Ukraine vs Russia Foreign Fighters: Mercenary Law and Predatory Recruitment

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/03/13

Dr. Dmytro Koval is an international law scholar and practitioner. He serves as Co-Executive Director and Legal Director at Truth Hounds, a rights organization that documents and investigates crimes. Koval is an Associate Professor of International and European Law at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and sits on the International Advisory Council of Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office. He has held research fellowships at Stanford University, CEU, Jagiellonian University, and the Academy of Sciences.

Denys Sultanhaliiev is a Senior Researcher at Truth Hounds, the rights NGO that documents and investigates war crimes and other crimes. His work focuses on building evidence-based reports, interviewing witnesses and prisoners of war, and translating field findings into legal analysis for accountability efforts. At Truth Hounds, he has contributed to research on Russian practices, including occupation-related abuses and conflict-linked violations, and regularly briefs audiences on investigative methods and findings in Ukraine.

In this discussion, Scott Douglas Jacobsen interviews Dr. Dmytro Koval and Denys Sultanhaliiev of Truth Hounds, with Roman Koval noted for research oversight. Koval explains that international law defines “mercenary” narrowly, so many foreign fighters fail the cumulative test. He contrasts Ukraine’s enlistment, framed as self-defence under UN Charter Article 51, with Russia’s widely characterized aggression. Sultanhaliiev describes Russia’s “predatory recruitment”: exploiting migrants in Russia, coercion via police pressure, and overseas intermediaries who mislead recruits about civilian jobs. Incentives fluctuate regionally, while trafficking cases remain under investigation. They also flag drone factory recruitment of vulnerable women in practice.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: People understand that in wars, individuals with prior military training or combat experience sometimes join foreign armed forces. In Ukraine’s case, the full-scale phase has now lasted nearly four years, and the broader conflict has continued since 2014.

For those who volunteer and join the Ukrainian Armed Forces, how does that context differ from the Russian case, in which individuals from countries such as Kenya, South Africa, India, or North Korea are recruited or sent to fight on the aggressor side?

Dr. Dmytro Koval: Recruitment by foreign armed forces is not unusual in human history. Foreign nationals have long fought for causes beyond their own national communities. This has continued even after the development of international legal rules aimed at limiting mercenarism.

Under international law, “mercenary” is defined narrowly. The criteria used in key instruments—such as Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Article 47) and the UN Mercenary Convention—focus on factors including whether a person was specially recruited to fight, takes direct part in hostilities, is motivated essentially by private gain and promised material compensation substantially in excess of that paid to comparable members of the armed forces, is neither a national nor resident of a party to the conflict, is not a member of that party’s armed forces, and is not sent by another state on official duty.

Because the definition is cumulative and restrictive, many foreign fighters—whether on the Ukrainian or Russian side—do not meet the legal criteria for “mercenary,” even when that label is used in public discourse.

There are, however, significant differences in how Russia and Ukraine recruit foreign fighters. The primary distinction concerns the side for which they fight: a state exercising self-defence in response to an armed attack, or a state widely described by international bodies and legal experts as engaging in an unlawful use of force.

Ukraine is acting in self-defence, relying on the UN Charter framework, including the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51.

Jacobsen: Since 2014, the UN General Assembly has adopted multiple resolutions affirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity and addressing the status of occupied territories.

Koval: Russia, by contrast, is widely described in international legal analysis and by numerous international bodies as waging a war of aggression or committing an act of aggression.

The UN Security Council has not adopted a resolution formally determining aggression in this case, largely because Russia, as a permanent member, can veto such action. International courts and tribunals can address associated violations—such as war crimes and crimes against humanity—but the crime of aggression has jurisdictional constraints that often depend on Security Council referral or state consent.

Nevertheless, many international resolutions and expert legal assessments characterize Russia’s conduct as aggression. Participation on Russia’s side may therefore be understood, depending on the circumstances, as contributing to an internationally wrongful use of force.

Participation in the war on Ukraine’s side is framed as an effort to restrain violations of international law through a lawful response to aggression—namely, self-defence. That is a core difference between the causes for which Ukraine recruits and those for which Russia recruits.

Another significant difference concerns the recruitment process itself. We have not seen reports of the Ukrainian state recruiting foreigners through coercion or systematic deception. There may be misunderstandings or unmet expectations, but these differ substantially from the practices attributed to Russia.

In contrast, Russia’s recruitment practices, in some documented cases, appear to approach or cross into conduct resembling human trafficking. Recruitment has reportedly been conducted through intermediaries or brokers operating abroad. Some foreign nationals were allegedly promised civilian employment in Russia unrelated to military service. Upon arrival, they reportedly signed contracts with the Russian armed forces that were not translated into their native languages, and some were then sent to training centers or deployed to the front.

