Mariia Sulialina on Defending Children in Occupied Ukraine

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/12/11

Mariia Sulialina is a Ukrainian human rights defender and head of the NGO CCE “Almenda,” which documents abuses against children in Russia-occupied territories. Born in Crimea, she became an activist as a teenager and joined Almenda in 2013. After Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, she left Yalta for Kyiv and began documenting indoctrination, militarisation, and violations of children’s right to education. Sulialina works with Ukrainian and international partners to secure accountability, reintegration, and access to schooling for affected children. In 2024 she received the Civil Rights Defender of the Year Award for her leadership, resilience, and long-term vision and courage.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Sulialina about defending children’s rights under Russia’s occupation of Crimea and other Ukrainian territories. Sulialina describes Almenda’s evolution from civic education work in Yalta to documenting war crimes, indoctrination, militarisation, and barriers to Ukrainian schooling. She explains how her team secures and verifies evidence for courts while protecting witnesses, and why the “right to truth” matters for future reconciliation. Reflecting on exile, colonisation, and divided wartime experiences, Sulialina stresses reintegration, unity, and giving children the freedom to decide their own futures. The conversation foregrounds trauma, resilience, and responsibility.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: When did you start getting involved with the Centre for Civic Education, “Almenda,” by the way?

Mariia Sulialina: I started when I was 13 or 14. Three people created Almenda. Two of them were students at the university next to my school, and the third was my mother. She was working at that university. I have been with the organization from the beginning, but I started working actively in it in 2013.

Jacobsen: The war can be, superficially, broken down into three phases: the period before 2014; the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in the Donbas region; and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine from 2022 onward. How has Almenda’s mission evolved during each of these phases?

Sulialina: The most significant change came after 2013, because when Almenda was created in 2011 in Yalta, Crimea, we were focused on democracy, human rights, and education. We worked with schoolchildren and students. The idea was to create an active local environment of people who understood human rights and were ready to defend them.

This is why, during the events in 2013 and then in 2014, members of the organization were among the most active in the region, in our city, and in other cities—first during Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity, and then during the occupation phase.

When Crimea was occupied, it became almost impossible for us to continue our work there. Because of direct threats to the head of the organization, she had to flee even before the so-called referendum, and there were also direct threats to the organization itself. We could not continue our work or continue working directly with youth.

We had to adapt. We began working on documenting war crimes and on ensuring access to education for children, because before the occupation, this had not been an issue. After the occupation, it became one. We had many connections with students and universities. I was a student at the time. Many members of the organization were also students, so we understood the challenges students in occupied territories faced firsthand.

That is when we began working on this issue. Since 2014, we have continued working to ensure that students from occupied territories have access to Ukrainian education because we understand the value and impact of education.

We have also continued documenting war crimes, working to hold perpetrators accountable, and developing a system for reintegrating children. The longer the occupation lasts, the more challenging reintegration becomes—especially for those who were born in occupied territories.

They are now about 11 years old. When they either come to Ukraine or when the territories are liberated, it will be more challenging for them to begin living in a new reality, because they know only the truth of the occupation. The same is true for those who were very young when the occupation began—children aged six or seven. They have also spent years in the Russian educational system.

Ukraine has changed a great deal over these years, and reintegration can be challenging for them. This is why we are working to ensure that Ukraine has not only policies but also concrete instruments to help these children remain part of Ukraine.

Jacobsen: If we are talking about the change in the organization’s work after 2022, what shifted?

Sulialina: After 2022, we had to expand the focus of our work. Before, we were focused almost entirely on Crimea. When Russia occupied new territories, we saw from the beginning that the same patterns emerged in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, and earlier in parts of the Kharkiv region.

We understood that we had to expand our focus and begin both documenting what was happening there and helping children in those newly occupied territories gain access to Ukrainian education. They started facing the same challenges that children in Crimea had faced for years.

Jacobsen: Preserving the evidence, collecting it properly, and safeguarding reliable material are essential. How do you ensure that?

Sulialina: We underwent several training sessions to ensure that our evidence would be admissible in court. It is important to us that we collect evidence that can be used in legal proceedings, because one of our aims is to help Ukrainian authorities or international bodies ensure accountability for these crimes. Another critical issue for us is ensuring the right to truth, because we understand it will be essential to future reconciliation.

