Everywhere Insiders 35: Trump, Elections, Arms Control, and Sudan

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/02/24

 Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen questions the US-imposed June deadline for Ukraine–Russia negotiations, noting shifting promises and unclear consequences if talks fail. Irina Tsukerman argues the timeline is arbitrary and politically performative, with election pressure on Kyiv constrained by martial law and security realities. They explore “strategy by spectacle,” in which media attention substitutes for coherent policy, and examine claims about the Epstein files as a cultural-political accelerant. The conversation expands to nuclear arms control, warning that treaties fail without automatic enforcement and credible monitoring, especially with Russia’s record and China’s opacity. Finally, they address Sudan: funding pledges matter, but access, ceasefires, and protection for targeted communities are decisive.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: The United States has given Ukraine and Russia a June deadline to reach an agreement to end the war. As a brief footnote, President Trump had claimed—before taking office—that he would end the war within 24 hours. Since then, the timelines and targets discussed publicly have shifted. What is your assessment of this June deadline?

Irina Tsukerman: It is notable because, in a separate context, US officials have also floated an ambitious timeline pointing to March for a deal, alongside pressure on Kyiv to consider holding a referendum and national elections afterward—ideas that face major legal and security obstacles under Ukraine’s current martial-law framework.

The most recent US-brokered talks in Abu Dhabi did not produce a breakthrough, even as fighting continued. Around the same period, Russia carried out significant strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, contributing to severe disruptions.

On elections in Ukraine, it is not clear why Washington is making the timing a priority. Whatever one thinks of the policy merits, elections and referendums are prohibited under martial law, and Ukrainian officials have argued that any credible vote would require both secure conditions and significant lead time.

The fixation on elections also appears selective globally. By comparison, Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has publicly stated that national elections could take 4 to 5 years, citing the need for groundwork in constitutional and administrative matters.

As for why June was chosen, there is at least one concrete coincidence: Trump’s birthday falls in mid-June. In 2025, a major US Army 250th-anniversary parade took place on June 14, which coincided with both Flag Day and Trump’s birthday.

The core practical question remains unresolved: what happens if the deadline is not met? Recent reporting suggests that, if no agreement is reached by June, the Trump administration may increase pressure on both sides, but the specific consequences have not been clearly defined.

Jacobsen: What happens then? I genuinely hope someone has asked that question, because I do not see the media pushing back on these deadlines. I argue, in rhetorical terms, that the point can be made succinctly: the so-called US grand strategy, as it is framed in this administration or this particular phase, is that there is no grand strategy.

The maelstrom that followed the second administration likely reflects the underlying chaos created by a lack of coherent decisions and consistent policy. That chaos generates attention and media interest, but it does not amount to a strategy. This dynamic is reflected in Trump’s background as a reality television host, where conflict and spectacle were central to driving ratings. 

One illustrative anecdote comes from the COVID period, when Anthony Fauci later recounted entering a room to find Trump watching multiple television screens and commenting on how well a public confrontation had performed in terms of ratings. Whether taken literally or symbolically, the episode captures an attention-first mindset.

Tsukerman: That suggests the absence of grand strategy is replaced by disruption followed by media amplification. Where the media logic fits is complicated, especially given that Trump’s approval ratings declined substantially after taking office, dropping into the high-30-percent range. That is not strong by conventional political measures. 

Jacobsen: Still, attention operates differently from approval. In the old Barnum sense, both positive and negative coverage generate visibility.

Tsukerman: It is worth noting that Trump initially articulated something resembling a grand strategy. It focused on the Indo-Pacific, with an emphasis on weakening the Russia–China partnership and replacing it with a Russia–India–US alignment. This was not necessarily a sound strategy, but it was at least coherent and articulate. Early steps included outreach to India and public support for expanding the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC, an initiative developed under the Biden administration but never fully implemented due to security and logistical constraints. Trump claimed he intended to operationalize it and even floated involving Italy. Parts of this agenda overlapped with existing US policy and had some geopolitical logic, even if the Russia component was deeply problematic.

That framework unravelled quickly. The breakdown began with tensions involving India and then cascaded outward. The core question is whether this strategy was ever intended as a serious, long-term plan, or whether it functioned primarily as an opening narrative to generate momentum during the first hundred days in office, before giving way to a different approach dominated by tariffs, volatility, and short-term economic or political calculation.

For these reasons, the June deadline does not appear particularly meaningful. It is difficult to identify a clear plan for what follows if it fails, which, given current conditions, seems likely. I hope someone presses the administration on what the contingency plan actually is.

Jacobsen: Another issue here is geopolitically consequential, primarily because of its moral and cultural implications. I will briefly draw on a previous case. During an early public fallout between Trump and Elon Musk, Musk claimed in a social media post that the Epstein files had not been released because Trump appeared in them. Whatever one thinks of Musk’s motives or credibility, the allegation circulated widely and was then dropped.

More recently, Trump reposted a racially charged video involving Michelle and Barack Obama, which was later removed. That removal does not necessarily indicate remorse; instead, it suggests that the content was noticed and generated backlash. The question is how episodes like these are interpreted, normalized, or absorbed by the media ecosystem and by the broader political culture.

