Everywhere Insiders 12: Epstein Files, Africa Conflicts, and Nvidia

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/08/28

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. 

Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman discuss the Justice Department’s release of Ghislaine Maxwell’s interview transcripts, which detailed her cooperation but left grand jury records sealed. They highlight ongoing questions about Epstein’s network, victim silence, and unresolved financial angles, including possible Russian bank links. The conversation shifts to Trump’s National Guard deployment in D.C., which critics say focuses on optics over crime reduction, and to Joe Gruters’ election as RNC chair, underscoring Trump’s grip on the GOP. Finally, they examine U.S. diplomacy in Africa, Rwanda-DRC tensions, and Nvidia’s controversial AI chip sales deal with China under Trump’s revenue-sharing arrangement.

Interview conducted August 22, 2025.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Today, once more, we are here with the wonderful Irina Tsukerman. The U.S. Justice Department has now released the full transcript and audio recordings of a two-day interview with Ghislaine Maxwell, Jeffrey Epstein’s once–associate and convicted sex offender. Any thoughts?

Irina Tsukerman: The interview was conducted on July 24 and 25 by Donald Trump’s lead criminal defense attorney in his New York cases, Todd Blanche. Victim names were redacted, but aside from that, the content remains unaltered. Maxwell cooperated extensively, answering questions about roughly 100 individuals. Shortly after the interview, she was transferred from a low-security prison in Florida to a minimum-security federal prison camp in Bryan, Texas.

Meanwhile, a U.S. federal judge in New York, Richard Berman, rejected the Justice Department’s request to unseal grand jury transcripts from Epstein’s 2019 case, reaffirming the need to uphold grand jury secrecy rules. Another judge in Maxwell’s case, Paul Engelmayer, similarly denied such a request, stating the materials would not shed any meaningful new light on the crimes or their investigations. The judges criticized the move as potentially a diversion from releasing the substantial investigative records the DOJ already holds—estimated at around 100,000 pages.

So, yes—this is interesting. The House Oversight Committee is preparing to receive and review redacted versions of the DOJ files related to Epstein and Maxwell—but no specific public release timeline has been announced.

It remains unclear what—or whom—the grand jury secrecy is protecting, especially since Maxwell is already convicted and serving a 20-year sentence. The reluctance to release those transcripts, despite the interview’s disclosure, is puzzling.

As someone quipped, handing those files to someone like Pete Hegseth—known for his ‘judicious handling’ of information—might be the fastest path to clarity. But more seriously, the once-heated “Epstein-gate” seems to have faded from the spotlight as coverage shifts to matters like diplomacy and law enforcement actions in major cities. Still, the core questions remain as relevant as ever.

Who supplied those women to Epstein? Which parts of the trafficking network went unpunished? Even if Epstein and Maxwell operated as lone actors, a supply chain likely facilitated their crimes. If not Epstein’s network, then indisputably someone else profited. That does not remain comforting, regardless of political affiliation or administration.

To dismiss this as a “non-story,” while ignoring the harrowing experiences of victims, feels particularly callous. Just because some survivors accepted settlements to remain silent—even sealed ones—that doesn’t invalidate their accounts; it certainly doesn’t protect anyone involved. Now that Epstein is dead, the rationale for shielding others is even less credible.

Moreover, some of these survivors might be willing to speak out again—about individuals who weren’t party to nondisclosure agreements and whose actions may still be unexamined.

It’s also worth noting that Maxwell’s move to a minimum-security prison has ignited public indignation. Victim advocates describe the facility as overly comfortable—a “country-club” or “Club Fed” scenario—and argue that such leniency appears inexplicable for a convicted sex trafficker. The transfer came just after her interview with Blanche, fueling speculation about cooperation in exchange for softer conditions.

Maxwell claims that Donald Trump was never inappropriate with anyone she knew; she may have met him once around 1990, due to her father’s connection with Trump’s then-wife, Ivana—but the interview contained no incriminating information about him or any so-called “client list.”

