Everywhere Insiders 23: G7 Sanctions, Venezuela, Nigeria, Sudan, Authoritarian Regimes, Western Power

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/11/29

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

In this episode of Everywhere Insiders, Scott Douglas Jacobsen interviews Tsukerman on G7 sanctions on Russia, U.S. pressure on Venezuela and Nigeria, and genocidal violence in Sudan. Tsukerman explains how symbolic sanctions, inconsistent U.S. policy, and proxy actors from Russia to the UAE blunt accountability while civilians pay the price. She links cultural “openings” under authoritarian regimes, such as Iran, to psychological control rather than real reform. Across cases, Jacobsen and Tsukerman trace a through line: absent strategy, selective outrage, and weak institutions enable atrocities, leaving vulnerable communities with little protection or meaningful recourse under international law.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: This is Everywhere Insiders, I think episode 23. We are almost at the halfway point of our collaboration—at least on this series. I believe it is the longest of the recent experimental weeklies, so thank you very much. We are going to cover a few things. This is local, but I think it is also international, obviously, with the G7. We had the Foreign Ministers’ Summit here. I was in attendance as an independent journalist, but with International Policy Digest. The oversized item was the sanctions on the Russian Federation—on, I think, 13 individuals and 11 entities. Since the original 2014 regulations came into force, Canada has now sanctioned more than 3,300 individuals and entities connected to Russia and related theatres under the Special Economic Measures framework. So, quick thoughts: what are your opinions about the state of the G7 and the approach they have taken at this meeting?

Irina Tsukerman: I am glad there is finally some united front on this one issue. The G7 has not been particularly high-profile under Trump, in part. He is not a big fan of multilateral formats in general and in part because he has focused heavily on bilateral or “mini-lateral” initiatives. Larger gatherings—unless they are very high profile and fit his narrative—have not been a priority. So the G7 has been in a kind of holding pattern: not collapsing, but not driving the agenda the way some other blocs have. There is bilateral engagement between the United States and other G7 members; some of it is positive, while some is less so. But at least the fact that this sanctions package came together sends a signal of coordination, even with Trump in office. 

On the other hand, how much will it change the situation on the ground? Anything is better than nothing, but Russia has proved highly resilient, even with a damaged economy, in sustaining its military campaign. It has adopted low-tech, attritional methods that do not require a flourishing economy. Ukraine, for its part, has suffered from a shortage of personnel in key areas like Pokrovsk and lacks Russia’s population base. 

Another issue is that political and budget fights in the United States have repeatedly slowed or complicated assistance. A federal funding freeze can delay forms of foreign aid, and there have been separate, explicit decisions from Trump and his advisers to pause or reduce some support to Ukraine. In 2025, for instance, some munitions deliveries were paused, and reporting has linked part of that initiative to the Pentagon policy shop led by Elbridge Colby, though Trump himself has also been directly involved in freezes. It was not that the Pentagon, on its own and without authorization, used a shutdown as an excuse; instead, a combination of budget brinkmanship and policy decisions created a stop-start pattern of support. 

You mentioned other U.S. developments. Washington is now openly threatening military intervention in Nigeria, with Trump describing it as a response to the killing of Christians and ordering the Pentagon to prepare contingency plans. At the moment, however, this remains rhetoric, planning, and political pressure—there has been no actual U.S. combat deployment. Many analysts and Nigerian voices see this as political theatre more than concrete policy so far. If it ever turned into a real deployment, it would raise legal and diplomatic questions about host-nation consent, a UN mandate, or congressional authorization, especially without explicit Nigerian support, as for Venezuela and Nigeria vis-à-vis the United States, the Maduro regime is widely viewed as a regional and international problem. 

U.S. prosecutors have charged Maduro and senior officials with narco-terrorism, alleging collaboration with drug-trafficking networks and groups such as the FARC, which the U.S. designates as a terrorist organization. Analysts also document links between elements of the Venezuelan state and Hezbollah and other Iran-aligned networks, framing Venezuela as a hub where organized crime and terrorism intersect. Venezuelan intelligence services have a record of abuses at home and have been accused of running espionage networks abroad, including across Latin America, contributing to perceptions of broad sabotage and interference. And Maduro has actively relied on Iran, Russia, and China—military, intelligence, and economic support—particularly as U.S. sanctions and U.S. military pressure have intensified.

All over the Western Hemisphere, there is no question that his presence alone—his engagement with those foreign actors—is a direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and there is no question that he is an exceptionally malign and completely illegitimate actor. The problem is not that the United States is trying to find a way to remove him; the problem is that what they are doing actually gets in the way of eliminating Nicolás Maduro. Rather than targeting this dictator—who is responsible for catastrophic, artificial economic collapse inside the country, who appears on numerous sanctions lists for corruption, human rights abuses, and repression of opposition movements, and whose government has triggered one of the most significant refugee crises in modern history—the United States has focused on attacking alleged drug-transport vessels. Some of them may indeed be connected to narcotrafficking, and some may not be.

