The National Security Shake-Up: Trump’s Loyalty Purge

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/04/27

In a wide-ranging interview, Irina Tsukerman, Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, outlines a systematic reshuffling within the National Security Council during Trump’s second term. Unlike his first term, the dismissals are deliberate, driven by loyalty tests and distrust of experts. Seasoned professionals are being replaced by underqualified loyalists, leading to leadership gaps, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and intelligence leaks. Figures like Laura Loomer, though fringe, gained influence, further destabilizing national security. The erosion of trust extends to international allies, threatening the integrity of intelligence-sharing frameworks. Tsukerman warns this ideological purge could cause long-term damage to U.S. global standing and operational coherence.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: So today, we’re here with Irina Tsukerman. She’s the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider. So, yes, I wanted to talk about key National Security Council officials in the second Trump administration.

Many dismissals have been in this second term, especially within the first hundred days. It’s always strange to count time like that—first hundred days, sixty, or ninety—it feels a bit arbitrary, like counting half-years as an adult. But what is the strategic rationale for dismissing National Security Council officials so far in this term?

Irina Tsukerman: This second term differs significantly from the first because what’s happening now isn’t random. It’s very systematic. Outside sources are prompting events—I’ll get to that moment—but overall, the approach is planned and strategic, unlike the more chaotic, reactive shuffling of personalities we saw in the first term.

In the first term, Trump didn’t fire many people who weren’t his own personal appointees. He chose not to fill many appointed positions, especially in diplomacy, but he didn’t mass-fire entire categories of personnel.

Now, however, he’s systematically targeting intelligence agencies. He’s calling them out directly. This process is both distinct and interconnected. First, there’s the broader emptying of personnel from general intelligence agencies. This included a buyout plan, which offered eight months’ worth of back pay to anyone willing to leave voluntarily. Those who stayed and fell into specific categories identified by the administration were then subject to unceremonious dismissal.

That aspect was framed as an efficiency measure and included administrative staff, technical personnel, and intelligence officers. So, it was a combination of things: first, a claim of improving efficiency by eliminating duplicative roles across major agencies; second, an attempt to purge what they consider the entrenched “deep state” within intelligence services.

That’s one major component. The NSC shake-up is slightly different but tied to another long-standing trend: loyalty tests. Trump and his close circle have applied these tests since he took office. What we’re seeing now is an extension of this approach—expanding the expectation of personal loyalty across the federal government, effectively redefining national security policy around it.

Unlike in the first term, where we saw more dramatic firings of high-profile figures like John Bolton and Rex Tillerson, this term is about building a structure where personal loyalty to Trump, rather than institutional or constitutional loyalty, becomes the foundation of U.S. national security.

The reshuffling in the second term is more insidious. It systematically sidelines qualified experts—not necessarily the top names you hear about in the news but the actual subject matter experts. These people do the core work.

We’re seeing the rise of political appointees with little to no national security experience. And that lack of knowledge has, disturbingly, become almost a qualification. The underlying logic in these circles—driven by a paranoid worldview—is that individuals who do have expertise may have been “hijacked” by the so-called deep state or maybe disloyal because they have institutional knowledge and competence.

By contrast, someone with no skills or experience owes their entire position to the Trump administration. They must remain loyal because, without Trump, they would not be there. That’s literally the rationale behind some of these staffing decisions.

This shift has raised serious alarms about the future of U.S. diplomacy and national security, both domestically and internationally.

Jacobsen: And what about the broader implications for cybersecurity and intelligence?

Tsukerman: The most concerning impact is the growing vulnerability of U.S. intelligence systems, cybersecurity protocols, and global influence. Multiple concerning trends compound this. First, efforts have been made to extract vast amounts of data for unclear purposes. Second, unsafe cybersecurity practices are emerging, even at the highest levels.

For instance, just last week, there was a reported case in which Elon Musk reportedly modified a cybersecurity protocol that allowed a Russian-linked entity access to sensitive systems, resulting in what could be a massive security breach.

