The Everywhere Insiders 9: U.S. Economic, Legal, and Global Policy Shifts

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/08/12

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. 

In this wide-ranging conversation, Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman discuss the resignation of Fed Governor Adriana Kugler, the firing of BLS head Erika McEntarfer, and the fallout from politically driven economic decisions. She critiques Trump’s birthright citizenship executive order, details the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, and unpacks escalating tensions in Gaza and Ukraine. Tsukerman also warns of increasing politicization in public institutions and media cuts, providing nuanced, Constitution-based insights into America’s evolving legal and geopolitical landscape.

Interview conducted August 1.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Once again, welcome to Everywhere Insiders, joined by the wonderful Irina Tsukerman. Today we are covering topics ranging from Writers’ Day through to developments on August 1, 2025.

Let’s start with the major news: Federal Reserve Governor Adriana Kugler has submitted her resignation, effective August 8, 2025.

Though some outlets loosely frame this as a firing, it is officially a resignation. That said, early departures from such positions often carry political weight, especially when they create opportunities for new appointments. In this case, former President Trump has already announced plans to name a temporary replacement within days to serve out the remainder of Kugler’s term.

Irina Tsukerman: This creates a rare and politically significant opportunity. Trump now has the chance to shape the Fed before Jerome Powell’s term as Chair ends in May 2026. The resignation of a sitting governor—especially in a contentious political environment—allows the administration to install someone more aligned with its policy agenda.

Jacobsen: And that brings us to another related shake-up. The head of the Bureau of Labour Statistics, Erika McEntarfer, was fired after the agency released a revised jobs report showing 258,000 fewer jobs than initially reported. While such revisions are routine and part of statistical transparency, the dismissal appears tied to political backlash.

Tsukerman: Precisely. This is troubling from an institutional perspective. When independent officials are dismissed following routine reporting corrections, it signals a politicization of data. That undermines the credibility of economic institutions and has long-term consequences for investor confidence and public trust.

Jacobsen: The broader takeaway from this labour report is that it reflects more than a typical economic downturn. This is not the result of a global shock or natural cycle—it’s largely self-inflicted. The contraction is tied to domestic policy decisions, particularly aggressive tariffs and regulatory burdens that have hit small and medium-sized businesses the hardest.

Tsukerman: That’s right. We’re seeing job losses not only in federal positions—where there have been sweeping layoffs—but also across private and related industries. Small and mid-sized companies, already operating on thin margins, are closing or downsizing. These losses were preventable. That’s what makes this report particularly concerning.

Jacobsen: So, to summarize:

• Adriana Kugler has resigned, allowing Trump to make a key appointment to the Federal Reserve.
• Erika McEntarfer was fired, seemingly in response to a routine data revision.
• The latest labour report points not to an external crisis, but to internal policy failures—especially those affecting American businesses.

Tsukerman: And with these institutional changes, we could be witnessing a significant reshaping of economic governance under this administration—one that prioritizes loyalty over technical expertise.

So, what we’re seeing now is the result of a cycle that Trump himself initiated. It began with funding cuts to universities, which were then forced to lay off staff. That was followed by the imposition of tariffs, which made it more expensive to operate import-export businesses. But the impact didn’t stop there. Even companies not directly involved in international trade have been affected, as they rely on various goods and materials that have become more costly.

That’s what many people forget—these policies have ripple effects across the entire economy. On top of that, there’salready a general expectation of slower economic growth, which naturally results in fewer job openings. Employers are responding with caution, scaling back hiring plans and operating under more conservative forecasts.

Jacobsen: And there’s also Trump’s escalating conflict with his political opponents, law firms, and entire sectors of the economy, which adds another layer of economic uncertainty.

Tsukerman: Exactly. These confrontations are contributing to an unstable business climate. The outcomes we’re seeing shouldn’t surprise anyone. The only reason some are shocked is that Trump, along with his allies, has been consistently exaggerating or misrepresenting economic conditions.

What’s more concerning is that even some respected experts echoed his narrative, claiming, for instance, that tariffs would have no real economic impact. That misled the public. So now, when the predicted consequences materialize, people feel blindsided. But this situation has played out exactly as many independent analysts warned it would.

Jacobsen: Speaking of geopolitical tensions, let’s turn to the Russia-Ukraine situation. There were provocative statements recently from Russian sources, and reports that Trump ordered nuclear submarines to be repositioned. What’s the story there?

