Everywhere Insiders 31: Russia’s Oreshnik Strike Near Poland, Iran’s Protest Pressure, and Grok Deepfakes

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/01/22

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Irina Tsukerman about Russia’s reported use of the hypersonic Oreshnik missile near Lviv on January 9, 2026, and what striking close to Poland signals for NATO deterrence. They pivot to Iran’s widening economic protests and hardline warnings from Major General Amir Hatami, with rights groups reporting dozens killed and more than 2,000 detained amid internet blackouts. Finally, Tsukerman dissects speech on private platforms—Twitter versus X—and the Grok deepfake scandal, arguing that inconsistent moderation and weak safeguards invite regulatory backlash and accelerate cross-border information fragmentation. Across three fronts, she urges resilience planning, legal clarity, and deterrence.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Thank you very much for joining me so late. I know you are coming straight from a conference. Russia reportedly used its hypersonic Oreshnik missile overnight from January 8 to January 9, 2026. According to early reporting, it struck a target near Lviv in western Ukraine, close to the Polish border, although the precise damage assessment is still developing.

People have expressed skepticism about high-profile claims involving “new” missile systems in this war—sometimes because capabilities are exaggerated, and sometimes because early reporting is incomplete. With that in mind, what do you make of the reported use of Oreshnik near NATO’s border? Based on what is publicly known, why target so close to Poland?

Irina Tsukerman: Skepticism is more than justified, given Russia’s long record—dating back to the Soviet period—of using claims about advanced weapons as psychological messaging as much as operational disclosure. That said, in this case, multiple credible reports indicate that Oreshnik was launched toward a target near Lviv. It is described as an intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads, although reporting indicates it carried inert, non-explosive warheads in this strike.

The broader significance of the strike is not only technical. The location matters. Targeting western Ukraine near Poland is widely interpreted as signaling—testing thresholds, shaping NATO psychology, and reminding European capitals that escalation can be placed close to the alliance’s frontier.

On the question of what exactly was hit, reporting varies in early detail, but the consistent element is that the strike occurred near Lviv and was associated with infrastructure or an industrial or state facility. The full effects remain uncertain.

Regarding Poland, it is accurate that Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace have occurred, including a significant episode in September 2025 that triggered immediate allied air responses. In that incident, NATO aircraft were scrambled, and intercepts occurred during the event itself. This was not a situation where NATO deliberated for months on whether interception was appropriate.

If Oreshnik did not cross into Polish territory this time, it may still have been close enough to serve its strategic purpose: intimidation, boundary testing, and message signaling. Whether the strike was deliberately calibrated near the border or involved any degree of misfire cannot be conclusively established based on current public reporting.

What is clear is that Oreshnik appears to have been used again after earlier reported tests or deployments in 2024. Its reappearance functions not only as a battlefield event but as a geopolitical broadcast. Russia continues to use these systems to project capability, provoke hesitation, and exploit ambiguity.

The danger is that continued restraint or indecision encourages further escalation. Russia has shown that it will expand the geographic and technological scope of its operations when it perceives hesitation. European leaders should not assume de-escalation will follow inaction. At this stage, they should not expect decisive leadership from a Trump administration. Their best hope may be that it does not actively worsen the situation.

Instead, European states should be focusing on optimizing their own forces as much as possible. In my view, investing in human personnel is just as important as developing new technologies or waiting for new systems to come online. We are seeing this clearly in Ukraine. It is not technology that is costing Ukraine most heavily; it is the human factor.

Ukraine is simply less populous than Russia. It has suffered heavy losses, and there have also been issues with desertions and recruitment. All of these factors allow Russia to continue advancing, even when Ukraine is extremely effective at targeting Russian military and economic assets and undercutting Russian strategy. None of that is sufficient if there are not enough people available.

The fact that many European countries are not serious about militarizing their societies—and I am not afraid to use that term, even if others are—is a major psychological weakness. At this point, it is a significant advantage for Russia.

Jacobsen: It has been a very busy week. Iran’s army chief has threatened a preemptive attack in response to rhetoric directed at Iran from President Donald Trump and the Trump administration in the United States.