That may well be true. Trump likely wouldn’t act illegally without ensuring privacy for himself. But presence alone—or proximity—can raise ethical questions. Importantly, there may still be individuals who were complicit—and whose actions may yet warrant scrutiny. All of these remain deeply newsworthy.

They are worthy of exploration. The financial angle of all of this remains unclear. I am curious whether any of these transcripts will shed light on the use of Russian banks in Epstein’s finances. Epstein and his circle’s links to foreign malign influence are as relevant as anything else in the story. The potential money laundering and other financial improprieties are just as worthy of examination as the sex trafficking and scandalous gossip.

Jacobsen: The National Guard now has troops on the streets of D.C. This is part of Trump’s crackdown. They are going to start carrying weapons. There has been no specification of the particular weapons. So, it could be regular law enforcement arms, or it could be military-grade. The order refers to “service-issued weapons.” Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: I am actually surprised that they have not been armed already. What is the point of deploying them if they cannot carry weapons? Without them, they have even less legitimacy. Then again, it raises a larger question: if you are there to intimidate people, that is not a legitimate use of law enforcement. If you are there to make arrests, then you should be armed and prepared to do so.

Now, regardless of the weapons issue, the broader fact is that even conservatives agree this deployment has not been effective against crime in D.C. The forces are not operating in the neighbourhoods with the highest crime rates. Instead, they are walking around in large groups through areas like Georgetown, which is already wealthy, safe, and ritzy.

If the idea is to make affluent residents feel secure, then mission accomplished. But if the idea is to fight crime in poorer, more distressed areas, the operation has failed. Even after criticism, they have not sent forces into the city’s peripheral, high-crime neighbourhoods.

I do not know the timeline for expanding this to Chicago and New York, but I expect the National Guard, FBI, and others will operate in much the same way—focusing on a few visible areas that generate media coverage rather than going where additional law enforcement is actually needed.

Ironically, in response to all of this, municipal authorities—rather than demonstrating that they can manage their own cities without federal intervention—have failed to act quickly to secure more resources and more municipal police on the ground. That could have deterred Trump from what many see as executive overreach.

He even staged a PR stunt by going out on patrol last night. Obviously, Trump himself was not going to make any arrests. Perhaps Trump should have been working on something more serious, given all the other problems facing the country. But many in the pro-Trump media and political circles are showing support, using a strawman argument: that statistics on crime in D.C. are “not accurate,” that there is rampant crime, and that the local mayor has done nothing about it.

I don’t think anyone ever claimed D.C. has no crime, or even minor crime. It’s accurate that the rate of violent crime has fallen substantially over the past two to three decades. That does not mean there isn’t still work to be done, or that the local authorities are handling it in the best possible way.

There’s also a conflation of issues. Violent crime, property crime, petty theft, the proliferation of homeless encampments, and visible drug use all get lumped together. However, there’s often a lack of clear distinction between actual crime incidents, unpleasant optics that may indirectly contribute to crime, and whether there is genuine danger to residents.

The irony, of course, is that Trump himself is a convicted felon, and he has pardoned many criminals—some of them not remotely “victimless.” He has even floated pardons for sex offenders. So I’m not convinced that his judgment on criminal justice carries much weight. At best, what he’s doing looks like virtue signalling to his base.

The Justice Department recently boasted of “100 arrests” in one night. But arrests don’t equal prosecutions, and prosecutions don’t equal convictions. If those arrests were carried out improperly, they could actually damage law enforcement’s credibility. So these numbers are not enough to celebrate. They could be, but the outcome remains unclear.

If the aim is intimidation and to look “tough,” that is not a deterrent for criminals. It’s a deterrent for tourists, business owners, and anyone uneasy about the optics of police-state tactics—military vehicles outside Union Station, for example.

Jacobsen: The new RNC chairman, Joe Gruters, is a longtime Trump loyalist. His background dates back to Trump’s era as a reality TV celebrity, and now, as party chairman, he was elected without opposition. He does not have any record of challenging Trump in any meaningful way. So, whether he’s a true believer or simply a sincere supporter, the outcome is the same: unquestioned loyalty. 