Tsukerman: It’s more about optics than action. Trump has been making increasingly aggressive statements toward Russia. He hasn’t taken any concrete military steps. Still, he has ordered U.S. nuclear submarines to reposition—a symbolic move intended to project strength and deterrence.

This follows another horrifying attack in Ukraine, where over 100 drones were launched by the Kremlin, striking civilian areas—one particularly tragic incident involved eight children killed in a single strike. Images of parents holding unconscious or dead children have sparked outrage, not only internationally, but even within parts of the U.S. Congress.

Jacobsen: Including among Republicans?

Tsukerman: Yes, even some Republicans who were previously more MAGA-aligned or sympathetic to Russia have begun expressing outrage. Putin’s brazenness, the rising civilian death toll, and ongoing threats toward NATO and the United States are shifting some of those positions.

As for Trump, his movement of nuclear submarines serves a dual purpose. It reassures his base that he’s a strong leader who won’t be humiliated by Russian aggression. But at the same time, it allows him to appear strong without actually doing anything that would contradict his longstanding position of avoiding confrontation with Russia.

Jacobsen: So it’s posturing?

Tsukerman: Precisely. It’s strategic signalling—projecting deterrence without engaging. He’s essentially saying, “We’re ready to respond if needed,” while ensuring that he doesn’t escalate the conflict. It’s a calculated move meant more for domestic optics than for changing the situation on the ground.

So far, Trump has not initiated any concrete economic or military action against Russia. There’s no indication that he will—unless there’s a direct attack on U.S. interests. So, this recent move—repositioning nuclear submarines—is, in reality, a relatively minor escalation. Frankly, it’s something that should have been done a long time ago.

But it’s also not particularly meaningful. Despite all the rhetoric—threats of sanctions, secondary tariffs, and punitive measures against Russian products—Russia continues to benefit from the time window it has essentially been granted. And during that time, they continue attacking civilians. They’re also continuing to receive weapons components from China and North Korea and conducting trade with several other countries.

There’s nothing substantial being done to accelerate the collapse of Russia’s war economy.

Jacobsen: And shifting focus slightly—on the domestic front—there’s renewed attention on anti-immigration rhetoric. One issue that’s come up again is birthright citizenship. I’ve seen headlines about it, including an executive order from Trump aiming to restrict it, even as a second federal appeals court has declared such restrictions unconstitutional.

This is your legal wheelhouse—where are we in the process? Why is this being blocked? And what’s the rationale behind this executive action?

Tsukerman: To clarify, birthright citizenship is enshrined in the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It was adopted in 1868 and grants automatic citizenship to “all persons born or naturalized in the United States,” regardless of the immigration status of their parents. Legally, this is not something that can be overturned by executive order—it would require a constitutional amendment or a Supreme Court reversal, neither of which has occurred.

The federal courts have repeatedly blocked attempts to restrict this right because they violate the Constitution. Trump’s proposals are largely political messaging. He’s trying to appeal to specific segments of his base, despite the clear legal barriers.

Jacobsen: What’s the historical foundation of birthright citizenship?

Tsukerman: Birthright citizenship is not just a right—it was essential to the founding and development of the United States. When the country was first established, there was no modern immigration system. Virtually everyone who came here did so without today’s legal procedures, because those procedures didn’t exist.

If their children had not been considered Americans, there wouldn’t have been a population to build and sustain the country. The U.S. needed people—families who were willing to stay, work the land, and take the political and personal risks of declaring independence from Britain.

Birthright citizenship ensured their children would have legal protection, not face deportation, and could inherit and build a future in the newly founded country.

Jacobsen: So the argument is both legal and historical?

Tsukerman: Absolutely. It’s both practical and rooted in constitutional law. The framers of the 14th Amendment were very clear about this: if you’re born here, you’re a citizen. The idea of “illegal immigration” as we know it didn’t even exist at the time. People arrived, stayed, and helped populate the land.

Immigration restrictions came much later, primarily in the 19th and 20th centuries, when procedures were introduced to prevent the spread of disease, criminal elements, or individuals considered threats to public safety. But birthright citizenship has remained a cornerstone of how the U.S. grows and integrates its population.

Without it, there would have been no incentive for many to remain in the U.S. during its most difficult years, especially when the country was broke, heavily indebted, and still struggling to establish basic institutions. It was a mechanism to ensure stability, continuity, and growth.