Such practices raise serious legal concerns and differ from transparent, voluntary recruitment. We are also studying differences in how foreign recruits are treated. At this stage, we cannot draw firm conclusions. However, media reports and some testimonies from family members and individuals who were recruited into the Russian army suggest instances of mistreatment.

The available information does not yet allow for a consolidated conclusion about the overall nature of Russian practices. We have heard significantly fewer allegations of mistreatment concerning foreign volunteers on the Ukrainian side, and we have not seen credible evidence indicating systematic racial discrimination or comparable abuse within Ukrainian forces.

These differences may prove significant, but our research is ongoing, and we are not prepared to present conclusions.

That is all I can add for now. We have conducted interviews with foreign prisoners of war who fought in the Russian army.

Jacobsen: The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported in 2022–2023 that it interviewed several hundred prisoners of war. Approximately half of the Russian POWs interviewed reported torture or ill-treatment. That was one area of symmetry in the early phase of the full-scale invasion.

However, there was an important distinction. Ill-treatment of Ukrainian POWs reportedly occurred primarily during detention by Russian authorities. In contrast, reported ill-treatment of Russian POWs by Ukrainian forces occurred more frequently during capture, transit, or initial processing, and was reportedly reduced once detainees reached official detention facilities. That difference may suggest variation in patterns of responsibility, though the UN’s reporting does not necessarily establish definitive conclusions about systemic intent.

Regarding allegations of racial or other discrimination, I will treat that as a tentative area of inquiry rather than a settled conclusion. I recently interviewed a Ukrainian press officer about diversity within the armed forces. Ukraine has mobilized women extensively, and women serve in significant numbers within the military.

Koval: I would not characterize the presence of women in Ukraine’s armed forces primarily in demographic or tactical terms. A more accurate explanation concerns social dynamics. Ukrainian society is generally less restrictive about gender roles than Russian society. Levels of gender equality in Ukraine are comparatively higher.

In Russia, certain sectors—including the military—retain more traditional and exclusionary norms in “toxic masculinity,” and the presence of women in those spheres is often viewed as inappropriate. In Ukraine, the situation is different. The participation of women reflects broader social equality rather than purely strategic necessity.

Jacobsen: On the Ukrainian side, there is mobilization and voluntary foreign enlistment. There is no mercenary army, and there is no evidence of systematic coercive schemes to recruit foreigners.

On the Russian side, there has been the Wagner Group. There have also been reports of deception and coercion involving individuals from countries such as South Africa, India, Kenya, and others. A third category involves allied authoritarian regimes, such as North Korea, sending troops under state direction.

So the Russian side appears more complex—private military actors, coercion, deception, and state-aligned deployments—whereas the Ukrainian side consists primarily of mobilization and voluntary foreign fighters.

Jacobsen: So the individuals carrying out these schemes have official positions within the Russian military structure? Or are they affiliated with governmental actors?

Sultanhaliiev: There appear to be several different recruitment schemes operating in different contexts.

One distinction concerns recruitment within Russia itself, targeting migrants who are already living or working there, as well as international students residing in the country. In many of these cases, recruitment appears formally voluntary. However, it involves the exploitation of vulnerability, particularly of migrants who are unable to extend their visas and do not view returning home as a viable option.

For some, signing a contract with the Russian armed forces becomes the most practical way to regularize their status. This dynamic may be described as “predatory recruitment,” because it relies on structural vulnerability. At the same time, the Russian government has sought to avoid large-scale domestic mobilization, creating demand for individuals who will enlist “voluntarily.”

The combination of state demand and migrant precarity creates conditions in which such decisions are framed as voluntary, even though they are shaped by constraint.

Nevertheless, we have also encountered cases that appear to involve direct coercion.

One category involves individuals already living in Russia—migrants or foreign students. We encountered such cases while interviewing individuals who had joined the Russian army and are now in Ukrainian captivity.

In some instances, there appears to have been direct coercion. For example, there are accounts of Russian police detaining foreign nationals over documentation issues and pressuring them into signing military contracts. In one case we examined, the individual was a student from North Africa, from a stable middle-class background, sent by his family to pursue a degree in Russia. He was not socially or economically marginalized. However, a combination of visa vulnerability, language barriers, and alleged police violence resulted in him signing a contract with the Russian army.

This constitutes the first category: recruitment targeting migrants and foreign residents already inside Russia.