Tsukerman: It’s the surprising political news of the day—though perhaps not too surprising given that Trump, as president, is already the de facto leader of the Republican Party. As such, Trump will almost certainly appoint—or encourage the appointment of—people to the top levels of the party apparatus who align with his agenda and persona. 

The problem is that he exerts such control over the party that there are virtually no objections to anything he does—appointments, agenda, implementation. This means that even if he were to lose the presidency through impeachment or leave office at term’s end, he would likely continue to wield influence over the GOP.

Consequently, it will be tough for anyone without his explicit approval to win the Republican nomination and challenge his hold on the party. Trump is not just consolidating compliance while in office—that’s pretty normal—he’s ensuring continuity of his political legacy long after his presidency, while sidelining other Republicans with differing views who might need resources and a platform to run.

He intends to continue influencing the nomination process well beyond 2025—through 2028 and beyond—which doesn’t bode well for the party’s chances in general elections. If the GOP primary winner is always someone like J.D. Vance—someone extremely close to Trump—and if Democrats avoid their past mistakes and field a reasonable, broadly appealing candidate, Trump-aligned nominees may win primaries but lose general elections. This is a structural long-term issue Republicans should address now.

Unfortunately, many are either deluded—believing Trump and his circle are far more popular than they are—or overly optimistic that Democrats will continue to falter. It’s turning into a race to the bottom where Republicans only need to be slightly less terrible. That’s not good for the country.

Jacobsen: On the global front, a lot is happening in Africa. The Nigerien army reportedly killed a senior Boko Haram leader, Ibrahim Bakoura, in a targeted airstrike in the Lake Chad region on August 15, though analysts urge caution as Bakoura has been reported dead multiple times before. Meanwhile, Uganda’s military has been active in Darfur pursuing over 1,200 suspects, and the Rwandan rebel group M23 has denied involvement in massacres in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Tsukerman: It’s a troubling surge of violence, which unfortunately isn’t surprising given that Western powers—once heavily involved in regional security—have mostly withdrawn or lost influence. The U.S. has attempted to strike deals with West African governments for access to raw materials and critical minerals, but those negotiations haven’t produced meaningful results yet. The situation in Sudan remains dire, and global attention is understandably focused on Gaza and the Russia–Ukraine conflict, meaning places like Sudan and the Sahel are undercovered, even as sanctions hit top leadership figures there.

However, there is no precise enforcement mechanism for physically resolving the conflict, particularly given the numerous state and non-state entities supplying weapons to both sides, which ensures neither side can fully prevail. There is an entrenchment of sectarian concerns, which provides warring factions with local and logistical bases of support and contributes to the continuity of the war. There are no third options or better alternatives. Even diplomacy—pushed initially by Saudi Arabia—has faded into the background. 

Most Middle Eastern and North African leaders’ meetings this week have focused on Gaza, not Sudan. Politically, that makes sense.

The Palestinian issue has been central in regional politics and media for decades, making it difficult to refocus attention elsewhere. It’s also an effective way to mobilize specific populations and distract from economic crises and domestic political troubles. For example, in Saudi Arabia, there was recently a massive leak of sensitive material from its external intelligence agency—an entire data dump posted online. It’s not surprising the government would want public focus shifted toward a highly emotive issue like Gaza.

Sudan has not been “weaponized” in the same way Gaza has. It lacks the same historical resonance across the Arab world, so it does not automatically appear on the regional agenda. As a result, there is little unique or sustained backing to pressure Sudan’s warlords into compliance with international norms, or to prioritize humanitarian relief for civilians.

Regarding Rwanda and the rebels, despite all the talk, there still has not been conclusive evidence of direct coordination between the Rwandan government and M23. If such a connection is clear, why has it not been proven unequivocally? And if it is not, who benefits from undermining Rwanda? The obvious answer is the DRC, which has every reason to amplify allegations of Rwandan involvement, given their rivalry over regional influence and resources. Rwanda is considered a Western ally, whereas the DRC is now backed mainly by Russia.

