Fighting Corruption in Wartime Ukraine: An Interview With Andrii Borovyk

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/09/12

Andrii Borovyk, Executive Director of Transparency International Ukraine, speaks on corruption, transparency, and democratic resilience during the Russian–Ukrainian war with Scott Douglas Jacobsen. Borovyk outlines how even low-level corruption undermines wartime procurement, trust, and international support. He highlights scandals, such as the “eggs scandal,” which led to reforms in military procurement, and stresses the importance of watchdog NGOs, civil society, and independent journalism. Borovyk explains the unique challenges of maintaining transparency in aid, the push for EU integration, and the risks faced by whistleblowers and activists. Despite the war, Ukraine continues to implement reforms, striving to balance emergency powers with democratic accountability.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Today, we are speaking with Andrii Borovyk, the Executive Director of Transparency International Ukraine. We conducted one interview previously for the second book project with Oleksandr Kalitenko. To set the tone: there was a red-carpet welcome for Vladimir Putin during his summit with President Donald Trump in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15, 2025. What is your general view of the Trump administration and how it has presented itself in terms of U.S.–Russia relations, and how do you think this reflects on its stance toward U.S.–Ukraine relations?

Andrii Borovyk: At present, U.S.–Ukraine relations lack sustainability and predictability. I believe this is a common challenge many countries face in dealing with the U.S. administration. Although President Trump says he wants to end the war, they do not appear to recognize that leaders like Putin must be fought—you cannot make a deal with them. Providing support to Ukraine is the way the war can be ended, not by doing business with an aggressor. That is how the situation is viewed from Kyiv.

In the last three or four months, there have been some indications, based on public statements, of a more realistic approach. However, the most recent comments—when asked about the August 28, 2025, attack on Kyiv, which killed at least 23 people—were disappointing. The response was essentially: “Look, but they are bombing oil plants.” How can one compare striking oil infrastructure that funds aggression with bombing residential buildings? You cannot, if you understand what is happening.

Still, I retain a small hope that strategic interests remain. The question is how Ukraine can persuade this administration to view the war from a different, more human and democratic perspective.

Jacobsen: How does corruption—even at low levels—affect wartime procurement, logistics, and spending?

Borovyk: In general terms, even low-level corruption—minor procedural violations or kickbacks—can have catastrophic consequences in wartime. War is costly, so efficiency is essential. Prices surge in short timeframes. There have been numerous cases, including in Ukraine over the past three years, where organizations and businesses tried to help procure weapons for Ukraine.

Artificially high prices arise because there are too many competing interests in a globally scarce market. Inflation is also reflected in inflated costs, making everything appear more expensive. Corruption can cause delays in deliveries, result in the use of poor-quality equipment, and lead to the inefficient use of available equipment.

Of course, corruption during wartime also affects how the country is perceived as a trustworthy partner by those working with us. The loss of trust and any dishonest use of funds can undermine both foreign support and domestic mobilization of resources.

Jacobsen: What are the relevant safeguards for ensuring transparency in international aid and military support?

Borovyk: When it comes to military support, it is not very easy. If we were only talking about civilian aid—money to keep the country running—it would be easier, because that information does not need to be classified. However, with military support, details such as prices, quantities, and supply routes cannot be published in open registers. Doing so would immediately expose to the enemy how weapons are being delivered to Ukraine.

In this case, the solution lies in specific and concrete procedures between those providing the military aid and those receiving it. Independent auditors from both the donor and recipient states should be present at all times. The only information that can be reported publicly should be shared jointly by both sides, taking security risks into account. Based on such disclosures, some public analysis can then be done.

This is why we continue to say in Ukraine that reforms must continue despite the war. The state needs to remain efficient and strong—not only for its own citizens and services, but also to be more effective in managing aid and in securing additional support from international partners.

Jacobsen: What have been the major procurement scandals and lessons learned since the start of the Russian–Ukrainian war?

Borovyk: Some issues are deliberate, while others are accidental—such as errors in accounting or implementation. However, yes, there have been scandals. The most infamous was the procurement of overpriced food and equipment by the Ministry of Defence during the tenure of the first minister after the full-scale invasion began. Journalists uncovered and published this information.

It became widely known as the “eggs scandal” in Ukraine, because one of the listed food items—eggs—was priced at a level considered absurd. The key lesson was that when something connected to the military is brought into the public eye, it can provide leverage and an opportunity to reform the sector.

As a result of that scandal, the minister was dismissed. A new agency was established to handle non-lethal procurement for the military. This agency now operates under transparent rules. Today, anyone can go online and see how many socks, how much food, and at what prices these items have been purchased for the military.

This is actually an example of when a corruption scandal helped fix systems at the governmental level. However, this was also due to the swift reaction of civil society and the media. That is why freedom of speech and a vibrant civil society are so important—sometimes to prevent corruption, and at other times to investigate and expose it, so that the government can address the problem.

