Everywhere Insiders 39: Iran’s Regional War, Regime Resilience, and Strategic Drift

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/03/29

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen asks Irina Tsukerman about the regional consequences of the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran, Tehran’s apology to Gulf states, and the resilience of the Islamic Republic. Tsukerman argues that Iran’s rhetoric of de-escalation masks deliberate regional aggression, while leadership losses and military damage have not produced structural regime change. She also examines Turkey’s cautious NATO balancing, Cuba’s geopolitical value to Washington, corruption-linked infrastructure challenges in South Africa and Gabon, and chronic insecurity in Nigeria. Across these cases, she emphasizes a theme: without institutional reform, transparency, and long-term strategy, force alone rarely produces durable political transformation.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Another conflagration: the U.S.-Israeli bombing campaign against Iran, the reported killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior figures, and Iran’s retaliatory strikes across Israel and several neighbouring states. Reuters has described the opening assault as the most ambitious attack on Iranian targets in decades, and Iran responded with missile and drone attacks that extended the conflict across the region. There have also been renewed calls for negotiation and de-escalation under mounting international strain. Reuters further reported that Iran’s president apologized to Gulf states for attacks connected to the conflict as it spread regionally. This appears to be a regional war, even if all sides still hope to contain it. What is your assessment of the apology and of the sequence of events over roughly the past week?

Irina Tsukerman: The apology should be understood in the context of continuing Iranian military pressure rather than as a sign that the crisis is over. Reporting indicates that Saudi Arabia warned Tehran not to strike the kingdom and its energy sector again, even as Riyadh stated that it still favoured a diplomatic settlement. At the same time, Iran’s attacks have hit or threatened U.S.-linked and Gulf targets beyond its own territory. That means the apology does not erase the damage already done or the broader regional escalation now underway.

Azerbaijan has also accused Iran of involvement in a broader campaign of sabotage. Azerbaijani authorities have reported that they foiled Iranian-linked plots, including a plan targeting a major oil pipeline, following an earlier incident involving a drone strike at Nakhchivan airport. If accurate, those claims suggest a coordinated effort rather than an isolated or accidental episode. They point to a strategy aimed at pressuring neighbouring states and raising the cost of their alignment with the United States and Israel.

Regarding the strikes on Iran’s leadership, reports suggest that the United States and Israel accelerated the timing of their operation after intelligence indicated that the Supreme Leader was meeting with senior officials. The strike was reportedly timed to target leadership before they could relocate to more secure locations. However, intelligence assessments have also suggested that the Iranian system of governance—particularly the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—allows for relatively quick leadership replacement. In that sense, the removal of senior figures, while symbolically significant, does not necessarily translate into the immediate collapse of the regime.

That point is important because the available reporting indicates that the IRGC continues to exert substantial control within the Iranian political system and has moved quickly to stabilize leadership structures. Despite significant military and economic damage, there have not been widespread protests or visible elite defections following the strikes. Iran had already faced legitimacy challenges and protests earlier in the year, but those dynamics have not yet translated into a mass uprising during the current conflict.

In short, Iran has suffered substantial military and economic damage, but the current evidence suggests that the regime remains operational and has shifted into a strategy of endurance. Rather than expecting a quick military victory, it appears to be pursuing a longer-term approach that combines regional pressure, strategic retaliation, and attempts to outlast its adversaries politically and economically.

art of the reason may be that people are reluctant to protest while strikes are ongoing. They do not want to risk being killed or injured during continued shelling. Another factor may be that the regime’s January crackdown was so effective that it weakened the will to protest on a large scale. Regardless, even at their peak, the protests were never sufficient to destabilize the regime.

From what I understand, the regime may actually have been closest to serious internal pressure before the Trump administration entered negotiations last year, before the twelve-day war. Since then, it appears to have regained some strength and resumed rebuilding, both its nuclear program and its conventional capabilities. Those capabilities have again been significantly damaged by recent U.S. and Israeli strikes. However, it remains unclear where the nuclear program currently stands or what has happened to some of the underground facilities where the regime stores critical weapons systems.

