Maritime Superiority and Strategic Deterrence: Why Naval Power Still Shapes Global Security

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): SWAT Sociedad Anónima (SWATSA, Barcelona)

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/11/07

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. 

This interview explores the evolving role of maritime power in global security and deterrence, expert commentary highlights the technical, operational, and strategic aspects of undersea drones, nuclear submarine endurance, supply chain resilience, and quantum navigation technologies, the discussion underscores how Western powers have prioritized air dominance while underestimating the enduring importance of maritime superiority, drawing on examples from the Black Sea, Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, and Red Sea piracy, it illustrates how naval readiness—or its absence—directly affects global trade, stability, and strategic deterrence against adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and non-state actors.

Interview conducted on August 16, 2025.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: As discussed, there is the matter of pedagogy and the ongoing review of the AUKUS agreement. A common question is whether such processes typically conclude on schedule, by military planning, or whether they generally take longer than anticipated.

Irina Tsukerman: At present, the review is scheduled to conclude in the fall. However, given the current state of the Pentagon, predicting the outcome is difficult. The Pentagon has been aggressively reducing staff, including personnel who would ordinarily participate in such reviews. Additionally, trade and diplomatic tensions with allied nations may further complicate the process, though in principle these matters should remain separate. The review itself is routine, with the primary goal being to identify and optimize any elements necessary for the strategic, operational, and technical assessment.

The program is ambitious and has been described by some as one of the most significant trilateral defence initiatives in recent history. Nevertheless, despite its broad scope, it has not attracted the same level of public or strategic attention as the Quad or other multilateral arrangements that have emerged over the past decade. The central focus of this process is Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. These vessels are intended to be powered by enriched nuclear reactors derived from United States and United Kingdom designs. Although there was controversy regarding France’s loss of a previous submarine contract with Australia, that issue is unlikely to affect the scope of the current agreement.

This program, often framed as a major defence alliance initiative, is designed to counter China’s growing threat in the Indo-Pacific region. The centrepiece of this strategy is the development of the SSN-AUKUS class submarines, which are expected to form the backbone of Australia’s future naval fleet. These submarines are based on the United Kingdom’s next-generation SSN design, with all three AUKUS nations involved in development, though the United States and the United Kingdom play the larger roles. They will be powered by pressurized-water reactors designed to increase endurance and enhance operational capability.

One of the most significant innovations in this class of submarines lies in stealth technology. Compared to earlier models, the SSN-AUKUS class aims to significantly reduce acoustic signals through advanced noise-reduction technologies, thereby improving their ability to operate undetected. In essence, the program represents an attempt not only to extend the endurance of submarine fleets but also to advance their stealth and overall effectiveness against rising Chinese naval capabilities.

One of the technologies mentioned is the use of anechoic tiles, which reduce reverberation by absorbing sonar signals. Alongside this, the submarines employ raft-mounted machinery to dampen vibrations, further improving stealth. These innovations make the vessels more enduring and survivable in contested maritime environments. In other words, if the Western alliance—the AUKUS partnership—were to enter into conflict with China, these submarines would be less vulnerable to detection and destruction.

A key feature of the design is the integration of the evolved version of the U.S. Navy BYG-1 combat control system. This includes more advanced sonar processing, improved weapons control, and tactical decision-making aids intended to enhance interoperability between Australian, British, and American naval forces—not only in training and regular operations but also in the event of conflict. The submarines will be equipped with bow-mounted active and passive sonar arrays as well as flank arrays, providing superior situational awareness. These systems allow crews to distinguish between different types of threats in complex environments and improve early detection.

The design also incorporates a standard vertical launch system (VLS), enabling deployment of a variety of weapons, including land-attack cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles. This versatility enhances both deterrence and operational flexibility. In practice, such submarines can perform missions ranging from strategic deterrence—maintaining a threatening presence at sea—to direct power projection, striking enemy vessels or even land targets. This aligns with the broader global trend of modern navies seeking to maintain superiority through advanced undersea warfare capabilities.

Importantly, the SSN-AUKUS submarines are being optimized for joint operations. This means they are not intended for unilateral use, but rather for integrated allied missions. Planned cooperation includes joint training programs, synchronized maintenance schedules, and coordinated deployment strategies. Operationally, these submarines will likely monitor maritime boundaries near contested international waters—particularly in regions where China has demonstrated expansionist behaviour, such as the South China Sea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and even waters close to Australia and Vietnam. The overarching aim is to provide credible deterrence against Chinese naval expansion while reinforcing collective security in the Indo-Pacific.

