Everywhere Insiders 32: Nobel Peace Prize Misinformation, Venezuela Power Politics, and NATO Strains

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/02/02

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman dismantle claims that María Corina Machado won or transferred a Nobel Peace Prize, stressing the prize’s non-transferability and the political misuse of symbols. They examine how gestures toward Donald Trump can be framed as coercion, pragmatism, or failed leverage in Venezuela’s democratic struggle. The conversation then shifts to Uganda, where Bobi Wine’s body armor becomes a warning about authoritarian violence and electoral manipulation. They assess Iran’s repression, information blackouts, and deterrence options, including cyber measures. Finally, they interpret Greenland tensions as power projection, NATO stress-testing, and Kremlin opportunism.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: There have been reports and public claims suggesting that Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado received the Nobel Peace Prize. This is incorrect. Machado has not been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Consequently, no Nobel Peace Prize medal could have been legitimately transferred, dedicated, or presented by her.

The Nobel Peace Prize is awarded by the Norwegian Nobel Committee, and laureates are determined through a formal selection process. A prize cannot be reassigned, transferred, or symbolically “given” to another individual who was not selected as a laureate. Physical possession of a medal does not confer laureate status.

Despite this, public statements circulated in which Donald Trump appeared to accept or reference a Nobel Peace Prize medal as a gesture of appreciation. Such statements do not reflect any action or recognition by the Nobel Committee and do not imply that Trump was awarded, shared, or endorsed for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Irina Tsukerman: Any suggestion that Trump received the Nobel Peace Prize—formally, informally, symbolically, or retroactively—is false. Nobel Peace Prize decisions are final, non-transferable, and solely determined by the awarding committee after evaluating candidates.

Claims that Machado dedicated a Nobel Peace Prize to Trump, informed him of such a dedication, or referenced it in an acceptance speech are likewise inaccurate, as she was not a Nobel laureate and delivered no Nobel acceptance speech.

This episode illustrates how symbolic gestures, misinformation, or political theater can create public confusion about institutional honors. While political actors may express admiration, gratitude, or alliance through rhetoric or symbolic acts, these gestures carry no legal, institutional, or historical standing within the Nobel framework.

In short, Trump is not a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Machado is not a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and no Nobel Peace Prize was transferred, dedicated, or shared.

Some have argued that Machado effectively gave in to blackmail or a shakedown by Trump in order to participate in what should have been an internal Venezuelan process of forming future elections and shaping the country’s political future. It should not be up to Trump to serve as the sole or even primary decision-maker once Maduro is removed. He is not legally in charge of Venezuela, and there is no practical mechanism for him to assume such authority.

Critics argue that by relinquishing the medal, Machado was attempting to bribe her way into having a seat at the table, and that doing so encourages Trump to continue this kind of behavior in the future. I understand that argument and am sympathetic to it. I also understand that Machado may have been approaching the situation pragmatically.

From that perspective, if this is who Trump is and what he demands, then the gesture could be seen as purely symbolic—one that might open the door to more meaningful outcomes and potentially improve conditions in Venezuela. In that sense, the situation resembles the biblical story of King Solomon and the disputed child: a test of who is willing to sacrifice for the greater good rather than extract personal gain at any cost.

In my view, Machado was not simply yielding to a shakedown out of personal ambition. She may have been making a calculated sacrifice for what she believed to be the greater good. If the gesture could have persuaded Trump to include her and other democratic candidates and voices in a difficult reform process, it would have been a small price to pay for something so significant.

The problem is that there is little evidence the strategy worked. Trump agreed to meet Machado, but largely to receive the medal. There is no clear indication of any long-term shift in his position. Despite his effusive praise at the time, he never suggested that he intended to include Machado in the transition process or alter the direction of U.S. policy toward Venezuela as a result of the meeting.