In other words, it is not clear that the current campaign is doing more than setting Iran’s conventional military capabilities back by a few years—or perhaps only months—depending on how long the conflict continues and how quickly the regime recovers afterward. I do not see it necessarily causing structural damage to the regime itself.

Hezbollah has reportedly been formally banned in Lebanon, but it is not clear that this will translate into meaningful practical change. If Israel stops attacking Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon, the situation could revert to what it was before those strikes began.

I also do not see a strategic plan aimed at weakening the regime’s ideological and political hold over institutions in Iran or across the region. President Trump has called on members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to defect, promising pardons and possible integration into a legitimate authority. However, only a small number of individuals appear to have defected. There has been no large-scale defection of the kind that would significantly weaken the regime.

Reza Pahlavi, who has presented himself as a potential transitional leader, previously promised to facilitate mass defections among military and security personnel. That has not occurred. There have been some individual defections, and a few diplomats reportedly defected shortly before the start of the conflict’s kinetic phase. Since then, however, there have been no reports of major figures providing significant intelligence or assistance to the United States beyond what has already been implemented.

The U.S. administration’s shifting messaging about the objectives of the current campaign has also created confusion. At different points, the stated goals have included supporting protesters, focusing narrowly on the nuclear program, expanding attacks to Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, demanding regime change, and suggesting that the United States would play a role in shaping a new government. These shifts have not helped unify the opposition, reassure the Iranian public that their interests will be respected, or present a coherent national security strategy.

There have also been reports of possible negotiations with new leadership figures within Iran. In reality, these figures are not entirely new; they appear to be individuals from the same factions who have moved into more prominent roles within the existing system.

This also undercuts the credibility of a regime-change scenario. If these new figures are confirmed and the United States ultimately reaches a deal, it will not represent regime change; it will simply be another agreement with the same system under different leadership.

Much will depend on whether they accept the conditions the United States had previously placed on the Iranian government. Those conditions would include strict limits on uranium enrichment, the removal of enriched uranium to a third country, and significant curtailment of the ballistic missile program. However, given that the Iranian government has previously violated agreements and that the JCPOA functioned more as a political arrangement than a strictly enforceable treaty with symmetrical obligations, there is little reason to assume such an agreement would hold without broader institutional changes within the state.

Removing a few individuals does not dismantle the governing system. Institutional change would require restructuring the political framework, establishing credible civilian authority, revising the constitutional role of religious authority within the state, and fundamentally reorganizing the Islamic Republic’s governing institutions. None of that is occurring at present.

There also appears to be no concrete plan for such changes in the near future. Israel may prefer an outcome in which the Ayatollah-led Islamic Republic is replaced by a government less inclined toward regional confrontation. However, Israel does not possess either the direct means or a clear political roadmap to produce such a transformation.

At the same time, reports indicate that the United States is deploying large numbers of interceptor systems to defend against incoming missiles and drones. There have also been discussions between Qatar and Ukraine about the potential supply of lower-cost drone-interception technologies. Ukraine is reportedly exploring the possibility of exchanging such systems for greater access to Patriot missile defence capabilities to enhance its own protection. So far, however, these discussions have not produced confirmed transfers.

Meanwhile, several Gulf states have warned that prolonged disruption could severely affect global energy supplies. U.S. shale producers have indicated that they cannot immediately scale production enough to replace a major loss of Gulf oil and gas exports. One of the central issues is the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil shipments typically pass. If that passage becomes unsafe or restricted, there are alternative routes, but they are slower and more expensive, which would likely drive up shipping insurance, transportation, and global energy costs.

Another factor is that Iranian strikes or threats have targeted energy infrastructure in parts of the region, placing additional strain on energy-producing states already facing economic pressures. Some Gulf governments have also hinted that broader geopolitical tensions could affect their investment relationships abroad.