We still do not know how that story will unfold. Still, we know widespread concern about how sensitive data is handled and how cybersecurity protocols are being weakened under current leadership.

Jacobsen: So when it comes to well-known figures, who stands out?

Tsukerman: One notable case is Timothy Haugh. He’s a U.S. Air Force general recently appointed by President Biden as the head of the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command. He has been dismissed. There is speculation and concern about the political targeting of career professionals like him. His distinguished service in intelligence and counterterrorism has earned him respect across the aisle, including from many Republicans in Congress.

The fear is that there is a growing pattern—an administration preference for personal loyalty over expertise.

His career exemplifies professionalism and meticulous intelligence work, which some perceive as “too establishment” or out of sync with the populist, anti-establishment rhetoric from certain corners of the administration.

His hypothetical removal would not be an isolated event—it would be part of a broader trend in which highly experienced professionals, particularly in intelligence and security roles, are replaced by those who echo the administration’s messaging.

To prove their loyalty, it is no longer enough for officials to avoid leaks and perform competently. Increasingly, they are expected to parrot the rhetoric and mirror the ideological tone set by the administration’s top—even if it is not formally part of their role. Unless someone operates entirely in the background, they must actively demonstrate their alignment.

The official in question had served in various roles at the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. He was known for his commitment to intelligence, integrity, and protecting U.S. national security from foreign threats. However, he was also a pragmatist—and that pragmatic approach increasingly clashed with the internal atmosphere at the White House, which had become marked by growing paranoia and distrust of traditional expertise.

This wasn’t just limited to the national security sector. Similar patterns could be seen in agencies like the Department of Health and Human Services. It was part of a broader trend. Individuals who were once respected, experienced professionals became casualties of what I would call a political purge—one that prioritized loyalty and ideology above competence and experience.

That particular dismissal and the firing of six National Security Council staffers—all considered competent, pragmatic, and level-headed—did not happen accidentally, randomly, or in isolation.

It stemmed from a bizarre and frankly alarming incident involving Laura Loomer, a well-known 9/11 conspiracy theorist.

Laura Loomer never held an official position with the National Security Council, thankfully. She is a fringe writer and political activist who calls herself a journalist. However, “social media personality” would be a more accurate description. She has a long history of promoting unfounded conspiracy theories and, by her own accounts, has struggled with mental health issues.

Jacobsen: And she gained influence during the second term?

Tsukerman: Surprisingly, yes. She emerged as a bizarre but increasingly visible figure during Trump’s second presidential campaign and continued gaining proximity to key figures. She began appearing at campaign events and became a symbolic voice for a particular ideological faction.

She is now 32 years old and rose from the margins of the internet as an online provocateur. She often promoted extremely outlandish and baseless conspiracy theories—some so fringe that, under normal circumstances, they would have rendered her persona non grata in any serious media or political circles.

But that’s no longer the case. Platforms like Elon Musk’s X (formerly Twitter) and other pro-Trump media ecosystems have given her a new stage. Her unhinged rhetoric—centred on accusations of government corruption and the so-called “deep state”—was entirely devoid of substantiated evidence.

To be clear, legitimate government corruption does exist, and we should address it through proper investigative and legal means. But Loomer promotes a world of fiction—an alternate reality fueled by paranoia and misinformation.

Her growing influence in Trump’s inner circle is disturbing. Sometimes, I wonder if her presence was truly influential or was being used as a cover—a mouthpiece for ideologies already brewing within the administration. Either way, the fact that her rhetoric helped shape or justify real staffing decisions is deeply troubling.

But Loomer’s vocal support for Trump’s populist agenda and her penchant for spreading disinformation made her a frequent and convenient ally for those in the administration who viewed professional national security experts with disdain. That contempt resulted in the unceremonious dismissal of several qualified staffers.

The rise of figures like Loomer has been deeply problematic. It encourages an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility toward intelligence agencies, diplomatic services, and other professional institutions—rather than fostering dialogue, reform, or strategic reorientation.

