Everywhere Insiders 33: Ryan Wedding, Gaza Reconstruction, and Davos Realpolitik

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/02/05

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Irina Tsukerman, a New York– and Connecticut–based human rights and national security attorney and Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider. They discuss the arrest of former Olympic snowboarder Ryan Wedding and what his case reveals about crime, fame, and political narrative-making. The conversation then widens to Gaza: Kushner-style “Riviera” redevelopment pitches, Hamas’s lack of demilitarization, and the absence of credible security guarantees or funding plans. Tsukerman warns reconstruction money could vanish into contractors without accountability. They close on Davos, Zelensky’s impatience with European drift, and U.S. messaging miscues. Throughout, both emphasize consequences over slogans and spectacle.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Ryan Wedding, a former Canadian Olympic snowboarder who was on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list and faces charges tied to a multinational drug-trafficking enterprise and an alleged witness-related killing, has been arrested in Mexico, according to top Justice Department officials. He is 44 years old. Officials allege he ran a drug-trafficking operation and was linked to multiple killings. U.S. authorities had offered up to $15 million for information leading to his arrest and/or prosecution. U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi confirmed the arrest on social media.

Irina Tsukerman: I can almost see Trump saying, “They’re sending us their worst people,” referring to Canada, and using this as an excuse to claim that Canada is helping Maduro and the former Maduro regime run a massive drug-trafficking empire targeting the United States. This will become the face of that campaign.

Jacobsen: They captured a criminal, but the story itself is remarkable. He is only 44 and has already lived three lives.

Tsukerman: I do not understand why, instead of capitalizing on his acclaim as an Olympic athlete and his sporting achievements, he chose a life of crime. People in drug trafficking usually end up either arrested with long prison sentences or dead due to internal fighting and inter-cartel rivalry. What made him think he could evade that fate is beyond comprehension, especially given the harm caused by narcotics trafficking.

Jacobsen: I worked with Olympians, and they are not typical people. There is an intensity and precision in everything they do, and it extends beyond sport into how they approach life. That mindset may lead them to believe they can get away with something like this. It is psychological, but it goes beyond achieving a single primary goal and stopping there. For many, it is never enough. Eventually, the body can no longer perform at that level, and they are forced to stop. In this case, federal force was needed to stop him.

Tsukerman: It is disturbing. There has to be a better way to channel former Olympians’ talents than allowing them to drift into lives of crime and chaos that end in long federal sentences in the United States or elsewhere. He could have pursued teaching, entertainment, or media as a sports commentator or served as a bridge between sports, media, and entertainment. He could have become an investor, building on his reputation and personal brand. Many paths could have harnessed his intensity and appetite for adrenaline without dealing drugs—unless evading authorities was the only thing that replicated the rush of high-adrenaline snowboarding. Even then, there were better options. Competitive shows, for example, could offer something comparable. He could have gone on Dancing with the Stars.

Jacobsen: This week has been full of strange stories, genuinely bizarre ones. Jared Kushner is, by most accounts, unqualified for the task he has taken on. The “question of Palestine,” as the United Nations typically phrases it, is the longest-standing issue on the UN agenda and one that provokes intense emotions. Kushner is not the person equipped to handle it with the necessary care or expertise.

Turning to the specifics, the proposal envisions modern cities with sleek high-rises, a pristine coastline, and tourism infrastructure. According to reporting by the Associated Press, including coverage by Julian Frankel, the plan involves a city projecting into the Mediterranean. This idea was outlined in a brief presentation Kushner gave at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

Kushner said, “In the Middle East, they built cities like this in three years, so projects like this are very doable if we make it happen.” However, the United Nations Office for Project Services has estimated that Gaza contains more than 60 million tons of rubble—enough to fill roughly 3,000 container ships—and that clearing it would take approximately seven years. Kushner has also claimed that relevant parties have worked with Israel on “de-escalation,” with the goal of Hamas’s demilitarization. Other reporting indicates that Hamas has shown no meaningful intention to demilitarize, either broadly or with respect to conventional weapons central to its guerrilla tactics.