In fact, developments point in the opposite direction. Trump held a phone call with the current vice president—whom even Secretary Rubio considers an illegitimate leader—and CIA Director Radcliffe has reportedly visited her. This suggests the United States is investing time and resources in engaging figures tied to the remnants of the Maduro regime. While these actors have taken limited steps, such as releasing foreign prisoners as a goodwill gesture, their rhetoric and conduct largely align with Maduro’s policies.

This pattern indicates that U.S. priorities may be less focused on democratic transition and more on securing a compliant ally who aligns with Trump’s interests. Machado, who appears genuinely committed to democracy in Venezuela, may not have fit that role. Her priorities would likely center on democratic reform rather than unconditional compliance with Trump’s demands, making her a less attractive partner than an authoritarian figure dependent on his support.

From this perspective, arguments that Trump prioritized oil interests and other economic or political benefits over democracy in Venezuela carry weight. It is far easier to control someone whose position depends entirely on his backing than someone who could emerge from an independent democratic process and therefore remain unencumbered by personal obligations to him.

For all the goodwill this gesture may have generated in the tone of the conversation between Trump and Machado, it did not reset his policy objectives in any meaningful way. It was naïve to believe that the gesture alone would change his position. If Machado hopes to redirect the process toward a more pluralistic outcome—one less aligned with Trump’s instincts and preferences—she will need to bring far stronger and more pragmatic arguments to the table.

Jacobsen: Turning to another case: the Ugandan opposition leader Bobi Wine has been campaigning in the town of Mukono while wearing a flak jacket and helmet, as soldiers fill the streets of Kampala ahead of a presidential vote. Photojournalist Hajara Nalwadda has noted that this offers an opportunity to document the reality of political repression, including tear gas and armed presence. Wine, a musician-turned-politician whose real name is Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, is challenging President Yoweri Museveni, who has ruled Uganda since 1986 and is seeking another term after repeatedly rewriting constitutional rules to remain in power. What are your thoughts on Wine wearing a flak jacket during what would otherwise be a campaign parade?

Tsukerman: Populism and highly visible messaging tend to resonate in authoritarian systems with underdeveloped political cultures, and Uganda fits that description. Wine is drawing attention to the fact that, as an opposition leader challenging a long-entrenched dictator, he is effectively a potential military target—vulnerable to abuse, intimidation, or even assassination attempts.

By wearing protective military gear, he underscores that this is not a conventional political campaign within a normal democratic process, but a struggle that carries real physical danger. Symbolism of this kind can be powerful and emotionally resonant, and it will likely attract significant attention.

That said, symbolism alone is unlikely to be sufficient. The incumbent retains overwhelming institutional advantages and is likely to continue abusing the electoral process regardless of the outcome, including through intimidation and terror against opponents. There is also the problem of political fatigue and cynicism among the population. After decades of authoritarian rule, many citizens may support the incumbent out of fear of reprisals or because they have been conditioned to believe that no better alternative is possible.

Wine’s approach is creative and compelling, and it sharpens the moral and political stakes of his campaign. Whether it is enough to overcome the structural disadvantages he faces and alter the outcome of the process remains highly uncertain.

Jacobsen: There have been no clear signs of new protests in Iran, though this is difficult to assess given the severity of the crackdowns and widespread internet shutdowns. A hardline cleric has called for executions and issued threats against President Trump.

Harsh repression since late December has reportedly left several thousand people dead. Earlier reports cited at least 2,500 deaths and approximately 18,000 arrests, including women and children. A U.S.-based human rights news agency later estimated as many as 2,797 deaths. Exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has referred to Trump as “a man of his word.” Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami’s sermons have reportedly incited chants calling for executions, including statements that alleged “hypocrites” should be put to death.

Russia has largely remained quiet publicly, while China appears to have supported Iran diplomatically. The current state of Israeli and American frontline commentary remains unclear. Within the Iranian diaspora, views are divided: some support strikes against the regime, while others oppose them, citing the limited benefits of past U.S. military actions. These views vary significantly case by case.

