Arie Perliger on White Nationalism, Digital Radicalization, and the Mainstreaming of Extremism

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/11/12

Prof. Arie Perliger, a security studies expert at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, discusses white nationalism, digital radicalization, and extremism. Perliger defined white nationalism as an ideology emphasizing racial purity and rejecting foreign influence. He noted that white nationalist groups construct ideological echo chambers, normalizing extremist beliefs and fostering recruitment through social media platforms like Telegram and Truth Social. He highlighted how conspiracies, including the Great Replacement Theory and Jewish global cabal narratives, shape extremist ideologies. He also discussed the mainstreaming of far-right rhetoric and how extremist communities provide both ideological and emotional support for their members. Misogynist extremism is another growing concern, as it intersects with far-right ideologies. Regarding domestic security threats, Perliger emphasized that far-right violence remains the most significant form of ideological violence in the U.S. He also touched on socioeconomic and geographic polarization as contributing factors. The interview concluded with discussions on academia’s role, political polarization, and the normalization of extremism.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Today, we are here with Arie Perliger, Ph.D. He is a professor of security studies at the School of Criminology and Justice Studies at the University of Massachusetts Lowell. He specializes in political violence, extremism, security policy, and far-right politics in the U.S., Europe, and Israel. His research applies social network analysis to terrorism and political violence, and his work includes three books and numerous articles.

His latest book, American Zealots: Inside Right-Wing Domestic Terrorism, was published by Columbia University Press. Perliger has also trained U.S. government agencies such as the FBI and CIA and contributed insights to media outlets like The New York Times and the BBC. So, he has some reach—you could say that.

Thank you for joining me today. I am a little pipsqueak freelance journalist from a small town in Canada—I appreciate it.

So, let’s start with definitions and distinctions. How do you define white nationalism, and what distinguishes it from other far-right or nationalist ideologies? Some people might focus on Hindu ethnic nationalism, while others might examine Islamism. How is white nationalism distinct as a cultural phenomenon as we see it today?

Prof. Arie Perliger: White nationalism is a broad term, and I’m not sure how useful it is, but I’ll go with it.

Nationalism has two major components, especially in its extreme forms.

The first component is the aspiration to create a homogeneous collective. The idea is that the more diverse or heterogeneous a collective is, the more vulnerable and dysfunctional it becomes. As a result, it has lower chances of survival and prosperity. If you understand this concept, you can see why white nationalists believe it is essential for Western nations—or at least what they define as “Western Christian nations”—to be predominantly white, predominantly Protestant, and committed to what they define as Western heritage, history, and culture.

In this context, they believe, for example, that all white people should reside in white nations and that those nations should remain exclusively white. They seek to increase what they define as the purity and homogeneity of their collective, ensuring that white people do not mix with other races or ethnic groups, either within or outside their countries.

The second component is the rejection of everything foreign—anything considered non-native. This is essentially an extreme form of nativism: the rejection of foreign people, customs, languages, holidays, food—anything foreign. They see anything foreign threatening the nation’s cohesion, unity, and strength.

In their view, a nation derives its strength from its homogeneity and purity. Cultural, ethnic, or linguistic mixing weakens the collective, making the nation more vulnerable. To them, the nation is like a living organism that needs to be protected and nurtured.

So, white nationalism adopts all these various concepts and primarily focuses on its perception of what it means to be white— which, by the way, is not usually what most people consider white.

For example, most white nationalists, when they talk about the white race, do not mean people from places like Italy, Spain, or Greece. These are not considered white ethnic groups in their view. They usually refer to what they define as the Aryan people—those they see as the descendants of Northern Europe, including Scandinavia, Germanic regions, the UK, and so on.

They have a specific definition of what white nations are and why they should enjoy a privileged status—why they should be at the top of the racial hierarchy.

Jacobsen: We also have the digital radicalization of people—or if not outright radicalization, then digital amplification. The same message is not necessarily more radical. Still, it is amplified through platforms like Parler, Telegram, WhatsApp, Truth Social, Bluesky, Twitter, etc.

So how are these platforms consciously used—not just as general social spaces but deliberately—to amplify this type of messaging to various people worldwide, particularly in Western nations?

Perliger: In multiple ways.

