Everywhere Insiders 10: Global Security: Gaza, Ukraine, Asia, and African Political Stability

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/08/17

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. 

In this interview with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, national security attorney Irina Tsukerman analyzes Ukraine’s growing unrest over government moves to place anti-corruption agencies under executive control, warning of public disillusionment, Russian exploitation, and Western missteps such as delayed military aid. She also examines escalating Thai-Cambodian border tensions—triggered by landmine incidents, cultural disputes, and nationalist politics—set against a backdrop of historical grievances and China’s strategic influence. Tsukerman explains how labour exploitation, contested heritage, and geopolitical maneuvering intertwine to destabilize the region. Her insights link domestic politics, identity conflicts, and great-power competition to broader patterns of fragility and missed opportunities for stability.

Interview conducted August 8. 

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: The most dramatic development I have seen in the past week is the backlash to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s explicit claims about maintaining military control over Gaza. This is quite a statement. I received an email this morning from a significant figure—someone connected to American institutions—saying we could interview this. My question is: what are your thoughts on this, and what will likely be the fallout by the time this is published?

Irina Tsukerman: The most controversial part of Netanyahu’s remarks is not about taking control of Gaza, because, in practical terms, about 75% of Gaza is already under Israeli military control. The key issue is that many people do not realize how small the territory is, so “taking over Gaza” sounds more dramatic than it is.

The larger strategic problem is that Israel’s military has not been consistently holding the areas it clears. This is why Hamas has been able to reconstitute itself repeatedly. They have not implemented a sustained counterinsurgency strategy—something General Petraeus and many others have advised, which would involve clearing, holding, and only withdrawing after Hamas is fully dismantled.

Another critical misstep was not targeting Rafah earlier, where much of Hamas’s leadership was initially entrenched. By delaying operations there, Hamas had time to disperse its leadership and fighters. Instead of cutting off the head of the snake early, Israel went after lower-level operatives first, allowing a large number of armed fighters to keep circulating throughout Gaza via its extensive tunnel network.

These tunnels are not a single contiguous system that can be seized in one operation; they branch off, intersect with civilian infrastructure, and allow fighters to surface unpredictably in other locations. Without controlling all of Gaza, including the tunnels, Israel cannot eliminate Hamas’s military leadership.

Netanyahu later clarified that he does not intend to annex Gaza. He said the occupation would be temporary, aimed at dismantling Hamas’s military infrastructure, rescuing hostages if possible, and then transferring control to another authority. The unanswered question is: who would that be?

The Palestinian Authority is ill-equipped for the task—it is struggling to maintain control in the West Bank, where Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are actively challenging its Authority. Israel has conducted multiple raids there in recent months. Still, the PA’s popularity is declining even among West Bank Palestinians, much less in Gaza.

In Gaza itself, there is also clan-based violence that is anti-Hamas but not pro-Palestinian Authority. These factions often resemble criminal gangs or smuggling networks and had significant influence before Israel’s 2005 withdrawal and Hamas’s 2007 takeover. Any transition to alternative leadership is therefore highly problematic.

The Arab states have little interest in directly administering or securing Gaza. They want the issue resolved without involving themselves or Israel, and they have shown no willingness to pressure Qatar to stop funding Hamas. The United States is in the best position to leverage Qatar, but it has not done so.

Given these dynamics, the most likely scenario after any Israeli withdrawal is political chaos, with multiple factions competing for power. This instability could spill over into the West Bank. Turkey and other regional actors may attempt to gain influence, even though Israel is determined to keep both Iran and Turkey out of the equation. Without a concrete alternative plan for governance, Israel may not be able to prevent outside involvement.

Nobody wants to open the borders until Gaza is demilitarized, and that will not happen quickly, regardless of the political outcome. The controversy is legitimate, but it is focused on the wrong aspects. Everyone understands that without a prolonged operation, Hamas cannot be entirely removed from Gaza. If that is the goal—and right now, there is broad consensus, even the Arab League has issued statements to that effect—there are still significant complications.

The Arab League’s problem is twofold: first, that Israel is the one carrying it out; second, disagreements about Israel’s methods. Some of the controversy is fueled by Hamas propaganda, some stems from Israeli disorganization, and some is simply the result of a lack of cooperation channels, which creates logistical problems.

The bottom line is that no one wants to participate in the solution. Still, none of the available solutions are satisfactory to any of the stakeholders, and for good reason. Gaza has been unstable for a long time and has deteriorated further over the past two decades. Former U.S. President Trump did not put forward a serious, workable plan for the U.S. role in resolving the conflict. He offered neither financing for reconstruction nor a plan for demilitarization, nor was he willing to commit American troops. He also failed to secure long-term Arab cooperation with Israel. As a result, there will be no clean transition to a less destructive status quo. Without significant regional changes and outside engagement, we are facing a prolonged asymmetrical conflict.

