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China’s behaviour can be quite aggressive, particularly in its approach to territorial and maritime issues : Nataliya Plaksiyenko-Butyrska

2026-11-21

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): Times Asian

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/08/10

Nataliya Plaksiyenko-Butyrska is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the New Europe Center and an expert on East Asia. She has written more than 100 analytical materials on international relations, especially the Asia-Pacific region, China’s rise, and Ukraine’s relations with Asian countries. Her work has appeared in outlets including Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, Ukrainian Pravda, and The Week. She also contributes commentary to television, radio, and international research projects on regional security and foreign-policy strategy in Ukraine abroad.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Nataliya Plaksiyenko-Butyrska about Japan’s strong support for Ukraine, East Asian views of China, and the strategic meaning of Taiwan for regional security. Plaksiyenko-Butyrska explains why Japan sees Ukraine through the lens of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the rules-based order. She also contrasts democratic alliances with more transactional authoritarian alignments, arguing that democratic support for Ukraine remains deeper, more durable, and ultimately more reliable in practice.

Scott DouglasJacobsen: The Journalists’ Solidarity Center, under the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, has major support from UNESCO and the Government of Japan. I have seen Japanese support appear in many places. Is there a primary reason why Japan is more supportive than other East Asian countries?
Nataliya Plaksiyenko-Butyrska: First of all, Japan is a member of the G7, and it is trying to strengthen its influence within that group. That is one reason.

Another reason is that Japan needs to defend the international rules-based order. Issues such as sovereignty and territorial integrity are central in current international relations, and Japan takes these very seriously.

Also, supporting Ukraine aligns with Japan’s broader strategic interests. Supporting a country that is facing aggression is consistent with its principles and its own security concerns.

That is why, for Ukraine, the relationship with Japan is very important and very helpful at this time.

Jacobsen: Do East Asian countries generally trust or distrust China?
Plaksiyenko-Butyrska: I would not say that these countries are afraid of China, but they perceive China as a country whose actions are increasingly assertive in the region. They understand that China’s behaviour can be quite aggressive, particularly in its approach to territorial and maritime issues.

So they try to develop policies to protect themselves from a more assertive China. They see that China is expanding its influence across the region, especially in the South China Sea. One very important and sensitive issue is Taiwan.

For Japan, this is directly related to its national security, particularly through the First Island Chain. It concerns both Japan’s own security and the broader regional balance. If China were to take aggressive action against Taiwan, it would affect trade routes and regional stability.

China’s ability to influence or restrict trade would create pressure on many countries. Control over key maritime routes or disruptions to navigation could have serious economic consequences for the region. That is why, for Japan and South Korea, it is important to preserve the status quo.

In Japan’s case, it is trying to strengthen its alliance with the United States, including through enhanced defence cooperation and deployments on its southwestern islands. This is intended to signal that Japan is prepared to respond to potential Chinese actions, including in a Taiwan scenario.

In South Korea, the situation is more complex. South Korea is more economically dependent on China, as many major South Korean companies operate there and rely on the Chinese market.

Because of this, South Korea’s government is more cautious in its relations with China. As I mentioned earlier, South Korea is also less confident in its ability to balance simultaneously the challenges posed by China and North Korea, especially considering China’s influence over North Korea. So it tends to act more carefully than Japan at this moment.

But in the case of China, if the United States were to reduce its presence in the region or show signs of weakness, China would likely act more assertively and increase pressure on neighbouring countries.

Jacobsen: China has shown a willingness to annex territories, such as Tibet. Historically, Russia also took large areas from China, including parts of what is now the Russian Far East. One could argue that historical tensions exist beneath current relations.

At the same time, looking at cases like Iran, Syria, and Venezuela, alliances among more authoritarian states often appear pragmatic rather than deeply institutional. They may cooperate on intelligence or military matters, but the relationships are not always stable or deeply integrated.

So how should we distinguish alliances among authoritarian or theocratic states versus those among democratic countries, whether weakly democratic or strongly democratic, like Iceland compared to India?

Plaksiyenko-Butyrska: During Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, we observed what some analysts describe as an emerging alignment among Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China. It appeared dangerous because these countries demonstrated a degree of coordination and support.

In the case of Iran, it supplied Russia with Shahed-type drones. In the case of North Korea, it has provided ammunition and, according to multiple reports, personnel support. A significant portion of artillery ammunition used by Russia has been assessed as coming from North Korea.

China has also provided support, particularly through economic ties and the supply of dual-use goods for military production.

However, the current situation shows that this alignment is not as cohesive as it may appear. When one of these partners needs direct support, the assistance—especially from China—is often limited or carefully calibrated.

China tries to balance its position. On the one hand, it seeks to present itself as a responsible global actor. On the other hand, it provides indirect or less visible forms of support that align with its strategic interests. So the level of support is more restrained than some might expect.

At the same time, this makes the situation complex and potentially dangerous, because these countries are not operating within a clear, formalized framework.

Jacobsen: What do you mean by not operating within a framework?
Plaksiyenko-Butyrska: In democratic alliances, there are established rules, institutions, and limitations—formal agreements, legal obligations, and shared standards. These create predictability in how countries cooperate and respond.

In contrast, cooperation among authoritarian states is often more flexible and transactional. It is driven by immediate strategic interests rather than long-term institutional commitments. That means their coordination can shift quickly depending on circumstances.

This lack of a structured framework makes their behaviour less predictable, thereby increasing risks in the international system.

Even as they support Ukraine, democratic countries face limitations related to their societies and elections. For example, when governments consider providing certain types of military assistance, they must take public opinion into account.

In Germany, for instance, decisions about supplying long-range missiles have been constrained by domestic debate and public concern about deeper involvement in the war. These societies do not always want to be directly involved.

In contrast, in North Korea, there are no such societal constraints. Decisions are made solely by Kim Jong-un. In China, support is directed by Xi Jinping and limited by his decisions, without meaningful public debate or electoral pressure.
So there is a clear difference. At the same time, democratic partners have shown that their unity, willingness, and preparedness to support Ukraine are deeper and more sustainable over time.

Thanks to this support, Ukraine has been able to resist Russia for more than four years. It is therefore very important for us, and for our European and broader democratic partners, to strengthen unity even further.

It is important for democratic countries to coordinate their economic and military capacities better. We can see pressures emerging, including political dynamics in the United States, while also facing coordinated challenges from authoritarian states such as China and Russia. For Ukraine, it is essential to withstand all of these pressures.

For example, during periods of foreign political pressure on Ukraine, European partners continued to support Ukraine and maintained their position. Thanks to this unity, Ukraine continues to resist Russian military aggression.

Jacobsen: The general sentiment within the United States, depending on perspective, is that recent political developments have created uncertainty in international relations.

If we look at this alignment of authoritarian and, in some cases, theocratic states, we also see a time dimension in democratic systems. In the United States, political terms are limited, with elections every four years and midterm elections that can shift policy direction.

So there may be periods of instability, followed by a rebuilding of alliances and trust, which takes time. This connects to what leaders such as Alexander Stubb in Finland and Mark Carney in Canada have discussed regarding the growing importance of middle powers.

We have seen that the relative share of global power—military, economic, and political—held by traditional superpowers has been changing, even as their absolute economic size remains large.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Nataliya.

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