Weaponizing Culture: Dr. Tetiana Boriak on Russkiy Mir and Cognitive Warfare

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/03/26

Dr. Tetiana Boriak is a researcher at the History Faculty. She got her PhD in History in 2008, and became Dr. Habil. in History in 2024. Tetiana Boriak was born on September 3rd, 1981. She graduated from Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in 2003. In 2004, she got her MA in history from this university, and in 2006, she got her MA in history from Kansas University (Lawrence, KS, USA). In 2008 she defended her dissertation thesis on the topic of documental heritage of the Ukrainian emigration in interwar Czechoslovak Republic (reconstruction of the so called “Prague Archives”). In 2015 received a title of Associate Professor. Since 2008 till 2016 worked in the National Academy of Managerial Staff of Culture and Arts. October 2020 – October 2022: Postdoctoral program at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Author of three books that got three awards. 

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen asks how culture becomes state power in Russia’s post-2022 doctrine. Dr. Tetiana Boriak, a Ukrainian historian of Soviet legacies and archival heritage, argues that “weaponization” long predates 2022, rooted in Leninist–Stalinist cultural engineering, Russification, and the manufacture of “Homo Sovieticus.” She traces today’s “Russkiy Mir” toolkit—films, textbooks, “traditional values” decrees, language programs, and youth militarisation—into occupied territories and abroad, alongside legal moves toward punishing “Russophobia” and replacing law with “historical truth.” Her prescription: defend rule-of-law norms, constrain influence networks, and amplify historians from former Soviet republics. She warns identity-shaping precedes tanks, and outlasts them.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Culture functions as strategic infrastructure. What are the mechanisms by which cultural policy becomes state power in the post-2022 Russian doctrine?

Dr. Tetiana Boriak: The problem starts immediately with the year posed in your question. The year 2022 is only a new period of weaponization of culture in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. To understand the problem, one has to turn to the Soviet period. Russia’s contemporary approaches to the humanities are grounded in the Soviet policy and practices. 

If you look at Lenin, Stalin, and Anatolii Lunacharsky (the first minister of education of the Russian Soviet Republic/the USSR in 1917-1929), you will see that weaponization of culture began there. They started using literature, education, cinemograph, and theater to promote the elimination of the unnecessary for the Soviet regime, “former people”. They created the concept of “National in Form, Socialist in Content,” which essentially produced a simulacrum of national cultures. So, all cultures, like a Ukrainian one in the 1920s – beginning of the 1930s, whose content was treated by the Kremlin as national, not socialist, were crushed (in Ukraine, Holodomor was one of the instruments of such a crush). The Soviet regime eliminated whole generations of intellectuals, destroyed their heritage, and cut off any mentions of them in the books and encyclopedias. In this way, Soviet citizens were isolated from “hostile” cultural influences (basically, the national ones). The Kremlin imposed harsh Russification, replacing education in native languages with education in Russian. They used culture, history, art, movies, and literature to promote the creation of “Homo Sovieticus” – the identity and formation of Soviet man, especially after WWII.

Since the end of the 2000s, the Kremlin has simply adopted these patterns, taking into account the new level of technological development. The Russian state creates a secure space for Russian art, theater, culture, history, and literature that work to strengthen Russian imperialism, hidden under the cover of “Russkiy mir”, “defence of compatriots”, “fight with Nazizm”, and “defence of Russia’s sovereignty”. Everything doubtful and threatening that does not fit these frames of Russia’s imperialism (covered as a special Russian state-civilization and a special path of historical development) is banned from this secure space. This image of Russia as a state with a special “great” language, culture, and literature helped to cover the Russian imperialism and totalitarianism – let me remind you that the last political Ukrainian prisoner was released in November of 1990, on the fifth year of Gorbachev’s Perestrojka. 

