Why Canada Lagged on Samidoun and the PFLP: Hawala, Crypto, and Diaspora Financing
Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen
Publication (Outlet/Website): A Further Inquiry
Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/10/06
Part 2 of 4
Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.
In this 4-part interview with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, Tsukerman on Canada’s ongoing vulnerabilities in counterterrorism and extremist financing. Tsukerman traces the problem back to porous financial oversight, weak cooperation with allies, and the persistence of diaspora networks sustaining separatist and militant causes abroad. From the assassination of Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar to the activities of Samidoun and Tamil separatist charities, she highlights how groups exploit hawala, cryptocurrency, and fraudulent charities. Tsukerman also assesses landmark Canadian cases, such as R v. Khawaja, and explains why cartels like Sinaloa and MS-13 are now classified as terrorist entities. The discussion underscores Canada’s lagging enforcement and geopolitical consequences.
Interview conducted August 22, 2025.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Now, regarding Samidoun—I had not looked closely at this group until recently. Samidoun is a Palestinian prisoner solidarity network that the United States eventually sanctioned. In 2021, Israel designated it as a terrorist organization, citing its ties to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The U.S. subsequently restricted its activities and financial networks. In late 2023, Samidoun was exposed as essentially a sham charity that funnelled money directly to the PFLP.
The United States designated the PFLP itself as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in October 1997 and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity in October 2001. Which leads to the obvious question: what took Canada so long to follow suit? Canada only formally listed the PFLP in 2003 and has been even slower in addressing organizations associated with it, such as Samidoun. That means there was a gap of over two decades between U.S. action and full Canadian enforcement.
Tsukerman: To be fair, the U.S. did not prioritize Samidoun until relatively recently, when counterterrorism experts began raising alarms more forcefully, particularly after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel. At that point, the role of groups like Samidoun came under much closer scrutiny. The structure was not all that different from the Holy Land Foundation and other networks in the United States that were prosecuted in the early 2000s for funnelling money to designated terrorist organizations under the guise of humanitarian aid.
Why Canada lagged is unclear. It may have been due to political differences or simply inertia in Canadian counterterrorism policy. The U.S. actions took place under the George W. Bush administration, and in Canada, governments across different administrations seemed unwilling to act decisively. The result was that, for roughly twenty years, Samidoun and its affiliates operated openly in Canada, raising funds and building networks without consequence.
Eventually, it became undeniable. Not only was Samidoun connected to the PFLP, but the PFLP itself took part in the October 7th attack as a junior partner to Hamas. That made Canada’s delay deeply embarrassing and increased pressure from the U.S. and allies for Ottawa to act.
Another factor was the rise of social media. Previously, these networks could operate quietly—through websites, word of mouth, and community fundraisers. After social media, everything changed. They could reach broader audiences, recruit more aggressively, raise money on a larger scale, and insert themselves into mainstream political discourse. Their visibility, influence, and toxicity increased significantly.
The mechanisms they used were standard. They claimed their fundraising was for humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, but much of the money was redirected to fighters and violent operations. They utilized hawala networks—informal money transfer systems that operate outside traditional banking institutions. For example, in Canada, one person would hand over cash to a contact, while someone else abroad would provide equivalent funds to a fighter or operative. No money moved through the banking system, so it did not trigger red flags.
Sometimes, they used small businesses, such as cellphone shops or convenience stores, as cover. Other times, they relied on private family channels. All of it was designed to avoid financial scrutiny, and it can be very effective—until law enforcement and intelligence services begin systematically investigating.
Once you catch someone inside one of these financing networks, you can start to unravel the entire structure. You look into how that person is making money, and when one individual is caught and begins naming others, you can systematically dismantle the network. That approach was practical for a while. However, it is used less frequently in Western countries now, as people are more familiar with its operation.
Instead, extremist organizations increasingly rely on cryptocurrency. It is not that crypto is untraceable—law enforcement can and does trace it, especially since someone eventually has to cash it out. However, crypto is more expensive, complicated, and resource-intensive to investigate. It is also perceived as more secure, and fewer law enforcement personnel fully understand its mechanics, which makes it attractive to malicious actors.
There are also other sophisticated methods of moving money. Some of these organizations buy stakes in legitimate companies—including social media and media companies—and then sell or transfer those shares, often through intermediaries. Others set up shell companies and route money through thousands of layered transactions before it reaches its final destination. These schemes are more complex to trace than simple cash transfers or hawala, and they are usually used for moving substantial amounts of money—anywhere from six figures to nine figures. The complexity adds expense, but it also increases opacity.
Jacobsen: Let us talk about hawala. Hawala has historically been a key mechanism. Another example relevant to Canada involves the Tamil diaspora. Around 2010–2011, the Canadian government revoked the charitable status of organizations such as the Tamil Refugee Aid Society of Ottawa and the Canadian Foundation for Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation because of their suspected links to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
The LTTE was a separatist military organization based in northern Sri Lanka. It was militarily defeated in 2009, but it had created an extensive network of affiliated organizations abroad. Even after the military defeat, diaspora-linked groups continued to raise money and promote the cause, indicating that the movement did not entirely come to an end with the loss of armed control on the ground.
It is strange to think about. If you have been defeated militarily, why continue?
Tsukerman: Because if you have a cause, a battlefield defeat does not end it—especially for the diaspora. People outside the conflict zone do not have the same pragmatic concerns as those still in Sri Lanka, who may want to integrate, rebuild, and move on with their lives. In the diaspora, there is often more idealism and, in some cases, greater radicalization. These communities can raise funds, disseminate propaganda, and foster resistance long after the military conflict has ended. In many cases, the more extreme elements are funded and encouraged from abroad, while the people at home might be ready to stop fighting. Unfortunately, this pattern is typical across many conflicts.
Often, the people living in conflict zones—like Gaza—are more likely to reach a compromise or some form of agreement than their supporters abroad. Those in the diaspora do not pay the price of fighting. They live in relative comfort, removed from the daily dangers of conflict, and imagine scenarios that fuel their activism. The personal sacrifice required of them is far less.
This dynamic connects back to the Sikh separatists. India is often more frustrated with the diaspora activists in Canada than with the separatists still in India. At home, the government can contain violence, and communities eventually grow weary of fighting and settle down, at least temporarily. However, when supporters abroad keep the narrative alive—maintaining political pressure, sending funds, and amplifying propaganda—it prevents the situation from ever fully stabilizing. This is why India is so angry at Western countries for failing to shut down those networks.
While the Tamil separatist issue has been primarily contained in Sri Lanka after the defeat of the LTTE in 2009, other problems have emerged. Islamist extremism, as well as Buddhist nationalist extremism, have become prominent sources of violence and discrimination. The ethnic dimension of conflict is less pronounced than it was before, but religious tensions have now become a driving factor. The government has somewhat stabilized in recent years, especially after disastrous economic policies were rolled back. However, Sri Lanka still feels like a pressure cooker—unstable and at risk of future unrest. When I visited a few years ago, it did not strike me as a peaceful country.
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