Everywhere Insiders 25: Witkoff, Yermak, and the Geopolitics of Corruption

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/12/08

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Irina Tsukerman about Steve Witkoff’s leaked coaching of Russian officials on how to pitch Trump a Ukraine “peace plan,” and the parallel resignation of Andriy Yermak, Zelenskyy’s powerful chief of staff. Tsukerman frames Yermak’s fall as evidence of Ukraine’s growing judicial independence, contrasting it with entrenched corruption in Russia and slower, institutionalized rot in the United States. She argues Witkoff’s conflicts of interest and recklessness merit investigation, then examines a National Guard killing used to justify sweeping immigration reviews, and Russian recruitment of foreign fighters amid coups and instability in Guinea-Bissau and across Africa.

Interview conducted November 28, 2025.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Steve Witkoff is a high-ranking American official. For those not familiar with American politics, he was coaching Russian officials on how to speak to Trump, and more than that. This was leaked, and it became a scandal. The more interesting part is the gaslighting—the inversion happening—where people are not calling the person who engaged in potentially traitorous behavior a traitor, but instead are calling the people who exposed him traitors for revealing sensitive information about what they are calling a peace plan for negotiations.  It’s been a convoluted journey. On a separate note, you may want to edit this later: Yermak just resigned. It’s huge. It just broke. So, who just resigned?

Irina Tsukerman: Andriy Yermak. He’s Zelenskyy’s chief of staff.

Jacobsen: Yes, I saw that. I saw that on Twitter.

Tsukerman: The story is actually bigger.

Jacobsen: They were conducting investigations into his corruption, and anti-corruption officers went to his home.

Tsukerman: Yes, they did. But the story is bigger than it appears, because many people do not realize what a crucial role Yermak has played in the administration. Some have accused him of effectively controlling access to Zelenskyy and wielding outsized influence over major decisions. He is widely regarded as one of Zelenskyy’s closest confidants and political gatekeepers. Even when U.S. officials tried to sideline him or keep him out of high-level meetings in Washington, he still managed to insert himself into nearly every major negotiation. This is the level of influence we are talking about, and it is now officially gone.

Jacobsen: Within a Ukrainian context, what does this mean within Ukrainian political culture? My understanding is that Ukraine is a dignity-based culture. So exposure like this—the investigations, the corruption, and the abuse of influence—feels undignified.

Tsukerman: Yes and no. It is actually a very positive sign for the independence of the judiciary and the broader system of checks and balances in Ukraine. It shows a serious dedication to combating corruption at all levels, and that no one is too powerful to be held accountable. Even if this creates temporary embarrassment for Zelenskyy, the fact that he did not stand in the way of these investigations and accepted Yermak’s resignation will ultimately reflect positively on him and counter accusations that he is a wannabe dictator or inherently corrupt—accusations heavily pushed by Russian propaganda. Nothing like this would happen in Russia. Anyone who falls under Putin falls because Putin removes them, not because an independent anti-corruption body is scrutinizing them.

This sends a powerful and positive message to the international community, and I believe it will be seen that way by most people, except perhaps Yermak’s personal loyalists. From what I understand, he was not universally well liked and had created many political enemies. I do not think he will be greatly missed, nor do I think this will reflect poorly on Zelenskyy. If anything, it helps clear Zelenskyy’s name from guilt by association.

Regarding dignity culture, the corruption scandal itself was the damaging and undignified part. After all the efforts Ukrainians have put into gaining Western support, building trust, and restructuring society after Soviet and Russian influence, the fact that authorities are finally targeting the real decision-makers behind a major corruption scheme shows that the reforms have been real, not cosmetic. There is certainly a possibility that Yermak will try to exert influence behind the scenes, but it will be much harder without public visibility or an official post.

Jacobsen: We always have to keep this in consideration. How does this compare to the current phase of American corruption? How does this compare to the current phase of corruption in the Russian Federation?

Tsukerman: There is definitely a difference with the United States. In the U.S., the corruption we are seeing has accumulated over time at the highest political levels from multiple political elements—both Democrats and Republicans—but for the most part it was limited to political insiders and party functionaries. It has not reached the extremes seen in many post-Soviet states, which were penetrated top to bottom for decades. That is not to say that political corruption in the U.S. does not have corrosive effects; it absolutely does. I just think it takes longer to metastasize, because until relatively recently there were effective mechanisms to expose corruption and make it unacceptable to the public.