Anywhere China has either an ongoing maritime dispute or seeks to project power, it has expanded its presence—even sending surveillance ships as far as Alaska, which, while unusual, has occurred. In such cases, advanced submarines under the AUKUS framework would mean that not only the U.S. Coast Guard would be responsible for countering these incursions, but allies could potentially deploy as well.

While I do not expect such deployments to the far Pacific in the immediate future, escalation could make them necessary. Integrating the combat systems of the AUKUS nations allows multinational forces to operate more effectively, enhancing collective security and joint operational capacity. Strategically, this strengthens deterrence and contributes to allied cohesion.

Regarding basing, Australia’s Osborne Naval Shipyard in South Australia has been designated as the primary facility for the maintenance of the new nuclear-powered submarines. The site is currently being upgraded to meet stringent requirements associated with nuclear propulsion. In addition, Australia has committed to significant investments in domestic shipbuilding capacity, though this has been the subject of considerable controversy.

The United States faces significant challenges in this regard. American naval shipyards are chronically overburdened and under-resourced, with maintenance backlogs, staff shortages, and inadequate modernization. Reports have highlighted rusting infrastructure and insufficient personnel, leading to delays across multiple projects. Although shipbuilding is officially declared a priority, Congress has struggled to allocate resources effectively or pass comprehensive reforms to address the bottlenecks. Civilian commercial shipbuilding initiatives have received some legislative support, but comparable progress has not been made in the military sphere.

Strategically, Australia’s investment in U.S. shipbuilding capabilities is viewed as mutually beneficial. It could both expedite progress on the AUKUS submarine program and provide more general support to U.S. naval construction, which remains essential given China’s rapid naval buildup. However, Pentagon cost-cutting measures—particularly staff reductions—have not reduced project costs, which remain tied to earlier projections. This mismatch between resources, workforce, and financial planning contributes to delays and inefficiencies. Congressional debates continue over whether current projects remain adequate and relevant in light of China’s accelerating defence investments.

When so many of the people who were supposed to oversee these projects are dismissed, it inevitably changes the budget, the timelines, and the framework for review—including who is responsible for safety oversight. This is part of the reason the process has become far messier than it should have been.

Submarines are not the only focus of the AUKUS agenda. They are the centrepiece, but the partnership is also advancing other projects, including hypersonic weapons. These systems are controversial—not because they are ineffective, but because they are enormously costly relative to their limited operational scope. There is an ongoing debate about whether to prioritize more hypersonic missiles, which can only be produced in limited numbers, or to invest in a broader range of conventional weapons that cover multiple threats.

The trilateral framework is also funding joint development of cruise and anti-ship missiles (outside of those deployed on submarines), uncrewed undersea vehicles (UUVs)—essentially underwater drones—and quantum technologies. The latter are particularly significant given China’s accelerated research and collaboration with other BRICS countries, especially India, in both general-purpose quantum computing and defence-oriented applications.

Another critical capability under review is the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM), a long-range, all-weather, subsonic cruise missile capable of precision strikes against land targets. These have been used extensively in recent conflicts, including operations in Yemen, where U.S. stocks were rapidly depleted due to years of stalled production. This shortfall highlights the vulnerability of relying on limited inventories of highly advanced munitions.

The Tomahawk is already designed for deployment from Virginia-class submarines. It may be integrated into the future SSN-AUKUS submarines, though the exact scale of deployment has yet to be finalized. To expand strike capacity, the U.S. Navy has developed the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), which adds four additional vertical launch tubes to Virginia-class submarines. This allows for significantly greater missile capacity, enhancing strike options and deterrent capability if integrated into the AUKUS program.

That would make the submarines more suited for offensive purposes, not simply for deterrence patrols or “looking scary.”

Beyond the submarines, Australia is also integrating the Naval Strike Missile (NSM)—a modern anti-ship missile jointly developed by Kongsberg (Norway) and Raytheon (U.S.). It has a low radar cross-section, making it stealthier and more challenging to detect, and it is designed to strike moving maritime targets with high precision. The Royal Australian Navy is integrating NSM into multiple surface platforms, including the ANZAC-class frigates and the upcoming Hunter-class frigates, enhancing overall warfighting capability in preparation for potential conflict scenarios, particularly with China.

In addition, Australia is procuring Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) systems from Raytheon. These surface-to-air missiles are critical for fleet air and missile defence. The SM-6, in particular, offers extended range and multi-role versatility, engaging not only aircraft but also cruise missiles, ballistic missiles in their terminal phase, and even surface targets. Recent conflicts—including missile and drone attacks in the Middle East—have underscored the vital importance of layered air defence. Without it, naval forces are highly vulnerable.

