Rick Rosner On, 37: Ukraine, Russia, U.S. Diplomacy, Drone Warfare, and the Changing Economics of War

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): Personal SubStack

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/09/16

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Rick Rosner discuss U.S. diplomacy toward Ukraine and Russia, concerns about conflicts of interest, Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, shifting Western military support, Patriot shortages, and Ukraine’s expanding drone and ground-robot capabilities, including their implications for modern warfare, geography, and strategic leverage.

American Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Concerns

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Anything new in the American military or in U.S. foreign policy?

Rick Rosner: American foreign policy looks chaotic to me. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are playing major roles in negotiations involving Ukraine and Russia. Witkoff is Trump’s special envoy, while Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and a private investor, has also been participating in the diplomatic effort. In early September, the two met Putin in Moscow and then travelled to Kyiv as part of renewed U.S. efforts to advance talks.

I think critics widely perceive them as too accommodating toward Moscow, although saying they are literally “in Putin’s pocket” would go beyond the available evidence. Kushner’s simultaneous diplomatic role and private financial interests have also generated conflict-of-interest concerns.

Jacobsen: Has anything reinforced those concerns recently?

Rosner: Yes. Reporting this week found that Russian businessman Umar Kremlev, who has close ties to the Russian state and to Putin’s circle, paid hundreds of thousands of dollars toward parts of Donald Trump Jr.’s wedding celebrations in the Bahamas. Trump Jr.’s wife, Bettina Trump, has acknowledged that Kremlev hosted two nights of post-wedding festivities as a gift. Congressional Democrats have now opened an inquiry into the matter.

Stuff like that contributes to the perception among some Americans that the Trump family is too entangled with wealthy Russian interests. It also reinforces skepticism about whether the administration can negotiate with Ukraine and Russia impartially and effectively.

What is the view in Kyiv?

Kyiv’s View of American Diplomacy

Jacobsen: There is an appropriate level of skepticism about American diplomatic visits and negotiations involving Ukraine and Russia. A common concern is that proposed settlements could accommodate too many Russian demands or treat Ukrainian territory and resources as bargaining material.

There is also cynicism about corruption. Ukrainians are well aware of corruption within their own government, and there is substantial domestic criticism. At the same time, Russia’s political and economic system is significantly more authoritarian and deeply intertwined with state patronage networks, so the situations are not directly equivalent.

Many Ukrainians consider continued engagement with American diplomacy necessary, even when they have limited confidence that negotiations will produce an acceptable result. After more than four years of full-scale war, that skepticism is informed by a lot of accumulated experience.

Rosner: So Ukraine is increasingly acting on its own leverage?

Energy Infrastructure and Strategic Leverage

Jacobsen: Yes. Ukraine has continued striking Russian oil refineries and other energy infrastructure that it argues contributes to financing or sustaining the Russian war effort. Those attacks have materially disrupted Russian refining capacity and fuel production. Reuters reported that six major diesel-producing refineries had reduced or halted output after drone attacks, and Russia has imposed fuel-export restrictions in response to shortages.

Ukraine describes those facilities as legitimate military or war-supporting targets. Trump, meanwhile, has publicly urged Zelenskyy to stop attacking Russian diesel infrastructure because of the effect on global fuel supplies.

So what you are seeing is a tension between American pressure for an energy ceasefire and Ukraine’s view that strikes on Russian energy infrastructure provide one of its few forms of strategic leverage. Russia and Ukraine have both continued attacking energy facilities despite recent diplomatic proposals to halt such strikes.

Rosner: Trump has told Ukraine to stop striking Russian diesel infrastructure because he says those attacks are contributing to higher global diesel prices. On September 13, he publicly urged Zelenskyy to stop targeting Russian diesel supplies, saying Ukraine could hit other targets. Ukraine, for its part, argues that Russian refineries are legitimate military targets because they support Moscow’s war effort.

Jacobsen: Does that undermine Washington’s claim to be a neutral mediator?

Rosner: At the very least, it complicates that claim. The person trying to negotiate an end to the war is also publicly telling one side to stop using a particular form of military pressure because of its effect on fuel markets.

My understanding of U.S. support for Ukraine under Trump’s second term also needs some qualification. It would be inaccurate to say the United States has provided zero support. The administration has continued to facilitate weapons transfers, including through arrangements in which third countries purchase U.S.-made weapons for Ukraine. Trump also announced in July that the United States would allow Ukraine to manufacture Patriot interceptors under license, and he said some interceptors could be supplied immediately.

Military Aid and Ukraine’s Changing Dependence

Jacobsen: So Ukraine is less dependent on direct American aid than it once was?