Jacobsen: And now it’s being rechallenged in court.

Tsukerman: Yes, and it’s being blocked—correctly—by the judiciary. Attempts to remove birthright citizenship by executive order are legally invalid. The courts are upholding the Constitution. It’s one of those rare instances where the legal system is doing precisely what it was designed to do: protect foundational rights from political overreach.

This is what so many people who are now crying about so-called “anchor babies” fail to understand. Without birthright citizenship—without those very “anchor babies”—none of us would be here. There would be no United States as we know it.

Now, of course, it’s reasonable to say we should have processes to ensure that individuals with serious criminal records or evil intent aren’t allowed to remain here. That’s a fair point. But children born on U.S. soil do not have criminal records—they are not culpable for their parents’ actions.

The argument that birthright citizenship incentivizes illegal immigration misses the mark, especially when you consider that this is precisely how the country was founded. Birthright citizenship is foundational to the American national identity. It’s not a loophole—it’s a cornerstone. It’s what made the United States possible, and it’s relatively unique compared to many other countries because of how our history unfolded.

People who misunderstand this need to go back and crack open a U.S. history textbook—many of them, I suspect, for the first time—and learn how this nation was formed.

Jacobsen: And some of the loudest voices in this debate are, ironically, descendants of relatively recent immigrants.

Tsukerman: Exactly. Many of the same individuals who are now calling for restrictions would not even be here if the standards they propose today were applied to their own families. Many early Americans arrived in the New World as indentured servants.

If we applied their logic retroactively, why should the children of indentured servants—who were bound by contract—have been granted citizenship? By that logic, they should have gone back once their service ended. But of course, that’s absurd, and it underscores the flawed reasoning behind the current rhetoric.

So it’s no surprise that two federal courts have already blocked Trump’s proposed restriction on birthright citizenship. Yes, sometimes you get split circuit decisions, and then it may go to the Supreme Court. I’m not certain whether this case will ultimately make it that far. But if it does, I strongly suspect the Court will strike it down.

The proposal is a blatant attempt to undercut the constitutional foundation of American citizenship—and it’s unlikely to survive legal scrutiny in its current form.

Jacobsen: Let’s pivot to public media. There’s been a significant funding cut that’s drawing attention, especially around the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB). Reports suggest it’s either shutting down or projected to shut down following a $9 billion funding cut to public media in general.

Of that, $1.1 billion was explicitly earmarked for CPB, which, in turn, distributes funding to NPR and PBS. This was part of a long-term funding plan—stretched over two years—but it’s been abruptly eliminated by the Republican-controlled House. What are your thoughts on this move? Have you seen any reactions from NPR or PBS yet?

Tsukerman: This is a significant blow to independent, publicly funded journalism and educational programming. CPB is a nonprofit organization that plays a crucial role in ensuring that Americans—especially those in rural or underserved communities—have access to non-commercial, educational media.

The elimination of $1.1 billion in CPB funding is part of a broader trend we’re seeing: attacks on institutions that provide fact-based, publicly accountable information. When funding for public broadcasting disappears, it’s not just about NPR and PBS losing resources—it’s about communities losing access to trusted reporting, children’s educational programs, arts programming, and local journalism.

Politically, this isn’t just about budget priorities. It reflects an ideological shift away from public goods and toward privatization or politicization of information channels. I haven’t seen formal statements yet from NPR or PBS, but I expect strong public responses. This decision directly threatens their ability to operate, especially in smaller markets.

Jacobsen: And, with the collapse of local news outlets, losing CPB-backed stations could widen the information gap.

Tsukerman: Absolutely. These cuts don’t just affect the coasts or major cities—they hit the heartland. And that’s precisely where independent, nonpartisan media is often most needed. If anything, this move will make it harder for many Americans to stay informed.

First of all, this has been in the works for quite some time. We knew it was coming—it’s been discussed for months, essentially since the start of Trump’s second term. That said, even with the warning signs, it was still a shock for many, especially those who lost their jobs.

What’s particularly troubling is how many MAGA and MAGA-adjacent commentators celebrated the funding cuts. They argued that PBS and NPR were promoting radical left-wing content. But what they fail to recognize is that PBS and NPR were only a small part of what the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) funded.

