Everywhere Insiders 28: EU €90B Ukraine Loan, Frozen Assets Fight, and UN Security Crisis

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/01/06

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen questions Irina Tsukerman on the EU’s €90B 2026–27 Ukraine package, hailed by António Costa and Friedrich Merz as a zero-interest loan after frozen-asset plans unravelled. Tsukerman says the loan delivers urgent liquidity and keeps Russian funds immobilized, but warns it will fall short if the war persists. She argues politics, not legal precedent, blocks the use of those assets and feeds far-right claims that taxpayers must shoulder the burden. The interview widens to UN funding decline, Houthi detentions, and Sudan’s Zamzam massacre, urging consistent civilian-first accountability. Vladimir Putin labels asset use “robbery”; Stéphane Dujarric says UN symbols protect less.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: So, EU leaders have agreed on a €90 billion support package for Ukraine for 2026 and 2027, after efforts to structure the package around frozen Russian assets ran into objections and ultimately unravelled at the summit.

After almost four years of war, the IMF estimates Ukraine will need about €137 billion in 2026 and 2027. The government in Kyiv is near the edge financially and needs the money by spring.

The European Council President, António Costa, stated, “We have a deal. Decision to provide 90 billion euros of support to Ukraine for 2026–27 approved. We committed, we delivered.”

And then German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated, “The financial package for Ukraine has been finalized. Ukraine is granted a zero-interest loan. These funds are sufficient to cover Ukraine’s military and budgetary needs for the next two years… If Russia does not pay reparations, we will, in full accordance with international law, make use of Russian immobilized assets for paying back the loan.”

Now, another piece is paraphrasing Vladimir Putin on the earlier, unravelled idea of using frozen Russian assets for Ukraine, with him framing that as “robbery” and arguing it would undermine confidence and spook investors.

I don’t know whether he means the eurozone specifically or the EU more broadly. But this is basically a clash over the rule of law. In one context, consequences follow from the rule of law: assets can be frozen, and there is an argument for using frozen assets—especially if reparations are not paid—to cover the country being aggressed upon’s support costs. In the other context, Russia does not generally present itself as operating under those same rule-of-law constraints.

So what are your thoughts on this loan? What are your thoughts on the statements by Merz and the European Council President, as well as Mr. Vladimir Putin?

Irina Tsukerman: Obviously, a loan is better than nothing at all because the money comes in immediately. This is what Ukraine needs right now: immediate financial aid in whatever form it comes. The condition of repayment is literally reparations from Russia, and we will be waiting for those for a very long time. So I do not think Ukraine needs to worry about repayments anytime in the foreseeable future. This is the upside.

Another upside is that Russia does not get its money back. The frozen assets remain perpetually frozen. Even if they cannot go to Ukraine, they are not going back to Russia either. That means Russia cannot use these assets for any other illegal or dangerous activity. However, while they remain frozen, they do not serve anyone particularly well.

I am hoping that at some point there will be a political or legal breakthrough—either a change in the legal context, a reinterpretation of current laws, or a shift in priorities. Right now, several countries are blocking the use of these assets. Besides the usual suspects, Italy is one of those countries. In Italy, there is a growing and significant presence of far-right populist actors, as well as a substantial portion of the far left that is also sympathetic to Russia. This includes figures within the governing coalition and even within Meloni’s own party. So it is not all that surprising that Italy has taken this position. Italy is one of the countries that continues to conduct illicit business with Russia, mainly in the luxury sector.

But ultimately, if the war continues to drag on, the current loan will prove insufficient. If we are talking about an extended conflict, Russian assets will be helpful. And the sooner the European Union concludes that this is a viable option, the better for everyone.

One of the downsides of not proceeding with this approach is that the far right in those European countries can now claim that European taxpayers have to pay for support to Ukraine out of pocket, which increases debt. We are already seeing affordability and economic problems in most leading European countries. In France, for example, a significant trade deal had to be postponed due to prior grievances over that agreement. There are other examples as well.

The UK may lead by example, given its status outside the EU. There has been a move by Starmer to begin the process in stages, by amending the legal framework and going through the courts to achieve the desired outcome. I don’t know how that will ultimately end. Still, the UK can set an example simply by being independent of a broader regulatory framework and therefore not having to depend on other countries to make that internal decision.

