Ukraine 2025: War Crimes Documentation, Drone Strikes, and the Fight for Democracy

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/02/13

Oleksandra Romantsova is a Ukrainian human rights defender and Executive Director of the Center for Civil Liberties, a Kyiv-based NGO that documents war crimes and advocates for accountability. With the Center since 2014 and executive director since 2017, she has helped coordinate monitoring of violations linked to Russia’s aggression and supports victims, detainees, and occupied communities. She engages policymakers and courts. The Center for Civil Liberties was a co-recipient of the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize.

Remus Cernea is a Romanian humanist, environmental and civil-rights advocate, and former member of Romania’s Chamber of Deputies (2012–2016). He founded the Solidarity for Freedom of Conscience Association and has campaigned for church–state separation and equal rights. In parliament, he promoted reforms on discrimination, civil liberties, and animal welfare, including efforts to ban the use of wild animals in circuses. Since 2022, he has reported from Ukraine as a war correspondent, writing for Newsweek Romania and other outlets.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen asked about abuses in 2025 and justice gains. Oleksandra Romantsova described infrastructure strikes, information operations, prisoner exchanges, and evidence of torture in custody, emphasizing protection for detainees, children, and civilians under occupation. Remus Cernea cited reduced U.S. support, Ukraine’s resistance, and Romania’s elections, where pro-European forces won as extremists surged. He recounted Shahed drone hits, filmed civilian strikes, and observed Patriot interceptions. They warned that impunity would weaken international rules and invite future wars.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: We are now more than two years into this series of interviews because Russian aggression continues at the behest of Mr. Putin and the Kremlin. Looking back at 2025, what do you consider the most egregious rights violations, and what do you think are some of the wins for justice in general?

Oleksandra Romantsova: I am trying to remember what happened at the beginning of the year — what exactly concerned us then. Mostly, the question was whether we had any weapons, because Trump was becoming a significant game-changer.

That is what we were worried about: did we have any real instruments to defend ourselves? On top of that, there was destruction. It was the second winter in which they tried to destroy our electricity system. Now they are concentrating many attacks on the Odesa region and other parts of the country.

At the beginning of the year, the focus of the fighting and the strikes was very much on the east and south of Ukraine — areas such as Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk — and they were trying to “add oil to the fire,” so to speak. The blackouts did not always happen directly because of the missile launches, but also because of decisions around how electricity was managed and sold inside and outside the country.

I think this year they demonstrated a high level of attack not only through strikes with various weapons, but also through large-scale information and psychological operations. They tried to insert certain narratives and destabilize us that way.

In the summer, the so-called negotiations began, and that is why there was only one clear positive development: we received prisoners of war back, though under very different conditions. We also finally found out what happened to Viktoriia Roshchyna — the Ukrainian journalist who had died in Russian captivity and whose body was returned to Ukraine in early 2025, bearing clear signs of torture and mutilation.

Remus Cernea: She was tortured.

Romantsova: Yes, she was tortured. That was the subject of a major international investigation. Journalists and media organizations came together to carry it out. Torture, kidnapping, targeting journalists, targeting medical workers, targeting humanitarian aid, all of this continues. Has it become larger in scale? Yes, maybe. We know that many journalists and media workers have already been killed, injured, disappeared, or imprisoned as a result of Russian aggression, and that the Ukrainian Institute of Mass Information has documented hundreds of crimes against the media and, by now, many dozens of dead and missing journalists. It is exciting, in a terrible way, to see how this year has developed. It looks different from previous years. For us, it still follows the same patterns, but now they are pushing those patterns harder.

Cernea: From my perspective, in 2025, we had this Trump factor. It is a significant change because Trump was elected, and that changed everything regarding the United States’ policy.

When you look at the United States now from a European perspective, the U.S. is almost an adversary,  not a partner, not a reliable ally. Unfortunately, U.S. assistance to Ukraine became severely reduced or stalled, not only military aid but also non-military and humanitarian support, due to decisions taken by the Trump administration and congressional deadlock.

This Trump factor changed not only the situation in Ukraine but also global security. As NATO countries, we cannot be sure the U.S. would support or defend us in the event of a Russian attack on the Baltic states, Poland, or even Romania. So this factor changed everything. However, let me also say that Ukraine has succeeded in resisting.