Major General Amir Hatami has framed these statements and actions as a dual threat from the United States and Israel. This comes despite protests sparked by economic pressures affecting many civilians. Economic hardship is not evenly distributed—wealth tends to follow something like a Gaussian curve. Some people are doing well, others are not. When officials speak of economic woes, they usually mean a substantial segment of the population, not everyone.

Hatami was quoted as saying, “The Islamic Republic considers the intensification of such rhetoric against the Iranian nation as a threat and will not leave its continuation without a response. I can say with confidence that today the readiness of Iran’s armed forces is far greater than before the war. If any error is made, it will face a more decisive response, and we will cut off the hand of any aggressor.”

Any thoughts on the economic protests, commentary from the Pahlavis and others, and the response from the military leadership?

Tsukerman: It is a highly complicated situation. In terms of economic pressure, this is so far the most serious factor pointing toward the potential collapse of the regime. I am not suggesting that such a collapse is imminent. In fact, this is unlikely to be a gradual process. What we are seeing resembles pre-terminal stress rather than a slow decline.

The reason I say this is that the Islamic Revolution itself began with a similar pattern: economic collapse and mass demonstrations led by the bazaar class. Until now, many regime loyalists held out even as other demographic groups began to fracture under various grievances. That loyalty has persisted up to this point.

However, a combination of reimposed sanctions, misallocated budgets, chronic mismanagement, and Iran’s prioritization of external imperial ambitions over internal development has made daily life increasingly unlivable—even for these core constituencies. Prices have skyrocketed, and the value of the currency has collapsed precipitously.

While economic collapse alone may not be sufficient to bring down the regime’s institutions, it severely undermines whatever support remains. At this stage, the issue is no longer ideology. It is survival. Historically, this basic economic dynamic has preceded revolutions, uprisings, and state failure across the world.

That said, this does not mean we are witnessing the beginning of a peaceful transition to a better system of governance. That outcome is far from guaranteed. Groups such as the IRGC may be waiting in the background to seize and co-opt the process for their own purposes, much as occurred after the revolution that was initially driven by leftist and communist movements.

What happened in Iran in 1979 followed a similar pattern. A popular uprising was ultimately co-opted by Khomeinist Islamists for their own purposes. The IRGC could be attempting to play the same game today. Regardless of how events unfold, the regime is failing. It is no longer able to perform the most basic function of any government: sustaining life for its population. It cannot reliably provide even fundamental necessities.

Iran’s performance is worse than Russia’s and far worse than China’s. That disparity explains why the level of discontent in Iran is far greater than what we see in those countries. Russia, by comparison, despite a generally harsh internal environment, has managed to shield its economy relatively well from sanctions. It has continued trade with various countries, maintained functional intelligence and security relationships with allies and proxies, and preserved a minimal standard of living for most of its population. Discontent is growing there, but it remains far below the level Iran has now reached.

For the protests in Iran to have a more decisive impact, additional factors would be necessary. The first is unified leadership. The protests are spreading organically across the country, even in the face of deliberate internet shutdowns imposed by the regime to obstruct coordination. There is a clear level of popular solidarity around a shared grievance, which is important. However, leadership capable of translating this widespread frustration into a coordinated political movement is still largely absent.

Another key factor is whether the military and other state institutions will turn away from the regime—either by allowing the protests to proceed to their conclusion or by actively joining them. So far, the IRGC has been relatively restrained. There is speculation that some within its ranks are deeply frustrated by their own economic conditions and may be willing to abandon the regime altogether.

It is also important to note that parts of the IRGC include holdovers from the pre-revolutionary Shi’a establishment. They did not leave the country after 1979 and instead joined the new institutions. As a result, not all IRGC members are ideologically committed Islamists. Some joined simply because they possessed relevant skills, needed employment, and were willing to work for whoever held power.

That said, the IRGC leadership is highly ideological and deliberately selected to be so. I am not optimistic that anything constructive will emerge from that group. The regular military, while weaker in many respects, remains substantial and could potentially shift the balance in favor of anti-regime forces. That has not yet occurred.