Unless a solution is found to guarantee safe transit through the Strait of Hormuz and to keep major refineries and export facilities operating, the situation could become extremely serious. In such a scenario, the limiting factor in the conflict may not be military capability alone, but the broader economic and energy constraints affecting all parties.

Jacobsen: This next topic shifts to Latin America. President Donald Trump said on Saturday, March 7, that Cuba wants to make a deal and that negotiations are taking place with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. He made the remarks during what he referred to as a “Shield of the Americas” gathering. Trump stated, “They want to negotiate, and they are negotiating with Marco Rubio and me and some others. I want to make a deal, and I think a deal could be made very easily with Cuba.”

Tsukerman: Interestingly, just a day earlier, Trump suggested the possibility of an “Iran-type scenario” for Cuba, implying potential military pressure that could remove elements of the government and replace them with leadership approved by the United States. The idea now appears to be to reach an agreement that would avoid direct military confrontation.

However, it is unclear what such a deal would entail. Unlike Venezuela, a major oil producer, Cuba does not have the same level of strategic importance for energy resources. Cuba’s significance is more political and intelligence-related. The Cuban government maintains an extensive intelligence network in Latin America and has historically supported governments and movements that oppose U.S. influence. Cuban security and intelligence services have cooperated with a range of states, including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

There have also been reports in recent years of Chinese intelligence facilities in Cuba, although the details remain limited and sometimes contested. One possible element of any agreement could involve limiting Chinese military or intelligence presence on the island. That might resemble earlier periods of strong U.S. influence in Cuba before the Cuban Revolution that brought Fidel Castro to power and replaced the Batista government.

However, such a scenario would not necessarily represent a democratic transition in Cuba. Trump has not presented the negotiations as a liberalization project or a plan for democratic reform. Instead, it appears more closely tied to questions of geopolitical influence in the Western Hemisphere.

It is also uncertain whether China would be willing to abandon its presence in Cuba. China has invested significantly in Latin America over the past two decades through infrastructure projects, trade relationships, and military cooperation. After setbacks such as the cancellation of major Chinese infrastructure projects in Panama following legal challenges, Beijing may be reluctant to withdraw further from the region. It may instead strengthen its involvement in other countries.

At the same time, political shifts have occurred across Latin America, with some governments moving toward more conservative leadership that is less aligned with China. That could reduce some of China’s strategic advantages in the region. Nevertheless, Chinese influence remains substantial at the infrastructure level and through economic partnerships, military training programs, and information networks.

Russian and Chinese media and information campaigns are also active in Latin America. Replacing China’s influence with a sustained U.S. presence would require far more than a short-term military or diplomatic initiative. It would require long-term investment, expanded diplomatic engagement, economic commitments, and sustained security cooperation.

At present, there is not a fully articulated policy debate in Washington regarding the scale of involvement that such a strategy would require. Questions of funding, oversight, personnel commitments, and long-term governance support have not been clearly addressed.

Looking at Venezuela illustrates some of these difficulties. Even when leadership changes occur or sanctions pressure is applied, rebuilding infrastructure and stabilizing governance can take many years and require substantial financial investment. The political outcome often remains uncertain.

It is relatively easy to talk about removing leaders or pressuring governments. It is much more difficult to reshape institutions, transform political systems, and maintain consistent influence in a region over the long term. Removing power is easier than sustaining it, and it is unclear whether the United States currently has a long-term strategy for maintaining influence across multiple regions simultaneously—from Venezuela to Iran.

Jacobsen: There was also the situation involving Turkey. Some of the airspace in that region appeared to be under threat. Statements from Turkish officials—reported through state channels and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—indicated that Turkey was prepared to defend its airspace, its territory, and its sovereignty if those were violated. Turkey also has NATO’s backing, including the protections under Article 5. Reports suggested that Turkish forces deployed F-16s in a precautionary posture. While these are not the newest generation of aircraft, they remain highly capable fighter jets. That deployment sends a signal. What are your thoughts on Turkey and the dynamics in that region?

