the attackers had direct external support. The situation in Noshki became critical after militants abducted senior local officials, prompting a large-scale security operation. What are your thoughts on this?

Tsukerman: Balochistan has been a restive region for a very long time. It is divided between Pakistan and Iran, and instability there has deep historical, political, and ethnic roots.

Balochistan has a distinct ethnic group and a long-standing reputation for smuggling and other criminal activity, but it has also been semi-autonomous and has maintained a vibrant independence movement. It has been systematically marginalized and discriminated against by both Iran and Pakistan because of its distinct culture, language, and ethnic identity.

As a result, terrorist cells have been actively targeting government institutions in both Iran and Pakistan. At times, the two countries have coordinated responses, and at other times, they have pursued militants across borders independently. Some of these movements are more radical than others. Certain groups target not only military and government institutions but also religious and civilian targets.

This time, the level of activity has been higher than usual. Some of this escalation appears to be opportunistic, taking advantage of instability in Iran on the one hand and political turmoil in Pakistan on the other, including pressure from the Taliban and internal political struggles. Military activity has increased significantly in recent weeks, and the government appears to have decided to send a stronger message in an attempt to suppress the violence.

This will not end the activity. Disrupting militant cells can actually reinvigorate civilian recruitment. There has been no political solution to this problem, nor have I seen serious efforts to pursue one. The Pakistani government has relied almost entirely on a counterterrorism and counter-extremism framework, rather than a whole-of-society approach.

There has been little focus on addressing humanitarian concerns, political grievances, dialogue with local groups, or engagement with civil society. The approach has been almost entirely securitized and tactical. The government lacks a viable way to establish a long-term presence in the region without provoking severe backlash. Instead, it appears to have accepted short-term tactical operations—arresting, killing, or dismantling militant groups—without a broader plan to resolve the insurgency. That is the situation there.

Jacobsen: Shifting briefly, nature has a way of forcing geopolitical attention. Indonesia recently experienced a deadly landslide. The death toll is at least forty-nine as of yesterday morning in West Java province. It is a strange contrast—one of the few cases where nature, rather than people, is the primary cause of suffering. According to Indonesia’s central rescue agency, BASARNAS, forty-nine people were confirmed dead. Authorities warned that the number could rise, as this followed cyclone-induced floods and landslides that hit Sumatra late last year, which killed more than a hundred people. Indonesia has been experiencing a series of environmentally driven disasters. Any thoughts on this week’s environmental disaster?

Tsukerman: It reminds me somewhat of what happened in California not long ago, in terms of how authorities handled it. Obviously, the nature of the events is very different, but the response showed abysmal timing and, in some respects, serious incompetence. Authorities had been warned about the risk of landslides in that specific area.

Nevertheless, not only were appropriate precautions not taken, but funding that could have addressed these risks was cut. As a result, when the disaster struck, there was no adequate preparation, and the response was slow. That delay likely led to more people being killed or going missing than would have occurred if larger teams and proper resources had been in place.

This is basic government incompetence. If a government cannot guarantee search-and-rescue services or prepare citizens for natural disasters, then its legitimacy should be questioned. There should be political consequences for this kind of failure.

You cannot necessarily prevent a natural disaster, but you can evacuate people in advance. You can reinforce buildings. You can invest in search-and-rescue capacity to ensure that, after the event, there are sufficient teams to evacuate survivors, locate the missing, and distribute basic resources. If people are living in an area known to be prone to a specific type of natural hazard, and there is no realistic way to relocate them, then at the very least, the government should invest in making the aftermath as humane and efficient as possible. That is simply common sense.

Jacobsen: Now to the Middle East. More seriously, there should be far more reporting on what is happening in Iran. Let me group several developments. There was a gas-related explosion in Iran’s port city of Bandar Abbas, according to Iranian media. Qatar’s prime minister met with Ali Larijani in Tehran to discuss easing regional tensions. Iran’s president claimed that Netanyahu, Trump, Europe, and other countries stirred unrest—an externalization of blame. The United States imposed sanctions on Iran’s interior minister and a businessman, Eskandar Momeni, alleging that they were involved in financial activities benefiting Tehran.

Iran has also threatened to label European armed forces as terrorists in response to EU states blocklisting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, according to statements by senior Iranian security officials. There are also related developments involving Yemen and the UAE, which we can cover if time permits.

Tsukerman: Regarding the Bandar Abbas incident, that appears to have been a gas explosion. These kinds of incidents occur in Iran because of poorly maintained infrastructure. Fuel and other explosive materials are often transported or stored in inappropriate locations, without proper maintenance or adherence to basic safety procedures.

As a result, many explosions are neither criminal nor suspicious. They are simply the outcome of the incompetent handling of hazardous materials. That said, there have also been other explosions across the country that may be linked to militant activity, particularly involving Balochi groups taking advantage of broader instability.

