Partnership Studies 23: Restorative Justice: Partnership vs Domination in Criminal Law
Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen
Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project
Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2026/01/28
Riane Eisler, an Austrian-born American systems scientist, futurist, and human rights advocate, is renowned for her influential work on cultural transformation and gender equity. Best known for The Chalice and the Blade, she introduced the partnership versus dominator models of social organization. She received the Humanist Pioneer Award. Drawing on neuroscience and history, she argues that Peace begins at home and calls for a shift in worldview to build more equitable, sustainable, and compassionate societies rooted in connection rather than control. The three books of hers of note that could be highlighted are The Chalice and the Blade—now in its 57th U.S. printing with 30 foreign editions, The Real Wealth of Nations, and Nurturing Our Humanity: How Domination and Partnership Shape Our Brains, Lives, and Future (Oxford University Press, 2019).
In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Riane Eisler about justice through her partnership–domination lens. Jacobsen contrasts retributive criminal law with restorative practice that treats wrongdoing as harm requiring repair, accountability, and reintegration. Eisler argues punitive systems reflect domination mythologies that portray people as inherently bad, encouraging exclusion and lifelong stigma, including barriers to employment. She links violence to learned family patterns—“peace begins at home”—and frames restorative justice as evidence of a cultural shift toward partnership. The pair probe risks of trauma-as-excuse, concluding that acknowledging causality must strengthen responsibility, not erase it, so rehabilitation remains credible, humane, and effective.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: We are going to focus on two forms of justice. One is punitive—or, more precisely, retributive—justice as a traditional model in criminal law. Retributive approaches are often criticized for centering punishment of the offender, sometimes at the expense of victims’ needs, rehabilitation, and prevention.
Restorative justice contrasts with this by reframing wrongdoing as harm done to people and relationships rather than merely a violation of legal rules. It is often framed through questions such as: who was hurt, what do they need, and who has responsibilities to repair that harm? It emphasizes repair, accountability, and reintegration.
The United States is frequently cited as a contemporary case where reintegration remains difficult, and where reoffending rates are high compared with many European systems. What are your thoughts on these two approaches?
Rine Eisler: We have a heritage of punitive or retributive “justice,” rooted in domination-oriented systems. More recently, restorative and rehabilitative movements have become more mainstream, signalling a shift toward partnership. The premise is that we have often approached justice in the wrong way: people should be supported in returning from harmful actions and, where possible, in making amends to those they have harmed.
This connects directly to partnership versus domination. Many Indigenous legal traditions and many small-scale societies have historically emphasized relational repair, community responsibility, and reintegration rather than punishment alone, although practices vary widely across cultures and historical periods.
Where justice systems emphasize rehabilitation—as is often highlighted in parts of Northern Europe—reported recidivism rates tend to be lower than in more punitive systems, although cross-national comparisons require caution due to differences in legal definitions, reporting standards, and data collection methods.
Ultimately, this discussion turns on worldview: whether we see people as permanently flawed and therefore manageable only through control, or as capable of accountability, repair, and change within systems designed for reintegration. That underlying assumption shapes whether justice systems prioritize domination or partnership.
If you compare the treatment of people convicted of crimes in Finland or Sweden with that in the United States, the difference is striking. Even so, within the United States there are jurisdictions and programs where recidivism rates are lower and where incarcerated people are treated as human beings capable of change.
We also know that violence is learned, and that it is often learned first within families. That is why we recently held a virtual summit called Peace Begins at Home, to help people connect these dots. If something is learned, it can also be unlearned.
A punitive or retributive system often makes what psychologists call the fundamental attribution error: it treats wrongdoing as evidence that something is fundamentally wrong with the person. This is not a religious system, but it carries a similar assumption—that once someone has committed a crime, they are inherently bad and cannot truly redeem themselves.
That assumption follows people long after incarceration. When individuals are released, many employers are unwilling to hire them. In this sense, punishment extends beyond prison walls. At the same time, there are NGOs devoted to helping formerly incarcerated people find employment, which shows that alternative approaches exist.
