Everywhere Insiders 27: Weaponised Migration, Deepfakes, and Proxy Wars

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/12/30

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen spoke with Irina Tsukerman about how states weaponize pressure without firing a shot. They began with a Reuters-reported tunnel from Belarus into Poland, where border guards said more than 180 migrants crossed and about 130 were detained, illustrating organised facilitation and adaptive tactics. They then discussed exiled Hong Kong activist Carmen Lau’s report of AI-generated sexualised images mailed to neighbours as intimidation, echoing older disinformation playbooks amplified online. Tsukerman also unpacked Yemen’s STC–Saudi–UAE tensions after deadly Hadhramaut clashes, arguing fragmentation complicates any deal. Finally, they noted the U.S. indictment alleging BLM OKC donation misuse via fiscal sponsorship. 

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: A large number of migrants have been travelling to Poland via a hidden border tunnel from Belarus. The Polish Border Guard estimated that more than 180 migrants crossed. Based on the Reuters photo, it is not a large tunnel. It was supported by wooden posts and metal rods and was only about 1.5 meters high, so most people could not get through without crouching. Poland has been grappling with the migrant crisis. It has accused Belarus, a Minsk ally of Moscow, of attempting to destabilize Poland by encouraging people, mainly from the Middle East and Africa, to cross the frontier.

A border guard said, “The hidden entrance in the forest was located approximately 50 meters from the border fence on the Belarusian side of the border, while the exit was located approximately 10 meters from the barrier on the Polish side.” Polish Border Guard officials said around 130 migrants were detained after the tunnel was discovered, while others were still being sought. This was reported as the fourth such tunnel found this year in the Podlaskie region. What are your thoughts on this? What are your thoughts on the accusations of the weaponization of immigration by Belarus and Russia toward European countries such as Poland?

Irina Tsukerman: I had the fortune of being present at some of the exact locations depicted in these articles and news reports earlier this year, in September, when I visited the same area that Prime Minister Donald Tusk and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had visited weeks earlier. I observed Polish efforts to safeguard security, including multiple layers of metal fencing, barbed wire, and electronic monitoring systems, as well as human security guards patrolling the area.

What struck me was the sophistication and diversity of methods used to facilitate irregular crossings on this border. In my assessment, networks connected to Belarusian state structures and actors operating with their protection have sought to exploit migration flows as a pressure tactic. Recruiters have reportedly targeted high-risk regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, and many of the migrants arriving at the border appear to be young men. They are often directed on where and how to attempt crossings, sometimes in ways designed to provoke confrontations at the fence line.

In some cases, migrants set fires and throw containers filled with urine or feces at the guards. In other cases, they use night lasers pointed at the night-vision goggles worn by border guards to disrupt or impair their vision. In some instances, they are given tools to remove sections of the metal fencing to force entry. They crouch under or pass through gates and openings they create, then attempt to evade the police.

They usually observe patterns in police and border-guard presence, waiting for periods when coverage is less intense. At times, they appear in broad daylight. They also move from place to place to avoid remaining in one location long enough for guards to anticipate their movements and prepare interceptions. In some cases, individuals injure themselves while climbing over fences and barbed wire. They must be transported to hospitals at the Polish taxpayer’s expense, where they receive basic medical care before being identified and either deported or transferred to detention centers or courts.

This new reporting about tunnels is not particularly shocking. It was only a matter of time before digging began as a way to circumvent the difficulties of climbing over fences. Polish police and border guards have become increasingly effective at stopping both large groups and individual attempts to cross. At the same time, the fencing has grown more sophisticated and more difficult to bypass, making underground routes a logical next step for those determined to enter Europe at this particular location.

The reason these tunnels are not as sophisticated as those built by Hamas is twofold. First, they must be dug relatively quickly. Many of these individuals are living in forested areas while attempting to cross, with minimal supplies—perhaps only basic food and water. At this time of year, the weather is harsh, and it is neither comfortable nor safe to remain outdoors for long periods. The longer digging takes, the more likely interception becomes, so the tunnels are rudimentary and designed for rapid use. These crossings also involve groups gathered in the same place at the same time, which requires moving everyone quickly; splitting groups would draw attention and likely lead to the passage being shut down.