I cannot go into the details of how our databases work. Still, we use the Berkeley Protocol for open-source investigations. We ensure that only a limited number of people have access to this information to protect the personal data of those who provide testimony. We also ensure that the database itself is protected from different types of attacks.

A crucial part of our work is verifying information. Unfortunately, we are not able to verify all the information we collect. This is why we have some unverified material, and we acknowledge that. It is still essential for us to preserve this information, as we may later be able to verify it and determine whether it was false or accurate. Sometimes we receive firsthand information but cannot find supporting documents. We continue searching for supporting evidence, because this is part of assembling the larger puzzle needed to understand the real picture of what is happening in the occupied territories.

This is the challenge faced by all organizations working with occupied territories without direct access. We are limited in our ability to verify. After the full-scale invasion, it became unsafe for many people who remained in the occupied territories. Many fled. The same pattern we saw in Crimea is now happening in other occupied regions. Because of this, we have fewer people we can safely work with to verify information.

Another essential part of our work is ensuring that people who remain in the occupied territories are protected. They need a level of digital security awareness and personal security skills. This is why we cannot begin working with new people we do not know. We are limited in the number of trustworthy contacts we can work with inside the occupied territories. Before 2022, many of them could still travel, but now it is far more dangerous.

Many people have participated in various training programs to gain these skills. After 2022, with new occupied territories, it became almost impossible. This is why it is much harder to verify information in the occupied territories of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, as well as the newly settled parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Jacobsen: Your advocacy helped with U.N. resolutions recognizing the destruction of children’s identities in occupied Crimea and associated territories. For those who want to pursue similar advocacy at the U.N. level—whether on issues involving children or other crimes committed against groups in Ukraine—do you have any recommendations on how they should proceed? I mean, in coordinating and working with the U.N., or advocating at the U.N., in a way that is effective rather than simply speaking into the air.

Sulialina: I can share our experience, though I cannot say it will work for everyone. For us, our international partners were invaluable. We have a strong partner—the Human Rights House Foundation. They have been working at the U.N. level for a long time, so they have many personal contacts. They helped us greatly by arranging meetings and allowing us to deliver information. They also helped us draft documents in a way diplomats are accustomed to reading. This was a necessary learning process for us—understanding how things should be done and how people at that level expect to receive information.

Without such partners, the process would take far longer. In Ukraine’s case—not true for many other countries—we currently have good cooperation with the government. We are on the same side in these matters, and it becomes easier when you can also deliver information through government channels. We also have strong cooperation with the U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. They are excellent professionals, and we can provide a great deal of information through them, which then flows through the appropriate hierarchy.

There is no simple answer, but these personal connections and partnerships, especially with organizations that already have experience, are what work and what help. This is why our organization is part of the Ukraine 5 AM Coalition, which unites different groups working on war crimes and other international crimes. These organizations have various levels of experience. One of the reasons for forming the coalition was to support smaller organizations that began their work after 2022, allowing them to learn and to produce stronger documentation.

They are already doing important work, but sometimes it is essential to use the correct wording. Hence, the information reaches the right offices and can make a real difference. That is part of it.

Another example concerns our work on the indoctrination and militarization of children. Since 2014, we have focused more on education and on documenting the early signs of these practices. However, since the creation of the “Youth Army” (Yunarmiya) in 2015–2016, we have been focused explicitly on militarization. Before 2022, there were almost no sanctions and only minimal mentions in U.N. resolutions or other documents.

The full-scale invasion brought this issue into the open. The same happened with the deportation of children. Our partners had been raising the issue of child deportations since 2014. Still, there was almost no international attention to the deportation of children from Crimea. Only after 2022, when the number of deported children increased dramatically, did the issue finally receive global attention. A great deal depends, unfortunately, on political will and on changes in the situation itself.

Jacobsen: Now, there are two categories we can look at regarding children who have been deported: those numbers that have been verified, and those numbers that are still unverified or speculative, depending on the organization. Different organizations or state actors can give different numbers. What are the realistic, verified numbers of children who have been deported, and what are the speculative numbers outside those verifications? In other words, what is the realistic range?