A combination of a specific outlook marked by disrespect toward former Soviet republics and Western democracies, as well as toward the law, together with imperial aspirations, a non-modernized Russian conscience, the absence of democratic traditions, and adherence to totalitarian principles of running the state, with the terror and fear being one of them, enabled the further transformation of general instruments of creative activity and cultural diplomacy into a weapon. The Kremlin simply activated this weaponry during the Russia-Ukraine war. Such a weapon was called to acquit the Russian military crimes committed in Ukraine, to support its claims for the surrender of Ukraine, and to further right to replace the rule of law with the rule of strength with no legal consequences for the physical (Georgia, Ukraine) or cultural occupation of other states’ territory (Belarus) or a hybrid version of occupation (Moldova). 

The mechanisms: Ruskiy mir advancement through: 

– the production of films, video games, and books; theater, dance, singing, music, and ballet shows; 

– participation in international activities (sport, scientific, artistic);

– spread of the Russian language abroad through a special program for teachers; 

– introduction of the new history textbooks for the Russian students and Ukrainian students in occupied Ukraine; 

– special program 85+4 (4 occupied regions of Ukraine) for trips to Russia as a tool of identity change (elimination of the Ukrainian one and its replacement with a Russian one) for the Ukrainian kids on occupied Ukrainian territories and strengthening of this identity for the Russian kids; 

– appropriation of Ukrainian history, literature, culture, and art.

Theoretically, taken apart, there is nothing bad in a book or a theater show. However, being part of the Ruskiy mir concept and militarized imperial mentality, these cultural products pose an essential threat to Western civilization. Creator of the Ruskiy mir concept and Putinism/Rashyzm, Vladislav Sourkov, confessed that he was looking for something to cover the Russian imperialism. And so he came up with the formula Ruskiy mir. 

Jacobsen: Many quotations come from legislation enacted after February 24, 2022. Which legal changes matter for transforming culture and heritage into influence instruments?

Boriak: To my mind, after analyzing the legislation in the sphere of humanities, Russia would like to make the crime of “Russophobia” punishable. The term is officially introduced in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept (2023). And the Russian state would like to fill the term with such a meaning: this is any disagreement with the Russian policy in every sphere: a monument to Pushkin, a Russian church and language, or the war against Ukraine. Since 2022, there have been even discussions on the implementation of the law on Russophobia with the right to punish foreigners for the crime of “Russophobia”. To my knowledge, the law exists as a draft. Before proceeding further in this direction, RF has adopted additional legislation. 

The presidential decree on the preservation of “traditional Russian spiritual-moral values” was issued in November 2022 and constituted the first post-invasion legislative act in the analyzed sphere. It exemplifies the interconnection of values, “historical memory”, and “historical truth”, the latter of which encompasses “positive Russia’s contribution to world history”. The Russian policy of preserving values is also evident in the country’s international relations: Russia will counter the dissemination of “destructive ideology in informational space”. Russia will establish an international image of the Russian state as the “keeper and defender of traditional all-human spiritual and moral values” and will increase its global role and “international prestige” by promoting its values on the international stage. The concept of “mass consciousness” is employed in the discourse surrounding state information policy, strengthening the role of values, resistance to “destructive ideology”, and the state’s efforts to popularise them.

The strategic RF’s documents, adopted on the policies of values, foreign policy, historical enlightenment, and cultural policy, to varying degrees, mention the term “historical truth” to defend the state and justify its wars and policies, both internal and foreign. So, this notion is basically called to replace the notion of the law. Combined with the claims of Russia as a “State-civilization”, preservation of “historical truth” and fight with its distortion and (neo)Nazism, traditional and cultural-historical values, Role/contribution of Russia into the world history/culture/civilization and even “historical conscience” (sic), implementation in practice on these grounded legally points enables comprehension of culture as a weapon to defend the imperialist interests of the Russian state.

After all, the Concept of Foreign Policy openly declares that instead of “rules” in international law, there should be the right to express the will of “sovereign states”. In general, I see a Russian vector of intentions to reform international law. Why? International law is one of the last bastions that allows it to exert economic and political pressure on the RF and maintain at least some order in the world. The first step in this direction is a declaration of response to “unfriendly actions” against historical and memorial Russian objects abroad and sanctions against Russians. The second is the intention to change international standards in the field of human rights protection and the media.

