Global Terrorism Trends, Misogynistic Extremism, and Emerging Cybersecurity Threats – Insights from Irina Tsukerman

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): A Further Inquiry

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/08/12

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. 

In an interview with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, Tsukerman discussed global terrorism trends, noting differences between coordinated plots and lone-actor attacks, the distinct challenges of misogynistic violence, and the growing role of women in extremist activity. She highlighted emerging threats such as cyberterrorism and state–non-state collaborations, particularly between Russia and Islamist groups, signaling increasingly complex security challenges worldwide.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Today, we are here with Irina Tsukerman. I wanted to get your expert opinion on the breakdown of global terrorism. I have done some work and published content on counterterrorism, including in this particular Canadian-based publication.

One thing that has emerged from recent reports is that, in Canada, the majority of disrupted terrorism plots in recent years have been linked to individuals motivated by Islamist extremist ideologies. At the same time, completed attacks in the last decade have often been carried out by individuals acting alone, including those motivated by misogynistic, far-right, or other grievances. 

In the United States, law enforcement agencies have identified racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists—particularly white supremacists—as posing the most persistent and lethal domestic threat. Internationally, groups and individuals inspired by Islamist extremist movements—often associated with Salafi-Wahabi ideologies—remain responsible for the majority of mass-casualty terrorist attacks.

What are your thoughts on this, and how does it break down globally?

Irina Tsukerman: First of all, it is generally easier for security services to detect and disrupt a coordinated conspiracy involving multiple actors than a single, self-directed individual. Conspiracies generate communications that can be intercepted, and members may engage in logistical activity that draws attention. There is also a higher likelihood of infiltration or information leaks because more people are involved. This helps explain why multi-person plots are often detected earlier and disrupted more successfully than lone-actor attacks.

Ideologically motivated extremist groups—whether Islamist, far-right, or other—often draw support from community-based activities, such as in-person gatherings or online forums, which can facilitate both the spread of ideology and the recruitment of new members. By definition, group-based activity is easier to observe and track. That does not mean there are no lone actors inspired by Islamist extremism or no small conspiracies among misogynist extremists, but the operational patterns tend to differ.

Misogynistic violence presents different challenges for prevention and disruption. Individuals motivated by violent misogyny—such as those inspired by “incel” (involuntary celibate) ideology—often operate without direct coordination with others. They may conceal their intentions entirely, avoiding communications that could alert authorities. Their planning cycles can be short, their methods simple, and their ideological expressions less overtly linked to known extremist networks. This makes them harder to detect before an attack.

By contrast, Islamist extremists often do not conceal their ideological motivations entirely. With enough monitoring, patterns or “red flags” can emerge, such as online postings or communications with known extremists, which give authorities entry points for investigation.

Misogynistic extremists, however, may not belong to any formal organization or use coded language linked to an established network. They may appear to be ordinary members of the public until the moment they act. Even if they leave behind ideological writings, these are sometimes only made public after the attack.

An emerging factor is the development of misogynistic online communities—sometimes organized around social media influencers such as Andrew Tate—that blend lifestyle branding with grievance-based narratives. While much of this content originated in nonviolent “pickup artist” or dating-advice spaces, over time, certain corners have evolved into echo chambers that normalize hostility toward women. Initially, this shift was subtle enough to avoid significant law enforcement scrutiny. More recently, however, authorities have begun to recognize that such communities can be associated with domestic violence, harassment, and, in rare cases, acts of mass violence.

Jacobsen: As a point of clarification: is your mention of domestic violence meant to indicate that the extreme acts committed by violent misogynists—such as mass killings—serve as a visible but relatively rare manifestation of a broader base of violence, including more frequent acts like harassment and intimate partner violence?

Tsukerman: I would say that there is now a noticeable proliferation of generalized violence not necessarily driven by a coherent or structured ideology. Misogynists sometimes overlap with nihilistic groups whose members commit violence simply to prove themselves, without being motivated by a clear subcultural framework. Increasingly, these generalized nihilists are becoming a subculture of their own.

There is considerable overlap with incel communities, former “pickup artist” networks, followers of figures like Andrew Tate, and far-right groups in which misogyny is part of a broader ideological trend. I also think that individuals motivated by misogyny are more likely to be involved in other forms of violence that are not directly connected to misogyny. For example, they may engage in violence against each other in efforts to prove themselves, conflicts that resemble turf wars but without the organized criminal structure of a gang.