The second factor is funding. Hamas had years to construct its tunnel networks. It diverted billions of dollars in international humanitarian aid toward building highly sophisticated systems with ventilation and, in some cases, tunnels large enough for vehicles. The situation on the Polish-Belarusian border does not involve that level of financial support. While these operations are not cost-free—charter flights, basic sustenance, and tools all require money—they are not comparable to the scale of resources Hamas had at its disposal.

Another key difference is scale. These operations typically involve at most a few hundred people at a time, not tens of thousands concentrated in a single location. Such numbers would not be operationally feasible even for Russia or Belarus at present. At the peak of these efforts, however, approximately 37,000 people attempted to cross the Polish border in a single year, a figure that remains significant.

That number has declined as interception efforts have improved, but innovation continues. These tunnel attempts may open new routes—literally—for weaponized migration. It is possible that more tunnels will appear in the future, particularly in areas farther from fencing or where police presence is less frequent. A country cannot turn its entire territory into a continuous border-guard post. With limited personnel, opportunities for underground crossings will remain. This will likely require Poland to invest in underground detection technologies capable of sensing movement below the surface, much as it has already invested in sensors to detect human activity at night or at a distance.

Jacobsen: In Hong Kong, individuals such as Carmen Lau have been notified by Joshua Reynolds, a member of the UK Parliament from Believing Britain, that a fake, sexually explicit image is being used and distributed to neighbours. According to Reuters reporting, this represents the use of sexual humiliation through fabricated imagery as a tool of political intimidation. This tactic is not new in style, even if the medium is updated.

In my own profession, journalism, the major risk factor for being murdered is being male, while the major risk factor for being targeted with sexualized imagery or sexual harassment is being female. Similarly, here, fake sexualized images are being produced as a form of political punishment and intimidation. Lau is among more than 30 pro-democracy campaigners for whom Hong Kong authorities have offered HK$1 million (approximately US$130,000) bounties, accusing them of violating the city’s national security laws. What are your thoughts on this style of intimidation, and what are the broader implications for pro-democracy demonstrators?

Tsukerman: Like the other roughly 30 individuals, this case reflects how Chinese efforts to intimidate protesters, critics, opposition figures, diaspora communities, and others perceived as non-conforming to state expectations have become more diverse and sophisticated. This evolution is especially evident in Beijing’s extensive borrowing from the coercive and informational toolkits developed by Russia and other authoritarian states.

Rather than relying solely on direct violence, police force, or overt threats, authorities and their proxies increasingly deploy reputational attacks. Some of these methods are predictable: online smear campaigns, fabricated rumours, and false denunciations carried out by agents provocateurs. The use of sexualized imagery, however, represents a modern adaptation of older Soviet tactics that relied on altered or staged photographs to destroy reputations—particularly those of women, though men were also targeted.

Historically, such images were used to suggest affairs, unethical conduct, intoxication, or unprofessional behaviour, all designed to undermine public credibility. Today, sexualized photos or videos generated or manipulated with more advanced technology pursue the same objective but with far greater impact. The amplification effect of online platforms allows such content to spread thousands of times faster and farther than during the Cold War, when distribution was comparatively slow and limited.

In the past, the impact of these tactics was usually limited to the immediate community where the person lived or worked—their neighbours, colleagues, and people who knew them personally. In more advanced cases, local newspapers might have been involved. That cannot be compared to a video circulating online that can be viewed by thousands of people almost instantly. In Hong Kong and mainland China, this amplification can be pushed even further.

What we are seeing is a new twist on an ancient approach developed by Soviet intelligence, now adopted by pro-Beijing institutions and agencies, using essentially the same methods. The reason this is becoming more prominent now is straightforward. For many years, these actors were not particularly sophisticated. They relied mainly on brute force, crude accusations, and overt harassment. Over time, however, they have learned and adapted—through coordination and observation of tactics used by Russia, Iran, and other states, and by assessing what is more effective in the contemporary information environment.