Regarding hypersonic weapons, the AUKUS framework envisions cooperative work on hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), which travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5 and possess maneuverability that makes them extraordinarily difficult to detect and intercept. Their cost, however, is prohibitive, which necessitates close collaboration among the three nations to share research, development, and production burdens. This collaboration is intended to maintain a technological edge, especially as China continues to invest heavily in hypersonic systems as part of its naval and strategic modernization.

Another initiative relevant here is the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (FC/ASW) program, a joint project between the United Kingdom and France, with Italy joining as a partner. This program aims to develop a new generation of cruise and anti-ship missiles, including both subsonic stealth variants and supersonic high-speed variants. It is noteworthy because France, which typically emphasizes strategic independence, rarely engages in such collaborative missile projects. While the program remains in development and has not yet been integrated into AUKUS planning, its eventual products could enhance allied strike capabilities. However, high costs, immaturity of the designs, and interoperability challenges with existing platforms mean that adoption is still uncertain.

That suggests even more work and expense on top of what is already a massive undertaking. And then there are the drones—the uncrewed undersea vehicles. I sometimes want to call them “unscrewed,” because that is how it feels every time. Let me call them sub-drones.

Sub-drones are still under review and have not been fully approved by the AUKUS partners. The challenge is not only in deploying them but also in recovering them. If one were to be lost or sink to the seabed, retrieval before an adversary could capture it would be essential, but difficult. Operationally, these vehicles could perform multiple roles: intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and even strike missions. Their versatility would expand the effectiveness of submarine operations by providing additional capabilities and flexibility.

Alongside this, quantum technologies are a top priority in the AUKUS framework. Unlike some of the other programs that depend on political approval or shifting budgets, quantum research is recognized as strategically critical. These technologies are being developed for positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems, which would provide highly secure navigation—particularly effective in GPS-denied environments. The idea is that, unlike current systems vulnerable to interference, quantum-based PNT would be far more resistant to hacking or spoofing. While some argue no system will be truly unhackable, quantum methods will certainly complicate adversarial penetration attempts and provide an edge in contested environments.

To illustrate, in scenarios where GPS is unavailable—or where using it would reveal one’s position—quantum navigation systems could allow submarines and other assets to operate stealthily while maintaining precision and coordination. Whoever achieves reliable, deployable quantum navigation first will have a considerable strategic advantage, much like the current AI race.

All of these developments point toward a vision of long-duration submarine operations. Nuclear-powered submarines with pressurized water reactors do not require frequent refuelling or surfacing, enabling extended submerged missions. This endurance means they can remain stealthy in highly contested maritime arenas such as the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, where detection avoidance is crucial. Their propulsion systems and advanced quieting technologies will make them harder to track, giving allied forces a significant tactical advantage.

The review process, therefore, is examining not only the construction and propulsion of the submarines but also the integration of these advanced technologies—drones, quantum systems, stealth measures, and extended operational frameworks. It is a comprehensive assessment of how to build and sustain the most advanced allied submarine capability in history.

Each vessel is supposed to have noise-reduction technology. Moreover, as you noted earlier, every one of these aspects is subject to joint review. Operational considerations, then, remain a core focus of this process.

While the new technologies often draw the spotlight, the maintenance cycle is just as critical. It is less glamorous than new weapons systems, but it is essential. Reactor refuelling schedules, for example, must be carefully managed—you cannot afford to run out of propulsion capacity during extended operations. The same applies to the servicing of weapons systems. Without sufficiently trained personnel to maintain and repair these systems, they may as well not exist. Having highly trained crews who can quickly return assets to service is vital, both for cost efficiency and for operational readiness.

The review is also assessing whether Australian crews have the necessary capacity and training to operate advanced platforms alongside U.S. and U.K. forces. This involves joint patrols, sensor sharing, coordinated responses, and even missions such as rescues or escort operations. Often, naval standoffs involve “escort scenarios,” where vessels shadow or escort one another out of contested waters rather than engaging in battle. Interoperability in these situations is as important as it would be in direct conflict.

Supply chains are another crucial element under review—ranging from reactor fuel to sonar modules, torpedoes, and spare parts. Spare parts, in particular, are a strategic vulnerability often overlooked. If exports are restricted or suppliers are cut off, vessels can quickly become inoperable. As such, mitigating supply-chain bottlenecks is considered as strategically significant as building the submarines themselves.

Taken together, these considerations support the broader aim of deterrence. A combination of advanced weapons, strong maintenance capacity, reliable supply chains, and trained personnel signals to allies and adversaries alike that the alliance is credible. Allies are encouraged to deepen cooperation, while adversaries are deterred from aggression. This enhances not only the credibility of U.S. forward presence but also strengthens allied cohesion by countering the perception that partners are dependent or “free-riding” on American power.