Of course, any administration will have individuals whose views conflict with the president’s agenda, and replacements are sometimes necessary. That is a regular part of governance. But what we are seeing here is categorically different. This is not about political disagreements—it’s about eroding the foundations of evidence-based governance.

Loomer’s presence exacerbated Trump’s growing distrust of experts and analysts, driving the administration further from fact-based decision-making. The more Trump embraced voices like hers, the less he relied on the extensive networks of national security experts—including many loyal conservatives who supported his policy goals.

That left the United States more vulnerable to global threats and internal instability. In one alarming incident, Loomer reportedly arrived uninvited at the White House and met with Trump. After that meeting, she allegedly voiced concerns about disloyalty within the National Security Council. Soon afterward, six NSC staffers were dismissed.

When asked about the decision, Trump gave a vague response—saying things like, “Well, I listen to everyone… I respect people’s opinions.” This rhetoric aligned with his broader pattern of valuing personal impressions and emotional loyalty over institutional integrity.

Jacobsen: So, was she driving policy?

Tsukerman: That’s the question. I don’t believe she has real policymaking power. She could have been used as a stand-in or proxy by far more influential individuals within or adjacent to the administration. Trump appears to trust her—or perhaps she reinforces his instincts—which makes her a useful intermediary for advancing ideological goals.

What matters just as much as actual power is the optics. Her visibility shifts the Overton window—acceptable discourse on issues like national security. Even if she isn’t the one pulling the strings, her influence alters the political climate to facilitate dangerous decisions.

And if anyone wanted to weaken U.S. national security—whether a hostile foreign actor or someone with malign intentions—this would be a very effective way to undermine professionals, elevate loyalists, and reduce critical oversight.

Jacobsen: What is the impact of all this in the long term?

Tsukerman: At the end of the day, it puts national security at serious risk. The mass departure of seasoned professionals—including many people of colour—is not just the result of differing policy views. It reflects a broader trend of decision-making driven by ideology and personal loyalty rather than merit or national interest.

That is incredibly dangerous. The system becomes more vulnerable when a leader surrounds himself with yes-men, afraid to challenge flawed decisions, push back on incorrect information, or question poorly implemented policies.

The persecution—or prosecution, metaphorically—of experts stems from Trump’s belief that many institutions, including the national security apparatus, are inherently opposed to him. There is no evidence that General Timothy Haugh or the other dismissed NSC staffers acted in a way that undermined Trump’s goals. But they were removed nonetheless, caught in the tide of a loyalty-driven purge.

He accused them anyway. Trump is increasingly alienating himself from traditional sources of expertise by choice, which means that key positions are either left completely unfilled or are staffed with individuals lacking the requisite knowledge and experience to address critical issues. That creates a serious vulnerability that any adversary could easily exploit.

This trend is weakening the United States’ ability to respond to growing threats from adversarial state actors like China and Russia. It is also fracturing the coherence of U.S. foreign policy. As the White House becomes increasingly consumed by internal loyalty tests and political infighting—among individuals vying for power and Trump’s approval—national security practices, which once functioned as somewhat bureaucratic but effective machinery for maintaining global stability, are becoming fragmented and inefficient.

Ironically, decision-making is slowing down, not because of excessive bureaucracy but because no one is left with the authority, backing, or expertise to make critical decisions and act swiftly. That vacuum creates a system that is highly susceptible to manipulation—by outside actors like foreign adversaries or even by internal operatives with their own agendas.

The ideological shift away from professionalism toward political loyalty has made U.S. systems more vulnerable to cyber espionage by China, disinformation campaigns from Russia, and other forms of political and financial exploitation. The internal fragmentation creates openings for the exploitation of internal divisions, weakening the country’s defence infrastructure from within.

And here’s the ultimate irony: all these internal loyalty tests helped create the conditions that led to the Signal Leaks Scandal, often referred to as Signalgate. This reshuffling—the removal of competent staff and replacement with ideologically loyal but unqualified individuals—laid the groundwork for one of the most serious breaches of classified intelligence in recent history.