Jacobsen: Ahead of his meeting with the United States about the war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin today spoke with leaders of China, India, and three former Soviet states. No venue, date, or agenda for the meeting has been announced. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said he discussed peace and Russia with South Africa’s President Ramaphosa. Chinese President Xi Jinping told Putin that China welcomes renewed U.S.-Russia contacts as Russia seeks to end the war in Ukraine.

Tsukerman: If Russia truly sought to end the war in Ukraine, it could do so easily by withdrawing, stopping the abductions, and releasing civilians, including children, whom they have taken.

There have been over 700,000 Ukrainian nationals abducted by Russia, and only about 22,000 children have been identified so far. That means there are hundreds of thousands of people whose identities and whereabouts are unknown. Some have been transferred to Russia, some sent to camps for indoctrination and training against Ukraine, some placed in prisons or labour camps, and some trafficked internationally for sex exploitation. Many of these individuals are now effectively untraceable.

If Russia wanted to end the war, it could withdraw and release the civilians they have taken hostage. I do not see that happening. Instead, they are seeking political cover to gain more military and logistical support from China. They are likely to get it, since China is already supporting them in various ways and has stated it cannot allow Russia to lose the war.

As for discussions with India, China, and the post-Soviet states, India and China are historically rivals and should not be aligned, but U.S. tariffs under Trump have had the unintended effect of bringing them closer together. This, in turn, has drawn India back toward Russia after it had been moving away. Putin is scheduled to visit India shortly, and Prime Minister Modi is expected to visit China sometime this year.

There was a call between Prime Minister Modi and President Putin in which they discussed their bilateral relationship and Ukraine, exchanging warm words. This came right after former President Trump announced an additional 25% tariff on Indian goods—on top of the existing 25%—allegedly over India’s purchases of Russian oil. India was singled out for these secondary tariffs, which are not sanctions but instead economic measures designed to punish countries buying Russian crude.

Nothing comparable was imposed on China, which is purchasing significantly more discounted Russian oil than India, as well as engaging in other trade activities with Russia. Nor has the United States sanctioned Russian aluminum or other metals, despite importing large quantities of them.

While India and China are unlikely to become close allies, Trump’s economic measures against India are driving these two rival countries into limited economic alignment. Modi is under domestic pressure to take a firm stance against the United States, even though India does not have the kind of financial leverage that China does. This imbalance could explain why Trump is targeting India rather than China—the U.S. economy remains heavily dependent on Chinese capital and supply chains. In contrast, India’s still-developing economy is more vulnerable to tariffs. India’s overreliance on the U.S. market and its lack of diversified trade relationships make these tariffs a significant shock.

Central Asia is also emerging as a key geopolitical arena. Russia and China are competing for influence there, and India is trying to build economic ties with the region. Pakistan and Afghanistan currently serve as primary gateways into Central Asia, but new routes are developing. For instance, today an agreement was concluded between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States granting the U.S. significant economic and development presence in the Zangezur Corridor—a route connecting Europe to Central Asia that bypasses both Iran and Russia.

Central Asia is becoming an active collective player even as internal power struggles persist. Iran has not given up its influence in states such as Turkmenistan, and Turkey is using cultural and linguistic ties to expand its own economic and political footprint. The result is a complex and shifting geopolitical reality. While Russia is falling behind economically, Trump’s tariff policies are alienating U.S. partners, giving Moscow opportunities to attract attention and limited support despite its weakened position.

Jacobsen: One clarification: there was a recent media report claiming that India had paused potential plans to purchase U.S. arms in response to these tensions. However, the Indian Ministry of Defence has denied this, calling the story false and confirming that negotiations are ongoing. It remains unclear whether Defence Minister Singh’s visit to the U.S. has been cancelled. Still, even if he does not attend, lower-ranking officials are expected to continue the talks.

On a separate note, the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for Saif Suleiman Snedal, a Libyan national believed to be part of Group 50 or a subgroup of the Al-Saiqa Brigade. The ICC cites reasonable grounds to believe he is responsible for war crimes, including murder, torture, and outrages upon personal dignity, allegedly committed in Benghazi and surrounding areas. Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: Unfortunately, the destabilization caused by the Libyan civil war created fertile ground for a range of armed actors. Some of these groups were connected to the main factions in the conflict. In contrast, others were independent militias or transnational terrorist organizations—such as al-Qaeda and ISIS—that seized the opportunity to establish a presence in Libya.