In this area, as in so many others, we see a struggle between an underlying domination system—with its particular beliefs and worldview—and a partnership-oriented system with a very different worldview. Both exist at the same time. The real question is how to help the majority of people understand this difference. The only way I can see is by changing the mythology surrounding what we call “human nature.”
Whose needs does punishment actually serve? It is usually said to serve society’s needs, and partly it reflects a desire for fairness. Studies of children show that they want those who cheat or harm others to be punished, and that tendency appears early. But that does not mean punishment itself is a fundamental human need. If it were, restorative justice movements would not exist, and many Indigenous societies would not prioritize repair, reintegration, and reconciliation over exclusion whenever possible.
Whether someone can be redeemed is not always clear. It may be that some people are so deeply traumatized that change is extremely difficult. History does give us examples, particularly when we look at leadership across different eras. In many cases, such figures seek to suppress alternatives because they define them as evil or threatening.
Politically, punishment can be mobilized for support. In the United States, calls for harsher laws and more severe punishment often resonate with voters. This tendency also bleeds into social life. Americans, broadly speaking, can be socially punitive, carrying strong prejudgments that cut across political and social lines. At the extremes, different groups define an “ultimate bad,” and individuals associated with that category become targets.
It is often not the group in the abstract that suffers directly, but the individual who is labeled as belonging to that group. Ultimately, this comes back to beliefs about human nature. If people are seen as inherently bad or sinful, punishment becomes the default response.
That assumption is not unique to modern societies. Historically, rigidly domination-oriented systems often dealt with crime by executing offenders rather than attempting rehabilitation. Modern prisons are a comparatively recent invention, and even they reflect differing assumptions about whether people are capable of change.
Jacobsen: Is there any strength in the idea of an abstract legal code with universal application, even within a retributive justice system? In other words, while the punishments may be extreme, does the principle of equal treatment under the law offer any redeeming value within domination-oriented systems?
Eisler: I do not think the issue is really one of abstract versus concrete law. The core issue is punishment itself. If you believe that human nature is fundamentally bad, then redemption is not part of the system. Punishment becomes the central response, rather than repair, accountability, or transformation.
If you believe that humans are basically capable of good—most of them, at least—there are still difficult cases to consider. Some people appear to derive pleasure from other people’s suffering. I have not studied the genetic literature on this in depth, but in most cases I would say such behavior is linked to trauma. I am not an expert, though.
From a biological perspective, we can reasonably point to variation. Evolution produces differences. You will find people who are highly empathetic, and you will also find people who, despite environment or upbringing, consistently display harmful behavior—perhaps due to a combination of genetic and epigenetic factors. I do not know the proportions. But I would argue that most people are capable of atonement and redemption if we address the traumas that contributed to their criminal behavior.
Jacobsen: Is there a risk, in the shift from punitive or retributive justice to restorative justice, that trauma becomes an excuse—that people avoid accountability by saying, “My trauma made me do this”?
Eisler: There is that risk, of course. It is a complicated issue. The question is whether recognizing trauma becomes a way of evading responsibility, or whether it becomes a way of understanding causality and making a genuine commitment not to repeat the harm. I do not claim expertise here, but I do know this: the restorative justice movement signals that more people are moving toward a partnership view of human nature.
You cannot meaningfully restore unless you believe that people are capable of change. That belief stands in contrast to the idea that human nature is fundamentally bad or sinful—one of the foundational myths associated with domination systems. These systems have deeply influenced many religions, though not all of them.
Within religious traditions, you often find a core ethical insight—“do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” the emphasis on responsibility and empathy—that makes harming others morally difficult. Surrounding that core, however, are layers of rules and doctrines that can obscure it.
I have often said that I hope, someday, leaders of the world’s religions will seriously engage with this issue. At present, roughly 80 percent of the world’s population still identifies with some form of religion. Until we address how scriptures are interpreted, they will continue to be used against efforts to shift toward systems that can prevent trauma to a large extent—though never completely. Trauma will always exist. People become ill. Life brings loss.
There is death, there are floods and earthquakes—there is plenty of suffering in the world—but we do not have to add to it. That is really the difference between these two beliefs: the idea that we must add suffering because of human nature, versus the belief that people can atone and be restored to being productive, caring members of society.
Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Riane.
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