Jacobsen: How is the Russkiy Mir worldview projected outside Russia?

Boriak: We have a horrifying example of identity transformations on the basis of Russkiy mir in the occupied territories. Ukrainian patriots are murdered, imprisoned, or forced into exile. No Ukrainian-language space is left. Russian teachers teach students according to the Russian curriculum and school textbooks. Militarization is everywhere, even in kindergartens. The glorification of the Russian army is underway. Ukrainian monuments are demolished, and new monuments are erected to glorify the Russian imperial or Soviet period, or Russian military and political heroes and writers. The streets are being renamed back –Ukraine renamed them as part of the decommunization process after 2014. 

Outside of occupied Ukrainian territories, similar processes are taking place, but without the demolition of the Ukrainian monuments and imprisonment of Ukrainians. Monuments to Pushkin are erected in the countries that are “friendly” to Russia, for instance, Venezuela. 

Belarus is a striking example of the expansion of Russkiy mir. The state became the foothold for the Russian army’s invasion at the beginning of the war in 2022. Belarusians demonstrate a decreasing use of the Belarusian language in everyday life: from 36,7% in 1999 to approximately 25% in 2019, while Belarusians comprised 80% of the population. One can assume that, following the 2020 repressions and the emigration of many people from the state, this percentage is now even lower. The history books are rewritten to eliminate national heroes and to prove the “eternal” will of the Byelorussians to unite with the Russians in a single state. The Russian language is widespread; Belarusian cultural life in the Russian language includes Russian artists, culture, artifacts, and senses. 

Russian influence in African cultures spreads to the Russian Orthodox Church, which is proven to be not only a church but also a direct instrument in shaping public mentality toward Russkiy mir acceptance. African leaders support “immortal combat” – an action initiated by Russia to celebrate victory over Nazism and to raise military patriotism. In 2024, Zimbabwe unveiled the first monument to the USSR’s victory in the Second World War on the continent. This is the gradual legalization of Russia’s right to solve its problems in a military way: an advisor of the Central-African Republic, Fidel Huandzhyka, compared Wagner militaries with the Soviet soldiers and stated that Russia saved the world from Nazism and continues this war against evil nowadays (against Western civilization, according to the Russian claims). By the way, this RF’s presence in Africa also pushed many Africans to participate in the war against Ukraine. For instance, 1,000 citizens of only one country, Kenya, were recruited by Russia for the war. 

In 2024, a journalist, Iryna Kashchey, and a researcher, Massimiliano Di Pasquale, in Italy, noticed “geopolitical narratives pushed by the Kremlin” in Italian textbooks. The research published the next year touched 28 popular textbooks on geography and history. The authors concluded that these textbooks basically reproduce “untruthful Russian narratives of three epochs: tsar Russia, USSR and Putin’s Russia”: “Crimea by itself left Ukraine”; “civil war” on Donbas, positive image of Communism, “Russian city Lviv”, “Ukraine is a poor country and produces mainly weapon”, “Odesa in located in Crimea”, “Eastern Europe starts in Siberia” etc. In several years, these children will have the right to vote based on their school knowledge.

The network of the “Russian houses” abroad is the agent of Russian influence. There are now 87 Russian houses in 71 states. 

Participation in Olympic and Paralympic games, in various European cultural projects, on the stage, in art galleries and museums, and international organizations (UNESCO, library, museum, and archives associations, despite destruction and looting of cultural heritage in Ukraine and violation of the Ukrainian and international law) promotes legitimization of the Russian crimes, inviting the Russian state to continue committing its crimes. 

In sum, according to V. Sourkov, the Russian state needs “permanent expansion”. 

Jacobsen: Language policy framed as protection or unity occurs. How does official doctrine language redraw identity boundaries?