Now, Germany has shifted its position significantly since the start of the war. It is now moving toward consolidating a more unified position with some European leaders and getting closer to Nordic and Eastern European countries, including the Baltic states, in seeing Ukraine as a priority—especially as Germany faces its own situation with drones and other manifestations of Russian I would liket is welcome to see this change in tone and a more active position that is practically moving toward greater investment in supporting Ukraine through concrete means. Germany is still not where it should be, but it is reassessing its priorities. It is moving intensely toward some form of conscription and broader military preparedness, and it is trying to reawaken its economy to address long-standing problems and the burden of supporting Ukraine.

Interestingly, Putin’s comments closely echo the arguments made by four European countries and their lawyers, who claim that using the assets to help Ukraine would set a bad legal precedent by effectively normalizing civil asset forfeiture.

In the United States, however, civil asset forfeiture is a widespread practice, even without sanctions or political motives. If someone is suspected of drug trafficking, police can seize property at the scene, even before trial and regardless of whether the person is ultimately found guilty. Property can be forfeited if it is linked to a crime, independent of final responsibility. Of course, this can be contested, but it is often a complicated and lengthy process.

So civil asset forfeiture in the U.S. is quite common, despite strong private property protections—arguably stronger overall than in Europe. That is why this argument feels somewhat technical and, in some respects, disingenuous. Especially in the Russian case, unlike disputed criminal property, it has been clearly established that the funds in these frozen accounts are linked to oligarchs or government officials who bear responsibility for funding and perpetuating an illegal war and associated war crimes. This is not questionable or unclear. We are nearly four years into the war. This is not a situation where it is day one, and we are still arguing about the extent to which any of these people are responsible. So I think the legal argument is actually very weak in that regard.

Politics, rather than the law, is the real obstacle to actually using that money to help Ukraine. But eventually, if the costs continue to accumulate, Europeans may find it more feasible to release that funding than to continue incurring debt and borrowing from their own citizens.

Jacobsen: So the UN has had a rough year. First, there has been an overall decline in funding, which has diminished its capacity to act. For instance, one of the commissioners for the UN Commission on Ukraine, based out of India, who often deals with the Indian Supreme Court and served around 2013, has noted—and I agree—that the ability to carry out these commissions and even routine UN work becomes much more difficult when funding declines.

This was evident at the UN Commission on Women in March, and also at the Human Rights Council summit in Geneva over the summer, when I was there. I have also heard similar concerns raised in interviews I have conducted with UN representatives.

In addition, toward the end of the year, six peacekeepers and an interpreter were killed, and ten staff members were detained in Yemen by Houthi rebels. UN spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric stated, “It’s a very worrying trend. We see all too often that the UN flag, the UN emblem, no longer offers the protection it should to our colleagues.” He continued that UN personnel—whether humanitarian workers, peacekeepers, or political envoys—are there for peace and for the people, and that they need to be respected.

What are your thoughts on these killings of peacekeepers and the interpreter, the detentions by the Houthis, and the broader arc of how this year has unfolded for the institution and for staff who have, unfortunately, been murdered?

Tsukerman: In terms of the Houthis and their counterparts, none of this should be shocking, because these incidents are not new. They have increased in frequency and intensity over time. The Houthis, having temporarily frozen their maritime campaign, are now focusing on internal issues where they currently have greater leverage and a lower risk of being attacked by Israeli forces or losing property and lives. For them, this is a win-win situation.

They get to continue the propaganda narrative of fighting foreign aggression and making demands on the international community without incurring any high costs. The United Nations does not have a military contingent capable of confronting them. Inside Yemen, Southern Transitional Council forces have been advancing, but they have mainly been reclaiming southern Yemen and have not advanced as far as Sana’a. As a result, there remains a sense of impunity in territories under Houthi control.

The larger issue, of course, is that the United States is no longer leading a serious effort to hold the Houthis accountable, whether militarily, legally, or otherwise. Frankly, the Trump administration created a self-perpetuating arc. It came into office claiming that the United States was impoverished, hollowed out, and militarily weak. The rationale for appointing figures like Hegseth was to restructure the system, make it more efficient, reclaim a unifying spirit, bring in fresh blood, recharge and reawaken recruitment efforts, eliminate redundancies, and so on. Ironically, however, while the U.S. has been claiming that it is ushering in a new golden age of American strength, its policies have actually created the very poverty that the administration claimed was its starting point.

In other words, tariffs took a toll on the economy, diminished the manufacturing base, and scared away potential investors. They drove businesses out of work and forced hiring and expansion into limbo due to uncertainty. Conflicts with allies also led more countries to turn to other weapons producers. All of this means diminished opportunity for defence companies and reduced budgets.