Tsukerman: It is important to note that messaging from both Hamas and the Trump administration has been inconsistent, particularly regarding Hamas’s disarmament and Gaza reconstruction. Hamas has repeatedly stated that it does not intend to disarm or dissolve. J.D. Vance, the U.S. Vice President, has said that the United States currently lacks the means to disarm Hamas by force.

At other moments, Hamas has suggested it might consider disarmament if incorporated into a formal political structure governing Gaza. That proposal raises obvious problems, particularly when compared to Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon and Hamas’s continued self-identification as both a political movement and a governing authority. Notably, Hamas has not indicated any willingness to abandon its foundational charter, which contains genocidal language toward Israel and draws heavily on Muslim Brotherhood doctrine.

Jacobsen: Some Hamas officials have also been explicit on another point: it does not support a two-state solution in any meaningful sense.

Tsukerman: That is correct. Hamas has made clear at various points that a two-state solution is not acceptable to it. The only issue it has been willing to discuss is its role in governing Gaza. Acceptance of Israel has never been part of the discussion.

As for the Trump administration, the messaging has been equally contradictory. J.D. Vance stated that the United States lacks the capacity to disarm Hamas physically. Benjamin Netanyahu has insisted that Israel will not accept any outcome in which Hamas remains armed. Donald Trump, shortly before Davos, said he would pressure Hamas to disarm through political and other means. Yet at Davos, he described Hamas as a “small issue” and claimed it was already disarmed—a statement that does not align with observable reality.

No one has claimed that Hamas has been disarmed. Across a wide range of sources, from both left and right, it has become clear that Hamas has effectively reconsolidated its power since the end of formal hostilities. It has regrouped and re-established control in areas from which the Israel Defence Forces had previously pushed it out. Hamas is not going anywhere. It has made that clear and has successfully weakened or eliminated internal opposition.

Various clans that conflicted with Hamas only months ago appear to have suffered significant losses and no longer pose a serious challenge, at least for now. We are no longer hearing about sustained internal conflict between Hamas and rival groups. That raises the question of what is actually being discussed when policymakers talk about disarmament or transition.

That is the first issue: Hamas disarmament, where Netanyahu and Trump appear to be taking conflicting positions. The broader issue is reconstruction—who will pay for it, how long it will take, and how it will realistically occur. At various points, Trump suggested that reconstruction would be limited to southern Gaza, which is under Israeli control.

Israel has reportedly committed to reopening the Rafah crossing, which could introduce significant new complications. Hamas remains present. The final body of an abducted hostage has not yet been returned, although Trump has claimed that its location is known. No credible security guarantees have been offered. None of the states approached by the United States has agreed to participate in stabilizing Gaza or guaranteeing that Hamas will not resume hostilities.

None of these core issues has been resolved. In practical terms, only areas under Israeli control could currently be reconstructed, but even that is uncertain. Israel cannot realistically maintain power for the estimated seven years required to clear rubble. The war has imposed substantial economic costs, and Israel cannot afford an extended occupation of that duration.

The funding issue is equally unresolved. Trump has claimed that Israel would contribute between one and two billion dollars toward clearing Gaza’s rubble, and that Netanyahu had agreed. There is little evidence of such a commitment, and it is widely doubted that Israel has the financial capacity to absorb that cost. Israel has already incurred heavy wartime expenses, including asset sales and expanded social obligations. The Knesset has authorized long-term mental health assistance for survivors of terrorism, particularly following October 7, after several suicides prompted internal concern. All of this carries high financial costs.

Israel is therefore unlikely to finance Gaza’s reconstruction. Kushner and Trump have both stated at different times that the United States would not pay for reconstruction, presenting the proposal as attractive to Americans precisely because U.S. taxpayers would not bear the cost. Instead, they suggested private investment and foreign donors would fund the effort.

