Everywhere Insiders 22: Russian Threats, NATO Readiness, Drone Warfare, and Global Leadership at the UN

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/11/17

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

In this in-depth interview with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, Tsukerman discusses NATO’s readiness amid Russian aggression, Europe’s deterrence dilemmas, and the U.S. military’s strategic pivot toward drone warfare. Speaking with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, Tsukerman highlights Europe’s hesitation to escalate, Russia’s exploitation of ambiguity, and the West’s lag in defense deliveries. She also critiques the UN Climate Summit’s lack of follow-through, noting hypocrisy and inefficiency among global powers. Addressing U.S. absence from the UN Universal Periodic Review, she underscores the costs of disengagement and the need for structural reform within international institutions.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: A German Armed Forces commander says Russia could mount a limited strike on NATO at any time, and he has urged readiness.

They see a Russian attack as within the realm of possibility and view the recent round of nuclear threats as part of a broader war of intimidation. Lieutenant General Alexander Sollfrank told Reuters that Russia could theoretically launch a limited attack on NATO territory “at any time.” In separate remarks reported elsewhere, he said Russia has enough main battle tanks to make a limited attack “as early as tomorrow.” My assessment: They mean more than urgent readiness. If you’re saying they can attack tomorrow, you mean wartime readiness. Any thoughts?

Irina Tsukerman: From what I’ve observed during recent travels to Europe, as well as through conversations with various experts and daily observations, all of this is deeply concerning and consistent with Russia’s potential ability to strike. A lot depends on its level of desperation. The trajectory in Ukraine remains hard-fought and fluid, with periodic Russian gains and ongoing pressure on Russia’s energy security from Ukrainian strikes.

The United States has said it is not, for now, considering a deal that would allow Ukraine to obtain long-range Tomahawk missiles for use against Russia. (Discussions have been reported, but the current public position is “not considering for now.”)

Across Europe, governments are grappling with immediate—not theoretical—problems. Belgium has faced a surge of unidentified drone overflights disrupting airports, military sites, and sensitive infrastructure; authorities convened the National Security Council and announced plans to shoot down suspicious drones and create a National Air Security Center.

Jacobsen: You noted that active deterrence can blunt further encroachment. A relevant example frequently cited is Turkey’s 2015 shootdown of a Russian Su-24 near the Syria–Turkey border after what Ankara said was a 17-second airspace violation (the “17 seconds” refers to the duration of the incursion, not the response time). There has not been a similar incident since.

Tsukerman: European officials often give several reasons for caution: insufficient counter-drone capacity or cost concerns; incursions occurring over civilian hubs with higher collateral-damage risk; and the desire to avoid escalation. Romania, for instance, tracked a Russian drone in its airspace on September 13, 2025; permission to shoot it down was granted, but pilots refrained to avoid potential collateral damage.

At the other end of the spectrum, Poland has taken a more proactive posture. On September 10, 2025, Poland shot down multiple drones that entered its airspace during a large Russian attack on Ukraine—widely described as the first time a NATO member fired during the war—and invoked Article 4 for consultations.

Overall—and with exceptions such as Poland—the debate in Europe is about calibrating deterrence while managing escalation risks.

The British partnership on that front remains ongoing. There has not been a concrete, announced policy on definitively taking down Russian objects in the event of an incursion. So there is no clear policy. Of course, a strike is different from an incursion. An incursion can be considered a provocation without necessarily being interpreted as an act of war, even if it is meant as one by Russia. However, a strike on a country’s sovereign territory is absolutely, and without question, an act of war. If that happens, perhaps NATO as a whole would take more decisive action.

We have seen that after the drone attacks on Poland, NATO Air Forces mobilized fairly quickly. So it is not that there is a shortage of resources or that they are incapable of responding to a strike. Nevertheless, many questions remain. If that strike is self-contained and not part of a repetitive attack, will the country still feel the need to respond in that case? If the airstrike is offensive but incidental to a broader attack aimed at Ukraine, are they still going to intervene? How are they going to interpret incidental damage, such as the drone attacks that were initially interpreted as incidental—even though they later turned out not to be?

