The Everywhere Insiders 6: Gaza Aid, Iran’s Nuclear Program, and Global Diplomatic Challenges

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/07/09

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. She argued that Gaza aid site deaths result from broader insecurity and militant interference, not U.S. distribution, cautioning against politicizing humanitarian efforts. On Iran, she noted that the likely relocation of uranium stockpiles under intelligence watch complicates nonproliferation. Discussing regional unrest, she warned of Russian impunity and criticized the selective application of the UN Charter. She lauded Israel’s internal war crimes probe, questioned Trump’s diplomatic and financial tactics, condemned Southeast Asian torture networks, and urged focus on substantive solutions.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: UN Secretary-General António Guterres has criticized a U.S.-backed humanitarian aid initiative in Gaza, reportedly describing it as “inherently unsafe.” This criticism followed incidents where civilians were killed at aid distribution points in the Gaza Strip. According to AP News, Guterres linked the danger not directly to the aid initiative itself but to the broader insecurity and lack of coordination around humanitarian access in Gaza, where ongoing conflict and airstrikes have endangered civilians.

Irina Tsukerman: Civilian deaths at aid sites were not directly caused by the distribution initiative but rather by the broader security situation—particularly the conduct of warring parties. Hamas has been accused of undermining various aid efforts, sometimes through interference or by asserting control over distribution. There have also been reports, including from Israeli and U.S. sources, that Hamas has confiscated aid or interfered with its delivery.

Despite these challenges, the U.S. and Israel have cooperated to deliver millions of aid packages to Gaza. Initially, many of these efforts were successful, including airdrops and the construction of a temporary maritime pier by the U.S. military. However, these efforts have faced logistical difficulties, including damage to the dock and reports of aid not reaching civilians due to chaos on the ground and potential interference from local factions.

One controversial element of Israel’s broader strategy has included attempts to support or arm local factions that could act as rivals to Hamas. These efforts, which some sources describe as covert or indirect, aim to weaken Hamas’s grip. However, critics argue that empowering local militias or clans—some of whom may be secular but authoritarian and violent—risks replacing one problematic actor with another. Historical accounts suggest that Hamas initially gained political traction in Gaza in part because many residents distrusted the existing factions tied to the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, who were widely seen as corrupt or ineffective.

The main issue, then, is the conflation of humanitarian and political objectives. By blending aid delivery with attempts to reshape local power structures, the initiative became vulnerable to political manipulation. This gave Hamas both the motive and the justification to intervene.

Guterres’s criticism may reflect frustration with the breakdown of neutrality in humanitarian delivery. However, critics argue that his comments risk misplacing blame—targeting a relatively successful U.S.-led aid effort rather than the militant interference that disrupted it. There is also concern that some UN-affiliated agencies in Gaza have been compromised or politicized over time, which complicates coordination.

It is fair to criticize elements of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political strategies. However, one must also acknowledge that certain aspects of the aid initiative were practical—until political entanglements and local militant control undermined them.

As for recent developments related to Iran and the movement of uranium following Israeli airstrikes, Reuters has reported that Iran has threatened retaliation over the assassination of senior IRGC commanders and military strikes targeting its regional proxies. There have also been concerns in Washington about Iran’s nuclear program. However, there is no verified public report stating that the U.S. moved Iranian uranium after airstrikes, nor that President Trump warned Iran to relocate its stockpiles ahead of strikes. These claims appear to conflate multiple timelines or rely on unofficial sources.

What is known is that Iran continues to enrich uranium beyond the limits set by the now-defunct Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). U.S. officials are closely monitoring these developments. Discussions in Congress include possible additional sanctions or deterrence measures in response to Iranian escalation.

But you have to admit—once you give the Iranians advanced warning, of course, they are going to move their uranium stockpiles. The question is: where did they go? These trucks carrying enriched uranium cannot just vanish. They have to be somewhere. If the uranium was relocated, and it most likely was, then that new location is probably known—at least partially—by intelligence agencies, as it has been under discussion for some time. So why has there been no initiative to intercept it before it was moved so deep underground that there is now practically no chance of recovering it?

This also means that Iran could potentially restart its nuclear program almost immediately without needing to wait for reconstruction or to retrieve buried stockpiles from damaged sites like Fordow or Natanz. All of this creates a highly intractable situation. The U.S. is attempting to bring Iran back to the negotiating table. But without conditions that prevent Iran from continuing its nuclear development covertly, those negotiations are likely to fail. Iran currently has no incentive to negotiate, as it believes it still holds strategic leverage.