Saudi Arabia has made clear it will not contribute financially while Hamas remains in power, viewing any such investment as futile. Without security guarantees, reconstruction risks being undone if Hamas resumes hostilities.

At other points, Kushner proposed that the United States would cover roughly half the cost—approximately $60 billion of a $128 billion plan—with unspecified parties covering the remainder. That would still require tens of billions of dollars from U.S. taxpayers, without congressional approval, security guarantees, or a mechanism to prevent the cycle from repeating. It is unlikely that most Americans would support such spending under those conditions.

What will happen to any money allocated for reconstruction? It would simply disappear. I do not believe Trump has any genuine intention of reconstructing anything. Kushner and Trump understand that such a project is impracticable and impossible to implement without first clearing Gaza.

There are numerous unresolved practical questions: who would approve such a project; whether so-called Gaza technocrats—who are unelected—would be accepted by the population as legitimate decision-makers; whether anyone on the ground would follow their directives; and whether ordinary civilians, not necessarily Hamas fighters, would refrain from sabotaging the projects.

The likely outcome is that the money would be absorbed into an endless process that goes nowhere. Costs would be distributed among various companies, and the project would quietly slip out of public scrutiny. We have already seen similar patterns. Kushner previously announced a $2 billion fund supposedly earmarked for Jewish schools in Israel, yet there is no public evidence that such funds were meaningfully disbursed. Comparable dynamics have appeared in Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project, where costs ballooned far beyond initial projections and only a fraction of the planned development has materialized.

In such cases, large sums are often raised, projects expand beyond feasibility, and failure is later justified as unavoidable. By that point, accountability has vanished. I suspect Gaza faces a similar trajectory. In plain terms, this resembles a classic confidence scheme. Grand plans are continually expanded to explain why earlier, smaller commitments were never fulfilled. Increasingly ambitious proposals mask the lack of intent or capacity, until those funding the effort realize—too late—that they have been misled. In this scenario, the people being misled are everyone outside the small group responsible for managing the funds.

Jacobsen: That framing echoes other warnings we have heard at Davos. We previously referenced repeated cautions delivered to European governments about the broader security consequences of ongoing conflicts. Garry Kasparov expressed a similar point more bluntly, arguing that the reason people in Paris can enjoy an everyday life is that Ukrainian soldiers are fighting and dying on the front lines. In diplomatic language, this amounts to a critique of European allies for failing to speak frankly or act decisively.

Some unusually candid remarks did emerge, including statements from Mark Carney and from Finnish officials. Against that backdrop, the United States has completed its withdrawal from the World Health Organization, following executive orders to exit or defund dozens of international and regional institutions, including parts of the UN system.

At the same time, senior U.S. figures have made several high-profile misstatements. Trump publicly criticized the Nobel Committee and appeared to conflate Norway, Greenland, and Denmark, even though Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, not Norway. He also repeatedly misspoke about geography, at one point referring to Greenland as Iceland. Elon Musk attempted a wordplay joke involving Venezuela and “peace,” which fell flat and drew little reaction.

Taken together, there is an excellent deal unfolding—particularly around Davos speeches—where leaders are speaking, sometimes bluntly, about issues within their spheres of concern, while U.S. messaging has often appeared confused or internally inconsistent. What is your assessment of these broader contexts, and of the pattern of American missteps we are seeing?

Tsukerman: The most significant takeaway for me was President Zelensky’s speech. He directly confronted European leaders and made the point that, four years into the war, Europe is still mainly in the same position as at the beginning. He noted that he stood in the same place last year, making essentially the same appeals. At that time, European leaders did not want him openly discussing long-range weapons such as Tomahawks to avoid political discomfort. We are now back in that same situation.

Trump has not delivered Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine over the past year, citing various justifications. Meanwhile, Kyiv, Kharkiv, and other cities have experienced widespread power outages during one of the coldest winters in recent memory due to Russian bombardment. Several countries have supplied generators, but the scale and type of military assistance required to weaken Russia’s defences decisively have not materialized.