This process has different facets. The first involves associations, organizations, and groups that want to promote white nationalism and various white power ideologies. They create online communities.

When I say communities, I mean both digital spaces where people can promote, discuss, and debate various racist, xenophobic, antisemitic, and white supremacist narratives freely. These communities do not just provide spaces for discussion but also serve to legitimize, normalize, and, in many ways, rationalize these kinds of views.

Creating ideological echo chambers provides an important space for ideologies to grow, evolve, and respond to real-world events.

For example, after the beginning of the Gaza War, many far-right communities were divided. On the one hand, they expressed satisfaction at seeing so many Jews being killed. But on the other hand, they also harbour a deep hatred for what they perceive as Islamic radicalization.

So, on one side, they say it is a “good thing” that Jews are being massacred. On the other side, they argue that Hamas’ actions expose Islam as barbaric, reinforcing their belief that the white race must be protected from these groups.

That’s another element of it. I mentioned communities earlier, which also serve another function—providing emotional support. They become places where individuals who feel anxious, angry, or frustrated can find a sense of belonging. In that way, they do not just radicalize people ideologically but also serve as emotional support networks for individuals drawn to these extremist movements.

So that’s one element.

The second element is that online tools are highly effective in exposing people to ideologies, conspiracy narratives, and extremist constructs. In many cases, they also help fuse these views into mainstream discourse, shaping political rhetoric and public debate.

One thing that is obvious to me— as someone who is fairly old and has studied these groups for almost 25 years—is that many of the ideas and narratives once promoted by very extremist groups 15 years ago are now much closer to the mainstream.

Ideas I never imagined would reach mainstream political rhetoric are now openly discussed and even normalized.

So that’s part of it—this online ecosystem enables these ideas to become normalized and integrated into mainstream discourse.

Jacobsen: You mentioned conspiracies. Conspiracies are a major part of the online world, where fringe beliefs have at least moved one rung closer to the core of so-called “mainstream” discourse.

Some of the narratives that tend to emerge include:

• The Kalergi Plan claims that European elites have orchestrated mass immigration to mix or even “erase” European identity.
• The Great Replacement Theory, a broader version of the Kalergi Plan, asserts that non-European immigrants systematically replace European populations through state policies and global agendas.
• Eurabia, which suggests a secret alliance between European political elites and Arab powers designed to transform Europe into a predominantly Islamic society.
• White Genocide is the claim that multiculturalism and diversity are intentional strategies to undermine and eliminate white populations.
• Elite Replacement and Globalists allege that political and economic elites are conspiring to replace traditional national identities with a globalist agenda.
• Cultural Marxism is the belief that leftist academics and policymakers are subverting Western civilization through progressive policies.
• Religious Replacement is the idea that Christianity is being deliberately erased in favour of other religions, particularly Islam.
• Hybridization and Eugenics/Dysgenics Theories argue that intermixing populations is part of an intentional strategy to weaken white genetic and cultural identity.

So, there is a wide range of distinct types of conspiracies and distinct narratives that fall within each of these categories. Conspiratorial thinking is quite diverse—it asserts knowledge where none exists.

Why does this frame of mind persist?

To me, as a layman journalist covering this topic, it sounds like much of it is grounded in fear of the other—whether that “other” is Jewish people, Arabs, Muslims, or other marginalized groups.

Perliger: Yes. I think it’s interesting that you didn’t mention probably the most deeply rooted, persistent, and resilient conspiracy of all—

Jacobsen: The Jewish global cabal?

Perliger: Yes. The belief is that Jews control global politics and global finance and are secretly manipulating world events.

Jacobsen: And, of course, a major manifestation of this is George Soros-based antisemitism.

Perliger: But to be clear, this isn’t just about Soros himself. It’s the broader idea that Jews control financial institutions, political systems, and media networks and that they are orchestrating events behind the scenes.

Jacobsen: This kind of narrative deliberately excludes terms like Zio-banksters in mainstream discussion, even though that remains a coded phrase in extremist circles.

Perliger: Yes. Or the classic Protocols of the Elders of Zion, right? Interestingly, this is one of those conspiracies or racist narratives that are probably the most common among people who do not even consider themselves white supremacists, racists, or even conservatives. Many people believe that Jews have some disproportionate control over world affairs, global finance, and politics.