The vast majority of CPB’s support went to local media outlets across the country, particularly in rural or underserved areas where commercial media outlets simply don’t exist. Without CPB, these communities lose access not only to national news but also to vital local coverage: weather updates, emergency alerts, public health announcements, and community events. The loss is much broader than people realize.

Jacobsen: So it’s more about dismantling an infrastructure than just removing two high-profile names.

Tsukerman: People saw the funding as symbolic because of NPR and PBS. But the real impact is structural, affecting basic media access for millions. Now, the only hope for these regions is private funding, which introduces its problems. Private funding can come with editorial strings attached, and it may not even come at all, especially in economically depressed or sparsely populated regions.

This decision could effectively silence entire communities. They won’t have any media coverage—no public voice. And there’s no guarantee that private media will step in, or that if they do, they will be neutral.

Jacobsen: Couldn’t the administration have taken a more measured approach—reforming CPB instead of cutting it?

Tsukerman: Absolutely. If the concern was that CPB programming leaned too far left—particularly in NPR or PBS content—the administration had plenty of legal authority to restructure CPB. The president could have replaced leadership, established new oversight protocols, and reoriented its mission to reflect the administration’s priorities better. That would have been a valid and legal approach.

Yes, some of the coverage in recent years leaned more progressive, but that doesn’t mean the entire operation had no value. Much of the programming was non-political: cultural documentaries, educational children’s shows, and arts coverage. Eliminating all of that, rather than reforming it, is a missed opportunity—not only to preserve public service media but to use it to communicate this administration’s message more effectively.

Jacobsen: All right. In the last couple of minutes, let’s turn to Colombia. Former President Álvaro Uribe has been sentenced to 12 years of post-arrest supervision for abuse of process and bribery of a public official. This stems from a witness tampering case that has gone on for over 13 years. The sentencing came from Judge Sandra Liliana Heredia. Uribe continues to maintain his innocence. Is this unusual by global political standards?

Tsukerman: Not at all. This fits the global pattern of political corruption cases, especially involving former heads of state. It’s not unique to Colombia, nor is it unique to the right or left politically. In this case, the allegations involve bribery, abuse of process, and potential links to right-wing paramilitary groups.

There’s a long history in Colombia of murky relationships between political elites and armed groups, and many have criticized the government’s handling of peace negotiations and transitional justice.

Jacobsen: So it’s part of a broader pattern?

Tsukerman: Yes. Whether or not Uribe is guilty, the larger issue is systemic. It reflects deeper tensions in Colombian society around accountability, justice, and the role of political power. It also highlights how long such cases can take—this one dragged on for more than a decade. The fact that a conviction happened at all is significant. It signals that the judicial system, despite its flaws, is still able to function under extreme political pressure.

Some critics argue that the Colombian government has made questionable deals with various militant groups. The core question, however, isn’t whether controversial negotiations occurred—those happen in nearly every conflict resolution context—but whether there has been a consistent standard applied to Uribe compared to others.

In other words, is Uribe being singled out, or is the current administration pursuing him fairly and impartially under the law? That’s where the controversy lies—not so much in the charges themselves, but in how the current government is handling the prosecution and whether it can be trusted to enforce justice without political motivation.

Jacobsen: Let’s break down the background. This whole case stems from a complaint Uribe himself filed in 2012, correct?

Tsukerman: Yes. Back in 2012, Álvaro Uribe filed a complaint against Senator Iván Cepeda, accusing him of manipulating witnesses. But that move backfired. The investigation revealed evidence implicating Uribe himself in attempts to coerce or manipulate incarcerated paramilitary witnesses, effectively turning the tables.

This case became Colombia’s so-called “trial of the century,” not only because of its duration—13 years—but because it marked the first time a former president in Colombia was convicted and sentenced for criminal offences.

Jacobsen: And the political reaction has been intense.

Tsukerman: Very. Uribe’s supporters—including his party, Democratic Center—have decried the verdict as judicial persecution, claiming the judiciary is politically weaponized. U.S. figures like Senator Marco Rubio and even the Secretary of State have expressed support for Uribe, adding international pressure.

On the other hand, Colombian leaders such as President Gustavo Petro, Senator Iván Cepeda, and human rights organizations have praised the decision as a victory for judicial independence. The case has become a flashpoint for Colombia’s broader democratic and institutional health, especially with presidential elections due in May 2026.

Jacobsen: What happens now for Uribe and his party?