Tsukerman: That’s not to say there aren’t factions inside Rwanda’s government with ties to rebels, but the situation is far less clear-cut than alleged. Western media often fails to probe deeply, repeating accusations without substantial evidence, which muddies understanding.

For now, the U.S. has attempted to prevent open war between Rwanda and the DRC and has, to a degree, frozen escalation. But with the core issues unresolved—rebel activity, resource control, and geopolitical rivalries—the risk of renewed conflict remains high.

What Trump’s brand of diplomacy seems designed to deliver is immediate, tactical achievements—preventing significant conflict flares and presenting the optics of negotiation—rather than doing the painstaking work of long-term, substantive diplomacy to resolve underlying tensions, whether in Africa or elsewhere. So, I’m not expecting lasting resolutions any time soon.

Jacobsen: Now, on a different front: we’re living in an almost “Blade Runner–esque” corporate world, where massive multinationals rival states in influence. Take Nvidia’s role in the U.S.–China tech calculus. According to the Associated Press, Nvidia’s CEO Jensen Huang has been in talks with the Trump administration about a new AI chip—the so‑called “B30A,” based on the Blackwell architecture—designed for the Chinese market. It’s intended to be weaker than the B300 but still powerful enough for data centers.

Tsukerman: It sounds paradoxical—but it’s standard in geopolitics today. Multinational corporations aim to maximize profits, even in contentious markets. They’ll maintain working relationships with governments, even adversarial ones, to access those customers.

That said, the sensitive nature of chip technology makes governments act. The U.S. is adopting a mix of restrictions and controlled access, trying to safeguard national security without completely shutting off lucrative markets. China, on the other hand, uses its rare-earth dominance as leverage, slowing Western innovation.

But here’s where things get tricky—according to Reuters and AP, Nvidia and AMD agreed to share 15% of their revenue from chip sales to China with the U.S. government to secure export licenses for the chips. That was a massive reversal of prior export curbs.

Others labelled that arrangement an unprecedented “tax” or “quid pro quo,” raising questions about where national security stops and revenue-generation begins. Nvidia reportedly could generate up to $50 billion from AI chip sales to China—so a 15% cut is no small clause; it’s a substantial federal revenue stream.

Why is the U.S. essentially “arming the adversary,” even if mostly symbolically? Some believe Trump himself struck a deal to take a personal cut of these sales—but there’s no credible evidence supporting that claim. It appears more like a political exaggeration.

It’s a deliberate blend of national-interest calculus and private-sector pragmatism—corporations push for access, governments demand oversight, and power balances shift accordingly. The next step in this paradigm seems to be creating chips that give China just enough capability to remain competitive, while limiting interoperability with Western systems and slowing progress toward the most advanced versions. It’s essentially a halfway measure: not cutting China off, but not letting it advance unchecked either.

But this looks like a corrupt deal undercutting U.S. national security. Previously, the goal was to deny China access to sensitive technology. Now, with this revenue-sharing arrangement, Trump benefits financially through cozy deals. Where that money ultimately goes is unclear. What we do know is that the U.S. government still carries about $35 trillion in debt, and nothing from these export taxes has gone toward debt reduction. The ceiling keeps getting raised to keep essential agencies operating.

So, the new revenue isn’t going toward debt relief. It’s going to contractors, programs, or disappearing into mechanisms with little transparency. Long term, it’s self-defeating. Nvidia is pleased because it no longer faces constraints and can expand globally. But from a national security perspective, it’s disastrous. It undercuts Trump’s own rhetoric about China as an economic and security rival.

There has been some criticism from within the Republican Party, but nowhere near enough. The bigger question is when Congress and party leadership will ask themselves how far they’re willing to go to satisfy Trump’s personal whims, instead of pursuing a coherent presidential agenda.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much, Irina. 

Tsukerman: Bye.

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