Russia’s defences are not as formidable as often portrayed. Had Ukraine received that level of support earlier, Russian losses—particularly economic and industrial—would likely have been far more severe. While Russia has sustained high casualties and has a larger population to absorb them, the war has imposed significant economic strain, including the destruction of factories and manufacturing capacity. In my view, this industrial vulnerability is one of Ukraine’s most important strategic advantages, and European leaders have failed to grasp it fully.

Instead, Europe remains bogged down in debates over the legal handling of frozen Russian assets. This kind of legalistic fixation may be appropriate in peacetime, but not when Europe as a whole—not just Ukraine—is facing an existential security threat. Trump’s ability to attack Europe stems from perceived weakness and division. He sees people he can manipulate. Had Europe presented a genuinely united front and taken decisive action on Ukraine and its own security, Trump would not have been able to push these distractions very far.

Much of the time wasted on debates about Greenland illustrates this dynamic. The entire episode has been a farce. Trump’s remarks to the Norwegian prime minister made it clear that the issue was not about resources, Arctic security, Russian drilling, or long-term U.S. strategic interests. It was about ego, provocation, and testing NATO. For a long time, many actors played directly into that strategy.

When European leaders eventually engaged using Trump’s own language, they effectively handed him the appearance of a victory. In reality, what was presented as a concession was little more than a restatement of provisions already contained in the 1951 joint defence agreement. Trump himself had not read the agreement. Had he done so, he would have known that what was framed as a negotiation outcome was already within existing U.S. rights.

Europe was not conceding anything that the United States could not already do unilaterally. Trump perceived it as a significant win largely because he did not understand the underlying framework, and neither did much of the public. Many people were suddenly discovering Greenland without previously knowing it existed. Trump himself appeared to confuse Greenland with Iceland, despite Greenland being part of the Kingdom of Denmark and Iceland being a separate state.

Almost overnight, commentators declared themselves experts on U.S. security interests in the Arctic. Yet for years, no serious security officials—not even Arctic specialists—had argued that Greenland was the central solution to Europe’s or America’s security challenges.

When it comes to the sudden concern over the Arctic, I have difficulty taking it seriously. If something is genuinely a major national security priority, you do not begin treating it as such only after Trump decides he wants it. Anyone who did not consistently write about this issue for years or argue for its importance to policymakers before Trump raised it is not exceptionally qualified to speak on it now.

This is not how civil society is supposed to function. Think tanks and experts are meant to inform and advise administrations, not retroactively justify presidential claims after they are made. Many of the so-called experts who suddenly aligned themselves with this position have exposed themselves as intellectually unserious. Their opinions should carry little weight in future security debates.

All of this suggests that the Greenland episode functioned mainly as a diversion—from the Epstein files and from more substantive security threats, such as Iran. Trump made explicit promises regarding Iran and failed to deliver. While the circumstances differed, there were opportunities where decisive action might have prevented large-scale loss of life or significantly constrained Iran’s strategic ambitions.

That brings me back to why Zelensky’s speech resonated so strongly. He cut through the noise of debates among figures such as Mark Carney, the Finnish prime minister, and Trump over a so-called new world order versus the post–World War II international system. He dismissed those discussions as irrelevant. What matters is not how one labels the system, but whether leaders are willing to act—to secure borders and to prevent violent hegemonic powers from continuing to destabilize others.

Whether Carney is correct in arguing that international law is failing and power politics dominate is ultimately beside the point. The outcome is the same. No one stood up and said, clearly and unequivocally, that Ukraine would receive everything it needs to liberate its territory as quickly as possible, regardless of Trump’s position. No one made that commitment.

Zelensky was right to call this out. Davos has increasingly become another debating society. No one truly cares how the current situation is labelled, or whether international law technically applies. What matters is what leaders actually do in response to the concrete realities on the ground.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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