Oleksandr Tsyvinskyi: Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Reboot, Economic Security and the Shadow Economy

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/12/25

Oleksandr Tsyvinskyi is Director of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU), appointed in August 2025 after more than two decades in law enforcement. A PhD in Law from Lviv, he previously served as an investigator and head of organized crime units, then as a leading detective and unit head at the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. A combat veteran of the Anti-Terrorist Operation and the full-scale war, he links security, the rule of law, and economic resilience. As ESBU chief, Tsyvinskyi focuses on dismantling the shadow economy, protecting honest business, rebuilding public trust in Ukraine’s recovery, and anchoring Ukraine’s long-term EU-oriented future.

In this two-part interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Oleksandr Tsyvinskyi, Director of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, about rebooting the ESBU amid Russia’s war. Tsyvinskyi explains his plan to rebuild the team, move from many small cases to a few systemic ones, and focus on business security and the shadow economy. He links tax evasion norms to Soviet-era contempt for the state, arguing that independent institutions, radical transparency, and cultural change—from schools to kitchen-table conversations—are essential to make corruption shameful and the rule of law non-negotiable. They also discuss Western support, avoiding coercive conditionality while strengthening Ukraine’s institutional resilience.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Looking at the big picture for the 4th quarter of 2025 and the first and second quarters of 2026, what is the most important message to convey about economic security, anti-corruption efforts, transparency, and related issues in Ukraine?

Oleksandr Tsyvinskyi: The first and most important thing for us is to reload the system. That means reloading our team to start producing the results everyone expects. We have to begin this work this year. Next year, in the first two quarters, this process will continue, and we must complete it by the end of 2026. This is the top priority in human capital management. Secondly, we are completely reordering the Bureau’s priorities. We are shifting from minor cases to large ones. We are moving from quantity to quality. Moreover, the most important development is the creation of an entirely new direction: business security, which we have not addressed before. The next element is working with the shadow economy—black-market business—and then working with those who violate the legal sphere. Our results will include, first, reloading the team; second, reformatting our approaches; third, formally registering our three main priorities; and fourth, identifying organized criminal groups and bringing them to responsibility in the first two quarters of next year.

Jacobsen: How much of this is a holdover from the Soviet legacy in terms of institutions and how people conduct themselves, and how much is not? I do not mean this in a critical sense; I am trying to clarify. If a historian were to look at it, we would see that we are all shaped by our national histories. How does that post-Soviet history feed into the practices that built systems that led to higher corruption, and into the institutional ways in which people worked? I want to be very clear, because I know it can be susceptible to some if they are reading this, in terms of someone from what they call “the West.” For some reason, they do not include South Korea and Japan in that definition. Looking at it objectively as a historian, you have the post-Soviet timeline, you have the institutions, you have the cultural habits people carry, and then you have the reforms you are talking about—moving away from all of that.

Tsyvinskyi: First of all, for many years, people were taught that you cannot change the system, that private property does not exist. Moreover, when private property began to function, we found ourselves in a situation of complete irresponsibility. Because now there is a feeling—if a person does not pay taxes or tries to avoid them—that, in post-Soviet countries, this is unfortunately treated as usual. Before, everything was considered “the property of the state,” which supposedly belonged to everyone, meaning it belonged to no one. Moreover, the state could be deceived. That same attitude has remained the same now: not paying taxes is deceiving the state, and deceiving the state is normal.

The worst part is that from the post-Soviet past, when people sit at the table—drinking coffee in the kitchen or in a bar—and someone says they deceived the state or did not pay taxes, it is received normally and not criticized, unlike, for example, European countries such as Finland, Germany, or Canada. If two friends in Canada sit down and one tells the other that he deceived the state by not paying taxes, I do not think he would receive moral support for it being acceptable or admirable. However, in Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries, deceiving the state is treated as usual. Because the state is perceived as nothing, and there is no feeling of shame. There is no feeling that you have actually stolen from a children’s home, from a hospital, from a road project—stolen from somewhere real.

Jacobsen: Why?

Tsyvinskyi: Why such an attitude? Because the state has constantly humiliated and punished people, and now there is a persistent negative attitude toward the state, unlike in European countries. For me, this is part of the Soviet legacy. It is an entire culture, and this culture changes very slowly. That is why these consequences remain.

Jacobsen: What can be done?

Tsyvinskyi: Today, our institution is beginning to work on changing the culture—on the idea that not paying taxes is shameful, that it is not good, that it is harmful, and that people should feel responsible for this. Because to this day, people are not ashamed; they are proud of it. Our task is to change the culture around this.