The second category involves recruiting individuals from abroad. We have identified significant numbers from countries such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Cuba. You mentioned North Korea, but we would treat that separately. North Korean troops are deployed under the authority of the North Korean state and serve as members of the North Korean armed forces, even if operating in coordination with Russia. They are not contract soldiers within the Russian military structure. That situation should be analyzed as North Korea’s participation in the war, not as foreign mercenaries or coerced recruitment into the Russian army.

Jacobsen: Do we have estimates of how many individuals have been recruited through these predatory mechanisms?

Sultanhaliiev: The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reports that over 18,000 foreign nationals have already been recruited into Russia’s army in the war against Ukraine, as of December 2025. Available estimates suggest that recruits from Cuba, Nepal, and Sri Lanka number in the thousands. For other countries, the numbers appear lower, likely in the hundreds. These figures are approximate and should be treated as estimates rather than exact counts.

In comparing Russian and Ukrainian recruitment models, we must note that our research has not examined Ukrainian recruitment mechanisms in the same depth. However, available information suggests that the number of foreign volunteers serving in the Ukrainian military is significantly lower. Publicly available data also indicate that financial incentives—particularly signing bonuses—are substantially higher in the Russian armed forces than in the Ukrainian military. Our research on these differences is ongoing.

Jacobsen: What are the signing bonuses? And how long do the contracts last?

Sultanhaliiev: That is a complex question. The standard advertised rate across our data transcripts is around 200,000 rubles (~$2,000/month), appearing consistently in recruitment flyers, Sinhala-language leaflets, contract documentation, and verbal briefings upon arrival. Based on interviews with foreign nationals currently in Ukrainian captivity, the promised amounts vary widely. The highest figure we heard was 1.9 million rubles, though that was a promised amount rather than a confirmed payment. More commonly, figures mentioned were around 500,000 rubles as a signing bonus. Signing bonus: The range runs from ~150,000–200,000 rubles (~$1,600–2,000) up to 1,900,000 rubles (~$19,000). The lower tier appears to be the more standard figure in earlier or lower-tier recruitment contexts.

There is no single standard amount in the Russian system. Payments depend heavily on the region where the contract is signed. The structure typically includes several components: a regional payment from the governor’s office, a federal payment, and additional bonuses from local administrations. These figures change frequently and are influenced by local budgets. Wealthier regions, such as Moscow or Saint Petersburg, tend to offer higher bonuses than less affluent regions.

Jacobsen: Given that the full-scale invasion has continued for nearly four years, the economy is under strain. Are there observable trends in reduced promised or actual payments?

Sultanhaliiev: Over the past six months, there have been fluctuations. This observation is based on broader public data and personal review rather than formal organizational findings.

The pattern is cyclical: bonuses decrease, then increase again. The difficulty lies in interpretation. A decrease in payments could suggest budgetary pressure. When payments increase, it could indicate recruitment shortfalls requiring higher incentives.

It is unclear whether declining amounts reflect economic strain or whether rising amounts signal difficulty attracting sufficient recruits. Ukrainian military analysts offer differing interpretations. What can be stated with confidence is that recruitment incentives in Russia are dynamic and responsive to evolving workforce needs.

If the Russian state budget contracts, financial incentives for enlistment would likely decline, affecting both Russian citizens and foreign recruits. In our research on foreign motivations, we encountered some cases of direct coercion or deception. However, in most of the cases we examined, financial motivation was central.

These motivations are often tied to economic vulnerability. Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Cuba are examples frequently cited in this context. When assessing motivation, it is important to recognize that decisions may reflect a combination of economic pressure and misleading promises.

A common pattern involves assurances that recruits would serve in engineering or construction units in occupied territories rather than in direct combat roles. We have not personally interviewed individuals whose promise was fulfilled. However, our interview pool consists of individuals who ended up in captivity, which generally requires frontline deployment. Given current Russian military tactics and sustained personnel losses, demand for the workforce appears high. There have been public reports suggesting that, at certain points, Russian casualties exceeded recruitment numbers. While the methodology behind those calculations is debated, the broader assumption is that recruitment pressure remains significant.

Jacobsen: We were discussing potential human trafficking mechanisms related to recruitment into the Russian armed forces. Military-related human trafficking differs from more widely recognized forms, such as sexual exploitation. Could you explain how these recruitment schemes function?

Sultanhaliiev: One of the most complex questions concerns intermediaries. In several countries, including South Africa, individuals with significant local influence have been linked to recruitment efforts.

Our research indicates that information about recruitment opportunities spreads through multiple channels within the societies from which foreign fighters originate. One channel involves commercial intermediaries based in those countries. Before increased legal scrutiny, such activity was not always treated as a serious offence by local authorities because it was framed as facilitating voluntary employment abroad.