Ukraine stopped the major Russian offensives on the front lines. Ukraine also carried out some spectacular missions, widely referred to as “Spider Web” in Ukrainian media, soon after Trump told President Zelensky that he had no cards. We can see Ukraine still has cards to play.

Ukraine continues to resist, even with reduced American support. Moreover, the horrific cases that Sasha spoke about must remind all friends of democracy and freedom to continue standing with Ukraine.

People must understand that Russia is a threat, of course, to Ukraine, but not only to Ukraine. It is a threat to all democratic countries. Moreover, unfortunately, the United States appears to be the first country to step back in the face of Russian aggression when we look at what happened over the past year.

Jacobsen: What about neighbouring countries, such as Romania, regarding elections and the regional right-wing shift? Are there concerns not only about military and financial support for Ukraine but also about morale? Does that pose a threat as well?

Cernea: In the last year, we had several elections in Romania: parliamentary and presidential elections, and just a few weeks ago, the Bucharest mayoral election. In all of these elections, the primary fight was between pro-democratic, pro-European, pro-Ukrainian forces versus populists, extremists, and pro-Kremlin forces.

The pro-European side won all of these elections. Now we have a pro-European government, a pro-European president, and a pro-European mayor of Bucharest.

However, in each election, the extremists came in second place. In parliament, they hold around thirty percent, which is a considerable share. The second-place candidate in the presidential elections was an extremist. The second-place candidate in the Bucharest mayoral elections was also an extremist. So it is a major political struggle in Romania.

Many people who lived peacefully a year ago are now on the front line of this political battle. Their lives have changed because of it. It was a hard battle — we were not sure we would win before the elections. Now we have gained some time. The next parliamentary elections will be in 2028. We will see whether, in four years, we can consolidate our pro-European, pro-democratic, and pro-Ukrainian political approach.

We saw a lot of propaganda and manipulation, especially on TikTok and other social networks. We are fully aware that this fight will continue for a long time.

Romantsova: For us, the results in Eastern European partner countries are significant: Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Baltic countries, and so on. For us, the question of what political situation exists in these countries can be the most important news of the week or even the month.

Hungary, of course, we are waiting for the day when Viktor Orbán is no longer prime minister. In Ukraine in 2025, there were heated debates over whether it was possible to hold elections during the war. The simple answer is no.

The more complicated answer is still no, but we need to start preparing, because Ukraine is a vast country. We need to be ready for presidential, parliamentary, and local elections once conditions allow. All of these processes must be prepared in advance, and we are not ready right now.

We do not have an updated database of the electorate. The people who need to be registered to vote. We are not yet sure how many people are displaced, how many are abroad, or how many are unable to participate. We do not know how to organize elections safely or determine which regions elections could realistically be held in. There are many questions.

At the same time, society is consistent on one point: we will not have elections now, because the military must have the opportunity to both elect and be elected. There is also the situation of millions of people abroad. People are tired of the old parliament, because in Ukraine, the presidency is not as structurally central as the parliament. Our system is primarily parliamentary–presidential. The parliament is the biggest concern: how can we form a new parliament legally without creating new fractures in Ukrainian society?

Now we have, for example, OPORA, the largest and most respected expert network in Ukraine on elections. They have prepared a white paper outlining what needs to be done to prepare for the first elections after the war, as well as the legal and administrative framework we will require.

The good news is that we finally have a functioning Constitutional Court. One of the major obstacles was that the Constitution provides only two types of elections, regular and early, neither of which accounts for wartime conditions. Now we have a full bench at the Constitutional Court, and our organization has submitted a complaint there. We are waiting for a decision.

This panel may offer a solution to the election issue. For example, one major obstacle is the requirement for continuous residency in Ukraine to run for parliament or the presidency. However, many people were evacuated, and most of them were women. That creates a serious gender inequality issue if residency is interpreted strictly.

Jacobsen: What has been the most stark moment during the war when you were on the ground reporting this year?

Cernea: On January 1, 2025, I saw four Shahed drones hit central Kyiv. It was a stark moment because there was no air defence response. Usually, when drones fly over Kyiv, you hear air defence attempting to intercept them. This time, all four drones struck their targets directly, and nothing tried to stop them. It was the only time that year that I witnessed drones hitting Ukrainian cities without hearing air defence.