Now if you fool the state, it is considered acceptable. Everyone will support you. They will say, “You are a good guy, let us drink beer,” and you will say, “I fooled the state today,” and they will answer, “You are a cool guy.” This is perhaps a lasting part of the Soviet heritage.

Until recently, it was considered acceptable for a long time. If you managed to avoid paying taxes and told your friends, they would support you. Moreover, if you said something like this in Canada, somewhere in a bar, people would definitely not help you. That was part of the Soviet legacy. However, now it is changing. Moving forward, as Oleksandr said, in our institution, we are trying to change the culture by saying: we need to promote different values—paying taxes is normal. If you do not pay, you are essentially stealing money from hospitals and educational institutions. This is a cultural issue, and that is what we are trying to change.

Jacobsen: My follow-up to that. In my conversations with Ukrainian colleagues, it typically goes like this: in private, we debate, challenge each other, and learn from one another. In public, in interviews, things are more polished, and that shapes the questions. In media, I sometimes ask—from your perspective as Ukrainians—what the West is getting right, getting wrong, and missing entirely in its coverage? Similarly, support for Ukraine is often conflated with imposition. Do you see what I mean? When it comes to supporting Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts, how can people who are not Ukrainian but support Ukraine ensure they remain sensitive and supportive without imposing? Ukrainians should be able to work on anti-corruption on Ukrainian terms. Support is good, but if it comes with strings, it becomes coercive. So: anti-corruption efforts without coercion.

Tsyvinskyi: If we ask our Western partners how they view anti-corruption efforts, the real question is how to convince people in the West that, on the one hand, we need to fight corruption, and on the other hand, we must ensure that this does not harm Ukraine or create the wrong perception of what is happening here. How do we convince people in the West to support Ukraine in its fight against corruption without creating problems for Ukraine? When I worked for 10 years at the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, almost every significant case we opened involving top officials generated strong reactions, and sometimes coverage in the Western press, focused on the existence of a corrupt official and presenting it as a systemic failure. However, it is better to diagnose and treat a disease, even if it requires surgery and pain. Only then will the patient recover and become effective.

In this context, the correct way to communicate is as follows: if there are independent authorities in Ukraine capable of holding the highest officials accountable, then this is proof that Ukraine is on the right track. In many countries—even in developed democracies—there are significant obstacles to enforcing the law against top officials. In Ukraine, this is possible. Ukraine demonstrates this, and there are more and more such bodies. We have two paths: to hide our problems and pretend everything is fine, or to perform the surgery, accept the pain, and grow into a democratic and effective state.

Objectively, today in Ukraine—especially in public policy and among officials—we have one of the most transparent systems in the world. The requirements placed on public officials, even those that limit their privacy by obliging them to disclose nearly all information, are unique. This is a powerful demonstration that we are rushing in the right direction. Moreover, the situation is straightforward: yes, we have problems, but we will solve them quickly and decisively. I think this is the best way to communicate with everyone.

If we did not have these bodies, and we did not identify the problems that exist—as was the case 15 or even 10 years ago—there would be no corruption scandals, no dramatic headlines. However, that would not mean there were no problems or no corruption. Everyone knew it existed. Now it is painful, but this pain is an obvious marker that Ukraine is moving in the right direction and choosing democracy.

What is very important is that when issues arose concerning the existence of anti-corruption bodies, the people made their position very clear. This is another marker that Ukraine not only has institutions that work correctly, independently, and without fear, but also that civil society is strong enough to defend these institutions. The point is not only about institutions themselves; it is about people defending their right to move toward a European society. This is the best form of communication.

If there are no independent anti-corruption bodies, then we cannot know the scope of the corruption problem, because no one will address it.

Jacobsen: So you are arguing that this is the pain period right now. Moreover, on the index—at least in Transparency International—there is a significant improvement.

Tsyvinskyi: It is like having a disease and pretending that everything is fine. Everyone may seem happy, but the disease remains. Alternatively, you can accept the pain of treatment and actually make the patient healthy. In Ukraine, we have anti-corruption institutions, including the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. The Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine investigates some corruption offenses. We say, “Yes, we have corruption—but we are treating it.” That is the difference.

Compared with other countries, Ukraine is one of the most transparent. In terms of requirements for public servants and civil servants, we have obligations that very few countries share. We must publish everything on a special website. Anyone can read how much money we have, how much is in our bank accounts. Any citizen of Ukraine can read how much money my wife has and in which accounts. Almost no other country requires this. Ukraine has a very transparent monitoring system.

This is why, when scandals arise, they are actually a sign that Ukraine is trying to fix its problems. In Ukraine, even if you earn money legally, are an official, and buy something for yourself, you will be publicly criticized for it. You must include it in your public declaration; it is on the website, and everyone can read it. Even if you can afford it, you will be heavily criticized across all media.