Understanding the impetus behind conspiracy theories and ideological narratives is important. They arise from people’s attempts to explain events or policies that they perceive as irrational, paradoxical, or incomprehensible, creating cognitive dissonance for them. For example, many white nationalists and far-right individuals struggle to understand why European nations would open their borders and be willing to absorb hundreds of thousands of immigrants, given the economic, social, and cultural consequences. To them, this policy seems completely irrational.

Since they cannot explain it through conventional reasoning, they turn to conspiracy theories to explain. Similarly, suppose they see an increase in the prominence of minorities in government, public policy, or the private sector. In that case, they attribute it to the Great Replacement Theory rather than acknowledging the much simpler demographic, social, and economic factors at play.

The fact is, there are much simpler historical explanations for many of these claims. Take, for instance, the antisemitic conspiracy theory about Jewish control of finance. The real historical reason is straightforward: for about 800 years, Jews in Europe were not allowed to purchase land. In most European countries, land ownership was restricted to Christians, so Jews were excluded from agriculture and land-based wealth accumulation. As a result, they had to work in professions that did not require land ownership—such as finance, law, and clerical occupations. This historical restriction created the association between Jews and finance in Europe.

These conspiracy theories persist because they provide a clear, simple, black-and-white explanation attractive to many people. They offer control and understanding in a chaotic or unfair world.

I’ll say something that I know you—and many of my colleagues—may not want to hear, but I am open about it. We saw a similar dynamic in 2016 when many people on the left could not comprehend how Donald Trump won the election. Since they could not accept that his victory resulted from widespread support, they developed theories about Russian interference as the decisive factor.

Of course, we know that Russia invested efforts in propaganda and online influence campaigns. However, the idea that Trump was some Russian agent orchestrating his election victory is an exaggerated conspiracy. His win was primarily due to domestic political factors, voter behaviour, and structural issues in the U.S. electoral system—not a grand foreign plot.

Many friends and colleagues on the left were completely convinced that Donald Trump’s victory in 2016 was the result of a grand conspiracy. Again, you see the same pattern—people struggle to comprehend and explain reality rationally.

However, there are simpler explanations for why Trump won the 2016 election. It was not the result of some elaborate Russian conspiracy or Manchurian Candidate scenario. I am not saying that Russian influence efforts did not exist, but they were not the determining factor.

With mass media’s fragmentation and democratization, these narratives are much easier to disseminate and proliferate. People now have access to alternative information sources, and as a result, misinformation spreads more rapidly.

I would also argue—and this is another point on which many of my colleagues might disagree with me—that today, it is nearly impossible to access media that does not invest heavily in interpreting the news rather than simply reporting it.

This is true for both the left and the right. People today, when they consume mainstream media, are fully aware that these media sources are heavily biased and driven by particular political preferences. If that is the case, people see no reason to trust so-called reliable sources of information over an independent blogger on the Internet.

We have lost the fundamental principle of journalistic objectivity. When mainstream journalists—those working at the most distinguished media organizations—decided that objectivity was outdated, they failed to recognize the long-term consequences.

Look at The New York Times and The Washington Post. When these institutions experienced internal pushback from journalists who wanted to abandon neutrality in reporting, they embraced this shift. If you openly admit that you are no longer striving for objectivity, the public will eventually take notice.

The public is not stupid.

So, that’s what they wanted? That’s what they got. 

Jacobsen: Be careful what you wish for. Next question. Which methodologies—particularly in social network analysis—have proven most effective in studying the structure and dynamics of white nationalist groups?

Perliger: Social network analysis helps us understand how social interactions facilitate ideological evolution and dissemination. It allows us to examine how extremist groups divide labour within their internal structures, how they change over time, mobilize support, and recruit new members.

There is no single form of network analysis. We have learned that social network analysis provides far better insights into the dynamics within extremist groups than traditional models of organizational structure.

The assumption that these groups operate as rigid, hierarchical organizations is incorrect. Many of these groups are fluid, diverse, and constantly evolving. They do not fit neatly into a top-down organizational chart. This realization led me to develop a network-based approach to studying extremism nearly twenty years ago.

At the time, many people were skeptical that we would ever be able to map clandestine networks or track the interactions of covert extremist groups. There was widespread doubt about whether network analysis would be effective.