And now it might. If Iran has managed to preserve or relocate even part of its uranium, the threat remains. Furthermore, if some of the recent intelligence is correct—that Iran was closer to developing a nuclear weapon than previously thought—then it is possible that components or even completed weapons were smuggled out of the country before these discoveries were made public. Iran has had longstanding exchanges with China, Oman, North Korea, and various non-state actors. It is conceivable that nuclear materials, or even fully assembled devices, could have been moved alongside other weapons, oil, or gas shipments.

In such a scenario, Iran may not need to build a new weapon on its soil; it could have outsourced the final stages of production or even stored weapons abroad, perhaps in North Korea. This would mean Iran has retained a strategic deterrent without openly violating its commitments in a traceable way. While these possibilities remain speculative, they are not being discussed widely in public discourse. Yet the implications are profound: incomplete strikes that leave Iran’s leadership intact and its infrastructure only partially damaged may serve as motivation for Tehran to accelerate its nuclear ambitions. It could even lead to a weapons test shortly if Iran believes the geopolitical window is closing.

Jacobsen: The United Nations’ peacekeeping chief, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, has stated that the conflict in Sudan is beginning to impact the Central African Republic. This was highlighted following an attack on a UN peacekeeper. What are your thoughts on the potential for this conflict to expand regionally? And if it does, what are the appropriate international responses to prevent escalation?

Tsukerman: I don’t expect a large-scale confrontation in the immediate future. The tensions have not yet reached that threshold. However, the fact that there is already spillover—and that incidents like attacks on UN peacekeepers are occurring—shows that destabilization efforts are underway. These are not isolated accidents. There are actors, including Russia and regional factions, who benefit from instability and may be encouraging it.

The more Russia sees no consequences for its actions elsewhere, the more it is emboldened to provoke unrest in additional regions—just because it can. This creates a dangerous precedent. We are already seeing troubling signs: for instance, former President Trump has publicly pushed to end U.S. funding for democracy-promoting initiatives abroad. That means Russian dissidents, Ukrainian civil society groups, and other vulnerable actors are losing critical support.

Additionally, there is a reported recommendation from the White House to end investigations into Russian war crimes in Ukraine. If that happens, it further signals to Moscow and others that international norms are optional. Such policies not only weaken Western influence but embolden authoritarian regimes to act without fear of accountability.

All of this is signalling to Russia that it can commit war crimes, provocations, invasions, and acts of aggression with impunity. Suppose Moscow can get away with a direct, full-scale invasion of a sovereign country like Ukraine. In that case, smaller-scale proxy attacks will likely proliferate. That is basic geopolitical logic. Russia’s aim appears to be creating as many flashpoints and destabilizing incidents as possible, forcing the U.S. and its allies to spread their attention thin—monitoring too many regions at once. This reduces the ability to respond effectively to any one crisis and weakens global coordination.

Jacobsen: The U.S. has recently threatened to boycott the upcoming UN Development Finance Summit. What are your thoughts?

Tsukerman: There has been much inflammatory rhetoric surrounding that summit. It is no secret that Trump has little regard for multilateral international gatherings, especially those organized by the UN. He has had longstanding issues with the UN—some of which involve its perceived interference with U.S. sovereignty, particularly when it comments on or critiques U.S. constitutional matters.

However, Trump’s more profound concern is the growing influence of China in these international arenas. He wants the United States to maintain dominance without contributing more financially, yet is simultaneously frustrated that other powers—especially China—are using diplomacy, lobbying, and funding to advance their influence in the vacuum left by the U.S. retreat.

So, now, the U.S. is attempting to withdraw, hoping that other countries will follow or that the absence of American participation will delegitimize the summit. The U.S. still holds a permanent veto at the Security Council, but walking away from other UN platforms only diminishes its soft power and influence.

And that is the irony: by not offering viable alternatives or engaging bilaterally with summit participants, the U.S. ultimately isolates itself. It is not setting up new channels, building alternative coalitions, or pursuing a replacement strategy. It is simply boycotting—thereby appearing more like a spoiler than a global leader.