Tsukerman: Domestically and internationally, when something appears this overt and this troubling on a basic level of judgment and sensibility, it has consequences. The Epstein files alone had already divided the MAGA movement between those demanding their release—often drifting deeper into conspiracy thinking—and those who opposed their release because of unwavering loyalty to Trump and a belief that disclosure could only be damaging.

Now that at least part of the material has been released, it is clear that this was not a trivial matter. There were legitimate reasons for concern—legally, politically, from a security perspective, and from humanitarian and human-rights standpoints. The fact that Trump appears to be shielding himself quite openly, yet has not generated significant outrage from either supporters or critics, is notable. Critics are primarily accustomed to Trump avoiding accountability, while supporters have strong incentives to minimize his role and redirect attention away from the issue altogether. Even silence functions as a form of deflection.

Some have taken the discussion in a conspiratorial direction, while others focus on broader narratives, such as whether Epstein was connected to foreign intelligence services. Trump appears to evade serious consequences essentially because there is no definitive, publicly available evidence that he committed a specific criminal act, only allegations, despite his central position within that social and political ecosystem.

The unresolved question is whether he directly committed acts such as sexual assault, harassment, or knowingly benefited from sex trafficking, or whether he functioned as an unethical bystander and enabler—someone who did not intervene, normalized the environment, and benefited socially or politically without directly participating in criminal acts. The absence of a clear “smoking gun” allows him to sidestep accountability, even though his role as an enabler is difficult to dispute.

We have discussed elsewhere the distinctions between bystanders, enablers, facilitators, and active participants. Many people accept that Trump is ethically compromised in general, which is not new. The remaining question is whether there is evidence of conduct so egregious that it clearly crosses a line beyond his established pattern of behaviour, independent of this broader context.

At present, that level of hard evidence has not emerged publicly. Whether it may appear in future releases, through corroborating testimony, or via material that was previously withheld or selectively framed remains uncertain. It is also possible that the whole picture will never be known, given that key figures are deceased or have incentives not to cooperate, and that some individuals who were widely believed to be involved were never charged. Ghislaine Maxwell herself raised this issue, questioning why numerous other alleged participants or facilitators were never brought to trial.

There may be additional testimony or evidence suggesting Trump engaged in illegal acts or derived more direct benefit from criminal activity than is currently established. For now, however, that case has not been demonstrated publicly. The manner in which these files are being released appears designed to maximize shock value and rumour circulation, while diverting attention away from a systematic legal analysis of Trump’s own conduct and potential liability.

Jacobsen: More broadly, the United States is now calling for renewed arms-control efforts and wants China brought into the process as well. One of the remaining strategic arms-control agreements expired recently, underscoring the fragility of the current nonproliferation framework. From what I have gathered through our ongoing discussions, there is much to criticize about this administration. Still, the call for a renewed treaty and the inclusion of China are, in principle, positive steps. Nuclear weapons remain an existential risk even when only one actor behaves irresponsibly. New treaties are therefore desirable. At the same time, as you noted before, there have been longstanding concerns about whether China has fully complied with testing and transparency norms. What is your assessment, and what additional considerations matter here?

Tsukerman: Treaties are only as effective as their enforcement mechanisms and the willingness of signatories to comply. In the past, including in agreements involving the United States and Russia, and in other contexts such as US–Iran arrangements, the United States has often remained bound by its obligations while other parties ignored or violated theirs, sometimes openly and sometimes covertly. That asymmetry disadvantages US security.

If actors such as Russia or China disregard their legal commitments and there are no credible enforcement mechanisms—either by the United States or by the international community—then such treaties can do more harm than good. If one side abides by constraints while others do not, the compliant party weakens its own defensive position. This is not an argument against international law as such, but against selective enforcement. Selective enforcement incentivizes rogue behaviour by both state and non-state actors, placing them in an advantageous position, which should not be acceptable in practice.

For this reason, I am skeptical that any new treaty proposed under Trump would be meaningfully enforceable, particularly given Russia’s long record of violating international law and breaching both multilateral and bilateral agreements over decades, not just in recent years or under specific administrations. It is unclear what would make a new agreement different unless enforcement were automatic and credible. Violations would need to trigger predefined consequences without prolonged political deliberation. Independent monitoring mechanisms would also be required, insulated from partisan interference, including interference by the US executive.

The same logic applies to China. Reports suggesting covert nuclear testing are deeply concerning. Unlike Russia, which has demonstrated significant deficiencies in the maintenance and performance of its conventional and strategic capabilities during the war in Ukraine, China appears more competent in sustaining its nuclear forces, despite serious corruption issues within its system. While many Chinese officials’ claims deserve skepticism, the operational viability of its nuclear arsenal is not among them. If China is testing, it may indicate preparation for a strategic confrontation rather than mere deterrence maintenance. That should raise serious concerns about Beijing’s near-term trajectory.

There is much to unpack here. During the Cold War, the arms-control framework was largely bilateral because the United States and the Soviet Union possessed more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. The problem they faced was fundamentally bilateral. As those treaties were implemented, overall stockpiles declined, even though they remain in the thousands today. The current environment is far more complex, with additional nuclear powers and weaker enforcement norms, making replication of that earlier model far more difficult.