Direct violence tends to generate significant negative publicity and condemnation from Western governments. By contrast, deepfake pornography and similar forms of digital sexualized abuse exist in a legal and moral gray zone. Even Western countries are still struggling to legislate against and enforce penalties for this kind of content, particularly when it is deployed through private or deniable channels. When state actors weaponize such tactics, they become even more challenging to counter.

When these campaigns occur in places such as Hong Kong or other non-Western jurisdictions, taking the content offline and attracting sustained attention from Western governments and human-rights organizations becomes much harder. These acts are often perceived as less brutal than physical violence or mass arrests, even though the damage can be equally pernicious—reputationally, psychologically, emotionally, and socially. As a result, they are less likely to trigger international activism, which is precisely why this method is expected to become a preferred tool of intimidation.

Jacobsen: Turning to another issue, a joint Saudi-Emirati delegation travelled to Aden following talks after clashes in which dozens of people were reported killed during a takeover by the Southern Transitional Council, or STC. Others were wounded in the violence, with reports indicating that some of the deadliest incidents occurred in Hadramout. The delegation’s discussions aim to address ways to reverse recent unilateral actions, including the withdrawal of forces from areas outside the eastern provinces. Aden is in Yemen.

Tsukerman: Aden serves as the seat of the internationally recognized Yemeni government, following the Houthis’ takeover of Sana’a. The underlying issue is much deeper than what the narrative presented by these two delegations to Western audiences acknowledges. This situation will not be resolved quickly or easily, nor through a simple mutual withdrawal of forces. These issues are perceived as existential by local actors, even though they also involve external security interests—in this case, those of the Emiratis and the Saudis.

The Saudis and Emiratis are effectively engaged in a proxy struggle, but there are legitimate local interests that go well beyond their external involvement. The Southern Transitional Council, or STC, emerged from what was once South Yemen during the period of communist rule. Many within this movement see themselves as pursuing eventual independence. At the same time, they remain formally part of the internationally recognized government. They are strongly opposed to the Houthis, who dominate the North and have increasingly pushed southward, smuggling oil and gas, depriving southern regions of income, and creating security problems even in southern Yemen.

The STC is also opposed to the pro–Muslim Brotherhood al-Islah party and to tribes affiliated with that movement. This is a complicated landscape because tribal, political, and ideological interests intersect in fluid ways that are not always easy to disentangle. Not all tribes involved are fully committed to al-Islah, and al-Islah itself is not composed solely of tribal actors. Some of its members are urban, city-based individuals who are less focused on tribal interests and more motivated by religious or ideological commitments. What results is a coalition of different groups converging under one umbrella. Politically, however, they are primarily affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and are often viewed as intermediaries among the Houthis, al-Qaeda, and other extremist or terrorist groups operating in Yemen and beyond.

At the strategic level, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates hold very different visions of Yemen’s long-term future. Saudi Arabia continues to insist on a unified Yemen, even if that requires negotiating some form of peace with the Houthis and tolerating the inclusion of Muslim Brotherhood–aligned actors. Not all Saudis support this vision; much of the backing comes from older power networks and from less ideological, more financially motivated elites.

The Emiratis, by contrast, back the STC. They view the Houthi-dominated North as irredeemable and believe that, to safeguard their own security interests against Iran-backed militants and the Muslim Brotherhood, the STC should exercise complete control over southern Yemen. In their view, separating North and South would simplify governance and improve security.

In my assessment, both sides are mistaken because they oversimplify the depth of sectarian, political, and social fragmentation within Yemen. The South itself is divided not only between the STC and the North, but also among various competing local interests. Simply separating the South from the North would not resolve these internal fractures or end the underlying conflicts.