A few days later, some reports suggested that these drones contained Chinese components or modifications that made them harder to intercept. However, seeing that in real time was very strange. Another difficult moment this year was when I filmed a missile strike on a residential building. When I arrived, people had been killed, and I recorded their deaths. That brings many complex thoughts and emotions.

Perhaps another striking moment was filming Patriot systems defending Kyiv and intercepting Russian ballistic missiles overhead. It was spectacular and dramatic, like something out of Star Wars, with rockets trying to kill civilians and other missiles trying to stop them.

Jacobsen: Was there anything this year on the scale of when Alex Craiu, you, and I witnessed the mass-casualty strike in Poltava?

Cernea: Fortunately, most missiles were intercepted by air defence, so the civilian death toll was not as high. There were residential buildings struck — nine people killed in one attack, seven in another — but nothing approaching the fifty-five killed in Poltava. Still, many civilians were killed in their own homes.

In Poltava, when we were there, the missile strike was catastrophic. This year, I filmed the battles themselves, not only the aftermath, including the drones that struck central Kyiv. I recorded all four impacts. I also filmed Patriot systems intercepting ballistic missiles.

That was essentially the end of my thought: at least three dramatic moments this year — missile attacks over Kyiv, strikes that killed civilians in residential buildings, and Patriot systems intercepting missiles overhead.

Jacobsen: Oleksandra, let me pivot. The UN Commission on Ukraine is operating with reduced funding and, therefore, reduced capacity, which limits the amount of human rights and legal documentation it can produce. Still, after the commission’s work this year, one significant finding was a roughly 300-kilometre stretch along the left bank of the Dnipro River, where they confirmed the systematic use of short-range drones to target civilians, classified as a war crime. 

Survivors from previously occupied areas are returning with documented sexual violence and trauma. There is confirmed and systematic abuse of the rights of Ukrainians, by both civilian authorities under occupation and by Russian military forces. With that in mind, what stands out to you regarding the Center for Civil Liberties and its documentation, whether of children, prisoners of war, or ordinary people trying to survive the war?

Romantsova: Everything stands out, because these are not abstract categories. They are people. Asking which group matters most is like asking whom you love more, your father or your mother. It is not a meaningful question.

Right now, we have emerging ideas about funding, recovery, and future programs in Ukraine, who should receive support and what forms recovery might take, but none of that can happen fully until the war ends. You can design policies, strategies, and visions that are healthy and necessary, but it all depends on stopping the shooting.

Millions of people in occupied territories cannot speak freely, cannot advocate for themselves, and cannot be reached safely. That is not a small number. It is millions. The first challenge is how to protect them — how to create pathways to safety, documentation, representation, and eventual return while the war continues.

The best protection, of course, is de-occupation, restoring Ukrainian control over occupied territories. However, if de-occupation is not immediately possible, the next question is: what options do we have to protect people?

Look at Lukashenko. Our colleague, himself a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, was finally released after years in a Belarusian prison. However, tomorrow, Lukashenko could arrest another hundred thousand people and turn them into political prisoners. That is the scale of the problem. So we ask: how do we protect people from the continued threat of Russian and Belarusian aggression?

Only after that can we fully address recovery, stabilization programs, rehabilitation, rebuilding Ukrainian institutions, andrestoring systems. At the moment, we are in a contradictory situation. On one hand, we are planning for the post-war future. On the other hand, we cannot be certain we will survive to reach that point.

We need to ensure the protection of people who are most at risk: prisoners of war, illegally detained civilians, children taken or held under occupation, and all civilians living under Russian control who could be arrested, deported, or disappear at any moment. These people have become our primary target group as human rights defenders, because they are still alive, and we can still help them.

So that is why we are here. I do not know whether this directly answers your question, but it is the essential message.

Jacobsen: Remus, do you have any additions to that?

Cernea: It is a profound tragedy for the people of Ukraine. The most important thing is the immense and irreducible suffering they are enduring.

This war has lasted a long time. In less than two months, we will enter the fifth year of the full-scale invasion, and it will soon be twelve years since Russia first began its aggression in 2014.

However, it is not only about Ukraine. It concerns all of us — the entire world. This war has global implications. The atrocities we are seeing were considered unimaginable in Europe in the 21st century. However, they are happening, and the future of humanity depends on what takes place in Ukraine. It depends not only on the horrors already committed, which must be documented and acknowledged, but on how this war will ultimately end.