Jacobsen: More than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons are still held by Russia and the United States. At the same time, as you noted, the contemporary period is marked by open disregard for international law by certain actors. Russia, in particular, has withdrawn from multiple conventions and treaties related to nuclear arms and humanitarian law. In that sense, withdrawal becomes almost symbolic, since the obligations were already being ignored in practice.

The current risk environment is far more multilateral. Beyond Russia and the United States, nuclear-armed states include China, France, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, India, and Israel, with Iran potentially joining that group in the future. This makes the challenge neither bilateral nor trilateral, but genuinely multilateral. The question then becomes how to bring everyone on board. The assumption is that if the United States, Russia, and China were aligned, others might follow. Yet this still leaves the problem of thousands of weapons, many of them embedded in aging or potentially degraded systems.

Another issue is the moral authority of those proposing new agreements. If a Trump administration puts forward a treaty, it is unclear whether it would carry sufficient credibility or gravitas to command respect. During so-called peace negotiations, we have simultaneously seen sustained attacks on civilian infrastructure. When comparing data from 2024 to 2025, reported bombardments increased dramatically nationwide by several hundred percent. That pattern reinforces the perception that commitments may be ignored.

Tsukerman: There is another dimension that concerns me deeply, which is the consolidation of power within the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping. Compared with earlier periods when authority was more distributed through the Politburo, power is now far more centralized. When excessive authority accumulates in the hands of a single leader, particularly one showing increasingly rigid or paranoid tendencies, the risk of catastrophic decision-making rises sharply.

I was never comfortable with China possessing nuclear weapons, but I previously assumed that Beijing would behave in a rational, self-interested manner. I no longer find that assumption reliable. Xi’s geopolitical strategy, his adversarial stance toward international companies that underpin China’s economy, and his pattern of abrupt decision-making suggest a shift toward the kind of paranoia we have seen under Putin. That trajectory has accelerated, and internal checks appear to have been weakened through purges within the military and party structures.

Many discussions focus on Taiwan—whether an invasion might occur and how quickly, and whether military actors would comply with orders involving nuclear escalation. The same logic applies more broadly. Nuclear weapons are not deployed with the push of a single button. The process requires multiple actors, and institutional friction can slow or halt implementation if dissent exists. When power is diffused, skeptical officials can intervene, delay, or persuade leadership to reconsider.

When authority is fully consolidated and dissent suppressed, the space between a direct order and actual deployment narrows dramatically. That is what makes China’s current trajectory so concerning. Recent structural changes appear to remove internal obstacles to executing a nuclear strike or other hazardous operations, posing a direct threat to US and international security.

Jacobsen: There is also a parallel humanitarian dimension unfolding alongside these security risks. Recent reporting has highlighted severe crises in al-Fashir and parts of the Darfur region, as well as findings from food security investigations indicating famine-level malnutrition in multiple towns. These developments suggest that humanitarian emergencies are spreading even as armed conflicts persist. How do you assess the compounding effect of humanitarian collapse alongside ongoing geopolitical and military crises?

Tsukerman: The situation has been dire for some time. The only positive development is that the United States and the United Nations are now working on a joint fund that would allocate approximately $700 million to Sudan for humanitarian assistance. While this would not fully replace suspended USAID funding, it at least reflects the US’s acknowledgment that the crisis is severe and that humanitarian aid is not a waste of taxpayer money.

The central challenge, as with most conflicts of this kind, is implementation: how to deploy aid effectively and ensure it reaches civilians. The leaders of the warring factions are often determined to prevent assistance from reaching populations aligned with their opponents. In addition, conditions on the ground are deplorable from a logistical standpoint, making consistent and equitable distribution very difficult. Allocating funds to address what is currently considered the world’s most severe artificial famine is straightforward. Implementing that decision in practice is far more complicated.

Some form of humanitarian ceasefire is likely necessary to facilitate aid distribution. There would need to be an internationally enforced agreement, not only to pause hostilities but also to provide a mechanism for neutral, even-handed delivery of supplies to civilians across conflict lines. This is especially urgent because there appears to be a systematic, ethnically targeted campaign of violence affecting particular non-Arab Black communities in the region.

This is not new. It echoes patterns seen during the earlier Darfur genocide, when the Janjaweed militias were responsible for mass atrocities. Those forces have since evolved into the Rapid Support Forces, which are more organized, heavily armed, and now operate as a de facto parallel authority. Although the parallel government is not internationally recognized, it functions in practice. The current situation is more entrenched and more dangerous than before because it is embedded within a nationwide civil war, making atrocities part of a broader, deadly mosaic.

At a minimum, greater international focus should be placed on reaching these particularly vulnerable regions and protecting civilian populations from targeted violence. It remains unclear whether the Sudanese Armed Forces have the capacity, political will, or credibility to do so effectively, or whether they would permit genuine international access afterward. Independent humanitarian access—free from control by the warring parties and their regional backers in Africa and the Middle East—should be the minimum condition for addressing the crisis. That alone would not be sufficient in the long term, but it would be a necessary starting point.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina. 

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