Jacobsen: The UN Charter is now marking its 80th anniversary. Secretary-General Guterres has warned against countries engaging with the UN in a “à la carte” fashion—selectively adhering to Charter obligations. He cited violations tied to multiple conflicts. While it is unclear whether he referred to historical, ongoing, or both kinds of breaches, the criticism seems valid in all three cases. What are your reflections on this anniversary and the selective adherence to the Charter?

Tsukerman: It is painfully apparent that the UN and other international organizations are falling short of their founding missions—especially in the realm of human rights. With the global rise in authoritarianism and widespread human rights abuses, many of the Charter’s commitments now feel hollow.

States responsible for gross violations of human rights are not being sanctioned or isolated; instead, they are welcomed at international gatherings, given platforms, and in some cases—such as with permanent members of the Security Council—granted veto power. That creates a system in which enforcement is nearly impossible.

When we mark anniversaries like the 80th anniversary of the UN Charter, it is primarily symbolic. Such milestones only hold weight if the member states genuinely uphold the values they signed on to. Selective engagement, or “à la carte” adherence, undermines the entire structure. If countries only follow the rules when it suits them, the system collapses into moral relativism and strategic opportunism.

The fact that selective treatment of international law and standards occurs is, from a practical standpoint, not surprising. Of course, states will cherry-pick the benefits that benefit them and push their agendas when given the opportunity. That is precisely where international consensus is supposed to function—where other member states and institutional partners are expected to hold each other accountable. But they do not. The disparity across nations is so stark that it is astonishing that any human rights are respected at all, anywhere.

What is needed is a clear and enforceable human rights charter. But enforcement begins at the national level before it can be applied internationally. And frankly, without mechanisms to hold global powers like China and Russia accountable—both of whom routinely use their positions on the UN Security Council to block scrutiny of their own human rights violations—it is challenging to envision meaningful global enforcement.

These powers often collaborate within the Security Council to prevent serious consequences for their actions. Without structural reforms or independent enforcement mechanisms, international human rights law becomes performative. At present, it risks becoming a global punchline.

Jacobsen: Reuters recently reported that Amnesty International and others uncovered 53 scam compounds operating out of Cambodia. These centers reportedly traffic and torture victims, including children, to run global cyber fraud schemes. Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: Honestly, I should be more shocked than I am. The proliferation of scam networks in certain parts of Southeast Asia is not a new phenomenon. What is new—and truly alarming—is the evidence that these criminal enterprises are increasingly partnering with human traffickers and other organized crime groups to expand their operations.

Why target children? First, because they can. Children are vulnerable, easily manipulated, and powerless. Second, it is significantly more challenging for authorities to investigate or prosecute such abuses, especially in areas where corruption is rampant or law enforcement is complicit. Third, there are well-established trafficking networks in the region that can easily supply these criminal syndicates with child victims.

Why torture them? Because these groups are utterly ruthless. People often underestimate the severity of financial fraud, but these operations are not bloodless crimes. Victims are usually elderly, isolated, or vulnerable individuals who are deprived of their life savings. These groups also engage in ransomware, extortion, and blackmail. There have been suicides linked to their scams, and many victims lose their homes, pensions, or basic livelihoods.

So, the objectives are predatory, and the methods are equally brutal. Unfortunately, prosecution is difficult. First, because these operations are transnational, requiring cooperation among countries with vastly different legal systems, political agendas, and law enforcement capabilities. Second, because many of the details of how these groups operate have only recently come to light, they had long operated in near-total secrecy.

While the existence of such scams in Southeast Asia has been known for years, how they function—the forced labour, the torture, the human trafficking pipeline—has only recently begun to be exposed in full detail. That exposure is critical if international law enforcement is ever going to catch up.

There has been a fundamental lack of attention, lack of resources, and low prioritization when it comes to tackling these transnational scams and trafficking networks. In addition, there is a clear deficit in training and preparedness for this type of complex, hybrid criminal activity. Now that these operations have crossed into open physical violence and abductions, perhaps the international response dynamic will shift. But it should not have taken this long.

Jacobsen: Israeli forces have reportedly launched an internal war crimes investigation concerning the deaths of 500 civilians in Gaza. Any thoughts on this?

Tsukerman: That is a very encouraging sign. It is precisely what should happen when credible allegations of grave violations are raised. The fact that Israel is conducting a self-policing investigation shows that the mechanisms of accountability are functioning, at least to some extent.