We are only now beginning to determine how many atrocities were committed by these actors. Unfortunately, many of them were able to travel freely for years, building networks, gaining influence, and advancing their agendas—not only in Libya but across North Africa, throughout the African continent, and in the Middle East. Libya’s fractured landscape compounds this: the country effectively has two rival governments. Most of the oil—especially in the east—is controlled by Benghazi. Still, the international community officially recognizes Tripoli, which has little actual influence in eastern Libya.

We also see significant Islamist influence emanating from Tripoli, which appears to offer a degree of protection to former fighters from the civil war, many of whom are now freelancing or engaging in outright terrorist activity abroad. It is encouraging that the international community is finally starting to take these Libya-based terrorists seriously, but sanctioning individuals is not enough. There must be resources devoted to tracking them down, prosecuting them, dismantling their networks, and cutting off their financial and logistical support. This also requires applying pressure on Tripoli and neighbouring states that have facilitated the movement and financing of these actors. The message should be clear: no ideological extremism will be tolerated.

The Biden administration’s efforts in Libya have been on reducing Russian influence in Benghazi. However, the reason Russia is present there in the first place is that Benghazi lacks a unified military force. It relies on militias and is not strong enough to confront Tripoli, which has military backing from Turkey. Benghazi also feels threatened by local militias, Islamist fighters, and mercenaries who have entered Libya over time. Today, Turkey is consolidating its foothold in the region.

This is a complex geopolitical situation, and removing a single terrorist will not fundamentally alter the strategic realities. Suppose we are to go beyond playing “whack-a-mole” with “extremists. In that case, there needs to be a framework for addressing Libya’s security challenges. That means depriving extremist groups of the “oxygen” they need to operate, forging political consensus, and building a more stable national government.

Jacobsen: The U.S. Mission warns of threats to Jewish and Israeli communities in the United Arab Emirates. According to a report, it has information indicating active threats, stating: “Terrorist organizations are operating with increased intensity these days in efforts to harm Israel.” The statement was vague, but the source is credible. Your thoughts?

Tsukerman: This is not surprising. After Israel targeted various Iranian proxies and Iran itself, an uptick in retaliatory activity was expected. Iran has openly stated it aims to target Israelis worldwide, not just in the Middle East. Israel recently evacuated its diplomats from the UAE after reports—unconfirmed but credible—of Iran preparing a new series of airstrikes that could affect the region.

It would also not be the first time that Jewish communities and Israeli citizens were targeted in the UAE. Not long ago, an Israeli-Moldovan dual citizen who was a rabbi was abducted and murdered there. While his Israeli citizenship was downplayed publicly, he had been tracked by Iranian intelligence, which reportedly hired foreign nationals in the UAE to carry out the killing.

Iran has previously attempted to abduct other nationals in the UAE, including opposition leaders, and in some cases threatened them directly. The UAE’s ability comes partly from its geographic proximity to Iran, as well as extensive trade ties. Many Iranian companies operate in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, and there are even intermarriages between some members of the Emirati royal family and Iranian nationals.

There is a significant level of Iranian influence in the UAE, making it fertile ground for interference. These new threats reflect an uptick in Iranian asymmetrical activity in place of any effective military response to Israel. This is not unprecedented—historically, Iran has targeted Jewish communities worldwide, including in Germany, and has used Hezbollah to carry out operations. They have attempted to assassinate Israeli businesspeople and stage abductions in Turkey.

The question is whether the UAE is equipped—politically, in terms of law enforcement capacity, and in intelligence resources—to handle this threat, and whether it has the political will to curb Iran’s targeting of Israeli visitors, Jewish residents, and businesspeople with part-time residency in the UAE. At some point, the UAE will have to decide what side it wants to be on. The United States has not been a remarkably consistent partner in countering regional threats. Still, Iran has become so politically toxic that countries maintaining close trade ties with it could face reputational and economic consequences.

Jacobsen: This ties back to our earlier discussions on antisemitism. The Aryan Freedom Network is reportedly “riding” high in the Trump era. The Neo-Nazi group, led by a Texas couple who are both children of Ku Klux Klan members, has gained prominence. According to Heidi Beirich, cofounder of the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism, extremist groups have become so normalized that ‘Proud Boys do not seem that scary anymore.’ This suggests an increase in antisemitism and related extremist ideologies, with the threshold for joining such groups decreasing while the extremity of their rhetoric and objectives is increasing. Your thoughts?