That is why the review is so meticulous. It spans everything from reactor physics to sensor fusion, from crew training to weapons deployment. Although it sounds complex, the framework is straightforward, since much of the political approval for these projects has already taken place. The task now is ensuring that the technical, operational, and logistical components align to deliver a sustainable, integrated force.

Every system, every operational cycle, and every technical infrastructure component is examined for how well it contributes to the broader ecosystem and strategic objectives. Once high-end capabilities are integrated, the question becomes: how does the entire posture compare to what adversaries are doing, and how flexible is it in delivering maritime dominance? That is what determines whether a state becomes a maritime superpower—or at least a credible naval power.

This is why so much attention is devoted to AUKUS and maritime power more broadly. Dominance at sea parallels the way air power came to dominate military planning in the twentieth century. Air superiority has received overwhelming attention for decades—and understandably so. It looks dramatic on television, it is easier for advanced powers to produce modern fighter aircraft, and it has become a hotly competitive global industry. Air power also allows the projection of force without placing large numbers of ground troops at risk. With the rise of drones—both aerial and unmanned combat systems—air dominance has been seen as the “new dimension” of warfare.

However, maritime power has never been more relevant, even though many assume naval battles belong to the past. In reality, we are less prepared for maritime confrontation now than at any point in decades. Take the Black Sea as an example. On the map, it may not appear strategically decisive, but disruptions there have shown otherwise. When Russia’s actions disrupted grain exports, hunger threatened countries as far away as Egypt. Without freedom of navigation, Ukraine and Romania cannot export grain fast enough to African markets. Unlike the U.S., which sells at higher prices, Eastern European exporters depend heavily on these markets. This illustrates how maritime disruptions quickly cascade into global instability.

Another example is the Strait of Hormuz, where a handful of irregular forces—or terrorist groups—can threaten international shipping. If tankers carrying oil or liquefied natural gas are blocked, the consequences ripple globally. Insurance rates skyrocket, transport becomes riskier and more expensive, alternative routes take longer, and energy prices rise. The result is higher costs for Japan, South Korea, and other energy importers, and ultimately, upward pressure on worldwide inflation. These examples underscore why maritime superiority is not only about naval combat but also about securing the global economic system.

And then there is the Suez Canal. Imagine a scenario where disruptions cut Egyptian canal revenue by 60 percent. That would plunge Egypt—and potentially surrounding countries—into severe recession, if not outright economic crisis. This is why maritime power is often underestimated. Its absence is felt immediately.

Look not only at Russia, whose sole aircraft carrier has been effectively sidelined and whose Black Sea Fleet has been badly damaged, but at China. Beijing has been investing enormous resources into upgrading and expanding its navy. At the same time, it has sought access to overseas naval bases. The most visible example is Djibouti, where multiple foreign powers now operate. However, China has also looked to the Middle East—including Syria and even unstable Yemen—as well as Sudan and Somalia. The goal is clear: long-term global maritime access. They understand that projecting power at sea never goes out of style. Western states, by contrast, have leaned so heavily on air dominance that they have allowed maritime preparedness to lag dangerously behind.

The vulnerabilities are obvious. Even small, inexpensive craft like Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps speedboats—designed for asymmetrical warfare—can harass and threaten U.S. nuclear-powered vessels. They are not “super-ships,” but they do not have to be. Persistent harassment degrades freedom of navigation. That is why many in Congress and policy circles have long argued for the U.S. to devote more attention to naval capabilities.

The U.S. is not nearly as far behind as the United Kingdom, which once led the world in naval power. Britain’s naval capacity has diminished to a fraction of its former strength. Today, it still deploys alongside the U.S. in operations such as those against the Houthis, but its ability to project independent naval power has been reduced significantly. Meanwhile, threats to maritime security have multiplied.

Some of those threats sound like they belong in history books—pirates, for instance. However, piracy has returned in very real ways, with groups in the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean forging links with actors like the Houthis and al-Shabaab. Attacks have reached as far as Indian waters. What once seemed like a relic of maritime legend is now a modern, destabilizing force.

Jacobsen: To sum up: the sea remains an essential domain of conflict. Air power is not overvalued, but maritime superiority is undervalued. Add cyber warfare into the mix, and it becomes clear that modern conflict spans multiple domains simultaneously. 

Tsukerman: The challenge for Western powers is to rebalance—recognizing that air, sea, and cyber all play decisive roles in maintaining security and strategic advantage. 

Jacobsen: Thank you.

Tsukerman: My pleasure. 

Jacobsen: Perfect. Thanks again. Bye.

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