It will not put an end to the economic problems or the endemic corruption associated with some factions of Yemen’s current government. As for the Houthis, the creation of a new border between the two states would not stop their ambitions. Yemen was previously divided into North and South Yemen—one under communist control, the other anti-communist. At that time, the Houthis were far less radical and were more aligned with Western and Saudi interests within an anti-communist framework. That situation has fundamentally changed.

Over the years, the Houthis have become significantly radicalized. They have also absorbed and integrated many northern residents who were not originally part of the Houthi tribal structure and who held different religious views. For this reason, simply re-erecting a political border or even constructing a physical barrier would not prevent the Houthis from conducting raids or attempting to reassert control over the South. They are armed with increasingly sophisticated weapons and are ideologically committed to expanding their influence beyond the North.

Because of this, focusing the debate primarily on territorial division is premature. The Houthis and other radical networks represent the most immediate and serious challenge, rather than the question of borders themselves. External powers do not see the problem this way. Instead, they continue to arm competing factions and malign actors against one another, deepening fragmentation.

Recently, however, the Southern Transitional Council managed to seize and secure significant territory from both Houthi-aligned forces and Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated groups, strengthening its position. In doing so, it also displaced pro-Saudi militias composed of Yemenis from various backgrounds. Not all of these forces were Houthis or members of the Muslim Brotherhood; some were pro-Saudi groups fighting to preserve Yemeni unity. In practice, however, these groups often found themselves aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood or even indirectly with the Houthis, albeit for very different reasons.

The STC has consolidated its position in strategically important areas such as Hadramout and has even blocked a Saudi political delegation from entering one of the contested regions. This action precipitated the current round of negotiations. Those talks are unlikely to succeed under present conditions because the STC believes momentum is on its side. It has gained a clear military advantage and is negotiating from a position of strength. As a result, it does not feel compelled to compromise with pro-Saudi factions or with Saudi Arabia itself, nor does it think pressure to withdraw forces or relinquish territory.

Pro-Saudi groups have been unable to regain lost ground or reverse recent losses, further reinforcing the STC’s confidence. For these reasons, I do not expect a diplomatic resolution favourable to Saudi Arabia in the near term. Saudi options are limited: either accept a compromise that allows the STC to retain the territories it has taken, or resume fighting in the hope that a pause will allow regrouping. Under the current terms, however, I do not see these negotiations making meaningful progress.

Jacobsen: On December 11, 2025, a federal grand jury indictment was unsealed. It is a 25-count case, including 20 counts of wire fraud and five counts of money laundering. The indictment names Tashella Sheri Amore Dickerson, who allegedly had leadership access beginning at least in 2016 as Executive Director of Black Lives Matter Oklahoma City (BLM OKC), with access to bank accounts, PayPal, and Cash App.

The significant fundraising surge described in the indictment began in late spring 2020, during the post–George Floyd protest period. The alleged embezzlement window is stated to have started in June 2020 and continued through October 2025, indicating conduct prosecutors allege extended into very recent times. This summary is drawn directly from a publicly available U.S. Attorney’s Office (Western District of Oklahoma) press release updated on December 11, 2025.

The specified money source exceeds $5.6 million raised, including funds from national bail organizations. These include grants from entities such as Community Justice Exchange, the Massachusetts Bail Fund, and the Minnesota Freedom Fund. Most of these funds were routed through a fiscal sponsor, which is a central element of the case.

According to the indictment, BLM Oklahoma City was not itself a registered 501(c)(3) organization. Donations were allegedly accepted through an affiliation with the Alliance for Global Justice (AFGJ), an Arizona-based 501(c)(3) organization that served as the fiscal sponsor. Under that arrangement, funds were restricted to permitted charitable uses, subject to accounting requirements, and prohibited from being used for real estate purchases without AFGJ consent.

Prosecutors allege that donations and grants entered this 501(c)(3)-restricted pipeline and were then diverted away from authorized charitable purposes and reporting requirements. Dickerson is alleged to have deposited at least $3.15 million in returned bail checks into her personal bank accounts, rather than into accounts associated with BLM Oklahoma City. Because the funds moved through a fiscal sponsor, prosecutors state that the indictment alleges returned bail checks were deposited into her personal accounts rather than into BLMOKC’s accounts.