And while the Trump administration claimed it was raking in billions, if not trillions, in tariff revenue, we have yet to see that money spent on settling debt, benefiting American taxpayers, or funding allegedly underfunded programs such as defence spending. In my view, the Trump administration uses the alleged devastation of U.S. institutions as an excuse to withdraw from the international arena, while worsening the situation by refusing to fund those very efforts and creating conditions that make funding impossible.

This is a self-destructive cycle. It is unhealthy and completely unconstructive. I am shocked that so few people seem able to see the obvious. If you do not fund programs and simultaneously destroy the opportunities to generate funding, you will have fewer programs to support, you will become weaker, and you will lack the resources to play a leading role internationally. This is not because the country is inherently poor; it is because of policy decisions that deny the opportunity to become wealthier. It is painfully apparent, but here we are.

It almost seems as though the administration wants to create a sense of paralysis and diminishment of the United States—internationally and domestically—and then use those conditions to deflect blame onto others, even as it actively worsens the situation.

Jacobsen: This next one is grim. In an already catastrophic situation, the Sudanese paramilitary group RSF has killed more than 1,000 civilians in Zamzam. This is based on an updated April report. More than 1,000 civilians were killed in a three-day attack by the Rapid Support Forces, according to the UN Human Rights Office.

Zamzam is the largest displacement camp in Sudan, located in North Darfur. Before the April attack, it housed more than half a million people. The number of internally displaced persons in Sudan now exceeds 14 million, and Zamzam represented a significant portion of that population.

The RSF blocked the entry of food and essential goods into the Zamzam camp for months before the attack, deliberately creating desperation. These people were then murdered en masse and subjected to sexual violence. That is a nightmare.

It would be worth seeing more people who speak passionately about war apply that concern more evenly and consistently. While attention to major conflicts is essential, situations like this—of immense human suffering—are often completely or largely ignored in much of North American discourse.

Any thoughts on the update on the attacks, sexual assaults, and the larger year-end context so that we can have some closing commentary as well?

Tsukerman: It is horrific, and it is increasingly resembling genocide rather than devastation that can be dismissed as a byproduct of war. This is because of the systematic and sectarian nature of the targeting, the executions, and the sexual assaults, which are clearly a power play by the former Janjaweed, now operating as the RSF. These groups have recently declared a parallel government, but they have not demonstrated any improvement in governance since then. Power for its own sake appears to be at least one of their goals.

They have also specifically targeted people in Darfur who belong to Black tribes rather than Arab tribes, and we are seeing this continue unabated. Recently, mass graves have been identified through satellite imagery. At the same time, on the other side of the conflict, the Sudanese Armed Forces—aligned with the official leadership under al-Burhan—have also been accused, with substantial evidence, of not only indiscriminate violence against civilians but also more targeted actions, including clearly avoidable mass killings and contributing to an artificial famine inside Sudan.

While the Janjaweed, now known as the RSF, appear to be more overtly brutal and more systematically dedicated to eliminating tribes perceived as politically opposed and racially distinct, the Sudanese leadership and its forces are hardly any better. They are more organized and probably more efficient, but they show no greater respect for human life. There is also significant evidence of war crimes on that side as well.

The core issue here is apathy and ignorance about the conflict in the United States. There are no major funding networks to generate sustained interest or organize rallies in the way that explicitly pro-Hamas organizations—distinct from broader pro-Palestinian advocacy—have mobilized on university campuses since October 7. There is no comparable infrastructure devoted to Sudan. Quite simply, there are no dedicated resources to turn this into a coordinated campaign, and media coverage has been poor.

What is also hurting the issue in the United States is a lack of moral clarity. It should be straightforward: every human life is valuable, and all war crimes should be condemned regardless of who commits them. But because global powers have inserted themselves into this conflict for their own security and geopolitical interests, you now have multiple factions backing the RSF and the SAF, sometimes even switching sides within the same war. That makes it very difficult for Americans to grasp a clear moral position: that civilians on all sides are innocent victims, even if historical factors place some communities closer to one faction or another.

People see Russia, the UAE, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt mentioned in connection with this conflict. Because of this external involvement, they do not necessarily see Sudan as a humanitarian catastrophe affecting an entire population. Instead, it is perceived as a battle of narratives among competing foreign sponsors and influence campaigns.