Tsukerman: Uribe has been placed under house arrest and is banned from holding public office, which has profound implications for his party’s strategy and candidate selection. He’s been the face and guiding force of the Democratic Center. His absence will force internal realignment and intensify infighting over who takes the reins moving forward.

There will almost certainly be appeals. The case now moves to the Bogotá Superior Court, which must issue a ruling by mid-October to avoid statute of limitations issues. From there, it could escalate to Colombia’s Supreme Court, and if unresolved, potentially to the Inter-American human rights system.

Jacobsen: Uribe’s legacy itself is contested, isn’t it?

Tsukerman: Very much so. On the one hand, he’s credited with reasserting state control over large parts of Colombia during his presidency, especially in the fight against the FARC. On the other hand, he’s been linked to the “false positives”scandal, where civilians were killed and falsely labelled as enemy combatants, as well as alleged ties to paramilitary groups.

This case hinges on the accusation that Uribe manipulated jailed paramilitary witnesses to discredit Cepeda—his political adversary—who was investigating Uribe’s alleged paramilitary connections. Essentially, the charge is that Uribe used elements of the very forces he once fought against to carry out a political smear campaign.

Jacobsen: Sounds like a classic “no clean hands” scenario.

Tsukerman: That’s a fair characterization. It’s murky, it’s messy, and it underscores the deep entanglement of politics, justice, and armed conflict in Colombia’s recent history. The legal and political fallout from this case will likely shape the country’s trajectory well beyond 2026.

Jacobsen: So, it’s being reported as “exasperation”—that’s the word used in a recent article I read, and honestly, it struck me as a bit of editorializing, which is unusual for wire services like Reuters. The context is frustration over Gaza, which is now reportedly pushing three of Israel’s allies toward recognizing a Palestinian state.

For listeners who may not know, the status of Palestine has long been contentious. Since 2012, Palestine has held the same observer status at the United Nations as the Holy See (the Vatican). However, many countries still don’t recognize it as a sovereign state. Others do recognize it fully. So, it’s not just a historical debate—it remains a politically contested issue.

What’s interesting here is that three close allies of Israel are reportedly moving—or being “pushed,” to use their word—toward recognizing Palestinian statehood. I believe a fourth might be Canada, possibly by September. But again, that’s something I’d want to double-check.

What’s your take on this? The two-state solution has been the official framework for decades. Still, opinions vary widely on how achievable it is at this point.

Tsukerman: You’re right to raise concerns about the language used—it’s more complicated than some of the reporting suggests.

First, none of the three countries has officially recognized a Palestinian state yet. What they’ve done is threaten to do so, under specific conditions.

In the case of Norway, its foreign minister stated that if Israel fails to declare or uphold a ceasefire, Norway would consider recognition. The issue there is that Israel has already expressed willingness to agree to a truce, while Hamas rejected the proposed terms. That rejection led to Norway’s envoy storming out of negotiations, accusing Israel of planning to escalate retaliatory measures. This accusation doesn’t fully align with the facts.

Jacobsen: So the trigger wasn’t Israel’s refusal, but Hamas’s?

Tsukerman: Precisely. That’s a key detail many outlets gloss over. Hamas refused the terms of the ceasefire. Meanwhile, Israel has taken several humanitarian steps:

• The blockade was eased.
• Humanitarian pauses were instituted.
• Aid deliveries were significantly expanded.
• The UN resumed operations inside Gaza.
• And multiple countries launched the largest coordinated airdrop operation to date to deliver relief.

Despite this, Hamas has actively obstructed aid efforts—diverting shipments, blocking deliveries, and even reselling humanitarian supplies at inflated prices.

Jacobsen: And what about Macron?

Tsukerman: Macron was more nuanced. He said he might announce French recognition of Palestine at the UN General Assembly, but only if the humanitarian crisis isn’t resolved through other means before then. That was a conditional statement, not a policy shift.

Since then, Israel and international actors have taken numerous steps to mitigate the crisis. So Macron’s condition hasn’t yet been met, and he hasn’t moved forward with recognition.

Jacobsen: So in essence, what’s being portrayed as a surge toward Palestinian statehood recognition is more like conditional diplomatic posturing, dependent on evolving ground realities?

Tsukerman: Exactly. These are leverage tactics—not finalized decisions. And they’re aimed just as much at Hamas and internal political audiences as they are at Israel.