Some intermediaries appear to have received compensation from Russian actors for facilitating recruitment. In addition, there are documented cases in both Africa and Southeast Asia in which recruits paid substantial sums—sometimes thousands of U.S. dollars—to intermediaries to secure what they believed to be legitimate employment in Russia.

Jacobsen: Which countries in Africa and Southeast Asia are we discussing?

Sultanhaliiev: In Southeast Asia, we have worked with cases involving Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. In each of these countries, there were instances in which individuals believed they were travelling voluntarily to Russia for work, only to later be recruited into military service.

In several cases, individuals who believed they were travelling for civilian work paid intermediaries to organize logistics. Travel was often arranged indirectly, for example, through transit countries in West Asia and the Middle East. 

In Africa, we have documented cases involving Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Ghana. These are the countries we have directly worked with, though there may be isolated cases in other African states as well.

There are also important legal considerations. One framework is forced labour. However, international law contains exemptions for military service, meaning that military recruitment does not automatically qualify as forced labour under conventional definitions.

Jacobsen: One clarification. From what you describe, there appear to be few or no documented cases of women or children being coerced into direct military recruitment. Most cases involve adult men from African and Southeast Asian countries.

Sultanhaliiev: Based on what we have seen, recruitment into combat roles primarily involves adult men, reflecting the structure of military demand.

However, there is a separate and widely reported case involving the Alabuga Special Economic Zone. In that situation, women from African countries, including South Sudan, were recruited for employment in Russia and later found themselves working in facilities producing Shahed-type drones used by Russian forces. These facilities manufacture large numbers of unmanned aerial systems annually.

Regardless of legal framing, such facilities are connected to military production and may be targeted in wartime. Recruiting foreign women into that industrial context places them at significant risk. We do not have clear evidence regarding how fully they were informed about the nature of the work before arrival.

From our interviews with men recruited into the Russian army, misinformation or inadequate information appears in nearly all cases. Even when individuals travelled voluntarily, they frequently reported that contracts were not translated, instructions were not explained, and key details were withheld. In many cases, there was either active deception or a failure to provide basic, understandable information.

Jacobsen: When individuals who were coerced later realize that they were coerced, what emotions or reflections emerge in interviews?

Sultanhaliiev: Reactions vary. It is important to understand the context: many of these individuals are now in Ukrainian captivity and face an uncertain future. Russia has not consistently included foreign recruits in prisoner exchanges, so some have remained in captivity for extended periods. This creates an extremely difficult psychological environment.

Emotional responses differ. Some express anger at intermediaries or authorities who misled them. Others focus on regret, particularly regarding the financial decisions that brought them into the situation. Some describe confusion—believing they made a voluntary choice, only later recognizing the extent of misinformation or coercion involved.

Their reflections are shaped not only by the recruitment experience but also by prolonged detention and uncertainty about repatriation.

We are not aware of cases in which the home countries of these detainees have actively pursued diplomatic arrangements with Ukraine to secure their return. For now, many of these individuals remain in Ukrainian captivity, and their future remains uncertain.

Emotionally, reactions vary. Some detainees appear to have difficulty accepting that they were deliberately coerced. They tend to believe that Russia, as a major state actor, would not intentionally engage in deceptive or unlawful recruitment practices. Some interpret their situation as the result of bureaucratic error rather than intentional misconduct. A few have even expressed a desire to return to Russia to seek unpaid wages or pursue legal action.

Jacobsen: Has there been any documented case of someone returning and receiving compensation?

Sultanhaliiev: We are not aware of such cases among those we have interviewed, as they remain in Ukrainian captivity. Two individuals with Kazakh citizenship were exchanged, but they also held Russian citizenship and were exchanged as Russian nationals. We did not have the opportunity to interview them before the exchange. In at least one of those cases, the individual reportedly returned to frontline service shortly after being exchanged. This suggests that repatriation to Russia can carry significant risks, particularly while hostilities continue.

Regarding the human trafficking dimension, several possible legal frameworks could be used to assess these cases. Human trafficking is one of the more promising frameworks because it can encompass recruitment for military exploitation under certain conditions. Some of the cases we have examined closely resemble trafficking under international legal definitions.

However, it would be inaccurate to classify all Russian recruitment of foreigners as human trafficking. Many individuals appear to have joined voluntarily, motivated primarily by financial incentives. The challenge lies in distinguishing voluntary enlistment shaped by economic hardship from coercion or deception that crosses into criminal conduct.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Denys and Dmytro.

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