Jacobsen: And if you buy something for this amount?

Tsyvinskyi: You must register this information in your civil servant declaration. Everyone will criticize you—media outlets will say, “Oh, look, he bought something. He bought a $3,500 item,” and so on. That is why Ukraine’s system is very transparent today. $3,500 is about two monthly salaries in our Bureau. Any amount above this must be officially declared on a public website. 

Jacobsen: I think it is important to note, in my analysis as an independent journalist from the outside, that people outside of Ukraine tend to highlight, and it is essential to highlight, the case involving Zelensky’s lifelong friend and former aide in the corruption scandal. However, the silver lining is that it demonstrated, first, the institution’s independence in the speed and firmness of its response. Second, it is part of a larger and more critical trend. Previously, Ukraine ranked low in transparency, comparable to Sudan or Nigeria. Now it sits among mid-level countries, which is a massive improvement that most states cannot claim. About reform, what are the key areas Ukraine needs to reform further—on Ukrainian terms—to move from that mid-level position toward the rankings of the least corrupt countries in the world?

Tsyvinskyi: It is essential to understand one thing: corruption and its reduction are not the responsibility of the Anti-Corruption Bureau alone. It is the responsibility of both sides. It is the responsibility of the entire system of government, on the one hand. Moreover, it concerns the people. It is also a matter of culture. When corruption begins to be condemned in the kitchen, at home, while drinking tea—as it is in many civilized countries—when it becomes shameful, unpleasant, humiliating, and socially condemned, then we will reach the point where corruption will be significantly reduced.

On the other hand, this must begin in school. Unfortunately, people very often do not pay attention to this. Everyone tends to focus on the short term. No matter how many significant cases the Anti-Corruption Bureau exposes, if we do not start solving this problem in schools, universities, the workplace, and culture—teaching that corruption is bad, negative, and humiliating—then we will have this problem for a long time. My firm conviction is that this requires a set of measures that are not limited to one institution. The point is that integrity should be a must-have. It should be the norm. Moreover, it should not be civil society alone that influences or controls this; it must be embedded in the corporate culture of government officials.

When, within that culture, someone learns that a colleague is taking bribes or doing something wrong and immediately informs the relevant authorities, we can overcome this quickly. However, if wrongdoing is tolerated or the response is insufficient, it is not acceptable to look the other way. It is necessary to respond and take measures to stop it. Moreover, this sometimes means reporting a friend or colleague to the authorities. We are prepared for that. This is the path that will allow us to reach the minimum level of corruption.

If you know that a colleague—maybe even a friend—who holds a high position is corrupt, and you inform the relevant institutions, that is how we eliminate corruption. The number-one priority is working with culture, because this is not about one, two, three, or four institutions. It is about how corruption is perceived. Therefore, it is clear that everyone must do their job and have zero tolerance for corruption.

Without a comprehensive working system—where committing corruption is viewed as abnormal, just as it is abnormal to steal a wallet, assault someone, kill someone, or commit any other crime—we will continue in a cycle where some people think they are heroes for doing what they do, and others try to catch them. It becomes an endless process. There is a saying that culture eats strategy for breakfast. This is often considered acceptable in private companies, but in state institutions, it is not always applied. That is why I said the public must consider corruption on the same level as other crimes. Everyone agrees you should not steal, kill, or assault someone. Along the same lines, corruption should be considered equally unacceptable.

When people think that way, the work begins in schools and universities. It is a long-term project, but it can significantly reduce corruption. Today in Ukraine—unlike in many countries that believe their corruption level is lower—in just ten years, we have gone from a situation where tens of thousands of people were untouched to one where no one in Ukraine can feel safe if they commit corruption offences. Ukraine is the only country that cannot feel safe amid corruption.

Jacobsen: In the war, in the context of Russian aggression, I often ask—perhaps you have heard the phrase “All that glitters is not gold.” Is there a phrase or aphorism in Ukrainian culture that, for you, captures what it feels like to be in the war with Russia? It means that everything valuable is not monetary in nature.

Tsyvinskyi: There is a similar metaphor—”All that glitters is not gold.” However, if you mean a phrase that describes the state of Ukrainians during the war, a general saying or metaphor, yes. I can translate it directly so it fits the context. Ukrainians are a very benevolent and very stubborn nation. Unlike others—I will not compare directly, but perhaps some would have given up—we stand our ground. There is a phrase: We should burn rather than surrender to anyone. And this is about us.

Jacobsen: Alright, we will call that an interview. Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Oleksandr.

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