Rick Rosner On, 38: Russia’s Wartime Economy, Ukraine’s Drone Campaign, Press Freedom, and Polling Reliability
Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen
Publication (Outlet/Website): Personal SubStack
Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/09/17
In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Rick Rosner discuss Russia’s war economy, winter warfare, Ukrainian attacks on logistics and consumer infrastructure, Russian polling under authoritarian conditions, global press freedom rankings, and declining survey response rates. They examine nonresponse bias, public opinion, media restrictions, and the practical limits of polling.
Russia’s War Economy and Fiscal Pressure
Rick Rosner: How much of Russia’s economy is actually being consumed by the war?
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: I would not put it at half of annual GDP. That would be far too high. Russia is devoting an extraordinary share of its federal budget to defence and security, but military spending itself is still a fraction of GDP, not anything close to 50 percent. The war is nevertheless creating substantial fiscal pressure. Russia’s projected 2026 federal deficit has risen as expenditures, including military expenditures, have increased.
So the accurate point is that this is an extremely expensive war for Russia, both directly through military spending and indirectly through inflation, labour shortages, sanctions, infrastructure damage, high interest rates, and forgone investment.
Let’s talk about the Russian winter. Winter was brutal for Napoleon when he invaded Russia, and it was brutal for Hitler’s forces. We are in mid-September now, so colder weather is coming. Could winter actually favour drones in some ways?
Winter Conditions and Drone Warfare
Rosner: Possibly in some technical respects, but I would be cautious about reducing it to colder air simply making drones fly better. Cold temperatures can increase air density, which can affect lift, but batteries generally perform worse in extreme cold, icing can become a problem, electronics are stressed, and weather conditions such as wind, snow, fog, and freezing rain can interfere with operations.
What has changed is that winter no longer necessarily produces the same reduction in combat tempo that people associate with traditional mechanized warfare. Both sides now use drones on a massive scale, and long-range strikes can continue even when ground maneuver becomes more difficult.
Attacks on Russia’s Consumer Economy
Rosner: Ukraine also seems to be attacking the Russian consumer economy more directly.
Jacobsen: Yes. One striking example is Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retailer. Ukraine conducted a sustained campaign against its logistics network during July and August. Ukrainian authorities said seven of the company’s ten largest logistics hubs had been struck, and reporting documented attacks on more than 20 Wildberries warehouses overall.
That matters because it expands the war’s economic effects beyond refineries, military installations, and heavy industry. Attacks on distribution centers can interfere directly with ordinary commercial life, deliveries, inventories, and corporate margins.
Russians and Americans are probably similar in at least one respect. People get angry when deliveries are late.
Long fuel lines and disrupted deliveries create costs that ordinary Russians can notice immediately. Reduced profits and damaged infrastructure affect businesses and wealthy owners. Those pressures can eventually become political concerns for the Kremlin, although measuring Russian public opinion accurately is difficult.
Putin’s Approval and the Limits of Russian Polling
Rosner: The last number I saw had Putin at around 65 percent approval, his lowest in years.
Jacobsen: That figure needs some context. Different Russian polling organizations produce materially different figures.
Polling in an authoritarian environment also has obvious limitations. Respondents may be reluctant to criticize the president openly, independent media are heavily restricted, and the state dominates television and much of the political information environment. So a reported approval figure should not be treated as directly comparable to one produced in a freer media and polling environment.
Rosner: Does Putin control the polling agencies too?
Jacobsen: The broader problem is the environment in which polling takes place. Russia severely restricts independent journalism and political dissent, which can affect what people know and how comfortable they are expressing criticism.
Reporters Without Borders’ 2026 World Press Freedom Index illustrates the contrast. The United States ranks 64th out of 180 countries, with a score of 62.61. Ukraine ranks 55th, with a score of 66.10. Russia ranks 172nd, with a score of just 23.15.
So I joke that I am not necessarily safer as a journalist in Ukraine, particularly during a war, but according to this specific press-freedom index, Ukraine currently ranks somewhat better than the United States. Russia is in an entirely different category, near the bottom of the global ranking.
Press Freedom in Russia, Ukraine, and the United States
Rosner: Out of how many countries?
Jacobsen: The Reporters Without Borders index ranks 180 countries and territories. Russia is 172nd in the 2026 index. Ukraine is 55th, and the United States is 64th. Afghanistan is actually included and ranks 175th. Reporters Without Borders says that since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, almost all independent Russian media have been banned, blocked, designated as “foreign agents” or “undesirable organizations,” or subjected to military censorship.
Even in a freer media environment such as the United States, how much confidence should we place in polling?
Polling, Participation, and Nonresponse Bias
Rosner: Polling has problems even in the United States. A properly conducted poll is not supposed to predict an election in the strict sense. It primarily estimates public opinion at a particular time.
Jacobsen: Is low participation itself the central problem?
Rosner: Not necessarily. That is another point I would qualify. Response rates have fallen dramatically over time. The real question is whether respondents differ systematically from those who do not. That is nonresponse bias.
My concern is that reasonable people often refuse surveys because they are busy or simply tired of being contacted. I do that myself. Somebody calls and says a survey will take 10 minutes, and then it takes 25. After enough experiences like that, people learn to say, “No, thank you.”
I once agreed to participate in a medical survey because it came from UCLA, which is my medical provider. I thought, “I’ll do them a favour.”
As the survey progressed, however, it became much more specifically focused on whether I had experienced racist or antisemitic aggression and whether those experiences had affected my health. That struck me as a fairly narrow set of circumstances.
But I could actually answer yes to some of the questions because the last time I appeared on Lance and I’s show, I became extremely angry about what I regarded as his anti-Muslim comments.
Obviously, there are serious problems involving some Islamist movements and extremist organizations. But Lance seems to treat nearly two billion Muslims as though they are collectively conspiring to do evil, and I got extremely angry about what I regarded as anti-Muslim rhetoric.
When I later took that UCLA medical survey, and it asked whether exposure to racist or antisemitic hostility had affected my health, I could at least understand why they were asking the question.
The survey itself also illustrates why people become reluctant respondents. They told me it would take about 10 minutes, and it took closer to 25. My wife was in the background telling me to hang up because she could not hear the questions and thought I might be giving personal information to some scammer.
Ordinary people often decline surveys because they are busy, distrust unsolicited calls, or have learned that a “10-minute” survey may turn into half an hour. I tend to say no myself.
Concluding the Polling Discussion
Jacobsen: Have we exhausted polling?
Rosner: I think so. I have another topic.
Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Rick.
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