The United States has never presented evidence, even in internal congressional briefings, that satisfies the burden of showing that this escalation is security-related, much less that it meets the standards for any extrajudicial use of force. Historically, when the United States carried out extrajudicial drone strikes, they targeted active terrorist organizations. The United States has indeed designated some cartels as terrorist organizations. However, it is not clear whether the alleged drug transporters would even fall under such designations, much less whether transporting drugs alone would constitute an imminent danger to U.S. citizens that could justify pre-emptive action. Given that there is no evidence these vessels were criminal, terrorist, or otherwise hostile actors, it is entirely possible that at least some of these strikes violated international law. That has created significant setbacks for public support of these operations and has generated unnecessary bipartisan polarization around something that should be straightforward. 

Opposing Maduro ought to be an easy bipartisan win. Another issue is that international partners have begun limiting intelligence sharing out of concern that their information could contribute to unlawful attacks. This includes Colombia, whose relationship with the United States is already strained for unrelated reasons, and even the United Kingdom, one of Washington’s closest security partners. The fact that these countries, all of which consider Maduro illegitimate and believe he should face intense pressure, are nonetheless deeply concerned sends a clear message that the United States is not approaching this correctly. Washington is not only lending credibility to Maduro’s narratives inside Latin America and generating anti-American sentiment, but also undermining international support for any future coordinated plan to pressure or potentially remove the regime, if that is, in fact, the plan. 

As of now, it is unclear what the United States intends to do. What we do know is that the Trump administration informed Congress that it does not currently have sufficient legal justification to carry out strikes on Venezuelan territory, despite widespread speculation. If this is what they are willing to admit publicly, it is obvious that any serious military action is unlikely in the near future. Unfortunately, all of these benefits go to Maduro and his supporters. It undercuts the opposition and diminishes the possibility of a peaceful, orderly transition should a viable framework for Maduro’s departure emerge. It also raises the risk of repeating past failures—such as the poorly executed covert operations against Fidel Castro. If the administration is planning similar operations, it should at least learn from history and avoid attempts unlikely to succeed. Unfortunately, from what I am hearing, there was at least one attempt to abduct Maduro or a senior member of his administration.

That went horribly wrong and caused public embarrassment, so that also does not bode well for any long-term plan to remove him from power. It is interesting: reports indicate that certain veil-related restrictions are easing while political crackdowns are intensifying. They are facing economic and political strain. Executions have surged to their highest level since 1989, and nuclear talks remain stalled. 

Jacobsen: I want to focus on something more cultural than geopolitical—how people are being allowed to relate to one another. There are women in jeans and sneakers and men in cafés, reportedly with some Western music. I am curious what “Western music” means here: is it music from the 1990s, or is it contemporary? Are they listening to Mary J. Blige or Kendrick Lamar, essentially? What are your thoughts on the loosening—however limited—of social restrictions that had previously been rigidly enforced in Iran? The question is: what are your thoughts, less on the geopolitics of stalled nuclear talks—which, if stalled, present nothing new—and more on the easing of some social restrictions amidst intensified repression? For example, executions are now at their highest since 1989. What do you make of this duality: cultural opening alongside escalating crackdowns? 

Tsukerman: It is not necessarily contradictory. In fact, this pattern has existed before. The Islamic Republic has always paired fear-based domestic control with just enough limited breathing room to prevent the situation from exploding into widespread uprisings. It is not liberalizing. It is not shifting its anti-Western ideological stance. In schools, in particular, there are significant restrictions on learning English and on exposure to any Western historical or cultural perspectives. 

Educational policy has become even more explicitly focused on indoctrinating younger generations into anti-Western attitudes, based on the regime’s historical lesson that if you do not indoctrinate them early, they grow more liberal—and that becomes a threat. What the regime is doing is managing two tracks at once: slowly shaping younger children into a more ideologically rigid, anti-Western mindset, while giving the current generation—those who grew up with VPNs and access to outside culture—just enough superficial cultural freedom to prevent them from becoming politically mobilized. The goal is to keep them distracted from their grievances and the intolerable nature of their circumstances. It is a form of manipulation—almost a psychological operations design—using harmless cultural openings to divert attention away from political rebellion.

The goal is to make them believe the situation is somewhat manageable without changing anything that matters to the regime. What matters to the regime is not what matters to the general public, particularly those who are not politically active. The objective is to prevent them from becoming politically active or joining groups seeking change. The crackdowns are the other side of this—essentially a carrot-and-stick approach. If you are a law-abiding citizen who behaves and does not violate restrictions, you are given a bit more room to enjoy life. If you are politically active or perceived as a threat, even if you are not actually a threat, the regime takes a stringent approach to demonstrate that it means business. It reinforces that deviations from the allowed practices will not be tolerated. The regime is exercising more control now than previously, when it was less consistent and less predictable. 