Jacobsen: Can you elaborate on the leak and what happened?

Tsukerman: Trump had long accused his staff of leaking information returning to his first term. But in this most recent case, he alleged that intelligence about internal communications—signals intelligence—was revealed through a chat group that an Atlantic journalist infiltrated.

Trump claimed the journalist had been invited inadvertently and that it was the fault of several staffers with ties to HECSES—a loosely affiliated internal group. Ultimately, three NSC staffers were arrested in connection with this incident. One was a deputy chief of staff who was quietly reassigned to another agency. The other two remain under investigation.

However, there’s no public evidence that they leaked classified information beyond what eventually surfaced in the media due to infighting between journalists and national security officials. Despite this, those three individuals became scapegoats.

Meanwhile, others—including figures like Waltz, Hegseth, Gabbard, & Ratcliffe who were reportedly responsible for serious breaches of security protocols—have not faced any consequences. They retained their positions, were not publicly reprimanded, and avoided accountability. They could even shift the blame to others, protecting themselves at the expense of those without involvement.

This left the Office of the Secretary of Defense with virtually no senior staff to implement or execute policy, adding to an already chaotic atmosphere inside the Pentagon and the broader national security apparatus.

So now, we find ourselves in a situation where the very administration that has long been accused of undermining national security is operating in an environment where leaks—both real and fabricated—are proliferating at an unprecedented rate. The structures that once maintained order and security are now in disarray.

In the case of the signal leaks, that incident became a public story. However, in other situations, we deal with leaks that point to serious internal security failings that are not adequately addressed through official channels.

Some of these are quasi-official leaks, meaning people within the system leak information not out of malice but out of desperation. They are unable to get the attention of their superiors to implement the correct protocols or address significant security concerns. So, ironically, they turn to the media—not because they want to undermine national security but because they are trying to protect it.

These individuals are, in effect, acting as whistleblowers. They are revealing the administration’s failures because there is no functional internal process to report and resolve those issues discreetly. If proper oversight mechanisms were in place—and if senior officials were competent, experienced, or even open to fixing problems—these leaks would not be happening.

Jacobsen: So it’s a breakdown of internal systems?

Tsukerman: This is the environment that has been created. Trump has been paranoid about leaks since his first term. At that time, he viewed them as evidence of a so-called deep state conspiracy to undermine his agenda. But the reality is more nuanced.

Yes, there were leaks under Trump. However, there were also leaks under Biden—from individuals who were not Trump supporters but who opposed Biden’s policies for being too centrist or insufficiently progressive. These people were often far to the left of Biden himself. That historical context fuels Trump’s paranoia: He sees leaks as proof that the government is inherently disloyal or corrupt.

While that view is not entirely irrational—leaks can indicate dysfunction—the way he chooses to address the issue is counterproductive. Instead of reforming internal processes or improving oversight, he replaces experienced professionals with loyalists, which worsens the situation.

The irony is striking: his actions to prevent leaks are contributing to the security failures that lead to more leaks. This self-reinforcing cycle further destabilizes the administration and damages the United States’ global credibility.

Jacobsen: How does this impact national security?

Tsukerman: These leaks—whether officially sanctioned, unauthorized, or somewhere in between—not only embarrass the administration but also harm the U.S.’s standing on the world stage. Foreign intelligence services, particularly Russia and China, exploit the situation.

The structural vulnerabilities created by this breakdown in process, trust, and professionalism have led to significant consequences. Chinese cyber operations, in particular, have capitalized on this dysfunction. China has leveraged its cyber capabilities to infiltrate U.S. government systems and private corporations.

They view U.S. cybersecurity infrastructure as significantly weakened—an unfortunately inaccurate assessment. The erosion of influence and authority among seasoned national security professionals has left significant gaps in defence, and these gaps have been exploited by both formal and informal Chinese actors, including hackers and intelligence operatives.