Sulialina: First of all, our organization does not work directly on the issue of deported children. This is why I do not have deep inside information on this. From what we know, the officially claimed number—around 20,000 children—is the one that can be documented.

When official bodies or experts cite a higher number, the actual number may be higher. But the issue is that none of us have access to the occupied territories, and Russia does not provide any lists. This is why the question of how many children were deported remains open. Sometimes children are deported together with their families, which makes it difficult to identify them in Russian registries for children without parental care. This contributes to the speculation.

For this issue, it would be much better to speak with, for example, the Regional Centre for Human Rights or SAFE Ukraine—organizations that have been working specifically on this matter for many years.

Jacobsen: Now, from your own experience, you started when you were an adolescent. Do you find that the grief, the difficulties, and the demands of this work, continuing now into your late twenties, have given you a more informed, experiential understanding of the process of documenting what is happening to these children?

Sulialina:  To clarify, I was not working in Almenda when I was 15. I have experience working in other organizations. I was working in human rights organizations, but from different angles. So it is difficult to say whether the work itself influenced me in that way.

The primary influence was the occupation of Crimea. When you see what is happening—and at that time, I was 17 or 18, relatively young, trying to figure out what I wanted to do with my life—and then such a massive injustice happens, it absolutely influences your decisions about your future. It gives an enormous boost to professional growth. That had the most significant impact.

And because I am a person from the occupied territories, I want to give children who are there the opportunity to decide for themselves what they want to do with their lives, instead of what is happening now, where Russia is deciding for them by militarizing and indoctrinating them.

But it is essential to understand that my personal feelings do not influence my professional expertise. For me, it is always necessary to refine information, look into the details, and understand why something is happening, rather than to create Ukrainian propaganda. Unfortunately, we also see some media outlets in Ukraine producing stories with no foundation.

By my first education, I am a historian, so all these facts and how they work are essential to me to ensure this will not happen again. We see history repeat itself, and it is necessary to ensure that, after victory, we do not see a new cycle of repetition. This is why I said earlier that one of the reasons our organization documents events, produces analytical materials, and works with teachers and students is to guarantee the right to truth. In 50 or 100 years, there should be no doubt about what happened during this period and what the facts were. Future historians will make their own determinations, but at the very least, we can gather information and evidence on which they can base those conclusions.

Jacobsen: A Romanian colleague told me that Russia, throughout its last 300 years of history, has invaded Romania about thirteen times. To your point—and to your expertise as a historian—that was a lot. So what would justice look like for these children? Reparations, accountability, and so on.

Sulialina: We can discuss what justice looks like for children who have already arrived in Ukraine and can tell their stories. For them, justice is the possibility of returning home freely. It is the recognition of what happened and that Russia did this to them. For those who lost families or homes, justice includes reparations.

But none of us know what justice means for children who remain in the occupied territories. This is a question we will need to answer in the future, because we do not have access to these territories. When we talk about Crimea and parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, we have not spoken to these children for eleven years. The number of children from these territories currently enrolled in the Ukrainian educational system is so small that it does not reflect the broader picture.

So this is a huge question—what justice means to them and what they want. I do not have the answer. I can imagine possible answers based on what we hear from those who are already in Ukraine, but not for those who remain in the occupied territories and who, because they are children or were children at the time, never could decide for themselves. Their parents made the decisions, and now they are living in a situation where they are essentially captive to the occupation and have no real influence over their own lives.

Jacobsen: What difficulties do the children face as they come out—whether after a year or after a decade or more—in terms of reintegration?

Sulialina: Now we can say that many of the difficulties are similar for children from territories occupied since 2022 and since 2014, because even three years is a long time to be under a system of indoctrination and militarization. The difficulties they face include psychological trauma. It is hard for them to understand what is true and what is false because the internet was blocked; they had no access to independent information, and Russian propaganda is effective. We cannot say these are unprepared or low-quality materials—the textbooks, materials, and methodological guides.

The recommendation materials for teachers, the video materials—they are all professionally produced. They work at a deep level to shape beliefs rather than simply present information. This is not just propaganda; it is a post-truth reality. When children are in that environment for an extended period, it becomes difficult for them to understand what is happening.