Yes, one can—and should—criticize certain government officials or political leaders for using inflammatory rhetoric that may contribute to a dehumanizing environment. However, the rule of law requires that credible allegations are investigated and, where warranted, punished. That is the mark of a functioning democracy and an ethical military code of conduct.

I hope that some of Israel’s harshest critics in the region take this as a lesson—not just as an opportunity to issue more condemnations. Instead, they should focus on adopting similar transparency and internal accountability mechanisms. Criticism is easy. Facing international and domestic pressure while investigating your actions is much harder—and that is what Israel is doing here.

Jacobsen: Shifting to another topic, Australia’s defense outlays are about 2.0% of GDP, with a forecast to reach 2.33% only by 2033–34. As you know, NATO’s minimum spending guideline is 2%. Canada, by comparison, remains around 1.4% and is projected to reach 2% in the coming year. What are your thoughts on Australia’s case and the broader implications of this American pressure?

Tsukerman: Australia faces its own set of unique security challenges, with China representing the most significant concern. While I do not believe China will launch a direct attack on Australia shortly, asymmetric threats—like cyber warfare, influence campaigns, and economic coercion—are real and growing. Australia needs to be prepared for these contingencies, which are part of NATO’s evolving doctrine.

Moreover, Australia is a crucial ally in the Indo-Pacific and a member of strategic alliances like AUKUS and the Quad. With mounting instability in the region, it is in everyone’s interest that Australia is well-resourced and strategically positioned.

That said, this issue is not just about raw budget numbers. Spending 2% of GDP is a baseline, but what truly matters is how that money is used—whether it is being invested in modernization, joint operations capacity, cyber defence, intelligence, and other force multipliers. Budgetary compliance alone does not guarantee security or alliance strength. Strategic clarity and efficient use of funds are just as important.

Correctly allocating a defence budget means more than just hitting a spending target. It requires ensuring that deliveries are made on time, that procurement processes are transparent and efficient, and that priorities are coordinated with allies in a way that addresses shared strategic challenges. All of these factors matter just as much as the actual size of the budget.

Simply throwing money at a problem does not guarantee responsible use. It often leads to the opposite. The U.S. Department of Defence, for example, has one of the most significant budgets in the world. Yet, it has consistently failed audits and has persistent issues with oversight, inventory tracking, and cost control. This shows that even with near-unlimited funding, mismanagement is possible—and, in some cases, systemic.

Jacobsen: One of the significant developments this week was a minor update to the investigation into strikes in Gaza. Prime Minister Netanyahu has publicly denied claims that Israeli forces were ordered to shoot Palestinians seeking aid. Strikes reportedly continue to impact aid convoys and distribution points. So, the core issue remains the distinction between inadvertent harm and deliberate targeting. Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: I have not seen any verified evidence that supports the claim of a deliberate shoot-to-kill order against civilians seeking aid. Most of these allegations come from anonymous sources unwilling to go on record or from individuals who are openly opposed to the war effort and Israeli military conduct. That does not automatically invalidate their concerns, but it does raise red flags about reliability and motive.

There is a crucial distinction between legitimate critiques—such as concerns over proportionality, civilian safety, or strategic missteps—and fabricating or exaggerating claims to score political points. Some of these reports, in my view, may cross that line. When people insert intent where there is no clear evidence, they undermine the credibility of real, evidence-based human rights monitoring.

Suppose these accusations are being made solely to bolster a political case without the backing of forensic data or credible firsthand testimony. In that case, we risk turning war crimes allegations into tools of political warfare—rather than instruments of justice. That can inflame tensions, damage prospects for peace, and create misinformation that further destabilizes the region. It is crucial to demand transparency and accountability from all sides—but also to uphold rigorous standards of evidence in how these allegations are reported and evaluated.

Jacobsen: I would like to bring up one last issue—Trump’s recent comments criticizing negotiations with Canada. This seems to be getting very little coverage. What are your thoughts?

Tsukerman: Yes, that’s the elephant in the room. Trump’s remarks were not only dismissive but also based on a bizarre justification. He claimed that the breakdown in negotiations was due to Canada’s proposal to tax large tech companies—many of which are based in the United States.

Look, it is entirely reasonable to disagree over taxation and digital trade policies. But walking away from broader diplomatic and economic talks over a specific tax proposal—especially one that is being considered or adopted by several democratic nations—is disproportionate and counterproductive.