Tsukerman: The reported death toll is almost certainly far higher than what Iranian officials or even human rights organizations have been able to confirm. These figures reflect only cases that organizations can independently verify, such as individuals whose bodies have been returned to families. Realistic estimates may range from 7,000 to as many as 20,000 deaths.

The apparent subsiding of protests is largely due to the overwhelming armed presence on the streets. Attempting to confront the regime while unarmed under these conditions is extraordinarily dangerous and effectively futile. There have been reports of arms accumulation in some provinces through smuggling networks, but even if true, such weapons would likely be limited to light arms, such as Kalashnikov rifles. These are no match for the regime’s tanks, heavy weaponry, and advanced firepower.

Organizing resistance without reliable communication is exceptionally difficult. Launching any coordinated armed action during an internet blackout is unrealistic at this stage. While Russia may have disappointed the Iranian regime in some respects, it has continued to provide political backing through indirect messaging, downplaying criticism and attacking the United States and other opponents.

It is also likely that Russia and China assisted Iran in disrupting satellite communications, including efforts to interfere with Starlink access. This suggests a broader technological contest, as similar jamming techniques could be used elsewhere. The United States and its allies are now effectively racing to counter these technologies before they become a serious and persistent geopolitical disadvantage.

The effectiveness of strikes depends on context, target selection, and execution. That said, the regime has already been significantly weakened by Israeli attacks. Well-targeted strikes against military and IRGC facilities could further degrade its capabilities, creating breathing room for protesters and increasing pressure on the regime. This matters not only materially but psychologically, as it reinforces protester morale.

Such strikes would also send a message to the militias the regime has deployed in Tehran and the provinces to terrorize the population and reinforce its own forces. They would further signal that continued threats against the United States and its allies carry consequences. Even when no direct attack occurs, Iran’s constant escalation rhetoric imposes real costs. Israel, for example, has had to prepare for possible escalation despite reported understandings not to attack each other prior to the protests. That preparation alone can cost millions of dollars.

The regime is forcing other countries to expend resources even when it has no intention of launching an attack. That behavior should carry consequences beyond sanctions. Sanctions policy itself has been inconsistent. It is striking that some individuals recently sanctioned by the United States were not sanctioned earlier for well-documented abuses.

Many of these individuals have already moved assets out of U.S. and SWIFT-linked systems, particularly since Iran has been disconnected from SWIFT for some time. Funds have shifted into Russia-backed banks and alternative financial systems. As a result, travel bans and asset freezes may be largely ineffectual, depending on the individual case. While sanctions announcements carry symbolic political value, they often fail to add meaningful psychological, political, or economic pressure in practice.

The debate is frequently framed as a false dichotomy: either full military escalation or complete inaction. That framing is incorrect. Significant damage could be inflicted through non-lethal measures, such as cyber operations targeting technologies used for military coordination, repression, and communications jamming. These measures could have alleviated repression without producing severe negative consequences.

Trump’s decision not to pursue even these options sent a damaging signal to the regime—that the United States can be pressured into backing down through dubious or exaggerated arguments. I am also unconvinced by the prevailing narrative surrounding the decision to abandon strikes. At various points, Israeli, Saudi, and Qatari actors have been portrayed as influencing this outcome. It is unlikely Israel would have advised complete inaction, particularly given that Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to the United States on December 29—one day after the attacks began—was intended to secure U.S. support in case Israel needed to strike the regime’s renewed defense program.

Statements from Israeli defense officials over the past several weeks indicate that the primary obstacle to Israeli action was the United States, not Israel. Trump did not want Israel to engage until the United States took the lead. That is why Israel remained uninvolved, not because Israeli officials believed no action could be effective. It is difficult to imagine Israel opposing cyber operations.

