Irina Tsukerman on Gaza Aid Stalemate, Syria’s Stalled Transition, and Japan’s Far-Right Surge

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): A Further Inquiry

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/08/10

Part 3 of 4

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. 

In this interview, national security attorney Irina Tsukerman joins Scott Douglas Jacobsen to discuss Gaza’s stalled humanitarian aid distribution, Syria’s hollow political transition efforts, and the rise of far-right nationalism in Japan. Tsukerman critiques UNRWA’s handling of 950 trucks of aid at Gaza’s border, citing political gridlock and Israeli accusations of Hamas ties. On Syria, she condemns U.S.-French talks with Syria as symbolic diplomacy enabling authoritarian consolidation while extremist militias roam freely. Turning to Japan, she links the surge in nationalist popularity to YouTube-driven rhetoric, coordinated disinformation, and Trump-aligned populist networks, warning that such movements weaken alliances and empower Russia and China.

Interview conducted July 25.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: UN aid chief has demanded evidence after accusations from Israel that UN personnel have ties to Hamas. It appears there are 950 trucks of humanitarian aid just sitting at the Gaza border.

Irina Tsukerman: Yes, and that’s important context. Israel reportedly allowed the aid into Gaza, but it hasn’t been appropriately distributed by UN agencies, specifically UNRWA, which had taken on responsibility for that distribution. It’s not the same aid coming from the U.S.-Israel Joint Gaza Humanitarian Fund, which has been far more successful, reportedly delivering about 90 million meals to vulnerable populations.

What this highlights is a critical breakdown in trust and coordination. Israel has accused certain UN staff of ties to Hamas. The UN, meanwhile, is demanding formal evidence before taking action. But in the meantime, aid isn’t reaching the people who need it most. And bureaucratic gridlock is costing lives.

In this case, the problem was that the aid wasn’t being distributed once inside Gaza. After Israeli ministries accused the UN of sitting on the aid for political reasons, resentment over being excluded from certain coordination efforts, for example; the UN suddenly resumed distribution earlier today.

The evidence essentially spoke for itself. The situation was well-documented, with satellite and ground-level images showing trucks passing into Gaza and then the aid just sitting, stockpiled and unused. Israel even released satirical imagery to highlight the absurdity of the situation. It was a bureaucratic and political failure that unnecessarily delayed critical humanitarian assistance.

Jacobsen: Syria, so, the U.S. and France are reportedly holding talks aimed at facilitating a political transition. Any reason for optimism?

Tsukerman: Honestly, not much. The type of conversations that the U.S. and France are having with the government leave much to be desired, especially after the massacres and atrocities in Suwayda and surrounding areas.

Whether these are direct orders or simply tacit approval, government-aligned militias operating under the banner of the Syrian military were involved in acts of mass violence—murders, rapes, and torture of civilians. Since then, the clashes haven’t honestly stopped, despite official ceasefire commitments.

Military forces have been redeployed, frustrating local communities. Yet, there’s still no viable framework for professionalizing the Syrian military, for establishing accountability, or for reforming command structures. Broad government promises have been made, but there’s neither the infrastructure, the expertise, nor the political will to follow through in good faith.

Rather than engaging in polite, diplomatic theatre, the U.S. and France should be playing a direct role in ensuring that these atrocities are not repeated. Israel, for instance, shouldn’t be forced into a position where it feels compelled to intervene across the border to protect civilians—or its diaspora, including Druze citizens with relatives in Syria.

This is a failure of leadership. It’s also a failure to condition sanctions relief on actual evidence of reform. No serious progress has been made on security sector reform, civilian protection, or disarming radical militias. Instead, extremist elements and foreign fighters continue to roam unchallenged in areas the regime claims to control.

There’s also the issue of foreign interference. Countries backing pro-government militias have enabled and even encouraged some of this violence. Syria, for its part, appears to have misread signals from Israel and the U.S.—interpreting their restraint as a green light to use force against minority groups under the guise of resolving sectarian conflict.

There’s been deep, longstanding tension in some of these regions. The outcome of the recent talks included vague commitments to grant the Suwayda communities—particularly Druze but also others—greater autonomy. But that’s not the same as meaningful protection from intercommunal violence.

What we’re seeing is symbolic self-governance in areas that were already effectively outside the Syrian central government’s control. These communities had some degree of autonomy, and that very autonomy—combined with government neglect—created a vacuum that enabled this cycle of bloodshed in the first place.

So, unless we see a genuine political transition backed by enforceable commitments, this isn’t a peace process. It’s a diplomatic cover for authoritarian consolidation, using sectarian proxies to maintain control.