However, today, most scholars acknowledge that applying traditional organizational models to study these groups has significant limitations. Network analysis has proven to be a far more effective tool for understanding their real-world behaviour.

Jacobsen: If you were to examine some of these networks of extremist groups, I’d be curious about the trickier cases—where definitions can be helpful, but the fluidity of these groups makes classification difficult.

If these networks are both intragroup and intergroup fluid, meaning they constantly shift and overlap, then defining them at any static point becomes challenging. So, what about groups that are on the edge of extremism—those that share many similar ideologies but don’t quite fit the definition of an extremist group?

Do such groups exist? Or do most of these groups naturally fall into the broader category of extremist movements, making them easier to identify once they embrace this ideology and begin spreading it?

Perliger: When we talk about extremists, I’m not even sure we should call them groups in the traditional sense. They are extremist communities or extremist spaces rather than formal organizations.

For example, my next book will focus on extremist misogynist communities. I am studying different types of extreme misogynist movements, and some of them exist at the intersection of far-right extremism and misogyny. Some are incel (involuntary celibate) communities, while others fall under the broader men’s rights movement umbrella. These are distinct but overlapping communities.

They promote ideological narratives that, in many cases, are extremist—first, because they exist on the fringe, and second, because they encourage animosity, hostility, and often violence against their perceived adversaries. These communities tend to have a clear definition of their enemies—they create a sharp distinction between the in-group and the out-group, defining who they are and who they must fight.

Jacobsen: So, they largely define themselves in opposition to their enemies rather than based on their intrinsic identity?

Perliger: Yes. Absolutely.

Jacobsen: That’s a critical point. These communities define themselves by contradistinction to the “other” rather than by a strong, positive self-identity.

Perliger: For example, these communities view feminism—and feminists—as the primary source of what they see as male oppression, marginalization, and discrimination. They justify violence, animosity, and hostility against powerful women, feminist women, or sometimes women in general because they believe these individuals are responsible for attacking men and threatening masculinity in modern society. They often use conspiracy narratives to distort and manipulate real-world data to fit their extremist worldview.

For instance, they might cite statistics such as:

• Men are now a minority in higher education.
• Men are underrepresented in certain professional sectors.
• Men are more likely to commit suicide.
• Men are more likely to suffer from mental health issues.
• Men are more likely to die a violent death or in wars.
• Men are more likely to experience poverty.

Then they argue: “Look, all these statistics prove that men are now oppressed, marginalized, and discriminated against.”

Of course, these statistics—while often factually accurate—are stripped of context and framed in a way that supports their narrative of victimhood. Many of these disparities have complex historical, social, and economic explanations. Still, extremist communities twist the data to fuel anger and resentment rather than meaningful understanding.

They identify their enemies, and they articulate why there is a need for action. So, it is not entirely surprising when a man walks into a yoga studio and starts shooting at women—because, in his mind, those upper-class, educated, empowered women are the enemy. They are the threat, the ones responsible for his suffering and grievances.

What we see today are extremist communities that promote radical ideologies. Occasionally, individuals or small cells from within these communities engage in acts of violence. This is the dominant pattern in Western societies—whether individuals are radicalized in jihadist spaces, far-right spaces, environmentalist spaces, or other ideological movements, they are eventually encouraged and empowered to act.

This idea behind direct action is turning ideological beliefs into real-world action. This decentralized direct action system has been widely adopted by most extremist movements today, whether they are far-right, jihadist, environmentalist, or left-wing. These movements create radical spaces and encourage individuals to act—sometimes independently, sometimes with support.

Where do we still see traditional terrorist paramilitary organizations? Mostly in developing countries, but not in the Western world.

Jacobsen: Is there a Venn diagram between white nationalism and misogynistic extremist groups? Defining these categories can be tricky, but how much overlap is there? Would you say it’s essentially a circle—a complete overlap?

Perliger: Between the far-right and white nationalist movements and the misogynistic extremist spaces? Yes, there is some convergence.

For example, if you talk about skinhead movements, many use misogyny as a recruitment tool. They even have a specific designation for young men they recruit through extremist misogynist rhetoric—they call them Schopenhauer’s Acolytes, referencing the pessimistic, misogynistic philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. So, skinheads and other far-right groups often use misogyny as an entry point to radicalization.

