Everywhere Insiders 41: Iran, Hamas, Russia, Nigeria, and Cyberwarfare

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/04/09

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Irina Tsukerman about intersecting crises shaping global security: U.S. strikes on Iran, the risks around Natanz, Hamas disarmament, Russian-Iranian coordination, Robert Mueller’s death, U.S. counterterror support in Nigeria, and Russian cyber campaigns targeting messaging apps. Tsukerman argues that Washington’s Iran policy remains multi-pronged, Hamas cannot be disarmed without enforceable control on the ground, and Russia remains strategically disruptive even when militarily constrained. She also warns that Nigeria’s conflicts resist simplistic narratives and that cyberwarfare increasingly exploits human vulnerability rather than technical failure. The exchange frames instability as interconnected, adaptive, and resistant to easy policy slogans. 

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: This first story is dangerous on one level and potentially de-escalatory on another. Trump has been claiming that he may wind down the war with Iran because, in his view, the United States is getting close to meeting its objectives.

Iranian state-linked media reported that the Natanz uranium-enrichment facility was targeted in a U.S.-Israeli attack. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, did not appear at Eid prayers, which drew attention given the significance of the occasion.

The broader strategic issue is whether the United States is meeting its political and military goals. So the first question is: what are the currently stated goals, and is attacking an enrichment facility with explosives inherently dangerous?

Irina Tsukerman: Regarding the first question, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated that U.S. objectives have not fundamentally changed. The stated goals include degrading Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, weakening its defense industrial base, targeting elements of its naval capacity, and preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

This does not represent a singular shift toward one objective, but rather a multi-pronged strategy. While the ballistic missile program has received emphasis, it is part of a broader operational framework rather than a newly exclusive goal.

There have also been discussions about substantial funding requests to Congress, reportedly in the range of $200 billion. Whether public framing of objectives is influenced by the need to justify such appropriations remains an open question.

Importantly, the nuclear issue has not disappeared from the stated agenda. Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon remains a central, explicitly articulated objective, even if rhetorical emphasis shifts among different operational priorities.

Regarding the safety of such an attack, there is always inherent risk when striking or operating near nuclear-related facilities. However, reports indicated that there were no confirmed radioactive leaks or immediate danger to surrounding populations following the strike on Natanz.

This suggests that, in this instance, the attack may have been limited to infrastructure rather than directly impacting enriched uranium stockpiles. That said, the overall risk profile depends on the specific targets, the condition and location of nuclear materials, and the nature of the strike.

Jacobsen: So the United States–backed peace framework has issued a Hamas disarmament proposal. Disarmament is a key condition; that is not new. Hamas has so far rejected the demand to lay down arms, also not new, and Israel remains in control of Gaza.

So this is a minor development. There were meetings in Cairo over the past week. The discussion involves Nikolay Mladenov and Aryeh Lightstone. Mladenov is a diplomat who has worked on Middle East peace efforts, and Lightstone has served as an aide to U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff.

Mladenov stated on the social media platform X: “It is now on the table. It requires one clear choice: full decommissioning by Hamas and every armed group. In this season, may those responsible make the right choice for the Palestinian people.” The article continues in a similar tone.

It appears largely procedural. The proposal formalizes what had previously been informal or unilateral efforts by the United States, now involving a broader group of countries and stakeholders.

Tsukerman: What has changed is the multilateral framing. However, Hamas is likely to reject this proposal, as it has rejected similar ones before. First, its ideological position has not changed. Second, the logistical situation has not changed. Third, no external body currently has the means to enforce disarmament.

Peacekeeping forces, even if deployed, do not typically have an enforcement mandate to disarm militant groups. Their role is to maintain stability, not to conduct offensive disarmament operations. While there have been suggestions that some forces could take on such responsibilities, this remains unclear.

The Israel Defense Forces would be the most plausible actor to carry out disarmament. However, such an operation would require full territorial control of Gaza, not partial control. At present, Israel does not exercise complete control over all areas where Hamas operates, making a comprehensive disarmament campaign unlikely in the immediate term.

It is also unclear whether any such operation has been formally planned or scheduled. Whether there is an expectation that international forces would first be deployed before further action is taken remains uncertain.

At this point, there is no clear mechanism to physically disarm Hamas if it refuses to do so voluntarily. No actor currently has both the mandate and the capacity to enforce such an outcome.

Some argue that if Iran’s support were significantly weakened, Hamas would be forced to disarm. That assumption is questionable. Even in a weakened state, elements within Iran could continue to provide support. Additionally, other regional actors, including Qatar and Turkey, may have incentives to maintain Hamas as a strategic asset.

For these reasons, a resolution does not appear imminent. Even if peacekeeping forces from countries such as Indonesia or Morocco were deployed, coordination would present challenges. These forces would need shared operational frameworks, common communication standards, and effective cooperation on the ground.

Jacobsen: They would all need to coordinate with every actor involved in this process, including Egypt, Israel, the United States, Qatar, and various Palestinian bodies, not to mention any multilateral peace framework. This is likely to be a very complicated process. Even in the best-case scenario—and I am not optimistic about that—it remains unclear whether all committed troops would deploy as planned. There has been no clearly defined timeline.

In 2025, the Russian Federation and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. This agreement emphasized cooperation but did not include a mutual defense clause obligating either side to enter a war on behalf of the other.

This brings us to the current development. On March 21, Vladimir Putin conveyed Nowruz greetings to Iranian leadership and described Russia as a reliable partner to Tehran. At the same time, the extent of Russian support for Iran remains contested. Some Iranian sources, as reported by Reuters, have indicated that Russia has provided limited tangible assistance during Iran’s most significant crisis since the 1979 revolution.

A reasonable interpretation is that Russia has offered diplomatic and rhetorical support while avoiding formal military commitments under the existing agreement.