Jacobsen: What about relevant legal mechanisms or structural oversight that may be necessary for large-scale donations? For example, when donations reach a certain threshold, would additional legal mechanisms be necessary?

Borovyk: If we are talking about donations in general—not military donations—then in the Ukrainian context, this reminds me of the ongoing discussions about reconstruction support. In Ukraine, the approach has been to maximize transparency. However, transparency is not simply about publishing a large number of documents; it is about building effective systems that facilitate transparency.

That is why civil society proposed, and the government is now developing, an online platform where all public investment projects can be tracked, including those funded by foreign partners. Soon, anyone—even a partner in Denmark, the United States, or Canada—will be able to see how reconstruction funds are being spent, the amounts allocated, and the progress of construction projects. Transparency combined with digitalization can make a real difference.

The second point is to provide civil society with sufficient tools for oversight. The third is ensuring transparent tenders for spending these donations. Ukraine is unique in this regard because even during the war, our national public procurement system continues to function. With just a few clicks—even on a smartphone—you can see numerous tenders and procurements conducted online. This level of transparency and oversight is rare under wartime conditions.

The other critical element is accountability. Oversight is not only about transparency but also about ensuring responsibility in the use of funds. That is why Ukraine needs continued reforms, especially to strengthen our audit institutions. At the governmental level, we have two audit bodies—one under the government and one under the parliament. These require a greater capacity to track potential misuse of funds and, when necessary, alert law enforcement to open cases.

Large-scale donations should be based on three pillars: transparency, civil society oversight, and robust audit institutions with enforcement powers.

Jacobsen: A question that is often on people’s minds is how Ukraine compares to other major wars in the last few decades in terms of transparency, corruption, and governance. In Canada, for example, media coverage focuses heavily on Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Palestine, with only occasional references to conflicts in Iran, Sudan, or Ethiopia. However, there are at least 15 major active wars worldwide. It is important to have a broader perspective. Three years ago, most questions centred on corruption in Ukraine’s weapons procurement, because there had been so much corruption in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Borovyk: I have always said that Ukraine cannot even be compared to Iraq or Afghanistan. Ukraine is a functioning state. From the beginning of the full-scale war, and even now, we have demonstrated that we are not falling apart. We remain a state, we remain a member of the United Nations, and our institutions continue to function. While I do not claim deep knowledge of every other conflict, what makes me proud is how Ukraine has managed this war internally.

In school and university, we were taught that in wartime, the media disappears, the government controls everything, there is no free speech, and everything is classified. However, this has not been the case in Ukraine. We have maintained relatively high levels of openness even during wartime. For example, our public procurement system has continued operating. At the very beginning of the war, competitive tenders were suspended and replaced with direct contracts. However, by June or July 2022—just four months later—the government reopened competitive selection processes in more and more sectors, as it understood that this approach saved money by achieving better prices.

We also continue to have independent media. Yes, there are occasional reports of law enforcement pressuring investigative journalists; however, Ukraine generally has an independent and active journalism sector. Starting at the end of 2022, an unwritten pact between government and civil society—whereby journalists would not criticize authorities while the war was raging—was broken. Since then, investigative reporting has flourished, producing many critical stories. That sets Ukraine apart.

In addition, our anti-corruption institutions remain active. A scandal at the end of July demonstrated that Ukraine’s political life is very much alive. Politicians, like those in many countries, often do not favour anti-corruption bodies, but civil society pushes back, and people even protest in the streets to defend them. This resilience impresses observers.

These examples provide Ukraine with an opportunity to become a model of combining wartime needs with ongoing reform. What also makes us unique is that, while fighting a war, Ukraine applied for European Union membership and is now carrying the responsibilities of moving toward integration. There is no precedent for a country applying to join such a major political and economic union while simultaneously conducting a war and pursuing reforms.

Reforms are difficult even in peacetime. Attempting them during war is extraordinarily hard. That is the defining challenge—and also the defining difference—of Ukraine’s current context.

Jacobsen: Reforms are difficult in regular times. Try them during bombings. Let me move to my next question: How can democratic institutions balance emergency powers with democratic accountability? This is a nuanced issue that is not always easy to thread.

Borovyk: Yes, and your question is fundamental. Over the past three years, I have noticed that many people, including politicians, often misunderstand what this means. They often say: “We are at war, so we need to be more flexible. We need to concentrate power and make quick decisions.” Moreover, sometimes someone will respond: “But this is not democratic.”

Democracy is not simply about whether power is concentrated or not; it is also about how power is distributed. Democracy is about checks and balances. If proper checks and balances are in place, then concentration of power can still be acceptable during wartime. The balance between emergency powers and democracy can be achieved through an active role of parliament. In Ukraine, however, our parliament is not always as active as it should be—but ideally it should play a stronger role.

Independent media, anti-corruption bodies, and civil society organizations also help balance concentrated power. Another factor that helps Ukraine is European integration. The lengthy list of conditions attached to EU support, along with the even longer list of reforms required for integration, imposes accountability on the government. These are legal obligations we must implement, and they help ensure Ukraine remains a democratic country despite the war.