In sum, while the two-state solution remains the official diplomatic framework, the reality on the ground is fragmented, and recognition talk—at this stage—is largely conditional, reactive, and politically calculated rather than a real-time policy transformation.

Jacobsen: So, all of this has led to further diplomatic strain. There has been an open confrontation between Israeli officials and the foreign ministers of those three countries that floated the idea of recognizing a Palestinian state. Some of those foreign ministers have privately admitted that their plan backfired—the moment they made those announcements, Hamas began celebrating, which was not the reaction they were hoping for.

On top of that, Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Palestinian Authority, announced new elections for next year. But shortly after, some of the foreign officials involved were hit with sanctions by the United States, adding yet another layer of political tension.

Tsukerman: Right—and the situation has become even more chaotic due to the rhetoric from figures like Ami Ayalon and Mamdani, who claimed recently that Israel is not even a real country, calling it merely “an idea.” He’s arguing that Israel shouldn’t exist, and that Palestine should be a contiguous state encompassing the West Bank, Gaza, and all territory in between.

In other words, instead of supporting a two-state solution, which is still the official stance of the Arab League and reflected in a tripartite statement by Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, Mamdani is pushing for a one-state solution—but with Palestine replacing Israel, not coexisting alongside it.

Jacobsen: And just to be clear—Mamdani has no actual political power, correct?

Tsukerman: Correct. He’s not a policymaker. But his comments are reflective of a sentiment that exists on the fringes—among Hamas sympathizers and certain anti-Israel activists. While Hamas itself isn’t even interested in a defined Palestinian state—they openly call for inclusion in a broader Islamic caliphate, as outlined in their charter—there are secular or non-Islamist sympathizers who still agree with the idea of eliminating Israel as a state.

This is where the diplomatic controversy heats up. None of the three Western leaders who floated the idea of recognizing Palestine articulated specific borders. They proposed recognition unilaterally, without any negotiated parameters, delimitation, or demarcation, which goes against longstanding U.S. policy, which has consistently emphasized a negotiated solution between Israel and the Palestinians.

Jacobsen: So this isn’t just a political miscalculation—it’s a departure from decades of diplomatic precedent.

Tsukerman: Exactly. The West—particularly the U.S. and the EU—has continuously operated under the assumption that mutual negotiations would determine borders, security guarantees, and other key aspects of statehood. These new comments represent a break from that framework. And now, the countries involved face a diplomatic dilemma.

They made these statements publicly, not behind closed doors. So now they’re stuck. Can they walk them back? If they attempt to reframe their recognition as symbolic or conceptual—acknowledging a future Palestinian state, but not formally recognizing it in legal terms—will it make a difference?

Practically speaking, no. It won’t change anything on the ground. But politically, one of the ministers, Espen Barth Eide of Norway, explicitly said the point was to put pressure on Israel. Yet ironically, he was pushing for a ceasefire that Israel had already agreed to.

Jacobsen: So it was an effort to leverage something that had already been conceded?

Tsukerman: Pretty much. Which raises the question: What exactly were they trying to achieve? All this has done is create a diplomatic scandal, where no one knows how to resolve it because key officials spoke too soon without a clear plan or coordination.

Jacobsen: So the result? Status quo?

Tsukerman: Yes—at best, a continuation of the current impasse. In terms of the actual process of recognizing a Palestinian state, there’s a formal diplomatic mechanism for that. But this scandal between Israel, France, the UK, and others is far more volatile because it played out in the public arena.

That means these governments now face a choice: either act on their public declarations or find a politically palatable excuse for backing off. And neither option looks great. In the meantime, Hamas is capitalizing on the situation—using it to highlight tensions between Israel and its Western allies, and to further the narrative that Israel is becoming isolated on the global stage.

Jacobsen: The Arab League is now saying—collectively and unequivocally—that Hamas must go. They continue to support a two-state solution, but they’re making it clear: it has to be without Hamas.

Tsukerman: That’s a significant shift. While the Western leaders haven’t explicitly said “Hamas must go,” they’ve implied it. They’ve spoken about supporting the idea of Palestinian statehood. Still, in practical terms, that recognition would require a government not controlled by Hamas.

The problem is in the messaging. What the public hears is that these leaders are recognizing a Palestinian state—full stop. There’s no mention of conditions or the need for governance reforms. That’s why it’s so controversial. It sounds unconditional, even if, in reality, it isn’t.