A lot of questions remain, and much depends on each country, because many NATO members still reserve the right to an individual response without necessarily engaging all of NATO. The overall dynamic is not particularly inspiring. The overall message to Russia is, at best, unclear. The strategic ambiguity is not in Europe’s favor because these countries seem to be hedging on the side of caution rather than on the side of a strategically overwhelming response. At worst, there will be only a partial or limited response, ranging from an overflight or sharply worded collective statement to a purely defensive measure, such as imposing a no-fly zone above European countries, without necessarily responding with an act of aggression against the Russian Air Force or Russian territory.

Russia is counting on exactly that—this unwillingness to escalate—partly due to the fact that many European weapons ordered for self-defense have still not been delivered. They have a few years before those deliveries are completed, typically two to five years on average. Internal decision-making processes are also extremely slow. Russia has been trying to stir up anti-war sentiment, and all of this presents a posture that appears far from unified from the perspective of an external aggressor.

Jacobsen: The U.S. Army has planned to buy about one million drone units to accelerate its unmanned capabilities. According to U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth, the procurement is expected to occur over the next two to three years, with a refined estimate of between half a million and one million annually in the years to follow. Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: Yes, it is part of the broader “dronification” of the American military apparatus. The Pentagon is trying to learn from the war in Ukraine and from the fact that drone warfare has become such an integral part of this combined conventional and asymmetrical battlefield. That said, no war is ever going to be exactly the same. It would be a mistake to overemphasize drones to the exclusion of other domains, such as naval warfare, which the U.S. military is also trying to address to the best of its abilities. At the same time, it would be equally mistaken to underestimate the growing role of drones in the contemporary battlefield and the effort to minimize human risk and reduce the cost to both lives and infrastructure—an evolution that appears to define the direction modern warfare is taking.

The fact that this particular war has become an unprecedented testing ground for drone warfare does not mean that future conflicts in different terrains will not revolutionize other aspects of military capability unrelated to drones. Much will depend on who is involved and under what circumstances such escalations occur. For now, it makes sense to diversify U.S. capabilities with the most battle-tested contemporary technologies, including drones, while keeping other options open and closely following emerging trends—whether they are being tested in this conflict or in other regions where the United States is likely to be either a participant or a supporter.

We have clearly seen that drones have already influenced U.S. domestic considerations, given the number of unexplained aerial sightings in recent years, including under the current administration. Similar incidents have occurred among close U.S. allies such as the United Kingdom. From a defensive perspective alone, it makes sense to view drones as an integral part of expanded military capabilities. Whether drones will take on a central role, or remain complementary or equal to other aspects of modern warfare, remains to be seen.

Jacobsen: Turning to another major topic—at the UN Climate Summit, world leaders have gathered once again. There have been repeated statements over the years that time is short, that anthropogenic climate change is real, and that the physics of it are non-negotiable. UN Secretary-General António Guterres opened the summit by warning that the world risks exceeding the key benchmark of 1.5 degrees Celsius—or 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit—above pre-industrial levels, as outlined in the Paris Agreement. He called it “a moral failure and deadly negligence,” emphasizing that even a temporary overshoot would have dramatic consequences: every fraction of a degree higher means more hunger, displacement, and loss.

Regardless of one’s stance toward the UN, the statement reflects a physical reality: as the planet warms, extreme weather events are becoming more severe, which should be an increasing concern, particularly for those already vulnerable to environmental instability. What are your thoughts on this meeting, on that statement, and on the roles of China, the United States, and India—the three largest emitters?

Tsukerman: First of all, all three countries are attempting, to varying degrees, to diversify their energy sources. Even China—while still expanding its coal capacity—is also investing heavily in renewable and green energy technologies. India faces significant pressure but has been developing its nuclear energy sector and is a recognized leader in certain areas of nuclear innovation. The United States, while the Trump administration has been skeptical of some forms of green energy such as wind and solar, is simultaneously pushing forward investments in nuclear energy, including small modular reactors (SMRs).

So, it would be inaccurate to say that the three top emitters intend to remain polluters indefinitely. Economically and logistically, however, the full transition will take time. Each of these countries faces different domestic challenges and priorities that shape the pace and scale of their shift toward cleaner energy systems.

Achieving an adequate combination of energy security and economic power is essential for any country to successfully adapt to new forms of energy. That is the best-case scenario. In many countries, however, they cannot afford to make the switch or are constrained by geography—by what they can import versus what they can produce or sustain locally.