Even Saudi Arabia urged Trump to pursue limited, surgical strikes against legitimate military targets rather than broad bombing campaigns. From the Saudi perspective, this was a legitimate concern: they did not want to become a frontline state. At the same time, it is unlikely the Saudis would have objected to significant damage to IRGC weapons depots, which would have reduced Iran’s ability to threaten the region.

The only regional actor with a strong incentive to ensure Iran faced no consequences was Qatar. Qatar maintains close financial, energy, and political ties with Iran, including an IRGC presence that reportedly helps safeguard the ruling family. It is plausible that Qatar exerted pressure on the administration to avoid action. It also serves Qatar’s interests to portray the United States as weak or easily influenced, enhancing its own image as a power broker.

Taken together, Trump’s last-minute decision to take no action—paired with the unsubstantiated claim that protests had subsided despite no clear evidence that the killings had stopped—suggests bad-faith arguments were likely made behind the scenes. Some believe Trump may still act later. One possibility is that he is waiting for naval assets to arrive in the region, which can take about a week. Others argue this is a deliberate feint, citing past instances when he initially claimed he would do nothing and later ordered strikes on Iranian targets.

However, past cases suggest these were not calculated fakeouts but rather instances in which Trump changed his mind after additional arguments or developments emerged. That could still occur here. Even so, it does not negate the concern that, for now, Iran has been led to believe the United States has backed away from its public commitment to protect protesters and has taken no concrete steps to do so.

Even members of the Iranian diaspora who oppose reckless or poorly conceived military action would find it difficult to argue that the United States should limit itself to rhetoric alone. Few serious observers contend that loud statements without action constitute an adequate response.

The central security concern is not whether action occurs, but whether it is effective, proportionate, and designed to minimize harm to civilians already under extreme pressure. Any response should weaken the regime rather than provide material for internal propaganda and should be structured to avoid escalation involving third parties in the region. Those concerns are legitimate and necessary.

The key issue is whether action weakens the regime rather than giving it material for internal propaganda, and whether it avoids escalation involving third parties in the region. Those are legitimate concerns, which means any operation must be carefully planned and strategic, not impulsive.

The United States has already demonstrated that it can act in a disciplined and professional manner when it chooses to, even against serious threats. The removal of Maduro from Venezuela made that clear. It is also worth recalling that in June, Trump reportedly urged Israel not to eliminate regime leaders when an opportunity arose. Given that history, the claim that Israel is now restraining the United States from acting is difficult to accept.

It is far more plausible that Qatar exercised behind-the-scenes influence. Qatar has substantial leverage with the administration through extensive financial ties and strategic cooperation. It is possible that Qatari officials persuaded Trump to back off either by misrepresenting conditions in Iran—something that cannot be ruled out, given Trump’s limited subject-matter expertise and similar gaps within his administration—or by offering inducements in exchange for restraint.

Secretary Rubio would likely have challenged misleading claims, but he was not the primary decision-maker in this context. Other figures involved are more susceptible to manipulation through false or selective information, and this has occurred before. The outcome we are seeing is consistent with that pattern.

Jacobsen: Shall we move to military developments or Greenland?

Tsukerman: Let’s discuss Greenland.

Jacobsen: European troops have arrived in Greenland as talks involving the United States have highlighted sharp disagreements. From a broader perspective, this is essentially NATO members disputing among themselves, which is both unusual and destabilizing. European states have expressed support for Denmark as discussions between Denmark, Greenland, and the United States have revealed fundamental disagreements over the Arctic island.

Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen stated that discussions focus on addressing American security concerns while respecting the red lines of the Kingdom of Denmark. The U.S. position has also been stated plainly. White House Press Secretary Caroline Leavitt said that the president has made his position clear: the United States wants to acquire Greenland, arguing that doing so is in its national security interest.

From one perspective, this raises an obvious question about NATO’s purpose. Collective security arrangements already exist, just not in the form President Trump appears to prefer. What are your thoughts on this dispute? Do you have any insights beyond the largely comedic commentary that has surrounded it?