It sends a message that the U.S. is unwilling to engage in difficult but necessary negotiations with close allies. And it weakens the kind of cooperation that is needed to address global challenges—whether in trade, defence, climate, or digital regulation. Canada has consistently been a constructive partner in multilateral forums. Undermining that relationship over a policy disagreement risks not only damaging bilateral ties but also eroding the broader credibility of U.S. diplomacy.

The problem is that Trump has framed the dispute as some nefarious, ill-intentioned attack on Americans by the Prime Minister and the Canadian government. That is so absurd that it is hard to know where to begin. There is no logical reason why the talks should have collapsed over what was, in essence, a standard policy disagreement. That is precisely why such negotiations exist—to resolve these differences.

If a policy gap exists, the next step is to work out compromises—introduce a give-and-take model or create a new structural framework to meet the goals of both parties. Instead, it appears that the administration either lacked the creativity to move forward constructively or never intended to negotiate in good faith in the first place. Perhaps Trump, now that the Iran issue has faded somewhat, felt the need to return to this anti-Canada narrative as a distraction from domestic challenges.

There are ongoing crises at home—from legal troubles to economic uncertainty—and posturing against a neighbour like Canada might seem, to him, like an easy win for his political base. He may resume the talks at a later date. Still, suppose he continues to treat every reasonable disagreement as an existential threat. In that case, he will rapidly alienate traditional allies and lose valuable diplomatic capital.

This is incredibly self-destructive behaviour. Turning minor disagreements into full-scale diplomatic breakdowns erodes trust, credibility, and the long-term ability to negotiate anything meaningful.

Jacobsen: On a different note, Reuters has reported that a UAE-based fund purchased $100 million worth of Trump’s “World Liberty Coins,” a cryptocurrency initiative associated with his brand. Do you have thoughts on this?

Tsukerman: I mean, let us be honest—it is not a massive sum for the UAE. They spend significantly more on arms, infrastructure, and influence-building globally. But the optics here are blatant. It is a strategic move to curry favour with Trump. The logic seems to be: if other governments and actors are buying access and goodwill through symbolic or frivolous means, why not them, too?

Unfortunately, we are witnessing what appears to be open bribery. These cryptocurrencies have no demonstrable utility or value in global markets. Yet, they are being bought in bulk—not as an investment, but as a means to gain favour. That is the core issue: Trump has created an ecosystem in which foreign states feel empowered to participate in pay-to-play schemes with virtually no oversight.

This is not about diplomacy or even soft power. It is about personal enrichment in exchange for political leverage. That creates an immediate and dangerous conflict of interest between Trump’s role as a private businessman and his potential or actual role as head of state. This is behaviour that would be outright illegal under most standard interpretations of conflict-of-interest law.

In a functioning democracy with adequate enforcement mechanisms, something like this would be prohibited entirely. There would be immediate investigations. But the current political climate allows him to get away with behaviour that, under normal circumstances, would be grounds for serious legal action. It is not just unethical—it is potentially criminal.

This is an impeachable offence. But until the Democrats retake Congress, I do not see anyone making such a move—or even seriously raising the argument in public.

Jacobsen: Anything else worth bringing up?

Tsukerman: Mamdani’s election by the Democrats in New York. 

Jacobsen: Let’s do Mamdani. He got elected—what are your initial thoughts?

Tsukerman: Mamdani’s election is significant, but what is troubling is how Republicans are handling it. They are focusing heavily on his alleged religious identity, framing it in a way that makes him seem like a threat. In doing so, they are turning him into a sympathetic figure for many observers, even those who might disagree with him on policy. By reducing everything to religious insinuations, they’re undermining legitimate critique and giving him political cover.

Instead of dismantling Mamdani’s hypocrisy and lack of political substance—his performative rhetoric, his privileged background, and his shallow understanding of complex policy issues—his critics are going after his alleged religious identity. That is a strategic mistake. He will not bring socialism; he will profit from socialist talking points while maintaining personal privilege. That is the argument they should be making. He is yet another political opportunist using ideological branding to build a platform. He is, frankly, a scammer.

Jacobsen: Any final thoughts for this week?

Tsukerman: Yes. There are severe issues in play right now. Unfortunately, many prominent figures seem more interested in hijacking these discussions—turning procedural matters into personal soapboxes, dramatizing secondary concerns, and diverting attention from the urgent issues that need resolution. That is the real takeaway from this week’s events: manufactured controversy continues to eclipse real solutions.

Jacobsen: Irina, thank you as always. 

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