As a result, the human rights and humanitarian imperative—to protect civilians from harm, regardless of who inflicts it—is being overwhelmed by geopolitical narratives, competing interests, and arguments over which faction is more legitimate or whose security claims matter more. Unfortunately, this dynamic is actively undermining efforts to center civilian protection and accountability, as the war drags on. At first, Russia clearly favoured the RSF. At the same time, the al-Burhan government was willing to make unsavoury deals with some of al-Burhan’s former associates and certain Muslim Brotherhood supporters. Today, however, we are seeing Russia effectively playing both sides in the war.

At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood has, in various ways, become an ally of both factions. To the extent that, in the earlier stages of the war, different countries prioritized either opposing Islamists or opposing Iran and Russia—or the reverse—neither side can credibly make those arguments anymore. Both sides are now aligned with some of the worst possible allies, and both are benefiting from weapons and political support wherever they can obtain them.

Quite obviously, some actors are more than willing to sell weapons to both sides for entirely cynical and self-serving reasons. Any moral constraints or limitations that various parties may have imposed on themselves earlier in the war have clearly disappeared under current circumstances.

There have been efforts to pursue a diplomatic solution, including attempts by the United States and others to impose sanctions against leaders and officials from these factions. But none of this has had much impact because, quite frankly, neither of those leaders had significant assets in the U.S. financial system, nor were they frequent travellers to Washington. You cannot exert pressure when there is no leverage.

Another option proposed by various countries is to sanction third-party states that have supported these actors and provided weapons and political backing. Still, that approach is highly complex and risky. Proving intentional and direct military support from specific countries has been very difficult, especially since all parties involved have strong incentives to claim innocence and publicly advocate for diplomatic and political solutions.

Publicly, everyone is emphasizing diplomacy, but behind the scenes, the alleged flow of weapons continues because personal and national interests take precedence. Another issue is that the United States no longer has a dedicated specialist assigned to Sudan. Under the Biden administration, there was a special envoy for Sudan. Under the Trump administration, the special envoy for Africa, Massad Boulos, has dealt only with select issues, largely business-related.

He has attempted to add a mediation dimension to the situation and to meet with various parties. Still, overall, there has not been a major diplomatic push by the Trump administration so far. After a meeting with MBS, Trump mentioned the possibility of a more dedicated diplomatic effort, beyond hosting talks among other parties. But to date, most U.S. attention has been focused on Ukraine and Russia, and Sudan remains, at best, a secondary priority.

As a result, there is no clear international champion beyond the conflicting parties themselves. No neutral peace-making actor is willing or able to take the lead and follow through in a way that does not empower the various conflicted contributors who continue to fuel the situation to make self-serving gains. I don’t know what that would even look like. Still, presumably it would require countries that are not involved in any aspect of the conflict other than pure diplomacy—countries with no incentive to benefit from closeness to one side or the other—and that could fully dedicate themselves to charting a course that best serves the interests of Sudanese civilians.

There has also been a relatively limited impact from Sudanese diasporas in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. They have not been particularly visible or vocal. I am not sure why, honestly; I am observing that these voices have not been prominent. By contrast, the Ukrainian diaspora has been very vocal. Likewise, the Israel–Gaza conflict has generated no shortage of commentary from all sides, including pro-Palestinian but anti-Hamas voices.

With Sudan, however, the diaspora’s impact has been almost muted by comparison. That may also be because there is not a large or politically influential Sudanese diaspora in the United States, which could help explain the limited political and media attention given to the conflict.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

Last updated May 3, 2025. These terms govern all In-Sight Publishing content—past, present, and future—and supersede any prior notices.  In-Sight Publishing by Scott  Douglas  Jacobsen is licensed under a Creative Commons BY‑NC‑ND 4.0; © In-Sight Publishing by Scott  Douglas  Jacobsen 2012–Present. All trademarks, performances, databases & branding are owned by their rights holders; no use without permission. Unauthorized copying, modification, framing or public communication is prohibited. External links are not endorsed. Cookies & tracking require consent, and data processing complies with PIPEDA & GDPR; no data from children < 13 (COPPA). Content meets WCAG 2.1 AA under the Accessible Canada Act & is preserved in open archival formats with backups. Excerpts & links require full credit & hyperlink; limited quoting under fair-dealing & fair-use. All content is informational; no liability for errors or omissions: Feedback welcome, and verified errors corrected promptly. For permissions or DMCA notices, email: scott.jacobsen2025@gmail.com. Site use is governed by BC laws; content is “as‑is,” liability limited, users indemnify us; moral, performers’ & database sui generis rights reserved.