But suppose you examine what they’ve said. In that case, it’s not fundamentally different from the diplomatic language we’ve heard for decades: support for a two-state solution, with the expectation that any Palestinian state must meet basic governance and security criteria.

Jacobsen: So, the controversy is more about the optics than the substance.

Tsukerman: Exactly. It’s about timing, framing, and public perception. Suppose the statements had included firmer language about excluding terrorist groups from any future Palestinian government. In that case, the backlash might’ve been more muted. But instead, it came across as rushed, vague, and poorly coordinated.

Jacobsen: Alright, last topic for this week: Sudan. On July 31, in Cairo and Dubai, we saw reports that Sudan’s paramilitary RSF has formed a parallel government, essentially splitting the country. This comes after two years of civil war, ethnic cleansing, famine, and mass displacement.

In the West, public concern seems laser-focused on Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine, which is fair to some extent. But by most definitions, over a dozen major wars are going on globally, and Sudan is arguably one of the worst. What are your thoughts on both the Western sphere of concern and the humanitarian disaster unfolding in Sudan?

Tsukerman: Sudan’s civil war is, without question, a far greater humanitarian disaster than either Ukraine or Gaza in terms of civilian casualties, mass displacement, and human suffering. We’re talking about hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths—and that’s not even counting combatants.

But it gets less attention for several reasons. First, it’s an internal conflict, not a war between two recognized nations. That makes it harder to fit into the Western media’s geopolitical narratives.

Second, there’s no clear “good guy”. This is a power struggle between two factions—the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Both claim legitimacy. Both are accused of atrocities. The victims are overwhelmingly the Sudanese people.

Jacobsen: So, it’s not a clear-cut story. That complicates public engagement.

Tsukerman: Exactly. Historically, Western media and governments have struggled to mobilize sustained attention when a crisis doesn’t involve strategic rivals or Western interests. Sudan has long been treated as peripheral—tragic, but geopolitically “nonessential.”

To add context: RSF, formerly part of the Janjaweed militias responsible for atrocities in Darfur, was partially integrated into the Sudanese military before splintering under the leadership of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti). It’s largely secular, but brutally opportunistic. The SAF, meanwhile, is also accused of systemic abuses.

Jacobsen: So what we’re seeing now is a de facto partition of Sudan?

Tsukerman: Yes. With the RSF declaring a parallel government, the country is effectively split. That introduces new risks: regional spillover, international refugee crises, destabilization of neighbouring countries, and even the collapse of any future unified state.

And yet, there’s almost no international appetite to intervene or even seriously mediate. Sudan is suffering in silence, mainly because it doesn’t align with the dominant narratives of Western foreign policy or media coverage.

The RSF—the Rapid Support Forces—is widely believed to be responsible for some of the ongoing massacres in Darfur, particularly targeting Black African populations. The RSF is predominantly Arab-led and has recruited mercenaries from outside Sudan, including from Chad and other neighbouring countries.

It receives backing from Russia, which has clear interests in Sudan’s gold mines—many of which are controlled by or accessible through RSF-held territories. Russia’s support is also strategic, seeking to expand its influence in Africa and secure military and commercial footholds, particularly as part of its broader efforts to counter Western influence.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) also backs the RSF, though for different reasons. The UAE had previously sought to establish a naval base in Sudan to expand its maritime influence. Still, the Sudanese army-led government rejected that proposal.

Additionally, the UAE has grown wary of the Sudanese military’s increasing re-engagement with former regime elements, particularly figures affiliated with Omar al-Bashir’s Muslim Brotherhood-aligned networks. These individuals have begun returning to positions of influence within the government, raising the alarm in Abu Dhabi, which views the Brotherhood as a major regional threat.

Jacobsen: So the Sudanese army is being backed by a completely different group of actors?

Tsukerman: Yes. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), or the formal government, is supported by a loose coalition that includes Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others.

• Iran has reportedly supplied drones and weaponry.
• Egypt and Saudi Arabia back the SAF primarily for security and stability reasons, viewing the military as a more manageable and predictable partner than the RSF.

The United States has attempted to mediate. Under the Biden administration, a special envoy was appointed to help broker peace. Still, the position’s status is unclear at this point. To date, no diplomatic breakthrough has occurred.

Jacobsen: Didn’t Saudi Arabia try to host talks?