Boriak: As the creator of Russkiy mir and Putinism, V. Sourkov’s statements shed light on Russia’s policies. I will quote several of his important, to my mind, reflections on Russkiy mir and Russia’ cognitive warfare. So, he confessed that “Russia intervenes into their [foreign politicians] mind, and they do not know what to do with their transformed consciousness” – and “they [politicians, the world] only think that they have a choice”. He describes ‘special sovereign’ development of Russia, “natural and the only possible condition of the great, increasing and the community of the peoples that collects lands” – the role, “assigned [by God? – T.B.] our country in the world history”. This model is “an effective tool of survival and elevation of the Russian nation… most likely for the whole facing century”.

Sourkov confirms the role of senses and emotions in the war Russia is launching. First, one has to create “waves” – to fill “the mental matrix” of Russians on the basis of “the archetypes of our national consciousness”, i.e., such a type of political system that implies ‘tsar’ with the expansion of the state through either endless military campaigns and wars, crimes against humanity, occupations, glorification of all military leaders and victories. The content of the “mental matrix” is tied to art, culture, literature, history, and the social domain, presented to the outer world as RM, with Rus and Peter the Great as one of Russia’s principles, but filled inside with the striving to lead the wars and dominate the world. Only having prepared the mind, political tools can “ride the waves” and “spread out in all directions, as far as God wills”.

He continues: “I built an official ideology based on the concept of the Russian world, which already existed in philosophical circles. The Russian world has no borders. The Russian world is everywhere where there is Russian influence, in one form or another: cultural, informational, military, economic, ideological, or humanitarian [a notion of humanity might also be included in this term]… In other words, it is everywhere. The extent of our influence varies greatly from region to region, but it is never zero”.  And finally, covering Russian aggressive militarism under the guise of ‘historical ratio’, he openly demonstrates the goals of the Russian foreign policy: “For Russia, permanent expansion is not just another idea, it is the existential condition of our historical existence.”

This approach is part of a cognitive warfare aimed at transforming the enemy’s mentality (see point 7).

Jacobsen: What are signature themes of the state-sponsored historical narrative emerging after 2022?

Boriak: This question concerns two parts: the distortion of history and the goals of such falsification. 

First, V. Medinsky, V. Putin’s assistant since 2020, former Minister of Education (2012-2020), and an initiator of the creation and head of the Russian Military-Historical Society since 2013, was one of the authors of the new history schoolbooks introduced in the 2023-2024 academic year after an open-scale invasion. He openly confessed that these textbooks are written through the prism of “reunification of Ukraine with Russia”.

These textbooks teach students that the Russian state has no borders. The textbooks show no respect for Russia’s neighbors, their sovereignty, or their history. The concept of brotherhood nations (a Russian and a Ukrainian) excuses Russia’s war against Ukraine and transforms it into a civil war in Ukraine with no Russian external army. The umbrella of “common historical memory” allows the elimination from public discourse of any crimes committed by the Soviet state against its republics.

Ukraine is desubjectivized. The term Rus, used to describe the old Rus state centered in Kyiv and along the Dnieper River, is presented as equivalent to Russian, appropriating thus medieval Ukrainian statehood and its heritage. Eastern Slavs until the 15th century were called “Russian people” or “Russians”, The chronicles in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were written in the Russian language, appropriating thus Lithuanian history as well. There was no Lithuanian, Polish, or Ukrainian colonization of the eastern and southern regions, and no Ukrainian population lived there; these empty lands were settled by Russians. 

The arguments from the Soviet historiography are used: the Ukrainian government from the time of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (1918-1920) is called “bourgeois-democratic”; the Bolshevik army appeared in Ukraine in 1918 because the Ukrainian Soviet government expressed “a wish” within the framework of establishing “federal relations” with Russia. Basically, only those Ukrainian governments and leaders are considered progressive who agreed to be dependent on Russia, while the national liberation movement of Ukraine from different periods is described as such, which was not supported by the local Ukrainian population.

