Sergiy Tomilenko on Journalist Safety, Solidarity Centres, and War Reporting in Ukraine

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/03/18

Sergiy Tomilenko has been President of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU) since 2017. Under his leadership, NUJU helped build a network of Journalists’ Solidarity Centres, supported by UNESCO and the International and European Federations of Journalists, to provide workspaces, equipment, training, and emergency assistance during Russia’s full-scale invasion. In the interview, Tomilenko argues that drone warfare has expanded the practical danger zone well beyond the immediate line of contact, and he describes parallel crises: journalist detention in occupied territories, targeted strikes on civilian infrastructure used by reporters (including hotels), and the economic collapse of many local outlets. He also notes that different watchdogs track media-worker deaths using different definitions, and he urges sustained international pressure for the release of detained Ukrainian journalists.

Sergiy Tomilenko, president of Ukraine’s journalists’ union since 2017, explains how NUJU’s UNESCO-backed Journalists’ Solidarity Centres became lifelines—workspaces, protective gear, training, and emergency aid—during Russia’s full-scale invasion. He says drone warfare stretches risk far beyond the front, while detentions in occupied territories and strikes on civilian infrastructure (including hotels) endanger reporters. He notes safety guidance shifted in 2024: avoid visible “PRESS” markings. Scott Douglas Jacobsen presses on misinformation and embedded reporting; Tomilenko argues that escorts impose security limits, not propaganda. With revenues collapsing, watchdog counts diverging solely by definition, and burnout rising, he urges pressure to free detained journalists.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: The legitimacy of information matters. Not through standard processes, but through flooded social media networks. People go to social media, pick up disinformation and misinformation, and that changes what they think they know and how they read. Even if the articles are the same, the frame they bring to those articles changes. There is a place for social media as a first-pass filter, but quality checks and fact checks, however imperfect, require people with professional experience who put time into making these reports, like yourselves and others do.

Tomilenko: The level of media literacy is insufficient, and ordinary people consume news on social media and other sources. They are consumers of news and media, and it is not easy for them to find reliable information or protect themselves from disinformation. Russians try to use safety concerns or other triggers because people are very afraid.

Jacobsen: What about foreign journalists—non-Russian, non-Ukrainian—who go with the military or associates to frontline areas? They may be toured by Russian forces or by Ukrainian forces. What are the risks for journalists in terms of independent reportage in this war, when reportage is guided in some manner? Is that something journalists should keep in mind, that what they see and the stories they receive can be filtered?

Tomilenko: As I see, if journalists are going to the frontline and are escorted by press officers or the military, we do not see pressure from the military or press officers on Ukrainian or foreign journalists about how to cover events. There are concrete limitations related to national security, but it is not about instructing journalists to cover certain political figures or to present only positive information about the Ukrainian army and only negative information about the Russians.

I think this system of official military communication, with press officers—there are hundreds, maybe thousands, of people involved in this communication infrastructure in the army—does not function as an infrastructure for pressure or propaganda against foreign journalists. As you see with the Associated Press, Reuters, CNN, The Globe and Mail, and other major Western media, there are no accusations of systematic pressure.

You, as journalists, can remain independent when covering the war in Ukraine. We see a lack of foreign journalists in Ukraine. So press officers are very receptive when foreign journalists request to travel to the frontline or to areas close to it to cover topics.

In general, we do not see a system of pressure on journalists or political restrictions. All restrictions are concrete and comparable to limitations in Western armies or in police emergencies. They are not political limitations. So independence isn’t the main problem right now.

After the full-scale invasion began, we created our own hotline for journalists during the war, called the Network of Journalist Solidarity Centres. You visited Lviv and are now in Kyiv at our office. At this moment, our main focus is supporting frontline Journalist Solidarity Centres in Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia.

We are glad if foreign journalists, like you, go to frontline regions—not necessarily the open frontline, but areas close to the frontline in Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia. Our colleagues can support with renting safety equipment, organizing access, and advising on local topics, interesting subjects, and sources of information.

It was a good idea to create this network of small hubs in the regions. UNESCO’s headquarters appreciates this work and is one of our key partners. UNESCO launched a special program called Safe Spaces for Journalists in Crisis Zones, and the creation of Journalist Solidarity Centres in Ukraine was the initiative’s first stage. For this moment, in Gaza, three Solidarity Centres have been created following the Ukrainian model.

This is infrastructure mainly for Ukrainian journalists, and we try to support Ukrainian journalists in emergencies—for example, when people try to leave occupied territory or after a journalist is injured during the war, as in the case of five journalists who were deliberately injured while working as journalists.

Jacobsen: When wearing protection—personal body protection, helmet, and vest —it is advised not to wear “PRESS” now. To be very explicit: whether at the frontline or not, the recommendation is not to wear visible “press” markings.