Tsukerman: Yes, Saudi Arabia did attempt to convene peace negotiations in Jeddah, but neither faction’s leadership attended. The Sudanese president has since gone on a diplomatic tour of countries like Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, seeking political support and funding.

Meanwhile, both sides have reportedly received weapons and material support from their international backers. There are also well-documented cases of weaponized starvation, where humanitarian aid is deliberately blocked, contributing to an escalating famine.

Jacobsen: That’s devastating.

Tsukerman: It is. We’re looking at a documented mass famine, tens of thousands of civilian casualties, and systematic targeting of ethnic communities. In Darfur, there has also been a separate but overlapping conflict, with a specific campaign of violence against Black minorities, amounting to ethnic cleansing.

Both sides have experienced territorial gains and losses. The Sudanese army has taken back some key cities, while the RSF is now attempting to oust SAF forces from Al-Fashir—the military’s last stronghold in Western Darfur. It’s a seesaw battle across different sectarian and tribal lines.

Jacobsen: And yet—no international outcry, no campus protests, no media firestorm.

Tsukerman: That’s the tragedy. Despite the severity of the humanitarian crisis, it hasn’t translated into mass global demonstrations or political activism, unlike what we’ve seen with Ukraine or Gaza.

The U.S. has imposed sanctions on leadership figures from both the RSF and SAF, but the practical impact is minimal. Most of these leaders don’t travel to the West and don’t hold assets in Western financial systems, so the sanctions are largely symbolic.

This is a multi-layered war, fueled by foreign involvement, mercenaries, sectarian violence, and power struggles—but it remains almost invisible in global discourse.

The situation in Sudan has turned into a massive mess, and no one seems to know how to resolve it. There are just too many layers—ethnic, sectarian, geopolitical—and too many external actors involved, each with competing interests. Andfrankly, there’s no strong incentive for any of them to stop meddling.

One key reason the West has paid less attention to the Sudanese civil war is that it’s not perceived as a direct military or security threat to Western interests, at least not at the moment.

In the Middle East, the war in Gaza has spilled over into broader conflict, with Houthi attacks disrupting international trade and escalating tensions involving Iran, Hezbollah, and others. In Europe, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to dominate headlines—not just because of the war itself, but because of broader security threats, hybrid warfare, and concerns about spillover into NATO countries.

By contrast, Sudan’s conflict is seen as self-contained, even though it has regional implications involving African and Middle Eastern countries, and also Russia and China, who are actively engaged.

Jacobsen: And the U.S. hasn’t taken a decisive role here either, correct?

Tsukerman: Correct. The U.S. focus has been disproportionately on Russia and China, especially under the Biden administration. The result is that Sudan gets treated like a peripheral crisis. The strategy so far has been more about pushing Russia and China out of Sudan rather than putting pressure on the actual parties in the conflict. But that approach isn’t working.

Under Trump, the approach was different but equally ineffective. Africa was deprioritized almost entirely, outside of narrow concerns like rare earth elements and counterterrorism operations against groups like al-Shabaab in Somalia. Beyond that, it was never treated as a serious strategic priority.

Jacobsen: So both administrations have fallen short—but in different ways?

Tsukerman: Exactly. And I don’t think either administration fully understood the complexity of the conflict. Sudan is often dismissed as “just another endless war,” but that overlooks the enormous human cost and the potential for regional destabilization. The U.S. has tried diplomatic mediation, but without direct leverage—military, economic, or otherwise—those efforts have stalled.

In contrast, the U.S. had better luck recently with the tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, where a tentative accord was signed. Whether that holds remains to be seen.

Now, Trump is reportedly offering to mediate between Ethiopia and Egypt on the Nile water rights dispute. That’s commendable, but it’s unclear whether anything tangible will come of it.

As for Sudan, unless both leaders are removed or one side decisively prevails, it’s difficult to imagine a political or diplomatic solution taking hold. The announcement of a parallel government by the RSF isn’t surprising—it’s more a formalization of their existing control. They’ve already operated as a de facto state within their territories.

This move is meant to increase legitimacy, attract external political support, and fundraise internationally. But for people on the ground, it won’t change much—they’re still caught between two brutal forces.

Jacobsen: Irina, thank you again for your time and insights.

Tsukerman: Always a pleasure. See you next week.

Jacobsen: Yep—get some rest before your next interview. Take care.

Tsukerman: You too. Have a good night.

Jacobsen: Bye-bye. 

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