The Proud Boys are another example—it is all about male pride, rejecting oppression, and reclaiming masculinity.

Jacobsen: We are deeply sorry for exporting Gavin McInnes to you.

Perliger: No, it’s fine. I wouldn’t worry. You Canadians will soon be the 51st state anyway, so these distinctions won’t matter much.

Jacobsen: Look, we have a plan: We will take all the honey in the country and line the entire U.S.-Canada border. That way, first, it will be covered with bears—black bears, grizzlies, polar bears, all of them. Then, the rest of the wilderness animals will take up the cause, and our border will be permanently protected. I’m sure you do not want to be trampled by a moose.

Perliger: But, in all seriousness, other forces may still push us to take over Canada—for example, climate change. As more parts of the southern U.S. become uninhabitable, we naturally need to move north.

And, as usual, we will do it in the name of Manifest Destiny.

Jacobsen: Of course.

Perliger: Why do you think we wanted Greenland?

Jacobsen: Yes, you’re planning well before Canada is on the table. You’re going way further.

Perliger: Yes.

Jacobsen: We often hear that white nationalism is the main security threat in the United States. Based on your analysis, is that a factual statement? Or, if not, is it still a high-level threat to domestic violent extremism?

Perliger: By far, the most common form of ideological violence in the U.S. is far-right violence.

I have been collecting data on domestic violent extremism in the U.S. for many years, and consistently, far-right violence is the most frequent form of ideological violence. Other forms of extremist violence exist, but they are far less dominant. So yes, this remains the major domestic security threat.

There are several elements of concern.

The first is the mainstreaming of extremist rhetoric. Many far-right political leaders and figures within the mainstream political system use similar language and tones as white power extremists, normalizing and legitimizing these ideologies. When extremists hear their leaders echoing their rhetoric, they feel validated, making it much harder to counter their narratives and contain their influence.

Suppose there is one thing the U.S. needs. In that case, there is greater political support for centrist leaders—those interested in governance and policy rather than pandering to the extremes. Right now, the political system is becoming so polarized that it is nearly dysfunctional—legislation cannot move forward, policies cannot be enacted, and everything turns into a zero-sum game where compromise is impossible.

The second major challenge—and the one I consider the most serious—is the increasing alignment between socioeconomic and ideological divisions.

In the past, if you lived in rural or urban America, you would still encounter people with different political views. There was a degree of ideological mixing in everyday life. But today, geographic division has become much more rigid—Americans rarely interact with people with different political views or perspectives on the country.

This fuels political polarization, distrust, and animosity between the left and the right. It turns political opposition into adversarial relationships, where people see those on the other side as enemies rather than fellow citizens with different ideas.

This trend is one of the biggest long-term threats to American domestic stability—not just in terms of violence but also in terms of governance and social cohesion.

Of course, that is an effective breeding ground for extremists, right? The urban-rural divide now aligns closely with the political divide, making it much more difficult to foster discourse that bridges these divisions.

Recently, we have also seen the socioeconomic divide converge with the political divide. For example, people like me—relatively upper-class—rarely encounter individuals with different views. What I am saying is that the convergence of ideological and socioeconomic divisions has created a situation where individuals with various shades of left-leaning or progressive ideologies mostly surround people like me. This reflects the reality that entire sectors of society—especially professional, academic, and operational fields—have become ideologically homogeneous.

As a result, economic divisions—such as the working class versus the upper class—are merging with ideological divisions. What we now face is political polarization and geographical and socioeconomic polarization. Reducing polarization, animosity, and adversarial politics becomes much more challenging when these factors align because people have limited shared interests, interactions, or spaces with those who think differently.

That is the main threat we are facing in the U.S. Specifically, we know that far-right terrorism, including white nationalist terrorism, is the most lethal form of domestic terrorism in contemporary America. 

Jacobsen: What are the demographics—age range, sex or gender, educational level, political leanings?

Perliger: First, it is important to understand that the far right includes multiple ideological streams. There are anti-government, anti-federal groups; traditional white supremacists; neo-Nazis; and Christian Identity adherents or other fundamentalist white supremacist organizations. Each of these groups has distinct characteristics.