These were communities that had been self-governing and self-defending for years, with deep mistrust not only toward the regional leadership but also toward Damascus more broadly. Not all factions, of course—but enough to keep the area relatively autonomous and, at times, highly restive.

The Syrian government viewed the local unrest as an opportunity to reassert control over the region. And now we’re seeing the consequences. As of yet, there is still no proper security framework in place. The U.S. could and should be more involved. But instead, Washington appears increasingly focused on minimizing its military footprint in Syria, looking for any excuse to disengage.

I think the only argument that might persuade this administration to take more substantive action is a pragmatic one: U.S. investments—whether humanitarian, diplomatic, or economic—will be endangered by the continued presence of extremist militias. No investor will take U.S.-led development seriously if projects are exposed to terrorism, violence, state collapse, or gross human rights violations.

That should be obvious. But for some reason, it isn’t.

Jacobsen: Alright, shifting topics. Explain to me why this Japanese conservative—some say far-right—politician suddenly became so much more popular than expected, especially among people who consume a lot of YouTube and other audiovisual content. What’s going on there?

Tsukerman: What we’re seeing in Japan is the resurgence of a particular strain of far-right nationalism—one with roots going back to World War II but which, for many years, was politically marginalized or moderated within the mainstream conservative bloc.

That said, there’s always been a subset of nationalists in Japan who argue that even the mainstream conservative parties are too dependent on the United States, too soft on external threats, and too open to foreign influence. It’s an ironic argument, really—Japan is one of the most culturally uniform, highly structured, and socially conformist nations in the world. It’s hardly overrun by foreign influence.

Still, these narratives tap into real anxieties, notably around Japan’s demographic decline and labour shortages. As Japan increasingly relies on foreign labour to fill jobs that either don’t attract domestic workers or for which there simply aren’t enough people, these nationalists frame immigration as an existential threat, rather than an economic necessity.

And in the past year, these voices have gained momentum—partly thanks to Trump-style rhetoric, amplified on platforms like YouTube, where algorithmic incentives reward emotionally charged, polarizing content. There may also be coordinated disinformation campaigns at play, where anti-Japan sentiment—real or manufactured—is used to provoke backlash and stir up nationalist fervour.

Jacobsen: Deliberately done to provoke a political reaction?

Tsukerman: That’s one possible theory. It would follow a pattern we’ve seen elsewhere—Trump using inflammatory rhetoric against countries like Canada, which in turn bolstered nationalist backlash and helped shift internal political dynamics.

So, why would Trump want this result in Japan? Because it plays into a broader strategy. He views these rising far-right populist movements as fellow travellers—whether it’s Japan’s nationalists, Germany’s AfD, or the Reform Party in the UK. There seems to be an effort—formal or informal—to build an international network of these ideological allies.

Interestingly, many of these movements embrace populist economic policies—often closer to socialism or even state feminism—despite branding themselves as nationalist or right-wing. Trump himself has criticized traditional conservative economic doctrines—like free trade and deregulation—as “neoliberalism,” blaming them for many of the West’s problems.

He’s drawn to the idea of strongman populism: ideologically flexible, personality-driven leadership that rejects globalism, questions alliances, and appeals to a particular vision of national pride. That model is being replicated—or at least admired—in more places than people realize.

Trump simply admires these types of figures. He sees them as “tough,” “natural leaders”—and the louder they rail against immigration and foreign influence, the more he views them as strong defenders of their nations. Of course, most of that is pure theatre. Much of what these politicians promise is vague, and their proposed solutions are often completely disconnected from economic or political reality.

We’re already seeing the consequences. In the U.S., for instance, while the markets may not yet reflect it, the underlying economy is showing signs of strain—declining job creation, contractions in GDP, and the disappearance of small businesses. These trends are starting to affect real people, even if the headlines haven’t caught up yet.

The same thing will happen in other countries that adopt this brand of populist economic nationalism. Instead of making nations stronger, these policies will leave them weaker and more isolated.

Take Japan. A Japan with poor relations with the United States is increasingly left to fend for itself. We’re already seeing the results: Japan has recently been pushed into signing a trade pact with China and South Korea—an outcome few mainstream Japanese parties wanted, since most view China as a strategic threat, not an ally.

And yet, now Trump is publicly praising the direction Japan is taking. Even more concerning, the extremists gaining traction in Japan are also pro-Russian, despite Russia still occupying Japanese territory—the Kuril Islands—an unresolved point of geopolitical tension dating back to World War II and even earlier, to the Russo-Japanese War.

This isn’t just a political coincidence. The broader strategy appears to be undermining traditional U.S. alliances and unravelling the post–World War II liberal international order. And who benefits? Russia and China. That’s the bottom line.

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