There have also been efforts—uneven, but real—to combat major fraud and abuses of public trust at the institutional level. That said, the mixture of foreign malign influence and corrupt domestic political actors insinuating themselves into the system with growing success over the past couple of decades has certainly escalated certain forms of corruption. But even so, Ukraine has had a much harder time. The Soviet legacy and years of Moscow’s meddling took an all-of-society toll, whereas in the U.S. these influences arrived gradually and penetrated the system far more slowly and inconsistently.

With Russia, there isn’t even an attempt to reject that legacy. Moscow and Kyiv emerged from the Soviet era in similar conditions, but over the decades the trajectories diverged sharply. Russia, if anything, moved backward. There was a brief period when all post-Soviet states faced chaotic economic transitions dominated by oligarchs. But some countries chose to move toward Western-style governance and pursue reforms, while others—like Russia—embraced corruption and authoritarianism. We saw that not only under Putin’s rule but also in the way he was brought to power.

In Ukraine, Russia’s attempt to install a puppet regime—through a combination of Russian influence and allied local oligarchs—resulted in the 2014 Maidan Revolution, when Yanukovych was ousted. That was not the end of corruption, but it was a powerful signal that the country was unwilling to remain in Russia’s sphere of influence or in the corrupt system that had defined society for so many years. At one point, Ukraine was considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world. It has been steadily moving away from that status and toward economic freedom, political pluralism, and genuine anti-corruption efforts.

The path is difficult—reforming anything deeply entrenched always is—but Ukraine is making a genuine effort, and the results are visible. More importantly, public desire to break with the corrupt past is unmistakably strong. Just speaking with ordinary Ukrainians makes that clear.

In Russia, by contrast, many people are resigned. They believe nothing will ever change. They have a nihilistic attitude toward corruption, and many would not know what to do with genuine political and economic freedom even if it were handed to them—as it essentially was in the 1990s, when many were not equipped to take advantage of it.

The depth of corruption in Russia is also worse because its authoritarian and corrupt governance structures stretch back centuries, long before the Soviet Union. Ukraine, meanwhile, has had nationalist movements, different historical struggles, and long periods in which its development diverged sharply from Russia’s. That historical culture shapes the mindset with which people confront political realities in the long term.

Jacobsen: So what is his officially established background, if anything new has emerged, and what does it say about American–Russian Federation relations? Also, as a historical point, how might prior American presidents or administrations have viewed this?

Tsukerman: Quite frankly, anyone bringing in someone like Witkoff—who, in some ways, appears to have been effectively sanctioned by Trump to do what he was doing—would be raising enormous national-security concerns. At the very least, it is reasonable to infer that Witkoff assumed the ultimate result would please Trump or align with what Trump was willing to accept as an outcome.

If I have to read his thinking, I believe Witkoff genuinely thought that by coaching the Russians on how to present this deal, he was helping ensure that the peace plan Trump supposedly wanted so badly would actually succeed. And I think he sincerely believed that. He foolishly believed, in my view, that Putin’s main obstacle to success was simply his inability to restrain himself in how he spoke publicly—either to Trump or about the situation—and that if Putin only behaved differently, the outcome would be far more successful.

Witkoff does not seem to understand that Putin is a fundamentally different political creature from Trump, and that Putin has absolutely no intention of ending the war. He is using the war as a tactical distraction from his own failings, from Russia’s current economic and military difficulties, and there is no more effective diversion for him than creating a constant spectacle that includes embarrassing the United States, generating endless political arguments, diplomatic dead ends, and the chaotic public debates we’ve been seeing.

However, none of that excuses the fact that Witkoff himself has been deeply compromised. He has a major conflict of interest—not only regarding U.S. national security and political interests, but even within Trump’s own political sphere. At some point he should have asked himself whether his actions actually served the president well, and whether any of this would reflect well on Trump if it were ever made public. Clearly, he never believed any of it would leak. He was reckless in his communications—so reckless that, in my opinion, it warrants a congressional investigation, and not only by Congress but also by relevant security agencies.

This is not the first time something like this has happened with him, and he continued the same pattern of careless communication, undermining whatever result he hoped to achieve—never mind the broader consequences for everyone else. He clearly prioritized whatever personal advantage he believed he could gain over any other consideration.

In my view, he was conflicted from the very beginning—because of his extensive business interests in Russia and his ongoing deal-making even as the U.S. was struggling with a politically explosive situation. He also appears to be in conflict with the administration itself in terms of achieving its stated goals.

