Irina Tsukerman on Trump’s Trade Tactics, Sudan’s Islamist Resurgence, and Gaza Aid Breakdown

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): A Further Inquiry

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/08/09

Part 2 of 4

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and GasCommittee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. 

In this interview, human rights and national security attorney Irina Tsukerman joins Scott Douglas Jacobsen to discuss Donald Trump’s golf trip to Scotland, its political undercurrents, and the challenges of U.S.–EU trade talks under his zero-sum approach. She critiques Trump’s reluctance to pressure Russia meaningfully, outlines Sudan’s Islamist resurgence amid alliances with the military, and examines the RSF’s resource-driven power struggle. Tsukerman also addresses allegations of UNRWA’s ties to Hamas, highlighting stalled aid at Gaza’s border and bureaucratic failures that delayed humanitarian relief. Her analysis connects geopolitical maneuvering, resource control, and political opportunism to broader instability and diplomatic inaction.

Interview conducted July 25.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: In other news, President Trump has reportedly flown to Scotland to play golf and engage in bilateral trade talks with the EU. Quick thoughts on the golf, and more serious comments on the trade discussions?

Irina Tsukerman: Well, given how quiet the world is right now—sarcasm intended—I suppose it’s the perfect time to play golf in Scotland. That said, Trump rarely travels just for leisure. There are likely business angles involved.

There are actors in Scotland he’s worked with before. The Scottish National Party, for instance, has received financial backing from foreign sources, including Russia and Qatar. It’s precisely the kind of anti-establishment, anti-globalist movement that both Trump and Musk have tacitly supported in the past. Whether it’s symbolic or substantial, the fact that Trump is engaging in bilateral talks while courting those kinds of actors should not be overlooked.

It’s become, essentially, a proxy for foreign-aligned interference in the United Kingdom. These are the kind of figures who could informally meet Trump over lunch or during a friendly round of golf—and then, shortly afterward, we might see certain political developments emerge that align with those interests inside the UK.

Meanwhile, the Reform Party is gaining traction and appears to be getting support from American political actors—potentially even inspiring U.S.-style movements of their own, despite, or perhaps because of, their failings in the American context.

Now, regarding the bilateral U.S.–EU trade talks, the issue Trump faces is that the EU has significant leverage. That’s why his threats or pressure tactics don’t easily sway them.

Ideally, we would see a free trade agreement between the U.S. and the EU—one that removes most tariffs and fosters mutual market access. This is especially relevant now, as the EU seems increasingly open to trade with China, even as Chinese policies raise red flags, like the export of cheap electric vehicles, many of which come with concerns over data security and surveillance.

American goods, in comparison, should be welcomed. And if European consumers ultimately choose not to buy U.S. products due to price or preference, that’s simply market behaviour—no one can reasonably argue with that. But Trump has escalated what should be a trade discussion into a political and ideological conflict. He’s turned a trade disagreement into a political weapon.

For one, Trump operates under a zero-sum mindset: if someone wins, someone else must lose. He doesn’t accept that trade can be mutually beneficial—or mutually harmful. That framework has made negotiation virtually impossible.

Second, he carries personal and political grievances against various EU leaders, which limits his willingness to compromise. His rhetoric has antagonized the very people he should be cooperating with. In some cases, he and his allies—reportedly including associates linked to Moscow—have meddled in European elections. He’s also publicly insulted heads of state, undermining trust and goodwill.

He’s pressured EU nations into buying American military equipment, tying it to NATO spending benchmarks like the 2% GDP defence target. While that’s a separate issue, it colours the broader relationship and complicates trade discussions.

All of these factors make meaningful progress difficult. And frankly, Trump doesn’t seem to be taking the process seriously. He promised 90 trade deals in 90 days. So far, he’s sent about 25 letters of intent. He’s signed a handful of agreements with various countries, but none have eliminated tariffs. Many have been criticized for their limited scope or negative economic consequences.

Some of the deals have raised costs for U.S. consumers. Specific industries—especially those reliant on imports or exports—have suffered, with some businesses even closing down due to increased trade barriers. That economic fallout hasn’t gotten much coverage in mainstream news, but it’s affecting real people, including some of Trump’s supporters.

All of this is entirely avoidable—and tragic. It’s leading to fewer people, both here and abroad, being able to enjoy access to diverse, high-quality products, collaborate in international business, and prosper together.

I hope that, at some point, Trump is forced to wake up to the consequences of his actions. But his calculations don’t appear to be about long-term prosperity. They’re focused on winners and losers at any cost. Or worse, on exploiting market volatility for personal gain, whether through side deals or opportunistic investments.