As a result, China can carry out cyber espionage campaigns with relative impunity. The combination of internal disarray and external threats is dangerous, and it is undermining U.S. resilience at a time when we can least afford it.

Just last week, in a tit-for-tat maneuver, China openly retaliated against the United States following a reported National Security Agency (NSA) operation that allegedly infiltrated secure Chinese government systems during the Asian Games—a regional equivalent of the Olympics for Asian countries.

In response, China publicly “burned” three NSA officers, naming them and accusing the U.S. of undermining China’s cybersecurity. This was particularly notable given that China’s cyber operations regularly target U.S. systems. Their retaliation, while framed as defensive, was part of the ongoing cyber warfare dynamics between both countries.

That is just one aspect of the broader China–U.S. cyber hostility. But another equally concerning aspect is the systematic dismantling of anti-Russian cybersecurity protocols within the U.S. government. This is not happening by accident, it is not a bureaucratic oversight, and it is a deliberate, high-level policy decision.

Jacobsen: They’re dismantling those protocols formally?

Tsukerman: Yes. Officially and formally, anti-Russian cybersecurity operations are being scaled back or dissolved across the Department of Defense and intelligence agencies. It is another disastrous consequence of the recent reshuffles in national security leadership.

This raises a critical question: What does all of this say about the current integrity of the U.S. security apparatus, and where is it heading?

It is difficult to fully assess the extent of the damage without a comprehensive review. Unfortunately, no one seems to be in a position—or willing—to make that assessment. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), for example, has been more focused on budgetary issues than operational capability, and even then, it lacks the specialized expertise to evaluate strategic security breakdowns properly.

But judging by observable outcomes, the impact is already quite severe. The mass firings and resignations of key staff—including those responsible for executing complex intelligence and defence operations—are taking their toll. We do not yet know the exact number or nature of the personnel losses, but what we can see from the top-level dysfunction is deeply troubling.

We have a Secretary of Defense operating without a whole staff. Top national security officials are making questionable and, at times, damaging decisions, ignoring basic safety and intelligence protocols. Meanwhile, highly competent and dedicated professionals are either leaving or being forced out—many have yet to be replaced.

Jacobsen: So, who’s running the show?

Tsukerman: That’s the terrifying part. In many cases, no one knows. We are seeing leadership gaps in critical areas like the NSA, where no director is in place. These positions are left vacant or filled with temporary acting officials who may not remain in place long.

This creates a massive vulnerability. Foreign intelligence agencies—especially those from adversarial countries—track these developments closely. Personnel monitoring is a significant part of their job. They look at who is in, who is out, and who holds what position. It is fundamental to their infiltration strategy through social engineering or direct hacking efforts.

When they see key U.S. positions left vacant or handed over to underqualified loyalists, it sends a signal: the system is unstable. The United States appears to be operating without sufficient staffing, subject-matter expertise, and robust security protocols or frameworks to manage the threats we face.

Jacobsen: So, from a foreign intelligence perspective, is it open season?

Tsukerman: In many ways, yes. We are dealing with a combination of political purges, loyalty tests, and leadership gaps compromising national security at a structural level. It is a dangerous situation—one that is already being exploited. The impact of these developments extends beyond adversaries—it also affects our allies, particularly within the Five Eyes alliance. This is the core intelligence-sharing network between the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. It has long been regarded as one of the most effective and trusted cooperative frameworks in the world, especially in counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and global surveillance.

Now, that trust is eroding. There have already been public and private complaints from allies, including unusual remarks from UK intelligence about specific U.S. officials. One name mentioned is Tulsi Gabbard. However, it’s important to clarify that she was confirmed as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). So, there may be confusion or misreporting on that front. Still, the broader point stands: U.S. allies are voicing concerns about the competence and reliability of current leadership within American intelligence.