Tsukerman: I do not think even Trump’s goals—naive and politically unpalatable as they may be to many—were served well by the way any of this was handled. Even Trump should now be asking very serious questions about where Witkoff’s loyalties actually lie. Is he truly serving the president’s interests, or is he serving the business side of the relationship he cultivated by being close to the president?

He had business contacts in Russia even before being appointed to his position, but he is undoubtedly benefiting far more from being affiliated with Trump than he ever did operating on his own. In that sense, there is a conflict of loyalties—national and personal. It possibly goes as far as functioning not merely as an agent for a foreign power, but potentially providing classified information. I have no idea how far it actually goes. If he shared classified information, that would be a violation of the Espionage Act. It would be morally treasonous. I do not know if it would rise to the level of constitutional high treason; I am not an expert on that aspect, and the standard has rarely been applied in U.S. history.

His extremely poor judgment may eventually overshadow even his motivations. He may genuinely believe he is not harming the United States, but he also likely does not care enough to think it through. His ego is overwhelming. It is difficult to assess his motivations at this point, but it is clear the result has been nothing but destructive—both for the administration in its limited goals and for broader U.S. strategic interests.

Jacobsen: Anything else on the Witkoff point?

Tsukerman: I would add that Witkoff himself did not surprise me. Nothing he did was unexpected. His behavior was remarkably similar to another figure who faded into obscurity and then resurfaced around some of the people linked to Chuck Carlson—I am referring to Rob Malley.

Rob Malley served in the Obama and Biden administrations and became the U.S. Special Envoy for Iran. Under Biden, he ended up under investigation for mishandling classified information and allegedly providing sensitive material to individuals connected to the Iranian regime because he believed it would help achieve a new nuclear deal. He lost his security clearance and was removed from his position, but he did not face trial or imprisonment. He still lectures at Ivy League universities in the U.S.

Witkoff is very comparable to Malley, with one crucial difference. Malley was highly ideological—deeply aligned with Iran and deeply committed to pursuing a deal. Witkoff is not ideological at all. He is much more of a mercenary, an opportunist. I do not think he has any ideological sympathies in this matter whatsoever.

Jacobsen: Alright, so there was a National Guard shooting—actually two—by an individual who has been identified as Afghan. After the incident, the political fallout included Trump claiming he would end federal benefits for non-citizens, pursuing plans to denaturalize migrants, undermining domestic tranquility, and framing the Afghan immigrant as having entered the U.S. under a Biden-era program. Trump is now calling for “reverse migration” to reduce the legal immigrant population. This is a lot happening at once, and it is tied not to institutions but to ideological policy, especially visible under ICE. What are your thoughts on this?

Tsukerman: The incident is horrific in many ways. The young National Guard member who died was only 20. Some argue she should not have been there in the first place, because a judge recently ruled that Trump had to withdraw all National Guard units from Washington, D.C. I was there at the time—not at the scene, but nearby—and many noted that the Guard did not serve any meaningful security role. Yes, they took part in some arrests, but it is unclear whether those arrests were pursued afterward, or how many were constitutional in the first place, given that military forces were detaining civilians. Most of the time they were walking around helping people with directions or collecting trash. All of that is well-intentioned, but not a good use of U.S. resources. It is entirely possible that had she remained at her original posting, none of this would have happened.

What we know about the suspect is that he traveled across the country specifically to target National Guard members. There is evidence supporting that he sought them out deliberately. Because they were deployed in a public space in D.C. rather than on a secure military base, they were much easier to reach. They were in plain view near the White House in a highly visible location. How he knew they would be stationed at that exact site is not yet clear. It is also unclear why he was so enraged at the National Guard specifically. Some information suggests he may have had a mental health crisis.

We know from his background that he had been embedded in CIA-linked frameworks in Afghanistan and had participated in U.S.-backed operations since the age of 11. That is extraordinarily young to be exposed to violence and paramilitary activity. By the time he left Afghanistan in 2021, he held a local commander-level position. We also know the Trump administration—surprisingly—approved his asylum case earlier this year. There is no record so far of him making political demands on the Biden administration, the Trump administration, or any other branch of the U.S. government. So if there is a direct political link between his actions and his past experiences, it has not been revealed.

There was no clear political messaging at the scene. He was not shouting political slogans or terrorist rhetoric. It is understandable that authorities suspect a terrorist motive, given that he targeted U.S. military personnel. That assumption is not unreasonable. But if he had any history of radicalization, it is still under investigation and has not been made public.