Tsukerman: I would not characterize Russian involvement as purely symbolic. There have been multiple reports indicating that Russia has provided Iran with intelligence and logistical support, which could have operational implications for U.S. and allied forces.

Statements attributed to Kirill Dmitriev have suggested that Russia could alter its level of support depending on U.S. actions elsewhere, particularly regarding Ukraine. While Dmitriev is not a formal government spokesperson, he has participated in high-level engagements and informal diplomatic channels, which gives weight to his remarks.

Even if such statements were not officially sanctioned, they suggest a broader strategic posture. Russia may not be heavily engaged in direct military operations in support of Iran, but it is not a neutral actor. It appears to be contributing in indirect but potentially consequential ways.

The strategic intent behind these signals may include influencing internal political divisions in the United States, particularly between isolationist and interventionist factions. This could be interpreted as an attempt to shape the broader geopolitical environment rather than to commit to direct confrontation.

In that sense, Russia’s role is neither decisive nor negligible. While it may be constrained in terms of direct military capacity, it remains an active participant through intelligence, signaling, and strategic positioning. This should be taken into account in both political analysis and military assessment.

Using the death of a political opponent as a cause for celebration—someone roughly his own age, by the way—is telling.

Jacobsen: It is an excellent point. Trump turns 80 in June, so they are close in age. It is not surprising, because Trump has expressed triumphalist sentiments at the deaths of political or ideological opponents before.

Tsukerman: Still, it is a petty thing to say. His position appears to be that Mueller led a “witch hunt” against him. That mischaracterizes Mueller’s role. Mueller was appointed as special counsel to investigate Russian interference in the 2016 election and related matters; Reuters notes that his 22-month investigation led to charges against 34 individuals and entities, documented Russia’s efforts to sway the election in Trump’s favor, and did not indict Trump because of Justice Department policy against charging a sitting president.

It is also worth noting that the Senate Intelligence Committee’s findings on Russian interference were in some respects at least as damaging politically as Mueller’s own findings, because the committee backed the intelligence community’s conclusion that Russia tried to help Trump in 2016.

As for the immediate news, Mueller died on March 20, 2026, at age 81, according to Reuters. Trump responded publicly, saying, “Good, I’m glad he’s dead,” which triggered a fresh round of backlash.

Jacobsen: So the United States has multiple MQ-9 drones operating in Nigeria alongside 200 troops to provide training and intelligence support to the military, which is fighting Islamist militants across the north, according to U.S. and Nigerian officials speaking to Reuters. Thoughts?

Tsukerman: Broadly, that is a positive development, and it helps explain why U.S. officials have been emphasizing that Washington remains engaged in Africa. Reuters reported on March 21, 2026, that the drones are collecting intelligence rather than conducting airstrikes, and that the roughly 200 U.S. troops are not embedded with Nigerian frontline units.

That matters because the security picture in Nigeria is more complex than a single narrative about one group targeting one community. There are multiple armed actors, overlapping insurgencies, communal conflicts, and criminal networks. Islamist groups are a major part of the threat environment, but not the whole of it. So any claim that the situation can be reduced to one clean story is too simple.

It is also true that many Muslim civilians, not only Christians, have been targeted by jihadist groups and other armed actors in Nigeria. The conflict landscape includes Islamist militancy, communal violence, separatist tensions, and state capacity problems, often overlapping in the same regions.

What seems constructive here is that the United States is doing more than conducting occasional strikes. Training, intelligence-sharing, and institutional support are more useful over time if the goal is to improve Nigeria’s ability to respond on its own. The Nigerian state has long struggled with corruption, weak capacity, and overstretched security institutions. Additional training may help, even if it will not solve the problem by itself.

So I would put it this way: this is a useful step, but not a decisive one. It is more serious than rhetoric, more constructive than simplistic blame, and still far short of a solution.

Jacobsen: This one is directly from the FBI rather than Reuters, so I do follow other sources as well. The warning states that Russian cyber actors are conducting a global campaign targeting commercial messaging application accounts belonging to individuals of high intelligence value. The campaign has resulted in unauthorized access to thousands of accounts.

It relies on phishing techniques, including impersonation. Attackers send fake messages while pretending to be automated support accounts. They tailor the messages to deceive targets into clicking malicious links or sharing credentials. In some cases, the attackers then link their own device to a victim’s account and move toward a full takeover. What are your thoughts on that, as an example of intelligence warfare?

Tsukerman: It is not surprising. According to a joint FBI-CISA public service announcement, Russian intelligence-linked actors are indeed running phishing campaigns against commercial messaging application accounts. The agencies said the actors have compromised individual accounts, but not the apps’ encryption or the apps themselves. The targets include current and former U.S. government officials, military personnel, political figures, and journalists.

The methods described are broadly consistent with intelligence tradecraft adapted to the messaging-app era. The attackers impersonate trusted or automated support accounts, trick users into clicking malicious links or scanning malicious QR codes, and then abuse features such as linked devices or account recovery workflows. That allows them to read messages, access contact lists, and in some cases send messages while impersonating the victim.

From a defensive standpoint, this means organizations should not treat encrypted messaging apps as self-securing. End-to-end encryption is not the issue here; user compromise is. The most useful response is better training, sharper situational awareness, and routine warnings about fake support messages, verification-code theft, suspicious QR codes, and unexpected device-link prompts. That would help companies, institutions, and individual users reduce obvious breaches.

I am less optimistic about how widely that lesson will be applied. Smaller and medium-sized organizations often respond to cyber threats by saying there is always something new, budgets are tight, and they will accept the risk. Unfortunately, that pattern tends to produce more breaches, not fewer. On this point, the bureaucracy is usually the malware’s favorite intern.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina. 

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