If it ends in a way that favours Russia, the future of Europe and humanity may become bloodier than at any time since the Second World War. Major wars could break out in Europe in the coming years and decades. Moreover, it would not be limited to Europe. If Russia emerges intact or rewarded, others will conclude that military aggression pays. States with weaker neighbours may attempt territorial seizures, and conflicts may erupt worldwide.

In such a scenario, international rules would collapse. We would have no functioning international law. Right now, we can already see that the United Nations is effectively paralyzed. It has taken no meaningful action to stop the war in Ukraine, despite its founding purpose being the prevention of and response to war. The UN system is blocked and largely inactive.

This means we lack effective international institutions. The UN Charter is routinely ignored. Only some Europeans and others who believe in a rules-based future still defend it, but Russia does not care about the UN Charter. Donald Trump does not care about it. Even China does not consistently respect it. If this continues, the future may be grim and violent for all of humanity.

Unless these atrocities stop soon, and unless those responsible are held to account, peace will be temporary and unstable. Any peace without justice will serve as the foundation for new atrocities, new wars, and future catastrophes.

Romantsova: I am thinking about what happens when we reach a situation with no rules, when we can no longer rely on law, when we cannot be sure that institutions work. It would not be the first time humanity has taken a step backward. The Middle Ages and other periods, including in Scandinavia, show how cruelty can return.

The question is whether we can prevent that return. Civilized societies, societies of rules, trust, and openness, can be destroyed or displaced. They can reappear elsewhere: in Africa, in Latin America, after decades of work. We often imagine democracy as natural to Europe or North America, but history shows that people repeatedly revert to brutality.

I fully agree with Remus: the struggle will be difficult. We are entering another fight over things we consider normal, even though they are not natural; previous generations fought hard to create them. We are returning to that fight because we have forgotten that democracy is not automatic.

Democracy is not gravity. It exists only if we work for it every day, think about it, participate in it, and support it. If we stop doing that, democracy weakens. So yes, the struggle ahead will be significant. It may feel small now, which sounds strange when millions of people are under attack, but the challenges ahead may be even greater.

Jacobsen: What have been the most significant losses on the Russian side? Secondarily, what has been most costly for Putin personally? Some say casualties matter less to him than financial strain; that economic pressure may hurt more than the loss of soldiers. Do you have thoughts on that framing, on understanding what is in Putin’s mind?

Romantsova: We do not know what is in Putin’s mind, ultimately. 

Cernea: I think Putin cares only about maintaining his regime. He wants to keep power. He does not care about Russian soldiers or ordinary Russian citizens. Everything he does is directed toward staying in control.

This is why it is hard to imagine peace through negotiation with Putin. What Donald Trump appears to seek — a peace achieved simply by talking — is either a dead end or a trap for Ukraine because Putin may need this war to stay in power.

If he ends the war, he faces more than a million soldiers returning home to low civilian wages, economic instability, and frustration.

He would face enormous economic, demographic, and social pressures. To avoid that, he may feel compelled to continue the war — perhaps even expand it. Many officials, including intelligence chiefs and the Secretary General of NATO, warn that there is a significant risk of conflict between Russia and Europe in the coming years.

Why? It is irrational for Putin to start another war. It would require significant resources to attack Europe, including the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, and others. However, dictatorships do not always behave rationally. History shows that even in moments of collapse, authoritarian regimes have launched or continued wars.

The risk is real. We cannot predict the future precisely, but we must recognize this possibility and prepare for it. If we are caught unprepared, the cost to our societies will be far higher.

Jacobsen: Are there differences in how the war is viewed among Ukrainian military officers, political figures, human rights activists, and media? Or is there broad agreement within Ukraine?

Cernea: There are differences between soldiers, journalists, and civilians. Many Ukrainian soldiers are committed to fighting and are unwilling to surrender territory without resistance. They want to live and return home to their families, of course, but many hold a strong sense of honour — the belief that one does not capitulate while there is still a chance to fight bravely, to win battles, and potentially to win the war itself.