Such individuals may view violence as an acceptable way to communicate or resolve disputes. This means you also see violence from them that is unrelated to gender issues. That said, there are distinctions: some groups are explicitly focused on anti-woman ideology, making it central to their identity, while there has also been growth in violence among certain youth groups that is not expressly directed at women.

We see examples across different subcultures: there are actual Satanists, actual neo-Nazis, and then there are “fake” versions of these—individuals who may not understand the doctrines but adopt the insignia, violent imagery, and gore for shock value, posturing, or social appeal.

Jacobsen: What is the gender ratio of known acts of violence? I assume it is close to 100 percent male, but I cannot imagine it is exactly 100.

Tsukerman: Among Islamist extremists, there is a growing number of women directly participating in terrorism, as well as engaging in domestic violence—such as honour-based violence and killings—often against women and children. This is a dimension that is frequently overlooked.

In addition, there is a rise in women engaging in less-lethal but still aggressive or unlawful acts, such as vandalism, harassment, or street-level intimidation. More younger women are participating in these behaviours than in previous decades. For example, there was a case in Philadelphia where a Jewish woman from a radical leftist background joined forces with an Islamist Arab man to plan an explosive attack. The plot was foiled before it was carried out. Still, the pair engaged in acts of vandalism and defaced synagogues with graffiti. This case illustrates how some radical leftist women are becoming involved in violent or semi-violent activity.

Historically, during the peak of radical leftist activity in the 1960s and 1970s, many women were involved in militant movements. On the far right, there are fewer known female perpetrators. Still, several women support these movements ideologically and contribute through facilitation, logistical support, or resource procurement.

Among misogynist extremists, I am not aware of a parallel phenomenon in which women commit violence specifically targeting men because of their gender.

There has always been individual domestic violence against men within families, but this is typically not ideologically motivated—it is more often the result of personal pathology, psychological issues, or factors such as alcoholism and substance abuse. However, I would say that women being radicalized, even into far-right ideologies, is something that is growing. I see it online all the time: women openly expressing support for various forms of violence against their perceived opponents, even if they are not personally carrying it out.

Whether this will translate into more women becoming willing to engage directly in violent acts is uncertain. Still, we have seen notable examples, such as the number of women participating in the January 6 Capitol attack in the United States and the January 8 events in Brazil. While women still make up a smaller proportion of violent extremists compared to men, the base of ideological support among women in these spaces is growing and, in some contexts, is proportionally comparable.

Jacobsen: This is not the kind of gender equality we mean when we talk about women’s rights. 

Tsukerman: It is similar to how women have historically been underrepresented as serial killers.

Jacobsen: It is numerical equality in the wrong moral category. Now, what about new forms of terrorism that have been documented? And why does this translate into a new category? Also, as a quick note, terrorism refers to acts of violence with a political motivation, correct?

Tsukerman: Yes, correct. Cyberterrorism is one of the emerging forms of politically motivated violence. By “cyberterrorism,” I do not just mean hacking, data breaches, or sending political messages. I mean the use of cyber methods to cause direct physical harm, such as disrupting energy infrastructure, interfering with medical facilities in ways that endanger lives, jamming or hijacking drones, or taking control of devices in the Internet of Things (IoT) to weaponize them.

These threats are becoming more serious as the digital sphere and physical reality become more intertwined. As technology develops, new weapons and methods will inevitably emerge, creating new types of attacks.

Another evolving trend is the nature of cooperation among perpetrators. We are now seeing increased collaboration between state and non-state actors—for example, between Russian operatives and jihadist groups. Historically, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union trained violent liberation movement operatives, from the PLO to various African armed groups. Today, Russia has extended such cooperation to non-leftist Islamist groups. There is credible reporting of GRU training for al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives in Afghanistan, as well as partnerships of convenience with groups like Hezbollah and Hamas.

These relationships involve the provision of weapons, financial aid, political backing, and logistical coordination, even when ideological alignment is limited to a shared interest in opposing the West. While they may not be staging joint mass-casualty attacks at present, there is evidence of intelligence sharing and operational support, particularly in cyber operations. This suggests the potential for increasingly violent, integrated, sophisticated, and successful collaborations in the future.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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