Everywhere Insiders 24: Trump’s 28-Point Ukraine ‘Peace Plan’

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/12/01

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

In this Everywhere Insiders 24 interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Tsukerman about the Trump administration’s leaked 28-point “peace plan” for Ukraine. Tsukerman argues that Donald Trump wildly exaggerates claims of having stopped “major wars,” confusing symbolic ceasefires and limited skirmishes with real conflict resolution. She contends the draft plan, shaped by Kirill Dmitriev and Steve Witkoff, is riddled with “Russianisms,” sidelines professionals like Sergei Lavrov, pressures Volodymyr Zelensky, and, in effect, rewards Vladimir Putin. The result, she warns, emboldens pro-Russian actors, undermines U.S. credibility, and recycles failed Gaza-style reconstruction ideas onto Ukraine’s very different war and Ukraine’s long-term security.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: We are back for Everywhere Insiders 24. The big news is the controversial 28-point peace plan submitted by the Trump administration for Ukraine’s consideration. There have been statements — even from the head of Virgin Air — suggesting that this is essentially a Russian peace plan: the concessions mirror what Vladimir Putin wanted, more or less, if not exactly.

About this peace plan from the president who claims to have stopped more than half a dozen wars by his own accounting, what is your geopolitical take on this proposal as a peace plan, and can you contextualize it into the broader mythos of “I have stopped eight major wars”?

Irina Tsukerman: Let’s start with the part about “major wars,” because many of those so-called wars were at best skirmishes, and many of them are not finished. Soon after pauses and ceasefires, tensions have returned to various levels. In some cases, the “wars” were largely symbolic. In others, they were literally ceasefires. He did not stop the wars. The Gaza conflict is definitely a ceasefire and not the end of hostilities — not even close.

The Azerbaijan-Armenia “war” was not a war in the sense he implies. It was a diplomatic breakthrough, part of an ongoing direct diplomatic process. So he didn’t stop a war there either. The wars and various counter-terrorism operations and hostilities that he points to were essentially over before his second term began. He had nothing significant to do with bringing them to an end.

He’s conflating skirmishes, temporary ceasefires, and ongoing diplomatic processes. He may be credited with contributing diplomatic capital, but that’s not the same as stopping a war. It’s a totally different category of diplomacy.

Leaving that aside, this 28-point plan — described in the media as possibly Russia’s desperate move to preserve its gains in the face of rising economic disaster at home — is controversial in many ways. It was leaked, possibly with the assistance of Kirill Dmitriev, who apparently met with the Trump administration’s envoy Steve Witkoff. Some claim the leak was deliberate. Regardless, it leaked at an early-draft stage without formal approval from many parties.

Another issue is that the draft contains numerous “Russianisms” — phrases and terms that suggest non-native English origins — indicating that whoever drafted or passed it on the American side may not have thoroughly edited it. At various points, members of the administration (including Marco Rubio) apparently tried to walk back the characterization of it as a finalized “plan” rather than a draft. But the fact that Ukraine was reportedly threatened with cuts to weapons and intelligence access if it didn’t adopt this draft by a deadline suggests the administration took it seriously.

It’s unclear why the administration is doubling down on something they themselves say was not ready for public presentation. It does not make anyone look particularly good.

Another point: this has been a one-sided deal negotiated between Dmitriev and Witkoff without input from many professional diplomats on either side. For example, Sergei Lavrov (Russia’s foreign minister) seems to have been sidelined. But note: there is no credible confirmation that several individuals “officially disappeared” or “died on an Aeroflot flight” as described — that part appears to be anecdotal, unverified, and should not be stated as fact.

So yes: Lavrov appears less prominent in these negotiations publicly; Rubio is active, but as far as available records show, he is not clearly part of the core Russian-side talks. 

These two “geniuses” came up with this plan—mostly, I suspect, Dmitriev and whoever advised him. Witkoff put his stamp of approval on it. Ukraine was never consulted in the process. It was apparent what Ukraine’s response would be. But before this plan was fully leaked to the public, one U.S. official apparently told journalists that they were confident peace between the two nations would be concluded by the end of the week based on it. It was going to be “the greatest peace.”

The funny thing is that it wasn’t even Trump; Trump at that point hadn’t seen the plan. There seems to be a level of absolute delusion among members of the Trump cabinet and assorted others that rivals whatever they accused Obama’s and Biden’s State Department officials of. If they think, based on this plan and after everything that’s happened, that Ukraine is going to simply put down its weapons, reduce its military, and go along with whatever, they’re living in a fantasy.