Regarding statements by Reza Pahlavi, they would carry more weight if he had joined his supporters on the ground. Encouraging people from the comfort of residences in California or Virginia is not particularly inspiring. In my view, this does not constitute serious leadership.

He undoubtedly has some following, though it is unclear how much of that support is organic rather than self-generated through self-promotion. More broadly, Iranians hold differing views on who should govern. However, Pahlavi is not a reigning crown prince. The Shah abdicated without formally transferring the throne to his son. Pahlavi has not lived in Iran for decades, has no governing experience, and is widely perceived as highly Westernized. These factors make him an unlikely candidate for leadership, regardless of how appealing the image of the former monarchy may be to some observers abroad.

Large segments of the population are strongly anti-monarchical, precisely because of the corruption, repression, and inequality that contributed to the revolution in the first place. For that reason, I am not optimistic about Pahlavi’s ability to meaningfully influence these events. If anything, he appears to be riding on the courage of people who are risking their lives on the ground.

The regime has responded with force. More than 2,000 people have reportedly been arrested, and at least 51 have been killed, including minors. Those being detained will not be treated humanely. Statements by Ayatollah Khamenei have made it clear that repression against what he calls “rioters” is encouraged.

The people taking to the streets understand the risks. They are risking their freedom, facing the possibility of torture, endangering their families, and potentially risking their lives. The level of frustration with the regime has reached a point where even people who only wanted to survive quietly are now protesting and exposing themselves to dangers typically faced by political activists—roles most of them have never previously occupied.

Another major concern is the posture of the United States amid these events. On one hand, President Donald Trump has suggested that he would consider deploying U.S. forces if protesters were being killed. At present, the death toll is not as high as it was during the 2019 protests or those in 2022, when approximately 1,500 and several hundred protesters, respectively, were killed.

It may be that Trump is waiting to see whether mass casualties occur. However, making highly specific threats without a clear intention to act is counterproductive. At a minimum, his comments should have remained within the realm of strategic ambiguity—expressing concern and signaling pressure without making promises he is unwilling to fulfill. Overpromising helps the regime, not the protesters, some of whom may be clinging to the hope of U.S. intervention. So far, no such intervention has occurred.

There are some limited positive developments. Expanded access to Starlink has helped sustain communication during internet blackouts. There are also persistent rumors of potential Israeli airstrikes, given Iran’s continued military activity directed at Israel. Whether such strikes would help protesters or instead provide the regime with a pretext to intensify repression and frame the protests as foreign manipulation remains unclear.

So far, no strikes have taken place. It is possible Israel is deliberately waiting for the situation to stabilize before acting, precisely because of these risks. If Israel were to strike Iran’s defensive capabilities, that could ultimately benefit the country. However, the outcome would still depend on internal organization.

Ultimately, it is up to the protesters to organize effectively, take control of institutions, and prevent Iran from collapsing into a large-scale sectarian conflict or failed-state scenario. Whether that will happen remains uncertain. The regime appears to be entering a phase of terminal decline, but it is impossible to determine how early or late this stage truly is. Anyone claiming certainty is likely overstating their knowledge.

Jacobsen: Let us turn to an international issue. Grok, on the platform X—formerly Twitter—has introduced new policies around freedom of expression, framed within American interpretations of free speech. I want to address four related points.

First, when the platform was still Twitter, how would you describe the state of freedom of speech there? Second, how would you characterize it under Elon Musk’s ownership? Third, what is the reality of freedom of expression when users believe they are speaking freely but are, in fact, operating on a privately owned platform where policies are set by the company itself?

Finally, turning to the immediate controversy: Grok has come under scrutiny for being used to generate explicit, non-consensual deepfake images, including sexualized images of real people—primarily women—as well as reports involving child-related content. Without going into unnecessary detail, these raise serious concerns.

So, considering these points—Twitter before Musk, X under Musk, user perceptions of free expression on private platforms, and the Grok controversy—how do you assess the current landscape?

Tsukerman: The most recent controversy involving deepfakes targeting private citizens highlights a long-standing debate about the extent to which private companies can set and enforce their own rules governing speech. One troubling argument claims that these platforms are no longer merely private forums but have become the functional equivalent of telephone companies. Under that logic, they should be treated as public utilities because of their dominance in the public sphere, limited to providing basic services and intervening only to remove clearly illegal content.