Tomilenko: Yes, after the beginning of the full-scale invasion, our recommendation in 2022 was to use “press” markings, following UNESCO safety guides. This changed later, mostly in 2024.

For example, I discussed this with our colleague Vasyl Miroshnyk, editor of a frontline newspaper. He explained to me last year that, after the full-scale invasion began, the main targets for the Russians were military vehicles and infrastructure. But in 2024, Russians increasingly attacked civilians. So we do not recommend that journalists—whether foreign or otherwise—use “press” inscriptions. We recommend using neutral black or blue helmets and protective gear without visible markings.

Jacobsen: To return to the foundational point of this entire war, regardless of political rhetoric or prior geopolitical disputes, broken promises by administrations and regimes, the core issue is international law, international humanitarian law, and the crime of aggression. Starting with Crimea in 2014, expanding over the years, and escalating significantly on February 24, 2022, we are now entering the fifth year of full-scale war.

The crime of aggression, followed by annexation, carries obligations under international law for any occupying power. We must not frame occupied territories as empty spaces. There are people there. Abuses are happening there. With that foundation, where do you see the role of the Solidarity Centres and the network within the country in the information space? How do they help ensure that accurate information is available so that fewer human rights abuses happen because those who can act have reliable information?

Tomilenko: Our role and our goal are to support journalists in need and to help them remain professional and responsible, producing accurate information. It is very important to provide support and networks so that journalists do not leave the profession. They should remain in the field and continue their work.

We see very serious mental and economic challenges for journalists. Some have lost their homes in occupied territories, lost their media outlets, or lost revenue as editors. Many colleagues are exhausted and are considering leaving the profession. The role of our Network of Journalist Solidarity Centres is to organize infrastructure and create an atmosphere of solidarity and mutual support among journalists.

For example, at the Zaporizhzhia Journalist Solidarity Centre, we created a so-called club of evacuated journalists. Journalists from temporarily occupied areas of the Zaporizhzhia region now live in Zaporizhzhia, which is under Ukrainian government control. At our centre, we gather about 30–35 journalists from the occupied territories. They need to be part of a community of journalists. They dream about returning and about rebuilding their audience. We train them to improve digital media and reach audiences, including refugees and others.

For example, within our journalistic community, some media outlets were restarted. As I mentioned, a local newspaper in the Zaporizhzhia region was revived. The editor-in-chief of this newspaper, Svitlana Karpenko, relocated from Zaporizhzhia because it is an open frontline city. She stopped operations at the start of the full-scale invasion and lived in Zaporizhzhia’s city center. Because she became part of our community of evacuated journalists, she decided, with our support, to restart the newspaper.

In April 2023, one year after the beginning of the full-scale invasion, she restarted it. Now she continues with support from international donors and others. If we had not created such a network and instruments for mutual support, many of our colleagues, especially in the regions, would not have remained in the profession or would not have remained here.

We encourage our colleagues to be responsible journalists. We do not encourage them to produce pro-Ukrainian propaganda or anti-Russian propaganda.

Jacobsen: When people try to charm me or pressure me, I respond that ‘I am not here as pro-Ukrainian or anti-Russian. I am here as a pro-human rights, and I try to present the case accurately.’

Tomilenko: For Ukrainian journalists and media workers, and for every Ukrainian, this is war in Ukraine. Russia is waging war against Ukraine and is trying to kill Ukrainians. As you see, at this moment, the most pro-Ukrainian city is Kharkiv.

Before the full-scale invasion, Kharkiv was often described as more pro-Russian. People there were neighbours with Russia, and some sympathized with Putin or Russia. They were not necessarily critical of European Union integration, but there were many political discussions. Now, Kharkiv is strongly pro-Ukrainian because people see that Russians want to kill them, not be their friends.

I think many Ukrainian journalists and media workers try to support Ukraine when covering events, but primarily they support Ukrainian citizens and the Ukrainian people. That does not mean producing propaganda.

Jacobsen: For opinion polls conducted ideally externally or internally and independently, but surveying Ukrainian sentiment about Russia, Putin, Zelensky, and the direction of the country, have people become more unified in their sense of identity and opinion about the war, or not?

Tomilenko: Yes, Putin has created a more united Ukrainian nation.

Jacobsen: A new patriotism, in a way.

Tomilenko: Yes, a new patriotism. Before the invasion, there were many political discussions in Ukraine. For example, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Mariupol were sometimes described as more pro-Russian cities. But after the invasion, we saw the Russian army try to destroy cities in the west and south. Now, some people still sympathize with Putin or Russia, but not openly. Those are marginal views, not a general trend. If people want to support Putin, they can go to Russia.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Sergiy.

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