Additionally, some acts of violence against minorities are no longer perpetrated solely by individuals traditionally associated with such crimes. For example, in cases of anti-Asian and antisemitic violence, there has been an increasing number of incidents involving perpetrators from various racial and ethnic backgrounds. I published a brief on this, but no major news outlets picked it up, unsurprisingly, because it is an explosive issue that few are willing to discuss.

The key point here is that context matters. Generally speaking, the most active and violent elements tend to be young white men.

However, I would qualify that by saying we are seeing a dramatic increase in the involvement of women—particularly young white women—in extremist communities. That is especially interesting in the convergence of misogyny and far-right extremism. We see a significant rise in the participation of women who espouse traditionalist, conservative, and even xenophobic, nativist, and misogynistic ideological narratives.

In my book, I dedicate an entire chapter to the term “misogynist” and the phenomenon of female-dominated spaces that promote misogynistic narratives and ideologies.

Jacobsen: That is fascinating.

Perliger: Yes, we do see this trend. Additionally, we are witnessing a noticeable increase in the involvement of ethnic minorities in far-right extremism. If you recall, there was a mass shooting in Allen, Texas, that received significant media coverage. The perpetrator of that attack at an outlet mall was Mauricio Martinez Garcia.

Jacobsen: Now, was he a white supremacist Mexican? 

Perliger: Yes. 

Jacobsen: A Hispanic white supremacist? 

Perliger: Yes.

Consider how Americans classify race and ethnicity in demographic data. In that case, they categorize individuals as “nonwhite Hispanic” or “white Hispanic.” That distinction might make some perverse sense in the framework of American racial classifications, but this case highlights a broader pattern.

Another example: In 2020, Stephen Carrillo, a member of the Boogaloo movement, carried out an attack in which he shot and killed a federal security officer outside a courthouse in San Francisco.

What I am saying is that while white men still constitute the majority in far-right extremist movements, there is a gradual increase in the participation of ethnic minorities in far-right activism. The Proud Boys, for example, include many Black and Hispanic members.

This development reflects how these groups are redefining their concepts of national identity and collective belonging. They are adapting and restructuring their ideological frameworks to accommodate a more diverse membership while maintaining their core far-right beliefs.

It also helps explain why we should not be surprised by the significant increase in minority support for Donald Trump and his immigration policies. In the last election cycle, many were shocked by the rising levels of Latino and Asian American support for Trump. But this is part of a broader realignment—various minority groups are gradually shifting toward the political right.

For instance, many Asian Americans have shifted their political preferences due to specific grievances with progressive policies. Each minority group has different reasons for developing animosity toward progressive politics, but the trend is clear. The answer is complex.

Jacobsen: We do not necessarily have to dive into all the nuances. But your work on online misogyny and its real-world impact is crucial. Misogyny, but also the way international dynamics intersect with it—there is a clear convergence of militant-oriented masculinity. This ideology is ascendant in that way. The only thing that comes to mind, based on my general knowledge of this topic, is that in some Islamist groups operating within developed English-speaking countries, the support for men—behind closed doors—often came from their partners in heterosexual relationships.

In many cases, the women were even more radical than the men, though less actively violent. They played a significant role in radicalizing their male partners, who would then go on to commit heinous acts of violence.

This seems somewhat different in the case of far-right extremism. It is not as hidden—it is more centred around white identity but also deeply rooted in a broader ideology of militant masculinity. 

Perliger: An extensive online ecosystem exists, particularly on TikTok and Instagram.

Jacobsen: That is interesting.

Perliger: I have research assistants whose primary job is analyzing these networks. We have developed a computerized system that helps process vast amounts of content. They do not have to go through everything manually. We are trying to map and understand these ecosystems. And yes, they are well-compensated—so do not worry about them.

Jacobsen: Do you do wellness checks on them?

Perliger: Yes. I acknowledge that they are exposed to much toxic content. But first and foremost, they are passionate about these issues and committed to understanding them.

Secondly, you cannot study these groups and their ideologies without engaging with their materials. You must read what they produce and expose yourself to their narratives to analyze them effectively. As a Jewish person, I have read some of the most virulent antisemitic propaganda. It is part of the work.

To understand people, you have to immerse yourself in their world. Of course, I do not say a word when I attend their events.

Jacobsen: Aerie, thank you for your time today. It was nice meeting you.

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