Textbook’s introduction “Our Motherland – Russia” (6th grade, 2016) says about huge territory and people who inhabited these regions in the past and live now, mentioning various languages, including Slovak, Estonian, Polish, Ukrainian, Finnish, etc. and concludes: “The history of numerous peoples living on the territory of our state is a constituent part of the history of Russia”. Thus, Greek cities of the northern Black Sea region, Scythian Tsardom, “steppe and forest-steppe territories of Eastern Europe to the Dnieper”, and “forest region from the Baltic Sea to the Ural Mountains” are presented as part of Russian history. Another conclusion says that “ancient city-states in the territory of the northern Black Sea region were the first states on the territory of today’s Russia”. Russia gained physical access to the former Greek city-states not through wars over the territories of foreign peoples, but through the declaration that such states were created by “people belonging to different language families”. The achievements of Russian culture include “monuments of Kyiv, Pereiaslav, Chernihiv, Halych, frescoes of Sophia Kyiv Cathedral, first schools and libraries, book miniatures” – heritage created on the territory of Ukraine where Ukrainians live now.

Territorial gains are presented as a process of return, “accession, transformation and expansion” with the aim of “defense”. So, further expansion on Ukrainian territory in the XVIII century is presented as a return, “entering” or “joining” (including Zaporizhzhia, Crimea, Left-Bank Ukraine, etc.), with arguments for the right to simply take back what once belonged to Russia. 

The history of the twentieth century is given through the “great” stages of the creation of the USSR, industrialization, collectivization, and Soviet national policy, the Second World War, with non-Russians on the sidelines. The famine at the beginning of the 1930s in the USSR occurred in the “state of happy workers”. There is no people’s will and needs – only the will and the needs of the emperor/general secretary/president/authorities.

“Others” as people who inhabited Russia are listed with emphasis on their ethnographic features, beliefs, culture, such as underdeveloped backward people who have not even reached the level of nations and have to be ruled by enlightened civilized Russians, and are not always grateful for being part of the “great and powerful” Soviet state.

The imperialism of Russia is presented as a norm, as a peaceful, voluntary expansion of the Russian state, in contrast to the “colonial expansion” of Western countries. Administration of the imperial space is presented as “effective measures of imperial unification”. “The Fundamentals of the State Policy in the Field of Historical Education” (2022) openly states that one of the conceptual tasks is the popularisation of the “military-industrial complex of Russia and military history”.

So, distortion of history is called partly to replace critical thinking with short and easy-to-remember cliches: “Kyiv is the mother of the Russian [in the original – Rus] cities”, “Moscow is the Third Rome”, “heirs of the Great Victory”, “Russia nevel lost any wars”, “Ukrainians are Nazis”, “God’s chosen people”, “rotten West”, Ruskii mir, “great Russian culture”, “defense of the rights of the Russian-speaking people”, “genocide of the Donbass people” etc. 

Secondly, it is not only about falsifying history. As noted above, the term has been introduced into legislation (“historical truth”), which is called upon to serve as the basis for resolving questions in the international arena. That is why the lectures on “pechenegs and cumans”, as Ukrainians sadly joke, have become part of the Russian foreign policy. The same with the narrative of the “Great Victory” in 1945 by solely the USSR/Russians and the great contribution of Russia to world civilization, which calls to excuse any violation of international laws and the committing of military crimes by Russia. That is why the entire presidential decree was adopted in 2024 on the “historical enlightenment,” calling in particular the occupation “historical unity.” Vitalii Pichugin defended his whole dissertation on “historical consciousness”. The latter, which has historical memory as its center, is not about comprehending the past and human intentions in commemorating the victims of calamities, but the “foundation of ruling the state” [italics in the text – T.B.]. Defense of Russian society’s historical consciousness has to secure it “with the goal of formation of love and pride for our fatherland”.