Whoever thought that, given Ukraine’s constitution, official position, and popular opinion, they would go along and sign off on this plan must be out of touch—or on something substantial. It’s unbelievably delusional.

What’s alarming is that the administration seems to believe it has significant leverage over Ukraine when it clearly does not. Yes, they can do damage. If they follow through with threats to cut off remaining weapons and intelligence, that would hurt Ukraine in several ways.

First, Ukraine needs accurate intelligence to conduct both defensive and offensive operations. Any weapons are better than none, even if they’re not entirely reliant on the U.S.; additional support remains vital because they have shortages of everything. But the reality is that they cannot afford to further reduce their military. They’re running out of personnel.

The major controversy in Ukraine—other than the ongoing energy and corruption scandals—is that authorities have had to conscript people directly from the streets because there aren’t enough to serve. Meanwhile, Russia has been sending waves of troops, along with mercenaries and even deceived recruits from Africa. We’re talking about a massive demographic mismatch.

The United States is increasingly biased in favour of Russia. Whoever is signing off on this plan from the U.S. side is clearly trying to favour Russia. There’s no other way to put it.

But there’s a different and equally damaging nuance to this whole fiasco. Even though it’s clear Ukraine will not accept this plan, there’s an informational angle. The message being sent is that the U.S. is easily manipulated into supporting Russia’s position — that it was never fully committed to Ukraine and never truly changed its stance, despite some tactical adjustments here and there. At the end of the day, under the Trump administration, it will always side with Russia. The U.S. cannot be counted on to take Russian aggression seriously. That’s the bottom line.

Jacobsen: That kind of messaging — does it embolden other pro-Russian actors internationally?

Tsukerman: Absolutely. Political actors favouring Russia across Europe and elsewhere are likely to feel emboldened by this. It’s a huge moral victory for Russia, which is precisely what they were hoping to achieve.

What’s even worse is that the administration, after claiming this leaked plan was not ready for public release, is now scrambling to enforce it. We know this from J.D. Vance’s phone call with Zelensky today. The bottom line is that Zelensky rejected the plan. He refused to betray Ukraine — and rightly so. He has no mandate from his own people to accept it. It would be an existential disaster if he did.

That said, Zelensky acknowledged that the level of pressure from the U.S. places Ukraine in a difficult position — either alienate its staunchest supporter or become utterly dependent on the Europeans, who have their own logistical and delivery problems. The third option, capitulating, would send a disastrous signal to Russia: that despite being the aggressor, despite committing horrific war crimes, and despite suffering significant losses, they managed to persuade the U.S. to side with them anyway.

The recycled narrative that’s been reintroduced — one we thought was buried — is that Zelensky doesn’t have the cards to win the war. We’ve heard this before, including back in February during the catastrophic meeting between Zelensky, Trump, and J.D. Vance. The same players are now recycling the same talking points from more than six months ago, despite all the evidence of what works and what doesn’t. And yet they’re returning to what clearly doesn’t work.

Jacobsen: Does Trump actually want to stop this war? Does he want peace, or does he want to hand Russia a victory—guaranteeing that Russian aggression across Europe will only grow?

Tsukerman: It looks more like the latter. Russian aggression is visibly increasing; it’s literally happening this week. Russian spy ships have been engaged in suspicious operations involving underwater cables in Europe and even attacked British forces with laser weapons. That’s an act of war—not a provocation, not an ambiguous drone sighting, but an attack. It may not have been lethal, but it was deliberate and potentially damaging.

The British response was restrained but insufficient. They warned that continued incidents would provoke a response, but they did nothing immediately, which only invites further aggression. The bottom line is that this is happening precisely because Russia feels free to expand without serious pushback from anyone—including the United States, which has traditionally been the global policeman in such situations. This so-called peace plan is taking advantage of that moment.

Right now, the U.S. continues to play for peace-building optics rather than results. We’re also seeing a striking lack of creativity. What’s particularly interesting is that Trump keeps recycling his diplomatic playbook even though it hasn’t worked. You cannot apply the same set of actions to completely different geopolitical contexts.

For example, Trump previously approached North Korea and offered to develop the coastline in exchange for denuclearization. Kim Jong-un rejected it outright. Then Trump moved on to propose a reconstruction plan for Gaza. Now Gaza is again in chaos, and Hamas remains in control. J.D. Vance even admitted there is no way to disarm Hamas.

So the U.S. has said it will proceed with reconstructing Gaza while the conflict is still ongoing, focusing on zones currently under Israeli control. The problem is that Israel cannot control those areas indefinitely without either declaring permanent occupation—which would trigger significant international backlash—or repeating the same mistakes that led to its withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.