Tsukerman: There are several reasons for this. One is what I call “coalition theory”: different radical factions are joining forces and mainstreaming each other in a post-ideological environment, as the traditional party structure breaks down. Conspiracy theories, public disillusionment with political corruption, and polarizing media narratives fuel that breakdown.

Trump himself has used rhetoric that many interpret as dog whistles to such groups, and he has done little to counter their influence actively. His administration did not make a concerted effort to denounce these movements, and in some cases, individuals in both lower and higher-ranking positions engaged with extremist platforms. One example is Kash Patel, who appeared eight times on a podcast that later broadcast content calling for a “final solution” against Jews in the United States and sought alliances with Islamist groups despite ideological contradictions.

Prominent Trump-aligned media figures have also contributed. Tucker Carlson has given platforms to Holocaust deniers; Candace Owens has promoted conspiracy theories; and figures like Daryl Cooper, Elon Musk, and Steve Bannon have, at times, engaged in behaviour or rhetoric that normalizes extremist ideas. Musk and Bannon, for instance, have been accused of mainstreaming a Nazi-like salute, and Musk’s X has become a permissive space for far-right rhetoric. Moreover, there was the recent Hitler episode on Grok.

Jacobsen: Yes—another Hitler episode. This has happened periodically, even since Grok was updated. Some speculate that Musk may have deliberately adjusted it to produce such content. At the same time, that timing appears plausible based on earlier patterns, it remains speculation.

Tsukerman: The fact that several well-known public figures with substantial influence over discourse are intervening on behalf of extremists and promoting them has created a silent acceptance—almost a whitewashing—of their presence. This emboldens such individuals, making them feel freer and more accepted, which is why they are re-emerging from the margins.

Many of these groups had been marginalized and depopularized in the past. Still, some are now gaining momentum partly as a backlash to cancel culture and what is perceived as extreme left censorship. That said, it is not purely reactionary—some of this resurgence has been actively cultivated. Russian funding of far-right groups in the United States is a documented reality. Russians have been linked to financially supporting neo-Nazi organizations, amplifying their messaging, and promoting specific figures.

Figures like Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens have been tied to Russian propaganda outlets, and in some cases, to other extremist networks, such as Qatari entities using Al Jazeera and Islamist channels to promote similar rhetoric. This “coalition theory” dynamic is increasingly visible. We have seen individuals like Kanye West promote antisemitic rhetoric to audiences within minority communities, and Nick Fuentes—once a fringe figure—has gained massive social media traction. This cross-platform boosting increases visibility, creates resonance, and facilitates ideological cross-pollination among disparate extremist factions.

The proliferation of conspiracy theories has become a unifying force, bringing together individuals from different ideological origins. These mechanisms are helping to accelerate the rise of the far right.

Jacobsen: Shifting to Asia, there was a recent simulated Chinese blockade of Taiwan, which revealed Singapore as a potential lifeline. Officially, Singapore has tried to remain neutral. Still, some within its government are increasingly concerned about Chinese interference in their political system. 

Tsukerman: Being a small state, Singapore is wary of taking an overtly pro-Taiwan stance, especially as U.S. policy under Trump has sent mixed signals: cancelling the Taiwanese president’s visit to Washington and scrapping scheduled defence talks. Such moves do not reassure smaller Asian nations.

China has seized on this uncertainty, expanding its political interference and military maneuvering. Taiwan’s party—already facing domestic dissatisfaction due to political mismanagement—has been overly reliant on the United States for both energy and security policy. This leaves it vulnerable, particularly when Washington’s actions appear inconsistent. China benefits from this public disillusionment, exploiting frustrations with the most vocal anti-China political forces.

We see similar patterns elsewhere in Asia. In South Korea, a former president adopted a tough-on-China stance but overreached politically. This opened the door for a more dovish leadership seeking rapprochement with Beijing. Japan and South Korea have even concluded a major bilateral economic cooperation agreement with China for the first time in decades.

Singapore is caught in the middle of these shifting dynamics, with deep economic ties to China that are not easily severed. Without active U.S. engagement—and especially in the wake of new U.S. tariffs on Asia-Pacific products—there is even less incentive for countries in the region to reduce economic dependence on China.

Jacobsen: On August 7, former President Donald Trump announced that he would nominate Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Stephen Moore as a Federal Reserve governor. Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: Some investor commentary has been skeptical. Drew Brenner, head of international fixed income securities at NatAlliance Securities in New York, stated: “Our view is he is controversial and will not pass. He will change the Fed.”

Jacobsen: First, he has no experience, no street smarts, no business background—always politics, unquote. Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: Look, has that ever stopped our politics? Think back to Congress. They rubber-stamped political “geniuses” like Tulsi Gabbard and defence hawks like Pete Hegseth.