So, history in Russia became an essential and vital political, diplomatic, and military weapon aimed at dominating the global information space and advancing the national interests of the Russian state. Also, history called to contribute to the creation of an alternative reality inhabited by eternal Russian victory, glory, grandeur, myths, and heroes, aimed at preparing the Russian population for the military change of the borders on the European continent. The topics in history textbooks presented through the lenses of imperial grandeur, brave Russian soldiers, and the success of “voluntarily” joining the Russian territory of numerous peoples legitimize Russian foreign policy and wars, together with V. Putin and the contemporary Russian authorities. Finally, Russian patriotism, as an agreement to obey the state and participate in its wars, is also shaped by history textbooks that do not set any boundaries between Russia and other states and glorify the Russian state and its corresponding ruler.

So, history had been turned into a religion to be believed in without doubt. It is now making the law of history in the form of ‘historical truth’ the final argument, accompanied by open invasion (in the form of the military intervention) or an invisible one (Russkiy mir expansion).

Jacobsen: You document rapid militarisation: expansion of cadet classes and a Youth Army: approximately 1.6 million members. What does this militarisation look like for students and teachers if framed as such?

Boriak: As part of the militarization policy, the “Strategy of the State Cultural Policy” openly declares that implementing the state cultural strategy will result in an “increase in the number of children participating in thematic sessions on military-history themes”.

Militarization is a constituent part of education in the Russian kindergartens. Small kids march in military uniforms during miniature copies of military parades and play militarized tales on the stage. The latter includes imitation of shooting, the murder of a “soldier” and grief over him, normalizing thus the war, conquer of other countries, and serving in the Russian army. 

Schools represent the next stage in the militarization of the conscience of Russian kids and youth. There is a commemorative activity called a ‘heroes’ desk’. It glorifies former students from the corresponding schools who died in the war against Ukraine. School activity of all-year-round commemoration of numerous battles and military conflicts from the Russian past contributes to the normalization of violence and war as an ordinary part of Russians’ lives. History textbooks persuade that the goal of every citizen is to defend their motherland and explain why this defence often takes place in other countries. Stalin is glorified as a leader who brought the sacral “Great Victory” and transformed Russia into a powerful state. 

Since 2014, special cadet classes have been created in schools, in addition to the existing cadet institutions. In January 2022, there were 26,000 students in 260 schools in Moscow alone. The war definitely contributes to the increase in the number of such military-trained students. In general, there are more than 7000 cadet classes in Russia. All “power ministries” have their own cadet classes or institutions.

Weaponization of culture and humanities, combined with militarization of outlook, resulted in the creation of a specific aesthetics of death and war with no moral restraints, and in a cognitive framework that always acquiesces to the employment of this aesthetics to go to war. 

Special Youth Army numbered 1,6 million in May 2024. Its members have their own military structures that duplicate the Russian Army’s structures, including the General Staff. 

Movement of the Firsts numbered 6,5 million members in May 2024. Ukrainian youth from occupied territories are actively included in the militarization process by the introduction of the Russian curriculum, the spread of cultural information products with corresponding glorification of the Russian army and serving there, and cadet classes. In 2025, the British Intelligence finally acknowledged that Russian “aggressive expansionistic moods for further perspective” will prepare “physical and mental resources for new invasions in the future”. 

Jacobsen: If we treat this as an ideological campaign, what indicators should researchers and policymakers watch?

Boriak: It is not an ideological campaign. It is a civilizational warfare defined as cognitive warfare. In 2021 Andrei Ilnitskii, an advisor to the head of the Russian Headquarters Valerii Herasimov, argued that the 21st century had witnessed the emergence of a new type of warfare: a ‘mental’ [cognitive] one, essentially concerned with identity. Its goal is “elimination of self-consciousness, change of mental, civilizational foundation of the enemy’s society. … The task of cognitive warfare, as of any other one, is to deprive the object of influence of sovereignty and to put it under the outside ruling. … [bold in the text – T.B.] One can destroy the state and liquidate the country by having changed the self-consciousness, outlook, goals, values, and priorities of the society. Cognitive warfare is aimed at changing the outlook. By the way, the Armed Forces and infrastructure can be restored, but the evolution of outlook is not possible to return”. 