There is a path for Ukraine to win this war. It may not involve retaking all occupied territories; instead, sustained military losses could eventually destabilize the regime in Moscow. That scenario is not impossible. Remember Wagner and Prigozhin’s march toward Moscow — the regime came close to crisis in 2023. Moreover, remember 1917: both Russian revolutions were catalyzed in part by soldiers. Losses at the front have triggered upheaval in Russia before and could do so again.

So victory does not necessarily mean territorial restoration alone; it could mean political change in Moscow driven by the consequences of military defeat. That possibility remains.

For journalists, the perspective is different. Their responsibility is to show the world what is happening, to document and convey reality as accurately as possible. This often means striving for objectivity, describing events as they are, not as one hopes they will be.

A journalist observes. A soldier fights. A reporter is not facing death each day on the front line. A soldier is — and knows any moment could be his last. Soldiers risk their lives, families, and futures for principles: national survival, freedom, and Ukraine’s future. That creates a different moral and emotional perspective than that of someone documenting events.

Ordinary civilians have yet another viewpoint. However, even many civilians understand the war directly because Russia has turned numerous Ukrainian cities into war zones. The front has come to them, reshaping everyday life and blurring the lines between civilian and combatant experience.

There is overlap between these perspectives, but they are not identical:

The soldier confronts death,

The journalist witnesses and records,

Moreover, civilians experience the war’s impact in their homes and streets.

Civilians in Ukraine experience bombardments, drone strikes, and missile attacks, so many of them understand the reality of war, at least partially. Life on the front lines is worse than in most cities, but civilians still have a sense of the hell soldiers face. However, civilians cannot respond directly to Russian aggression. Soldiers at least have the means to fight back; civilians do not. This creates different perspectives and different emotional frameworks.

However, despite these differences, the majority of Ukrainians — soldiers, civilians, journalists — still believe that Ukraine will prevail. Nobody knows precisely how, but there remains a collective belief that freedom and statehood will survive.

Jacobsen: What about sanctions, including the use of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine?

Cernea: International sanctions have affected the Russian economy, but Ukrainians have also taken matters into their own hands. Ukraine has carried out what I would describe as “Ukrainian sanctions,” destroying Russian oil refineries, striking the so-called phantom fleet vessels used to transport sanctioned oil, and targeting factories that support Russia’s war effort. In my view, these Ukrainian actions have been more effective than formal international sanctions.

Ukraine has developed its own drones and missiles, which are the main instruments of these Ukrainian sanctions. Today, Ukraine is the global leader in the military use of drones within the democratic world. NATO armies now study Ukrainian tactics. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, many Ukrainian soldiers were sent to Western countries to learn how to fight; now the situation has reversed — Western militaries come to Ukraine to learn how to fight a drone-based war.

Ukraine currently has one of the most capable armies in Europe, perhaps even globally, in terms of drone warfare. Russia also has drone capabilities, but Ukrainian creativity and innovation in this field remain superior.

Regarding frozen assets, the European Union has provided Ukraine with €90 billion in support, which will help the country endure for at least the next two years. There is ongoing discussion about using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine further. Whether that becomes legally feasible remains to be seen, but many hope a mechanism will be found in the future to use those assets to help Ukraine resist and eventually recover from Russian aggression.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Remus and Oleksandra.

Last updated May 3, 2025. These terms govern all In-Sight Publishing content—past, present, and future—and supersede any prior notices.  In-Sight Publishing by Scott  Douglas  Jacobsen is licensed under a Creative Commons BY‑NC‑ND 4.0; © In-Sight Publishing by Scott  Douglas  Jacobsen 2012–Present. All trademarks, performances, databases & branding are owned by their rights holders; no use without permission. Unauthorized copying, modification, framing or public communication is prohibited. External links are not endorsed. Cookies & tracking require consent, and data processing complies with PIPEDA & GDPR; no data from children < 13 (COPPA). Content meets WCAG 2.1 AA under the Accessible Canada Act & is preserved in open archival formats with backups. Excerpts & links require full credit & hyperlink; limited quoting under fair-dealing & fair-use. All content is informational; no liability for errors or omissions: Feedback welcome, and verified errors corrected promptly. For permissions or DMCA notices, email: scott.jacobsen2025@gmail.com. Site use is governed by BC laws; content is “as‑is,” liability limited, users indemnify us; moral, performers’ & database sui generis rights reserved.