These logistical issues will remain serious concerns, and they intersect with the fact that different climatic events affect regions differently. Some island nations are in danger of being overrun by rising waters, while other parts of the world—particularly in the Middle East and parts of South and Southeast Asia—face extreme water shortages as their primary concern.

There is no one-size-fits-all solution for the needs of the countries most affected by these climatic changes. There need to be specific, issue-focused task forces established to address regional problems based on the actual needs of those regions, rather than on theoretical global standards devised in distant institutions that may have little connection to the immediate realities these nations face.

Equally important, we have seen in the past that these international gatherings tend to be heavy on words and light on tangible commitments or follow-through. For example, under President Biden, the United States pledged $500 million in climate assistance to African nations, but those funds were never delivered—neither to Egypt nor to any other intended recipients in Africa. These kinds of unfulfilled promises undermine confidence and reinforce skepticism, both about the sincerity of the policymakers and about the feasibility of their proposed solutions.

It also does not help when many leaders attending these summits arrive in private jets, directly contradicting the sustainability message they promote. That fuels global cynicism toward both the cause and those claiming to champion it. As a result, any progress toward coherent, actionable policy is likely to be slow and uneven.

The fact that multiple deadly conflicts have erupted in recent years has also displaced some of the global attention and urgency surrounding climate change, particularly in regions that are not experiencing the most immediate or catastrophic effects. There is a real need to balance rhetoric and foresight with situational awareness—recognizing other pressing needs, the impact of policies on different economic groups, and how such pronouncements are interpreted by the media, civil society, and adversarial forces.

Adversarial actors have used “climate panic” as a tool—to sabotage infrastructural projects, undermine domestic energy security, or push counterproductive agendas that do not help those most at risk. In some cases, the panic itself becomes weaponized, fostering moral hysteria and political polarization. None of that helps the people who are facing immediate danger.

Let us not forget that while human contributions to climate change deserve attention, and defensive measures to assist affected populations are necessary regardless of cause, there are also deliberate policies that inflict environmental harm for political ends. For example, countries such as Iran have engaged in ecologically destructive damming practices that redirect water away from critical regions, or have polluted vital ecosystems through negligence or intentional policy choices.

While much of the global conversation about climate change focuses on the greenhouse effect and carbon emissions, there are numerous other, more immediate actions that can be taken to prevent environmental degradation and mitigate additional threats that are already unfolding in vulnerable areas.

Jacobsen: The United States did not participate in the mandatory Universal Periodic Review, which scrutinizes the human rights record of UN member states. For context, this process occurs every four to five years and is a central mechanism of accountability within the UN system. Almost every member state takes part. The absence of the U.S. is striking. What are your thoughts on this non-attendance?

Tsukerman: I am not particularly surprised. The Trump administration has demonstrated a consistent hostility toward the United Nations, which was clear at the last UN General Assembly opening session. Avoiding UN-related gatherings appears to be part of a broader pattern. The U.S. ambassador to the UN has also been focused on more immediate and region-specific issues—for instance, recent discussions with Palestinian representatives regarding Gaza reconstruction and transition planning.

That said, if the U.S. is not at the table, decisions will be made without its participation—and likely without its agreement. That is the price of absence. Even when such decisions are slow to be implemented or largely rhetorical, the influence of those who are present shapes the international narrative and direction.

Of course, the U.S. cannot be everywhere at once, and in some cases, its absence signals a message: do not rely on the U.S. to pay for or lead every global initiative. There is an implicit call for other nations and international bodies to streamline bureaucracy and take more ownership of problem-solving.

Even China has become increasingly skeptical—not only of the political aspects of UN activities but also of their administrative inefficiencies. The UN as an institution faces a serious credibility deficit. Instead of reacting with surprise to the Trump administration’s multilateral disengagement—which has been explicit and consistent—the international community might do better to focus on addressing the UN’s structural challenges.

Reform is urgently needed: issues of cost, resource allocation, effectiveness, political roadblocks, and bureaucratic bottlenecks are mounting. If the UN is to remain relevant and effective, it must take concrete steps to resolve these internal problems and rebuild confidence in its capacity to act decisively.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina. 

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