The companies themselves have rejected that framing. At the same time, they have faced intense and conflicting pressure from interest groups with sharply different views on what constitutes illegal content, what should be regulated, and whether these platforms cause more harm than good through moderation. This debate feeds directly into disputes over Section 230—specifically whether its protections should be curtailed and whether platforms should be treated as utilities and penalized for moderating content.

That debate has ebbed and flowed depending on who holds political power. It is also important to recall the controversy surrounding the Biden administration’s alleged coordination with technology companies on content moderation, which critics argued created First Amendment concerns because of government involvement. Regardless, there has never been absolute freedom of speech on these platforms.

It is also worth noting that Jack Dorsey, Twitter’s former CEO, encouraged Elon Musk’s acquisition of the platform. In practice, their moderation philosophies are more similar than different. The key distinction is not that one era was more permissive than the other, but rather which groups and which categories of speech were prioritized for regulation.

From my perspective, whatever moderation authority companies are found to have, they should apply their rules consistently. Based on broader observation and personal experience, neither Twitter nor X has done so. That inconsistency, rather than the mere existence of moderation, is the core problem.

Both platforms have selectively targeted political speech they disagreed with. I am not referring to clearly illegal material such as fraud, terrorism, criminal coordination, or child sexual exploitation. I am referring to ordinary political disagreement, which has been actively censored at different times by both regimes.

Individuals—including myself—have experienced censorship without transparent rule enforcement or procedural fairness under both systems. Observing not only my own case but many others, it is clear that enforcement has often been personalized and vindictive, driven by company leadership in some instances and by moderators or administrators in others.

These actions frequently exceeded the platforms’ stated rules. Enforcement was inconsistent, internal procedures were not followed, and legal challenges have often failed—not because the cases lacked merit, but because the companies have the resources to delay, exhaust, and outlast litigation.

These companies can afford to drag out lawsuits and effectively bankrupt anyone attempting to compel them to enforce their own stated rules.

Turning to the sexualized and otherwise disturbing deepfake content, the legal framework varies significantly across jurisdictions. In the United States, the law remains fragmented. In Europe, regulation is already far more restrictive. There are growing signals from Brussels and other European institutions that regulators are reviewing Grok and related tools for compliance with local law, with the possibility of penalties if violations are found.

Do I believe all such content should be criminalized? Not categorically. However, some of it clearly targets identifiable individuals, placing them in humiliating or damaging situations. Content that is virtually indistinguishable from reality can cause severe reputational harm, psychological trauma, and even legal consequences for victims. There should be meaningful restrictions on that category of material.

The sexualization of children, even in synthetic or generated form, is especially ethically indefensible. Determining where the line lies between material that constitutes child sexual exploitation and material that might be framed as satire or artistic expression is complex. That determination should involve psychologists, child-protection experts, and other professionals with relevant expertise, particularly where such content risks encouraging criminal behavior.

I am not an expert on drawing every legal boundary, but to borrow from a well-known Supreme Court observation, certain forms of harmful content are recognizable when encountered. There are generated images that so clearly cross ethical and social lines that any reasonable observer would recognize their potential for harm and their incompatibility with existing regulatory norms.

The legal debate surrounding these issues is ongoing and will not produce easy or uniform answers. How the United States, Europe, and other jurisdictions resolve disputes over legality, enforcement, and extraterritorial reach remains uncertain. Notably, many of these conflicts are not being adjudicated through courts but through political mechanisms such as sanctions and regulatory pressure.

As a result, none of this is likely to be resolved quickly. Without at least minimal international consensus, we risk a future in which widely used communication platforms become deeply fragmented—where entire populations are unable to access the same information or communicate across borders because of jurisdictional and normative divides.

That outcome is more dangerous than any single controversy we have discussed. When people no longer share a common informational ecosystem, censorship and manipulation become easier, not harder. The ability to evaluate information collectively, grounded in shared norms about what is permissible, is essential for any functioning public sphere.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and for your time, Irina.

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