Unless a permanent international stabilizing force is introduced, Hamas will inevitably return to those areas once Israeli forces withdraw—just as it has done in regions currently outside Israeli control.

What we’ll end up doing is wasting money on reconstructing something that a terrorist organization will immediately corrupt. And guess what? The Gaza reconstruction plan is now being refurbished for the Russian–Ukrainian context, and the results will predictably court disaster in much the same way as allowing Hamas to remain in power — perpetuating conflict indefinitely.

This is what we’re seeing: Trump, who claims to be a bold visionary thinker and political leader unafraid to challenge the status quo and push the boundaries of traditional diplomacy, is simply repeating the same old tropes. There’s no innovation — it’s a cut-and-paste approach from one geopolitical disaster to another.

You can’t do that. First of all, Gaza is not Ukraine. Hamas is not Russia. Despite superficial similarities between those entities, these are different wars, with distinct strategic realities, even if the moral dimensions — acts of aggression and ideological hatred — appear similar.

The other issue is simple: why try something that hasn’t worked? Why not wait to see whether the Gaza scenario achieves its stated objectives before duplicating it elsewhere? Especially when what has already worked — aiding Ukraine militarily against Russia — has demonstrably pressured Moscow.

Trump himself has admitted that Ukraine can win the war, that it can inflict severe damage on Russia, and that Putin has been deceiving him all along. So why revert to policies that fail, even in their original context?

Each time this recycled strategy reappears, it becomes less effective and more damaging. The pattern keeps worsening.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

Jacobsen: All right, we’re at the 30-minute mark. Let’s do one more segment, then we’ll turn to the Canadian topic.

Tsukerman: Right. Islamic State-linked rebels have killed 69 civilians in eastern Congo attacks — excuse me, 89 civilians. According to the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic, MONUSCO, the Allied Democratic Forces were responsible for attacks in several locations, including North Kivu Province, between November 13 and November 19. At least 20 women and an undetermined number of children were among the victims.

Jacobsen: The rebels also attacked a health center operated by the Catholic Church in Biambuay, killing at least 17 people, including women who had gone there for maternity care, and setting fire to wards that still had patients inside. This was a small massacre. What are your thoughts on this?

Tsukerman: It’s essential to draw attention to the parallels between this horrific incident and Russia’s systematic attacks on maternity wards in Ukraine. Those assaults have been somewhat less deadly in terms of immediate fatalities, but equally devastating in their destruction of infrastructure. Comparing ISIS-linked terrorists to Russia is not a compliment to either. One is a non-state actor known for brutality; the other is a member of multiple international bodies and maintains diplomatic relations with much of the world, less than before, but still significant.

So the next time various leaders start talking about human rights, we should ask why they continue to engage with a country that behaves like a terrorist organization.

Leaving that aside, it’s also notable that the Trump administration has not reacted to this attack, even though it targeted a Christian community, after previously threatening to intervene in Nigeria to deal with terrorists there. Admittedly, the attacks in this case were not against Catholics specifically, but against everyone indiscriminately.

We’re seeing the same pattern of weak, corrupt local governments unable to manage terrorist insurgencies. We’re also seeing almost no response from international forces of any kind. There are rumours that Macron is planning a return to West Africa on a diplomatic tour, but that’s unlikely to stop the continued rise of terrorism. At best, he might reestablish trade and military ties, but France wasn’t particularly successful against these groups before. It managed to contain them better than the pro-Russian juntas backed by Wagner and other Russian entities, but it didn’t eliminate their influence.

What we’re witnessing is the natural outcome of allowing proliferating ideological extremism, sectarian violence, and government corruption to go untreated. People fail to grasp that in today’s globalized world, such problems can’t be contained. They don’t remain confined to Nigeria, the Congo, or Africa in general. They generate refugee crises, humanitarian disasters, artificial famines, and ultimately the spread of extremism and terrorism into the West.

For now, Western security services have succeeded mainly in intercepting weapons flows and disrupting homegrown, amateur ISIS-inspired cells. But if the scale of violence and recruitment multiplies tenfold, will they still be able to act as effectively? I’m not so sure. As terrorist networks become more sophisticated, better organized, and more capable of infiltrating intelligence systems, the flow of information could start moving both ways.

Tsukerman: We’re seeing a long-standing problem. Horrific incidents are taking huge numbers of human lives, and the public largely ignores them because most people have written off Africa — and the humanity of Africa. Yet human security is becoming one of the most critical dimensions of modern security thinking. Without addressing that factor, we won’t see progress in developing effective counter-terrorism strategies or in stopping the global flow of extremism.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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