During periods of internet blackouts and heightened tensions with the United States, some attacks on infrastructure may indeed be the work of militant groups. But many incidents should not be over-interpreted. Iran’s internal decay and mismanagement alone are sufficient to explain a significant portion of these events.

When it comes to the interior minister, sanctioning him is the right move. Frankly, I am surprised he was not already on the sanctions list. Much of the Iranian government has been subject to sanctions for decades. These individuals have not contributed positively in any meaningful way.

Jacobsen: Is it possible that, when a government is not functioning coherently, gaps like this emerge? 

Tsukerman: Yes. Positions in Iran are frequently reshuffled, and from the U.S. perspective, it is easy to lose track of who holds which role at any given time. But sanctions should follow individuals, not just their political titles. If someone is already known for contributing to illicit activity, that behaviour does not stop simply because they change positions. Sanctions should move with the person.

Otherwise, all Iran—or any other country—needs to do is constantly reshuffle posts, giving the same people new jobs. In the United States, adding someone to a sanctions list can take a year or more. That gives individuals ample time to serve in a role before designation even becomes likely. That is not an effective sanctions regime.

This individual only came to prominence during the current administration, especially given the chaos of the past several administrations and a general reluctance to expand sanctions lists. Still, Iran’s Interior Ministry is not analogous to the U.S. Department of the Interior, which oversees parks and land management. In the Middle East, interior ministries are typically responsible for internal security. That makes this a very significant position and one that warrants scrutiny.

As for his broader contributions to security problems inside and outside Iran, those should have been evident. At the same time, U.S. intelligence agencies have undergone significant funding reductions. That may have affected their ability to maintain comprehensive tracking and analysis.

That said, the sanctions designation process does not primarily run through intelligence agencies. It goes through the State Department, the Treasury Department, and Congress. Human rights organizations and members of Congress typically submit recommendations, which the State Department then evaluates in coordination with the Treasury. Enforcement of sanctions does require support from security agencies, and staffing shortfalls certainly do not help.

Tracking individuals becomes even more difficult when there are fewer personnel and long-standing concerns—rumoured in some Iran-focused desks—about compromised staff. That obviously does not improve matters. However, in this particular case, Washington’s political desks could have identified it without intelligence involvement. The position is prominent. That is why I find it surprising that action was taken only now.

In addition to the interior minister, one businessman was also sanctioned. I was surprised that only one was named. When at least tens of thousands of people have been killed, it strains credibility to suggest that only a couple of individuals were responsible for contributing to such a massive human rights catastrophe. Many more people should be added to the sanctions lists immediately.

There was also the case of Ali Larijani’s daughter, who reportedly lost her job in the United States and was forced to leave the country. That, at least, suggests some belated recognition of the broader network involved.

She was reportedly researching at one of the major universities here. The obvious question is: why was she there in the first place? This highlights a broader problem in the West. We do not take security as seriously as our counterparts abroad.

In France, for example, there have long been reports of the children of Russian elites vacationing or residing at ski resorts. Why are they there? What are they contributing? It is not as though they have become dissidents against their parents or possess valuable information. They are enjoying the fruits of a poisoned tree—wealth accumulated through corruption, theft, and support for an illegal war. There is no compelling reason for them to enjoy the privileges of life in France. They should be back in their home country.

The same logic applies to the children of Iranian elites. Even if they are not personally involved in crimes, they are beneficiaries of illegal actions. As long as they are not actively opposing the regime, there is no reason they should be granted the privilege of living in the West or occupying positions that equally qualified people—without those connections—could hold.

This is not only about Americans. Immigrants and citizens alike who are equally qualified would be better suited for those roles than individuals tied to an authoritarian regime, who may also pose security risks, including the potential for information gathering on behalf of that regime. That alone makes their presence suspect.

Many of the reactions we are now seeing are extremely belated. Despite repeated promises to take decisive action, Trump continues to pursue negotiations. In doing so, he is effectively giving the regime time to prepare for potential attacks, to move sensitive materials and personnel out of harm’s way, and to ensure that any eventual action results in only superficial or cosmetic damage. That, in turn, may even serve the regime’s internal propaganda.

Even if, as rumours suggest, any future U.S. action were to involve a sustained military operation, the regime has already gained what it needed most: time. We may not fully know how that time has been used or why it was so critical, but it is clear that this is a deliberate strategy. They are not serious about disarmament. They are not serious about ending the nuclear program.

They do not care that satellite imagery is monitoring their nuclear activities. They openly admit to mass killings involving tens of thousands of people and are increasingly brazen about it. They are no longer even trying to conceal their actions. In effect, they are betting that this administration will not be willing to do what the situation actually requires.