Tsukerman: From what I understand, Turkey itself may not have been the intended target of the missile incident. It appears possible that the projectile deviated from its course or was directed toward another nearby country, such as Jordan. What is notable is how quickly NATO defences reacted. The projectile was intercepted before reaching its intended target, suggesting that NATO forces were already on alert and prepared for this scenario.

The response also carried a political message. Regardless of the debate surrounding the legality or legitimacy of the U.S. strikes on Iran, attacks on NATO member states would represent a clear red line. NATO’s reaction demonstrated that, at least at a basic level, the alliance remains committed to defending its members.

At the same time, Turkey’s political stance has been complex. The Turkish government has been critical of the U.S. strikes on Iran and has emphasized the importance of respecting Iranian sovereignty. This position is notable given that the Iranian government came to power through the 1979 revolution and has long faced criticism over human rights abuses and repression.

Turkey, therefore, is balancing multiple interests. On one hand, it seeks to avoid becoming a target of Iranian retaliation and to maintain regional stability. On the other hand, it continues to benefit from NATO membership and the security guarantees that come with it. This creates a situation in which Turkey can rely on NATO’s defensive framework while simultaneously expressing political positions that diverge from U.S. policy.

President Erdoğan’s government may also be using the moment to reinforce its own regional standing. NATO would still be expected to defend Turkey in the event of a direct attack, even if Ankara publicly criticizes aspects of U.S. policy. That dynamic allows Turkey to assert a degree of independence while remaining within the alliance.

At this stage, however, Turkey’s role appears limited. Turkey may be cooperating with Azerbaijan on intelligence matters related to Iranian activities, but there is no indication that Turkish forces are preparing to participate directly in the conflict. Nor has there been any formal request for such involvement.

For now, Turkey’s position seems largely strategic and cautious. It is maintaining its security posture, signalling readiness to defend its territory, and monitoring developments. Much will depend on how the broader conflict evolves. If a major energy disruption occurs, Turkey could be significantly affected, given its geographic role as a transit state for pipelines and energy corridors. Whether Ankara might attempt to leverage that position—through pipeline infrastructure or regional gas supplies—remains uncertain.

At present, however, Turkey’s involvement appears peripheral rather than central to the conflict.

Jacobsen: On that related point about Iran, there have also been statements indicating that Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, acting with a temporary leadership council, has approved the suspension of attacks against neighbouring countries unless those countries directly attack Iran. Are you skeptical of that statement as well?

Tsukerman: Yes. The statement is meant to signal de-escalation, but it also implicitly acknowledges that those attacks occurred. The announcement itself contradicts earlier denials and apologies. By declaring that attacks will be suspended unless neighbouring countries strike Iran first, the leadership is effectively admitting that those actions were taking place as a matter of policy.

At a minimum, it confirms that Iran had been deliberately engaging in activities widely interpreted as attempts to draw additional regional actors into the conflict. Now that some of those countries appear prepared to respond militarily, Iran is signalling that it prefers to avoid confrontation with them. Instead, it is seeking political pressure on the United States from regional governments without triggering a broader war involving the Gulf states.

Jacobsen: There is another development worth noting. The World Bank has reportedly backed roughly $350 million in funding to support South Africa’s electricity transmission infrastructure. South African Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana described the initiative as involving major investments in transmission capacity. The plan includes attracting private investment to build thousands of kilometres of new power lines and to expand transformer capacity.

South Africa has experienced more than a decade of severe electricity shortages, largely due to infrastructure failures rather than external supply constraints. At first glance, this investment appears positive. It could help address long-standing power shortages that have affected both economic growth and daily life.

Tsukerman: Infrastructure investment is certainly necessary, but the situation in South Africa is also tied to governance problems. The state-linked power utility responsible for electricity generation and distribution—Eskom—has faced repeated corruption scandals and operational failures. Investigations have exposed extensive mismanagement, and there have even been cases in which individuals connected to corruption probes were reportedly poisoned.

