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Rick Rosner On, 39: American Science, AI Risks, Education, Democracy, and Political Misinformation

2026-11-05

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): Personal SubStack

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/09/18

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Rick Rosner discuss American scientific achievement, Sputnik-era investment, artificial intelligence, catastrophic AI risks, education, mathematics performance, political resilience, Trump-era institutional stress, polling, and misinformation. They examine national pride and embarrassment, technological leadership, democratic constraints, generational stereotypes, and the persistence of false election claims.

American Scientific Achievement and the Sputnik Era

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: I have one quick, separate question. What aspects of being an American citizen make you proud, and what aspects make you embarrassed? Think broadly about national values, social conditions, educational standards, elite science, current leadership, and the trends you have seen during your lifetime.

Rick Rosner: There is a lot to say, but I would start with something that makes me proud. The modern technological world is, to a significant extent, a product of American science, engineering, investment, and institutions.

A major turning point came after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957. The United States reacted with alarm and dramatically increased its emphasis on science, technology, engineering, mathematics, aerospace research, and technical education. Sputnik helped drive increased federal investment and institutional changes, including the creation of NASA.

Jacobsen: And you see a connection between that investment and the later technology boom?

Rosner: Yes, although I would not draw a straight causal line from Sputnik to every later invention. The United States built a dense ecosystem of federally funded research, universities, defence programs, private companies, venture capital, semiconductor firms, and computing research. That broader system helped create the conditions for personal computing, the internet, smartphones, and much of the modern digital economy.

People in roughly my generation grew up during that period of enormous technological ambition. Later generations of engineers and entrepreneurs built companies such as Apple, Microsoft, Intel, and many others on top of decades of public and private research.

What disappoints me is that I do not see the same coherent national scientific mission today.

Artificial Intelligence and a New National Science Push

Jacobsen: Does artificial intelligence provide an opportunity for another national science push?

Rosner: It could. The United States is now in an intense AI competition with China, but another problem remains: how do you develop increasingly powerful AI systems without creating unacceptable risks?

The political debate is badly divided. Some American political leaders argue that slowing AI development would give China a strategic advantage. House Speaker Mike Johnson made that argument this week, while President Trump has also warned against regulation that might reduce U.S. competitiveness.

At the same time, major AI researchers and executives warn of increasingly serious safety risks. Some have called for slower development, independent audits, and stronger safeguards. U.S. companies, policymakers, and foreign governments are also actively discussing how to manage catastrophic AI risks without simply freezing technological progress.

I revise my original statement to “nobody is doing anything.” People are doing things. The problem is that no consensus exists on how to balance technological leadership, economic incentives, national security, and AI safety.

My concern is that some technology executives have enormous financial incentives to keep pushing forward, while governments fear that slowing down unilaterally could allow a geopolitical rival to gain an advantage. That creates a dangerous coordination problem. The question is not simply whether America can win an AI race. It is whether the United States, China, Europe, and the major AI companies can develop systems that remain governable as their capabilities increase.

With AI, I think there may first be a shakeout, somewhat like the dot-com crash around 2000. Valuations can become inflated, expectations can outrun near-term commercial reality, and some companies will fail. Then, out of that wreckage, you may get a more mature and durable AI economy, just as the internet continued developing after the dot-com bubble burst.

That is a forecast, not something we can know. But if it happens, I think the mature AI era could look like what I call a “utopia-dystopia marble cake”: extraordinary benefits swirled together with genuinely terrible consequences.

Catastrophic AI Risk and P-Doom

Jacobsen: What kinds of risks are you thinking about?

Rosner: Everything from economic disruption and misinformation to catastrophic misuse. I also worry about what people sometimes call “P-doom,” the probability that advanced AI could cause human extinction or similarly permanent disempowerment.

I compared that risk to Russian roulette, where one round with one bullet in a six-chamber revolver gives you roughly a one-in-six chance of death.

So a substantial group of AI researchers assign nontrivial probabilities to catastrophic outcomes, but no established scientific estimate says humanity has exactly a one-in-six chance of being wiped out by AI within the next 20 or 30 years.

Jacobsen: And extinction is not the only catastrophic scenario.

Rosner: Right. There are softer versions of apocalypse, if “soft” is even the right word. You could imagine AI substantially lowering the expertise required to design biological weapons or conduct other forms of catastrophic harm. I would not attach a specific casualty figure, such as 800 million deaths, because that would be speculative. The defensible point is that advanced AI could amplify the capabilities of malicious actors, which is one reason biosecurity and other misuse risks are being studied seriously.