Jacobsen: In Nigeria, there is a different issue that sits outside the usual Western commentaries. Witchcraft accusations remain widespread. In the West, witchcraft is usually viewed as a recreational or symbolic practice—people go to festivals, form covens, or treat it as a subculture. It is not socially consequential or life-threatening. In many parts of Nigeria, older women can be killed, and the sick or infirm can be further harmed due to superstition. Thousands of Nigerian children are now being accused of being witches. Many are abused or abandoned by their families. Pastors and witch doctors charge fees for exorcisms, creating layers of exploitation from charlatans. Aid groups are moving in to support children through school and university, and Nigerian aid organizations appear to be scaling up efforts to help children accused of this entirely fabricated crime. What are your thoughts? 

Tsukerman: The reason it is not a significant issue in the West is that most people who identify with witchcraft do not believe in its supernatural power. For them, it is a social or spiritual activity, and to the extent they do think, it is protected under the First Amendment as religious expression. As long as it does not cause harm or violate any laws, there is no reason for social concern. In Nigeria, however, many people genuinely believe witchcraft has a supernatural impact. That belief creates fear. Part of this stems from poor education, limited government reach, corruption, weak institutions, and the failure of authorities to protect citizens. Another part comes from deeply ingrained cultural, tribal, and—though to a lesser extent—religious traditions and superstitions.

Much of this is a tribal practice. Religions generally condemn witchcraft, but most do not actually believe it exists. When religious belief is paired with cultural and tribal norms, it creates a powerful combination of social prejudice. It also becomes a convenient tool for eliminating people you dislike for entirely unrelated reasons. If you envy someone, you accuse them of witchcraft. If you want to take over a farm, you accuse the owner of witchcraft. If you have a dispute with a neighbour, a witchcraft accusation can prompt others in the community to injure, punish, or kill them, removing the “problem” for you. 

It is often difficult to determine how much harm arises from genuine fear and ignorance and how much from people deliberately exploiting superstition to settle grudges or gain material advantage. Education is crucial. Reducing the influence of these beliefs requires active engagement, best practices, and community-level support explaining that witchcraft does not exist and that supposed rituals cannot harm anyone. When Christian communities facing jihadist attacks appeal for help, they receive international attention because there are significant Christian populations abroad who advocate for them. Children and adults accused of witchcraft have no such global constituency. Outsiders may believe witchcraft is real and avoid involvement, or they may not know the victims exist. No established transnational networks are advocating specifically for victims of witchcraft accusations. As a result, this issue receives far less international support than other human rights violations of similar severity. 

Jacobsen: The last topic is Sudan. The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are advancing eastward amid an escalation of the civil war. The most recent figures I saw were at least 150,000 people killed so far, with approximately 14 million internally displaced. There was international outrage over the large-scale killing of civilians in El Fasher. Amy Pope, head of the International Organization for Migration, has also reported that up to 50,000 people have been displaced from Kordofan in the past two months. It is a horrific situation. Any general thoughts? 

Tsukerman: Unfortunately, after the massacre in El Fasher—which many observers classified as indicative of genocidal intent—there was another similar incident in the same area, prompting renewed international outcry. RSF has been accused of attempting to wipe out portions of the population in Darfur and other regions on sectarian and racial grounds. There has been increasing pressure on the UAE and other countries believed to be supplying weapons to the RSF for geopolitical, security, or economic reasons. Other actors, including Russia, have been playing both sides of the conflict, further contributing to the devastation.

The humanitarian and human rights crisis is intensifying. There have been attempts to reach a diplomatic resolution to the conflict and to establish humanitarian corridors. Recently, the parties agreed to a humanitarian truce, but it is unclear whether it had any meaningful effect on the delivery of aid to civilians or on providing medical assistance to those affected by the massacres. As far as I know, conditions on the ground did not significantly improve. It is also unclear how long the truce was intended to last or whether it has already been violated. What we continue to see is the RSF gaining territory politically and militarily, while the overall situation inside Sudan remains unchanged. 

The United States has attempted to provide mediation through talks in Washington, but there is no dedicated envoy or task force focused solely on Sudan. The current special envoy for Africa—who is Trump’s in-law, Boulos—has experience living in Africa as a businessman but lacks the specialized geopolitical background needed to address each conflict independently. There is, therefore, a severe shortage of resources and expertise. Regional actors with strong interests in the outcome—such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia—have tried their own mediation efforts, but they often lack credibility with one side or the other and cannot independently resolve the crisis. Because Sudan is not treated as a top priority compared to higher-profile conflicts like Ukraine or Gaza, international attention and resources have been limited.

There has not been a sustained international focus on Sudan as there has been on other conflicts. Media coverage is increasing now that the Gaza conflict appears to be in a holding pattern. There is still internal activity there, unfortunately, but it is perceived as less active. That shift in attention, along with the shock over the massacres, has contributed to renewed international interest. Still, in terms of actual policy, this has not translated into much beyond additional U.S.-backed diplomatic efforts. There has been no overwhelming international pressure: no major UN resolutions, no serious attempts to deploy peacekeeping forces, and no significant African Union pressure on the warring actors through substantive initiatives. We are seeing a self-perpetuating conflict, with minimal intervention from those interested in ending the war.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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