Because of that history, investment alone will not necessarily solve the problem. Without serious reform of the governance structure and strict accountability measures, the same patterns of mismanagement could continue. Any large-scale infrastructure investment should be tied to transparency requirements, anti-corruption safeguards, and strong oversight mechanisms.

South Africa has substantial resources and industrial capacity. There is no inherent reason it should be unable to maintain reliable electricity generation and distribution, as other countries in the region with fewer resources have done so. The key issue is governance.

Jacobsen: Related to that broader question of economic governance, the International Monetary Fund noted on Friday, March 6, that it has been discussing macroeconomic policy and growth plans with the authorities in Gabon. The IMF indicated that policy dialogue will continue in the coming weeks, including during the upcoming IMF Spring Meetings. This stage focuses on planning rather than the immediate disbursement of funds.

In countries with high corruption perceptions, do these kinds of negotiations typically require additional safeguards—particularly regarding anti-corruption measures, budget transparency, and oversight during implementation?

Tsukerman: Yes, that tends to be the case. International financial institutions increasingly attach governance conditions to their programs, especially in countries with persistent corruption concerns. These safeguards can include auditing requirements, transparency obligations, procurement reforms, and monitoring mechanisms tied to specific policy benchmarks.

Without those safeguards, financial assistance risks reinforcing existing patronage networks rather than supporting development. The challenge for institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank is balancing the need to support economic stability with the need to ensure that funds are used effectively and responsibly.

Whatever improvements may have been taking place in those countries are likely to be reversed if there is no clear push for transparency and anti-corruption measures. Even in democratic countries, when there is democratic backsliding and a weakening of accountability, it sets a tone that resonates elsewhere in the world. It becomes much harder for monitoring organizations and international institutions to press for those mechanisms when already corrupt states can respond by saying that the United States is not doing the same. If the United States is perceived as sliding down anti-corruption rankings, other governments may ask why they should be held to a higher standard. Unfortunately, that is the message that is likely to spread, if it has not already.

Jacobsen: Another item: the Nigerian army has reportedly killed 45 bandits in Katsina State. The incident occurred in the Dan Musa area of Katsina State, northern Nigeria, a Muslim-majority region. The armed gangs were said to have come from neighbouring Zamfara State. I interviewed the governor of Zamfara State last year, and I believe he is still in office. That adds an interesting layer of context, because Zamfara has at times been presented as comparatively progressive under its current leadership, though whether that is reflected more in rhetoric than in policy is another matter. This makes the case particularly interesting.

According to reports, the attackers rode into the village of Yar Haske in an attempt to steal cattle. They returned the following day, at which point troops were called in. The subsequent clash reportedly resulted in at least 45 bandits being killed. If the primary purpose were cattle theft or related rural criminal activity, then the term “bandits” would seem to fit. What are your thoughts on this specific case?

Tsukerman: Unfortunately, if you follow Nigerian affairs closely, as I have for several years, this is part of a long-running pattern. There has been a steady stream of such incidents involving organized criminal groups, some more violent than others, clashing with farmers, stealing property, especially cattle, and at times engaging directly with security forces.

The sheer number of these incidents highlights the weakness of law enforcement, the lack of effective social reforms that could create alternatives to criminal life, and the inadequate protections available to farmers and rural communities. The broader problem is structural.

The United States, rather than viewing what is happening in Nigeria as part of a larger need to support reforms and assist the government in building more effective institutions, law enforcement capacity, and public service delivery, has often focused narrowly on ISIS-related incidents. However, the underlying conditions that make ISIS recruitment possible are closely related to the conditions that sustain ordinary criminal recruitment: corruption, weak law enforcement, and deep social instability.

All of these issues need to be addressed through a comprehensive, whole-of-society approach. Otherwise, both crime and terrorism will continue. Airstrikes alone will not solve Nigeria’s problems.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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