The way we are dealing with AI is not something I am particularly proud of, and that is not exclusively an American problem. It is a global governance problem.

American Science, Education, and Comparative Performance

Jacobsen: Is that connected to a broader concern about American science and education?

Rosner: Yes. I worry about anti-scientific politics in the United States and about whether the country is investing enough in education and scientific capacity.

I also made a crude comparison between American students and students in East Asia. The underlying educational difference is real in some areas, but the stereotype needs to be stripped away. It is not accurate to characterize Chinese or South Korean families as “little dictatorships,” nor to portray American students as caring only about TikTok and video games.

Jacobsen: What does the comparative data actually show?

Rosner: The strongest international evidence shows that several East Asian education systems perform exceptionally well in mathematics and science.

American students scored close to the OECD average in mathematics and above it in reading and science. Eleven percent of U.S. students were top performers in science, compared with an OECD average of 7 percent.

The United States has a particular weakness in mathematics relative to the strongest East Asian systems, while still performing comparatively well in other areas.

Work Ethic, Academic Culture, and Generational Stereotypes

Jacobsen: What about the claim that American students are simply working less hard?

Rosner: School performance reflects much more than individual work ethic. Curriculum, instructional time, tutoring systems, family income, inequality, teacher quality, school funding, cultural expectations, and access to advanced coursework all matter.

South Korea and several other East Asian systems do have intense academic cultures, including substantial private tutoring and high-stakes competition. That can produce impressive academic outcomes, but it also comes with social costs. So “they work harder, and Americans are lazy” is not a serious explanation by itself.

And I have to recognize the generational cliché here. I am an older guy saying younger people do not work as hard as people did when I was young. Every generation seems to rediscover that complaint.

You asked me about work ethic. I was last conventionally employed about 12 years ago. Some days, especially when it is brutally hot in Los Angeles in August and early September, it is difficult for me even to put on pants. So I should probably be cautious about lecturing younger generations about work ethic.

Political Institutions and Democratic Resilience

Jacobsen: What aspects of the American political system still make you proud?

Rosner: We are now in the sixth year of Trump’s two presidencies, and a lot of things are badly damaged. But the United States still has a political system that is broken in important ways and yet remains resilient in others. Elections, courts, state governments, civil society, journalists, and other institutions still impose constraints.

We are seven weeks away from the midterms, when voters will decide control of Congress. I would not predict the outcome, but if political institutions continue functioning and power can still change through elections, that is something worth valuing.

My concern has been whether the United States could drift toward a more durable form of illiberal government, something closer to what Hungary has experienced under Viktor Orbán. I hope the American system proves resilient enough to avoid that.

Trump Approval and Public Resistance

Jacobsen: How much public resistance to Trump is visible in the polling?

Rosner: Quite a lot, although the exact number depends on the poll. A Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted in September put Trump’s approval at 35 percent, with considerably more Americans disapproving than approving. So whatever else can be said about the durability of his political base, a clear majority in that particular poll did not approve of his performance.

Political Misinformation and the 2020 Election

Jacobsen: You have also argued that misinformation has become deeply embedded in parts of the Republican electorate.

Rosner: Yes. I would put that more carefully than I did before. I do not think it is useful to describe Republican voters broadly as stupid or mentally ill. Those are sweeping judgments, and political beliefs are not psychiatric diagnoses.

There is, however, strong evidence that false claims about the 2020 election remain widespread among Republicans. The election was not stolen, and repeated investigations, recounts, court proceedings, and official reviews found no fraud remotely sufficient to overturn Biden’s victory.

I would say there are mentally ill people on the far left, just as there are mentally ill people elsewhere in the population. What I am not proud of is the persistence of deeply entrenched political misinformation. That will be an ongoing problem in the United States.

Historical Comparisons and the Legal Status of Political Movements

After Nazi Germany was defeated in 1945, there were certainly former Nazis and Germans who continued to sympathize with Hitler or National Socialism. The Allied occupation authorities outlawed Nazi organizations, removed Nazi symbols and propaganda, and undertook denazification. The Federal Republic later prohibited the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party in 1952.

Jacobsen: You do not expect an equivalent legal response to MAGA politics.

Rosner: No. Being a Trump supporter is legal political activity in the United States, and I do not expect that to change. The challenge is therefore cultural and political, not about banning an ideology.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Rick.

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