Rosner: Yes, although it remains dependent on certain American technologies, especially high-end air defence. European countries and Canada continue to provide substantial military assistance. Canada, for example, announced a C$350 million package this month for air-defence interceptors to be supplied through a U.S. purchasing mechanism.

Ukraine has also become extraordinarily innovative in inexpensive warfare technology. Its drone industry has expanded rapidly, and the broader lesson of the war is that relatively cheap unmanned systems can perform tasks that previously required much more expensive weapons and personnel.

I would not state as fact that Ukraine is currently manufacturing 20,000 drones every day or flying 9,000 to 10,000 combat drones daily unless we have a specific source for those figures. What is well established is the enormous scale of Ukrainian drone production and battlefield use.

Uncrewed Ground Systems and Low-Cost Warfare

Jacobsen: And that innovation is moving from aerial drones to ground systems too?

Rosner: Exactly. Ukraine is increasingly deploying uncrewed ground vehicles, or UGVs. These are relatively small tracked or wheeled machines that can carry explosives, ammunition, supplies, weapons, or wounded soldiers. Some models are being used directly in assaults. Reuters recently documented Ukrainian units using small four-wheeled “Hyena” robots carrying roughly 20 kilograms of explosives. Ukraine’s Third Army Corps wants unmanned ground systems eventually to replace a significant share of soldiers performing dangerous frontline tasks.

They remind me, visually, of the delivery robots you see around parts of Los Angeles, although battlefield systems are obviously heavier, more rugged, and designed for completely different purposes. Some can carry remotely operated weapons, while others are essentially mobile explosive platforms or logistics vehicles.

Some Ukrainian ground robots are dramatically cheaper than conventional armoured vehicles, but there is no single standard price. Costs depend on the platform, communications equipment, payload, sensors, armour, and weapon system. So saying they all cost less than $10,000 would be too broad.

The larger point still holds. Ukraine is trying to substitute inexpensive, expendable machines for human exposure wherever possible. That is one of the most important technological changes coming out of this war.

The United States relies heavily on sophisticated weapons that are extremely effective but costly and difficult to manufacture rapidly. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed how quickly inventories of advanced missiles can be consumed. European militaries are now reaching the same conclusion and investing in cheaper, mass-produced alternatives alongside premium systems.

Patriot Interceptors and the Economics of Defence

Ukraine would still very much like more Patriot interceptors. Patriots remain among the few systems available to Ukraine that can intercept Russian ballistic missiles, and Ukraine has been critically short of them.

Cheap drones and ground robots can substitute for much more expensive systems in reconnaissance, attack, logistics, and some defensive roles. They cannot simply replace a Patriot interceptor when a ballistic missile is coming toward a Ukrainian city.

I would also revise the claim that Ukraine has “run out” of Patriot missiles or that the United States refuses to provide any more. Ukraine is critically short of interceptors, but supplies are still moving through allied procurement programs, and the United States has agreed politically to license future production.

That said, the economics are radically different. A sophisticated air-defence interceptor can cost millions of dollars, while many Ukrainian drones cost a tiny fraction of that. This is why Ukraine has invested so heavily in mass-produced unmanned systems. They cannot do everything, but they allow Ukraine to impose costs on Russia at a scale that would be impossible if every strike required a multimillion-dollar missile.

Rosner: Am I getting any of that wrong?

Range, Payload, and Strategic Geography

Jacobsen: The main thing I would add is the rapid increase in two capabilities: range and payload. Ukrainian drones and missiles are increasingly able to travel farther and strike deeper targets, including logistics facilities, refineries, and other infrastructure. At the same time, larger payloads let individual systems do more damage. Ukrainian long-range drones have now reached targets more than 3,000 kilometres inside Russia.

So, in simple terms, Ukraine can reach more sensitive targets at greater distances and inflict greater damage with each successful strike.

Historically, Russia’s enormous territory and severe winters helped frustrate large invading armies, most famously those of Napoleon and Nazi Germany. But modern long-range warfare changes part of that equation. A vast territory is difficult to protect comprehensively against relatively inexpensive drones because air-defence systems cannot be positioned everywhere.

Rosner: So geography can become a liability rather than purely an advantage?

Jacobsen: In some respects, yes. Long-range unmanned systems can exploit gaps across a huge defensive perimeter. Ukraine is the defending state in this war under the basic international characterization of the conflict: Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia’s government disputes aspects of that framing and advances its own justifications for the war, but international institutions and most governments identify Russia as the aggressor.

Ukrainians sometimes describe strikes on Russian refineries and other war-supporting infrastructure as a kind of “informal sanctions” policy. The idea is to attack both the machinery sustaining the war and important sources of state revenue. Recent Ukrainian strikes have forced major Russian refineries to reduce or halt production, contributing to domestic fuel shortages and export restrictions.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Rick.

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