Jacobsen: Dan Bongino—FBI.

Tsukerman: Yeah, Dan Bongino, assorted others. There is even the head of a terrorist group who was formerly a gardener. That is the extent of his counterargument—a 22-year-old saying, “I was a gardener so that I could run.” That is his political experience.

There have been other people with zero political experience—or even basic knowledge of policy issues—appointed to various positions. That will certainly not stop either Trump or Congress from confirming him.

It is obvious politics. Trump has made no secret of wanting to displace Federal Reserve leadership with people who are political loyalists and will do what he says: lower interest rates, fight inflation, and pursue economic growth, economic stability be damned. That is what he is working toward.

I am sure that the governor’s abrupt departure was not an accident. She was probably pressured to do so. Jerome Powell’Powell’s term ends in May 2026, which means Trump will be able to appoint whoever he wants to that position and essentially staff the Fed with people who answer to him, making it another puppet structure despite its supposed constitutional independence.

While Trump cannot legally remove Powell, he can surround him with loyalists and make him ineffective. He can also pressure and force people out, allegedly of their own accord, to implement his policies. That is precisely what he is doing systematically. This is what abuse of power looks like.

The fact that there is no widespread pushback—that people approve everything Trump does without question, with a poor grasp of economics, U.S. history, and the law—is another big problem. When you have an ignorant voting base, you cannot have constructive criticism of government policy. People tend to gravitate toward what sounds emotionally satisfying, rather than evaluating policies on their merits.

We have been reduced to playing for our favourite team, not examining the policies themselves.

Jacobsen: Good time for one more?

Tsukerman: Yes, and this one stands out—Uganda.

A Ugandan court denied bail to veteran opposition leader Kizza Besigye, who has been in jail for nine months on treason charges. This has raised concern among government critics, including opposition leader Bobi Wine, about a crackdown ahead of Uganda’s election. President Yoweri Museveni, 80, is seeking reelection.

He is not even the oldest African leader running for another term—Robert Mugabe was in his 90s when he ran again. Throughout Africa, it is common for elderly leaders to stay in power. Many of them, like Museveni, came to power during the Cold War, often with Soviet backing, and have maintained one-party systems that keep them in office for decades.

In Chad, there is a younger leader. Still, he has already been influenced by foreign powers like the UAE and Russia. In most cases, elections are neither free nor fair, and opposition candidates are excluded, prosecuted, or accused of crimes. Many opposition groups themselves are corrupt or ineffective, adding to the political dysfunction.

Uganda is one of the worst offenders in this regard. It is also facing a wave of jihadist violence, separatism, and border tensions—some of which are relatively new. The U.S. has largely abandoned holding these governments accountable. Under Trump, the focus has shifted to securing rare earth minerals in exchange for security and economic deals, with little interest in countering ideological extremism, fighting corruption, or supporting human rights reforms.

The previous administration focused more on climate change and countering Russian and Chinese influence. Still, even then, there was little emphasis on promoting good governance. As a result, Africa is filled with leaders who have been in power too long, many of whom are more interested in enriching their families than serving their citizens.

In more developed African nations like Kenya and Ghana, entrepreneurship is growing, and there is some political pressure for results. In Uganda, this is not the case. The treason charges against opposition leaders are a standard tool to suppress dissent. This is unlikely to change, and Trump will not pressure Uganda to make any changes.

The European Union has also avoided holding African governments accountable, focusing instead on two priorities: containing jihadism (with limited success) and preventing waves of migration from Africa.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

Tsukerman: Thank you.

Last updated May 3, 2025. These terms govern all In Sight Publishing content—past, present, and future—and supersede any prior notices. In Sight Publishing by Scott Douglas Jacobsen is licensed under a Creative Commons BY‑NC‑ND 4.0; © In Sight Publishing by Scott Douglas Jacobsen 2012–Present. All trademarks, performances, databases & branding are owned by their rights holders; no use without permission. Unauthorized copying, modification, framing or public communication is prohibited. External links are not endorsed. Cookies & tracking require consent, and data processing complies with PIPEDA & GDPR; no data from children < 13 (COPPA). Content meets WCAG 2.1 AA under the Accessible Canada Act & is preserved in open archival formats with backups. Excerpts & links require full credit & hyperlink; limited quoting under fair-dealing & fair-use. All content is informational; no liability for errors or omissions: Feedback welcome, and verified errors corrected promptly. For permissions or DMCA notices, email: scott.jacobsen2025@gmail.com. Site use is governed by BC laws; content is “as‑is,” liability limited, users indemnify us; moral, performers’ & database sui generis rights reserved.