At the same time, they are afraid to ask questions because they fear that asking questions will make them appear as enemies. This is another barrier they face in the reintegration process.

Another issue for younger children, especially those who have been in an occupation for eleven years, is the language barrier. They have no opportunity to learn Ukrainian in the occupied territories, so they lose the language. Some territories were Russian-speaking before, but Ukraine is becoming increasingly Ukrainian-speaking. This creates additional difficulties for reintegration, and in some cases, these children face discrimination or bullying in schools because of it. This varies by region, but it can be a significant issue.

They also do not understand the legal framework in Ukraine, especially those who have been under occupation since 2014. They lack experience with straightforward systems for children who grew up in government-controlled territory.

A massive barrier for children is the lack of documents. Without passports, it is tough for them to return to Ukraine. For those who have passports but do not have educational documents, the situation is easier. For those who have a Ukrainian birth certificate, it is also easier. But for those who were born in occupied territories and do not have a Ukrainian birth certificate, it is almost impossible to enter Ukraine. The only documents they have are Russian passports, and verifying their identity is difficult.

Even Ukrainian birth certificates do not include photographs or other identifying information, and these children are not present in Ukrainian state registries that could confirm their identities. So, when we assist children from Crimea in entering Ukrainian universities, this becomes their primary challenge—they cannot enter the country.

Jacobsen: Knowing what an occupied territory is—people internationally may know Kyiv, and they certainly know Crimea since 2014—how does that experience feel to you? Maybe I should ask it in two parts. How did it feel at the time, and how do you think looking back now?

Sulialina: You mean how it feels being in the occupied territory?

Jacobsen: Yes—the experience of being in the occupied territory, then having to leave home, and now looking back many years later.

Sulialina: It will not be a short answer, because Crimea was occupied in 2014, and I left Crimea in 2014. I was… I missed Crimea, and back then, it was still possible to go there.

At the beginning, it was the feeling of leaving your home, but your home still being the same. The last time I was in Crimea before COVID was when my grandmother died, and I returned to bury her. You come to Crimea, which the Russians had already colonized. There is another language. There are portraits of Putin on the roads from Simferopol to Yalta, along with all these paintings and symbols and everything.

And the people in the city changed. Many pro-Ukrainian residents left, while many Russians from Russia arrived in the town. You are in your own city, but it no longer feels like home because it has changed so much. This is part of Russian policy—to create an environment in which Ukrainians leave the territory and Russians move in.

The Regional Centre for Human Rights has an excellent report about the colonization of Crimea. They examined different colonization programs—how the system is structured, and how programs were created to both reshape the environment and encourage the deportation of Ukrainians from Crimea.

I cannot say that I miss home now. I was missing home in 2015, but unfortunately, I saw what had happened to it. My colleagues who were placed on blocklists and have not been able to visit home for eleven years still miss it, because they only have bright memories and have not seen what it looks like in reality now. That changes the feeling completely.

I still keep in contact with people from my hometown. They sometimes send me videos from the sea or from the Azalea nature areas. Of course, it is a place I miss, but I understand that returning home will be pretty tricky.

Even with those we remain in contact with, we have lived very different realities for all these years. It will be a process for us to find a shared vision for how our region should develop. They are not pro-Russian, they do not support Russia, but they have a completely different experience of the war. They lived the war in occupation. They became adults in their occupation. They started families in occupation. Some gave birth during the occupation.

This will make returning more complicated, and the same will happen in all regions where people were forced to leave and will eventually return. The same will happen in Ukraine when people who went abroad return. We also have different experiences of the war—those of us who lived under shelling and those who lived in safe European countries. We have different experiences and different visions for the future.

Sometimes internal conflicts arise, including over who is “more Ukrainian.” Unfortunately, we already see these conflicts. This is a challenge for all human rights organizations, for the government, and for society as a whole—regardless of the specific issue we work on—because we must preserve unity among people and find the shared values that hold us together.

A great deal depends on this—the future of the country and its ability to recover in every way: economically, demographically, and socially, because we are struggling on all levels.

Jacobsen: Mariia, thank you for your time today. I appreciate it. 

Sulialina: Thank you. Have a good day.

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