The Trump administration needs to understand that what the regime is doing now is a direct challenge to U.S. credibility on the international stage. If the United States wants to be seen as anything more than a declining power clinging to its interests in the Western Hemisphere, it must make its red lines clear, enforceable, and consistent. It cannot continue playing along with every dictator’s game or allowing significantly weaker states to set the tempo.

People often ask what the dictator’s game really is. Is it power alone? No. It is legitimacy—specifically, the legitimacy of a doctrinal position. The regime is not only about self-preservation, despite what some analysts claim. Of course, self-preservation is part of any regime’s agenda; no one wants to lose power or cease to exist. But in Iran’s case, it goes beyond that.

The regime is committed to preserving its theocratic tradition and ensuring continuity so that it can continue pursuing its broader ideological goals. They have not given up. Just because they are weaker now, or because another actor—Turkey, in this case—appears ascendant, does not mean the balance cannot shift again under different circumstances.

They do not think the way Western policymakers often assume. They do not believe so: “Iran lost power, so it is finished and will not return.” Instead, they think in generational terms: who will take up the struggle next? How can ideology, messaging, and political structures be exported and preserved during periods of upheaval? How can they be embedded in ways that allow for a future resurgence?

That is why we should focus on their long-term agenda. That agenda is destabilization of the Middle East—using instability to gain leverage, recruit followers, and ultimately claim religious legitimacy across the region. This is not easy, but it becomes possible if enough divisions can be created.

We are already seeing that process at work. The rifts between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the efforts by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar to isolate Israel, all contribute to the kind of regional fragmentation that advances Iran’s objectives. Even if the current regime is losing internal political legitimacy, its doctrine is very much alive.

Jacobsen: There is an argument circulating on social media that is factually grounded but rhetorically crude. You see it frequently. It is grammatically sound and internally coherent, but the tone is abrasive. The argument usually goes something like this: people were extremely vocal about earlier attacks in a specific city, especially when children were killed, leading to widespread protests across Western society, including on university campuses.

When I visited Harvard University, for example, I could not avoid seeing that moment in contemporary left-wing activism, sometimes uncomfortably aligning with far-right Islamist rhetoric. Now, when looking at the Iranian state’s actions—where death tolls are in the tens of thousands—people are noticeably quieter. The argument then proceeds by naming and shaming Western feminists and left-wing activists.

What I notice is that this argument is less about demanding consistent opposition to state-sanctioned violence and more about using the situation as a cudgel against groups the speaker already dislikes. I am sure you have seen this type of argument. How would you recommend parsing it to foster more unified and effective protest movements?

Tsukerman: The answer is actually quite simple. The key question is: what are you trying to accomplish? Anyone engaged in meaningful civil disobedience should be able to answer that clearly. If the goal is to draw attention to a specific injustice to produce change, then the protest has a purpose.

That is what happened during the civil rights movement. It was effective precisely because it was tied to concrete outcomes—legislation, court decisions, and policy changes. We know it worked because we can point to those results.

But if the answer is, “I want to protest for the sake of protesting,” or “I want to demonstrate how terrible other people are,” then that is not a strategy. That is chaos for its own sake.

Many contemporary activists have internalized lessons from the Arab Spring, and we know how that turned out. The Arab Spring initially had coherent goals centred on political reform and liberalization, but undemocratic and anti-democratic movements quickly hijacked it. Those groups seized power, governed poorly, and ultimately worsened conditions.

Unless activists today can articulate a clear plan for improving lives—what concrete change they seek and what political action should result from their efforts—it becomes apparent that they are not interested in solving problems. They are interested in power.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the conversation. 

Last updated May 3, 2025. These terms govern all In-Sight Publishing content—past, present, and future—and supersede any prior notices.  In-Sight Publishing by Scott  Douglas  Jacobsen is licensed under a Creative Commons BY‑NC‑ND 4.0; © In-Sight Publishing by Scott  Douglas  Jacobsen 2012–Present. All trademarks, performances, databases & branding are owned by their rights holders; no use without permission. Unauthorized copying, modification, framing or public communication is prohibited. External links are not endorsed. Cookies & tracking require consent, and data processing complies with PIPEDA & GDPR; no data from children < 13 (COPPA). Content meets WCAG 2.1 AA under the Accessible Canada Act & is preserved in open archival formats with backups. Excerpts & links require full credit & hyperlink; limited quoting under fair-dealing & fair-use. All content is informational; no liability for errors or omissions: Feedback welcome, and verified errors corrected promptly. For permissions or DMCA notices, email: scott.jacobsen2025@gmail.com. Site use is governed by BC laws; content is “as‑is,” liability limited, users indemnify us; moral, performers’ & database sui generis rights reserved.