Former intelligence officers familiar with similar operations have pointed out that cultural and linguistic barriers often make it difficult for U.S. intelligence agencies to assess the reliability of their assets. Sometimes agencies place trust in the wrong people, or conflicts arise that never get resolved due to cultural misunderstandings—not because a person is extremist or switching loyalties, but because they had employment-related disputes or irreconcilable differences.

It is possible there were red flags that were hard to detect. It may also have been very difficult to anticipate the kind of breakdown that occurred.

What we do know is that Trump used the incident as justification to order a review of all green-card holders from 19 countries. That is an enormous number of people. It is unclear who exactly will conduct these reviews, because many ICE personnel are not experts in cultural or linguistic interpretation, extremism assessment, or counterterrorism analysis. Yes, it is plausible that some individuals with fraudulent backgrounds or criminal history will be identified through this process. But there is also a strong likelihood of misinterpretation and personal bias, because ICE is not equipped to evaluate these cases properly, and the administration is placing clear pressure on personnel to deport as many people as possible—even lawful permanent residents.

We are seeing a process that might appear reasonable on paper, given that the previous administration did not always exercise sound judgment in migration vetting. But in practice it is likely to be highly politicized, unreliable, and vulnerable to error—especially when applied so broadly and under intense political pressure.

Jacobsen: There was a coup attempt in Guinea-Bissau. There are serious developments in Nigeria that are frankly chaotic. And of course Sudan remains a major crisis. Well, this actually connects to the research we were talking about. Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, the daughter of former South African president Jacob Zuma, resigned from parliament amid allegations that she lured 17 men to fight for Russia in Ukraine.

Tsukerman: Yes, I saw that. It was astonishing. I am very curious how that arrangement came about. Russian oligarchs have significant influence within the ANC and across South Africa more broadly. Some of them have direct access to the mining sector, which is dominated by powerful families with deep political ties.

I am sure she was not doing this for free. She was either acting as a government-connected intermediary or she was being paid—or otherwise incentivized—to recruit fighters. Whether 17 is a large number or a small one depends on how long she had been doing it and what sort of people she targeted. But it certainly indicates a sustained pattern of activity and a willingness to participate in recruitment networks.

It also tells us something about Russia: they do not have enough qualified manpower for the war in Ukraine or their other foreign operations. They are stretched thin. Yes, Russia’s population is much larger than Ukraine’s, but even with those demographics, a substantial portion of the available population is not militarily viable.

Russia’s population is significantly larger than Ukraine’s, but even with that advantage a large portion of the Russian population is de facto unqualified for military service. Many have health issues, substance-addiction problems, criminal records, or are still incarcerated. There are countless reasons why someone may not be fit for the military. Even if Russia wanted to mobilize more people, it cannot simply conscript everyone—someone still has to work, maintain the economy, and keep basic infrastructure functioning. The Kremlin also has to avoid tipping the country into total internal instability. Public dissatisfaction with mounting casualties will eventually grow and create serious problems for the regime.

For strategic reasons, supplementing Russia’s existing forces—particularly units disproportionately drawn from ethnic minority regions—with foreign fighters makes sense from Moscow’s perspective. It minimizes domestic political backlash by shifting casualties away from ethnic Russians. It is easiest to recruit from relatively friendly countries where education levels are low, crime rates are high, economic conditions are poor, and where people tend to trust government officials. That environment makes individuals easier to manipulate. Once these men leave, no one back home has the power to complain. Surprisingly, Jordan did protest after two Jordanian nationals were killed in action, and Jordan formally demanded that Russia stop recruiting its citizens. That was extremely embarrassing for Moscow.

Jacobsen: The general in Guinea-Bissau was attempting to oust the president with support from some parts of Senegal. Any quick thoughts on that?

Tsukerman: I find it shocking how quickly this coup unfolded. The international community did not have time to react. The general announced he was taking power without offering any meaningful explanation, and he is already being received by leaders in other African countries as though this were a normal and legitimate transition. The political culture in the region is different, but the global context matters too. International attention is consumed by multiple major wars and political crises. People are not paying attention to developments that normally would provoke widespread outrage.

When the coups occurred in Mali and other West African states, there was intense public scrutiny and debate. Now, it is not that coups have become commonplace, but priorities have shifted. There is far less patience and far less willingness to investigate internal political upheavals—so long as they do not dramatically disrupt regional relations or threaten foreign commercial and military interests. If this general does not start expelling foreign companies or militaries, he may end up gaining a degree of international legitimacy simply because the world is overwhelmed.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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