If that’s the case, he probably doesn’t care how any of this impacts the U.S. economy or our relationships with allies in Europe.

Jacobsen: Trump is on record now threatening to enforce tariffs on Russian oil. Honestly, that might be the least surprising news of the day. 

Tsukerman: I think most observers, especially those familiar with Trump’s past rhetoric, were deeply skeptical that he would follow through with any real pressure on Russia.

At best, this kind of threat is rhetorical leverage. At worst, it’s a pattern. He previously gave Russia a two-week deadline for sanctions action. Nothing happened. Even months later, nothing followed. What’s your view?

This is likely just another empty threat. Trump consistently demonstrates an inability—or unwillingness—to move past his admiration for Putin, often framing him as a kind of strongman ideal.

For whatever reason—be it personal, political, or financial—Trump seems to have a persistent bias against Ukraine. Maybe it’s connected to his domestic political grievances involving prior administrations. Or perhaps he’s just so personally invested in the issue that he refuses to reverse course, regardless of new developments.

But what is clear is this: despite the public posturing, Trump’s actual steps in favour of Ukraine have been minimal, indeed, nowhere near the level needed to counterbalance the time and political capital he has spent accommodating Russia. He’s lost credibility with U.S. allies, and he’s shown a repeated unwillingness to apply real pressure on a country that openly considers the U.S. an enemy—one whose state media regularly broadcasts anti-American propaganda.

Economically, Russia isn’t even a viable strategic counterpart to the U.S. It has limited global economic value, and it remains firmly aligned with China. Trump’s continued posturing doesn’t strengthen America’s security or financial position. On the contrary, it weakens it.

If he were serious about sanctions on Russian oil, he would have acted already, instead of giving extended, meaningless deadlines that allow Russia to continue bombing Ukrainian civilians with impunity.

Jacobsen: Switching gears—Sudan. Islamist factions are plotting a post-war comeback, supporting the military to reassert their influence. Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: Honestly, that headline’s a bit outdated. Sudan’s Islamists never really left. They’ve been making a comeback from the earliest days of the war. The fact that they aligned themselves with General al-Burhan. One of the principal warlords in Khartoum. It is clear evidence of this.

They’re willing to make unsavoury alliances to reassert control. In supporting the army, they’re playing the long game: outlasting the chaos, re-infiltrating institutions, and preparing to shape Sudan’s post-war political order.

Some of the states are banking on Sudan’s eventual stability. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others have been willing to overlook what they would typically view as a primary strategic threat. Specifically, I’m referring to the reemergence of Islamists and allies of former President Omar al-Bashir. Many of these figures have been released from prison to support the Sudanese army’s war effort.

Ordinarily, that would alarm these countries. But in this case, they appear to see it as the lesser—or perhaps less immediate—of two evils compared to the threat posed by the RSF, the powerful paramilitary group challenging the state. Their decisions likely come down to existing relationships, regional alliances, and the individual agendas of key rulers.

The RSF, for its part, has received backing from Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and a variety of international mercenary networks. While consolidating control and playing into tribal dynamics within Sudan, the RSF has been looting Sudanese gold to enrich its foreign patrons. So this isn’t just a power struggle. It’s a battle over natural resources as well.

There’s also a growing conflict over port access. For example, UAE had proposed building a port in Sudan, but the capital rejected it. That’s added fuel to the rebellion and raised further questions about long-term economic and geopolitical control in the region.

Islamists have become a convenient proxy. Their ideological foundations date back decades. They’ve maintained support within many local populations, particularly in areas tied to the legacy of al-Bashir.

Once the active phase of the war subsides, the Islamists will almost certainly try to capitalize. They’ll cash in on the “favours” done for the military and leverage the weakness of a fractured government to expand their influence. This could mean anything from forcing the sitting government to adopt Islamist policies to outright seizing power.

If that happens, the modest reforms introduced after al-Bashir’s fall will likely be erased. Any hope of a transition to a civilian-led democracy will be buried. The longer this continues, the less likely it is that Sudan will return to a more liberal political track. Many reformers and ordinary Sudanese citizens have lost hope.

The silence and inaction of the West only reinforce the belief that there’s little appetite for serious reform, justice, or long-term stability. Western governments seem either distracted, disinterested, or unwilling to engage in robust diplomacy or aid intervention.

Jacobsen: And Trump?

Tsukerman: For Trump, it’s transactional. He may want the conflict to end, but he doesn’t seem to care who ends up in charge, so long as the fighting stops and U.S. interests remain untouched. Other nations seem to be taking a similar stance: whoever emerges victorious, they’ll work with them, provided regional stability isn’t threatened.

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