Tsukerman: The substance of the issue is that there is no genuine necessity driving this situation. That is not because there are no legitimate threats to the region from Russia and China, nor because Arctic shipping routes are not serious national security concerns for both Europe and the United States. It is also not because Europe lacks legitimate challenges in terms of military preparedness for major conflict.

The reality is that the United States and Denmark have maintained a joint defense agreement covering Greenland since 1951. That agreement is precisely why the United States already maintains military installations there. It also allows the United States to station troops and deploy naval assets to secure Arctic maritime routes. No European state has attempted to block the United States from significantly securitizing Greenland against Russian or Chinese activity.

For that reason, the justifications offered for the current policy push appear to be excuses rather than substantive reasons. Trump’s rationale for acquiring Greenland has shifted repeatedly. Initially, he claimed that Greenland’s natural resources were critical to U.S. interests. That argument is weak: those resources are buried deep beneath frozen terrain and would take more than a decade to extract. Moreover, they would likely be refined in China, as the United States currently lacks sufficient refining capacity, which would also take years to develop. In addition, the United States already possesses substantial natural resources in Alaska and elsewhere that are far easier to access.

Trump then pivoted to national security arguments without clearly explaining how the United States is currently threatened. He has claimed that Russian and Chinese vessels are operating nearby. While intelligence activity has occurred, the United States already maintains superior surveillance and intelligence capabilities in the region. He has not articulated how acquiring Greenland would materially change the security situation or what additional tools the United States would gain that it does not already possess under existing arrangements.

Some argue that the goal is simply territorial expansion. If that were the case, pursuing Puerto Rico’s statehood would be far simpler, far less contentious, and geographically closer. Others claim Europe lacks the logistical capacity to secure the Arctic effectively. Yet the United States itself lacks sufficient icebreakers, which is why Trump has ordered new ones—an effort that will take years. None of this explains why ownership or control of Greenland is required rather than increased deployment under existing agreements.

Ultimately, this appears less about strategic necessity and more about exerting leverage over Europe. Trump has consistently framed Europe as a political problem, independent of Greenland. Much of this episode is about power projection, dominance, and cultivating an image of a leader who can impose his will. The messaging matters more than outcomes. It reassures his political base that he embodies the kind of strongman leadership they admire.

There is also a secondary factor: Russia has opportunistically threatened to pursue Greenland itself if the United States does not. This is a transparent attempt by the Kremlin to exploit NATO divisions, deflect attention from its illegal territorial occupations, including Ukraine, and equate U.S. foreign policy with Russian imperialism. The broader aim is to fracture NATO cohesion by forcing allies into conflict with one another rather than focusing on hybrid threats from Russia and China.

Trump appears to take these narratives at face value and has repeated talking points strikingly similar to Russia’s justifications for the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This is a serious concern for NATO unity and internal stability.

That said, Europe has not handled the situation flawlessly. Sending a minimal number of troops to Greenland does little to project resolve. While even Trump would likely hesitate to fire on allied forces regardless of their size, the symbolic messaging is weak. It reinforces Trump’s argument—however illegitimate—that Europe lacks independent military credibility without U.S. backing.

This feeds into his broader message: if Europe cannot defend its own interests, why should the United States respect European sovereignty? Why should the United States not simply prioritize its own interests unilaterally? That is the logic Trump is projecting.

If Europe wants to be taken seriously, it must adapt its approach. Trump does not respond to rule-based order, international law, or sovereignty arguments. He responds to power. The appropriate response, therefore, is overwhelming presence—even if it is not strategically necessary. This is about symbolism, image, and power projection. These are Trump’s preferred currencies.

Unless Europe learns to counter this style of politics on its own terms, Trump will continue escalating tensions. He is far less concerned with how his actions play in Moscow or Beijing than with asserting dominance and being applauded by supporters who favor this model of leadership.

Jacobsen: We will end this session here.

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