The indictment itemizes alleged personal uses of the funds, including travel, shopping, deliveries, vehicles, and real estate. The summary lists categories intended to demonstrate personal benefit, including recreational travel—specifically trips to Jamaica and the Dominican Republic for herself and associates—tens of thousands of dollars in retail shopping, at least $50,000 in food and grocery deliveries for herself and her children, and the purchase of a personal vehicle registered in her name.

The indictment further alleges the acquisition of six fundamental properties in Oklahoma City, deeded either in her own name or in the name of Equity International LLC, an entity prosecutors allege she exclusively controlled.

The indictment alleges that six properties in Oklahoma City were deeded either in her own name or in the name of Equity International, LLC, an entity she allegedly controlled exclusively.

The money trail is that the funds were returned as bail checks. Those checks were returned to BLMOKC, and the indictment alleges that, in many instances, they were deposited into Dickerson’s personal bank accounts rather than into BLMOKC’s accounts. Therefore, the donations and grant funds were accepted through Alliance for Global Justice (AFGJ) as a fiscal sponsor, and prosecutors allege that this is the structure through which funds were routed. The allegation is that she then deposited returned bail checks into her personal accounts. That personal-account spending was used for travel, shopping, food deliveries, a vehicle, and real estate—including six properties tied to her or to an entity she allegedly controlled.

This is an obvious line in the government’s narrative, as alleged in the indictment. Real estate is the key component. Money laundering allegations typically focus on moving funds into assets. Assets are critical—forfeiture considerations. If convicted, the property can become a target. It is a straightforward narrative of the conversion of charitable restricted funds into personal wealth.

Dickerson allegedly used interstate wire communications to submit two false annual reports to AFGJ. She allegedly represented that BLM OKC funds were used only for tax-exempt purposes, while failing to disclose their personal use. The alleged personal use is substantial, including six properties deeded to her or to a company she allegedly controlled. 

Some of the stakes: wire fraud carries up to 20 years per count, and there are 20 counts. Money laundering carries a maximum of 10 years per count, and there are five counts, with fines of up to $250,000 per count or twice the amount of criminally derived property involved in the transaction. If prosecuted to the maximum and stacked, this could expose the defendant to decades in prison if statutory maximums were imposed on each count and ordered to run consecutively.

The investigating agencies named are the FBI, the Oklahoma City Field Office, and the IRS–Criminal Investigation. The prosecutors named are Assistant U.S. Attorneys Matt Dillon and Jessica L. Perry. I know we try to do international, but this one is extraordinary because it cuts against a lot of mainstream left-wing discourse, while we often critique the Republican Party. This one is distinct and relatively straightforward on the alleged mechanics. What are your thoughts on this, given that this is the executive director of a major-city BLM organization? 

Tsukerman: I wish I could be shocked, but there were similar controversies in other states, including New York. One early, particularly jarring, high-profile example involved a self-described Marxist leader associated with the organization’s formal structure, who faced serious scrutiny over personal real-estate acquisitions and other financial accumulations that critics argued were inconsistent with the movement’s stated aims. That was one of the first significant public examples of this channel being accused of turning into a self-enrichment scheme.

I also do not expect many political actors to comment much about this case, either. In some prior cases, there was no robust effort to clearly disassociate, issue condemnations, or create meaningful guardrails to prevent recurrence. There was not a sudden increase in institutional scrutiny of organizational accounts after earlier controversies. A massive fraud allegation should trigger systemic tightening, but that often does not happen.

Unfortunately, when there are no guardrails—and when condemnation of outright criminal conduct is treated as politically inconvenient or as “impeding the movement”—that environment attracts con artists and frauds who will abuse the system. That does not mean everyone involved is a fraudster. It means that people adept at exploiting vulnerabilities are more likely to succeed in such an environment. Systems that fail to erect guardrails and fail to protect constituents from abuse become, in my view, culpable in a secondary way for allowing it to continue.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina. 

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