This is a “total war” against everything, aimed at the senses (mind) and emotions (unconscious). The strategic goals imply “restart of historical consciousness, of the system of education and bringing up, that is of basic senses and goals of this society, that is ideology, including rewriting (erasing of history, liquidation of traditions, lifestyles, faith (religion) and basic values”.

Other main ideologists of Putinism/Rashyzm agree. V. Medinski concluded that “Russia is ready to fight forever”. Sourkov also points that in Russia, “military-political functions” are “the most important and decisive”, and nobody hides them in Russia, unlike in other countries, because “an immanent feature of every state to be a tool of defence and attack.”

Jacobsen: Can you give a concrete example of how this cognitive warfare works in cultural production?

Boriak: So, here’s what I found as a horrifying example of the weaponization of culture. The plot. Several days ago, I saw a Russian music show featuring a male singer, portrayed as a soldier, and a female singer. The song was about eternal love that will keep this singer/soldier alive during the war against Ukraine. The singer/soldier had a nickname, “Maestro”. Now the trick begins. The same nickname “Maestro” had a very positive hero in the Soviet movie about the Second World War Tytarenko (played by a Soviet actor of Ukrainian origin Leonid Bykov). The movie is called “Only old men are going to battle”. Tytarenko/Bykov was a squadron leader who fought against the Nazis during the war. He sang a Ukrainian song and spoke warmly about Ukraine, which he was flying over as a pilot. So, how does cognitive warfare work? The first step: since 2022, the Russians have cut any mentions of Ukraine from this movie, replaced two Ukrainian songs with Russian ones, and dubbed Tytarenko/Bykov with a Russian actor. The second step: the Russian propagandists have taken one of the most positive heroes in the Soviet cinematograph associated with the fair war of the Soviet citizens against the Nazi occupiers. With just the nickname, the Russians link this positive, heroic image of a pilot to a contemporary Russian soldier. And the actions of the latter – the war against Ukraine and occupation of Ukraine – thanks to this positive association, become associated with a good action of defense of the motherland, as Tytarenko/Bykov did in the movie.

By the way, the image of a female singer (white dress, white socks with ruffles) is from the fashion of the 1920s – 1980s, contributing to the positive linkage of the Soviet past and the ongoing war of Russia against Ukraine as a fair one, as well as to the equalization of Ukrainians with Nazi against whom Tytarenko/Bykov was fighting. I was triggered by this nickname, even though I have not watched any Soviet or Russian movies since 2014. Unlike me, the Russians often see movies about the war, including WWII, on Russian TV as a part of the militarization of their outlook. So, they will definitely be triggered in their subconscious, with corresponding replacement of the senses and images. Hope I put it clearly. And this is just one recent example. Can you imagine how many other senses have already been replaced in the cultural objects, products, and projects?

Jacobsen: For wars of meaning, what responses are effective?

Boriak: How to react? To keep the spirit of the law. Not to allow any plays with “historical truth”, especially in times of war against another state. Do not allow politicians to employ history in their political activity. To comprehend the danger of culture and humanities as a weapon employed by Russia. To understand the militarized imperial outlook of not only the Russian authorities, but also Russian citizens in general. Not to allow them to leave the war with Ukraine unpunished. To limit the activity of their agents (church, Russian houses, official cultural, artistic, and scientific activities). Remember about Russia’s weaponized outlook: everything that could be used as a weapon will be used as a weapon by this state. To keep in mind Russia’s plays with history and to point out the Soviet and Russia’s wars and imperialism. To listen to the historians from the former Soviet republics who possess the tools to destroy Russian optics, still used by Western academia. To keep in mind that the role of the Russian language is to serve as the channel of indoctrination with the Russian outlook and ideology. And finally, remember about cognitive warfare led against you and your state when your national identity, language, culture, literature, and history might not always remain your shield against Russkiy mir expansion. 

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Tetiana.

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