Jacobsen: What about the legal frameworks for seizing and repurposing frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s recovery? Moreover, perhaps the process itself is also a factor, as people often hear about asset seizures but may not fully understand how they work.

Borovyk: That is a good question. I cannot provide a detailed legal answer here—I can offer a more technical paper later through our legal team. However, politically, I can say this: over the last three years, I have discussed the seizure of Russian assets with many European and U.S. politicians, both when they visited Kyiv and when I travelled abroad.

The answer I usually hear is not legal but political. They say: “We cannot do this, because if we seize Russian assets now, then, for example, China could do the same with our assets held there.” My response is that they are applying peacetime thinking to a wartime problem. That approach does not work.

Can you imagine, for example, during the German invasion of France, a French politician allowing German companies to keep operating in France? Of course not—they would have been immediately confiscated for the sake of France. That is the logic we are facing today. In Ukraine, such confiscations are possible, but in Europe, they are still not permitted. However, this is the 21st century. If Ukraine falls, Russian troops will be at the European Union’s border. If Europe wants to prevent this, it needs to seize Russian assets and redistribute them to sustain the war effort—keeping the fighting one thousand kilometres from the EU border, rather than two kilometres. That is my answer. If you would like more specifics, I can have my legal team prepare the necessary materials.

Jacobsen: How are NGOs and watchdogs, such as Transparency International Ukraine, helping to monitor corruption risks? 

Borovyk: NGOs and watchdogs play a critical role. Our primary function is to shed light on corruption risks, highlight specific problems, and draw attention to them so they cannot be overlooked.

In our case, we also monitor public procurement contracts. Over the last year, we terminated contracts worth more than $15 million across various sectors. These were contracts where we identified violations. We raised the issue—sometimes publicly, privately—and as a result, the contracts were cancelled.

Also, thanks to our applications and oversight, more than 40 criminal cases related to public procurement were opened last year. That is one side of our work—pure watchdogging. On the other hand, NGOs in Ukraine, including ours, often collaborate with the government to support reforms and close corruption loopholes.

In this sense, Ukrainian NGOs often act as a single large think tank, identifying problems and proposing solutions to mitigate corruption risks. Moreover, when there are attacks on anti-corruption institutions—which we believe are functioning effectively and producing results—we stand against those efforts, both publicly and privately. So yes, that is what we do. However, Ukrainian NGOs are not only watchdogs; we like to say we are also “do-dogs.”

Jacobsen: How can whistleblowers protect themselves, and how can institutions protect whistleblowers, investigative journalists, and activists during conflict?

Borovyk: This is precisely why reforms are necessary—so that governmental institutions have both the capacity and authority to protect. Some protections already exist on paper: authorities must provide anonymity and shield whistleblowers from retaliation. There are also several mechanisms designed to protect them. Sasha has spoken about this extensively.

Journalists are covered under the media law, which protects their sources. For activists, however, it is more difficult. There is no specific legislation to safeguard them. In general, for all these groups, international support mechanisms, public advocacy, and pressure from international partners can protect once an issue becomes public.

Those who speak the truth during war are literally saving lives, not threatening them. In Ukraine, this does not always work perfectly, but when scandals arise—such as cases of pressure against activists or journalists—strong public attention and reactions from international supporters significantly increase the chances that such attacks will fail.

Jacobsen: What about reputational harassment, doxing, or delegitimization?

Borovyk: Yes, this happens as well. That is why every nation must cultivate critical thinking among its people. In Ukraine, this is important because such harassment often appears on Telegram—a platform widely used in the region. There, you can find black PR campaigns targeting activists. The only absolute protection is telling the truth, because lies eventually collapse under scrutiny and often appear absurd in comparison to facts.

Jacobsen: That resonates with our experience in Canada as well. At the start of the full-scale war, Russia spread false narratives about Ukraine being run by neo-Nazis. Those claims faded over time, partly because they were so obviously false. The irony was apparent: Ukraine’s president was both Jewish and a former comedian. It was, unintentionally, the perfect punchline to Russia’s propaganda. Are there any other points you think we should cover regarding corruption and accountability during this war?

Borovyk: I would point to the Corruption Perceptions Index we published in January this year. Ukraine lost one point, which signalled stagnation in reforms—particularly in the fight against corruption. However, I hope that the events of July 22, when there was an attempt to strip the independence of anti-corruption institutions, will prove to be a turning point. 

The reaction from Ukraine’s international supporters—except notably the United States, at least publicly—was extreme. Hopefully, this showed our politicians that there is no alternative but to continue reforms, and that this is no time to halt anti-corruption efforts.

I say “hopefully” because Ukraine remains a normal country, even during war, and a new political season is set to begin in September. We will observe how politicians behave, the actions they take, and the initiatives they support in parliament and government.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for your time today. It was a pleasure speaking with you. I appreciate your expertise. 

Borovyk: Thank you. Goodbye.

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