When top-level officials are reckless, inexperienced, and lack the judgment or background to manage complex operations—and when they are not supported by skilled, experienced personnel beneath them—the result is a weakened national security apparatus. That instability puts U.S. intelligence at risk and the sensitive, shared intelligence entrusted to us by our allies.

Jacobsen: So it’s not just about America—about global trust and cooperation?

Tsukerman: It creates a ripple effect. Shared intelligence operations become vulnerable. Protocols get broken. Operations get exposed. These structural weaknesses cannot be fully understood unless you’re working inside those agencies and witnessing the deterioration firsthand.

Among our closest allies, there is a growing concern that the United States can no longer be considered a reliable partner. And it is not just ideological discomfort—it is practical and operational. If your senior staff consists primarily of political loyalists with no relevant qualifications, the actual quality of intelligence will decline. Oversight becomes nonexistent or is conducted by individuals who do not understand what they oversee.

This damages the integrity of U.S. intelligence and frays the trust our partners once had in us. I am not just talking about the formal frameworks of cooperation—I’m talking about the intelligence itself: its reliability, sourcing, and handling. Partners will begin withholding critical information if you cannot guarantee that sensitive material will be handled appropriately. And who could blame them?

There’s also increasing concern that, with U.S. leadership becoming more unpredictable, intelligence shared with us might be misused, mishandled, or even inadvertently exposed. These chaotic, ideology-driven reshuffles raise the risk that U.S. agencies could become a weak link, endangering not just our operations but also our allies—such as undercover agents and field officers embedded in high-risk environments.

Jacobsen: Here’s my final question. Given the current trajectory, what will the standing of the United States be at the end of this administration’s four-year term? Is there any historical precedent for countries rebuilding trust with their allies after such a significant breakdown—not just in intelligence but also in trade, economics, and diplomacy?

Tsukerman: That’s a profound and essential question. Trust is one of the most challenging things to build, straightforward to break, and exponentially harder to repair. That said, there’s so much strategic interdependency between the U.S. and its closest allies that some degree of cooperation will persist—especially at the professional and operational levels—even through political upheaval.

However, long-term damage will need to be repaired. When this administration ends, a thorough reassessment will be essential. That includes rebuilding not just personnel but frameworks, protocols, and confidence.

We will need to offer strong guarantees and structural reforms to show that a breakdown of this scale cannot happen again. Only then can we regain our allies’ trust and reposition the United States as a dependable leader in global security.

The United States has made comebacks before—and so have other countries. Take the Edward Snowden scandal, for example. That leak exposed highly sensitive intelligence operations, not just from the U.S. but also involving its closest allies. It caused a public backlash, diplomatic strain, and internal reassessments of intelligence-sharing protocols.

There was much grumbling, international criticism, and calls for reform. But eventually, the dust settled. The Five Eyes alliance and other security partnerships resumed their cooperative roles—more or less back to business as usual. Yes, there were adjustments. Some trust was lost. However, the underlying infrastructure of cooperation survived because it had long proven its value.

What makes the current situation under Trump so different—so much more destabilizing—is that this is not a scandal caused by an individual leak or a rogue actor. What Trump is attempting is a comprehensive dismantling of the post–World War II security framework that has governed intelligence relationships between the U.S., Europe, Canada, and other allied nations for the past seventy-five years.

Jacobsen: So it’s not just disruption—it’s redefinition?

Tsukerman: Exactly. He is not just disrupting it—he is trying to redefine it from the ground up. He’s attempting to reframe and rebuild the entire intelligence apparatus of the United States based not on institutional integrity or operational excellence but on loyalty to him personally.

This is a seismic shake-up—far more sweeping than even major historical intelligence crises, such as the Church Committee investigations in the 1970s. That was a monumental moment of oversight and reform, but it was ultimately about accountability within the existing framework. It did not aim to destroy or purge the intelligence community itself.

What we are witnessing now is different. This is a deliberate attempt to purge and replace—not through a careful process of reform or transition, but through chaotic, politically motivated upheaval. And the replacements are not necessarily qualified. In many cases, they are chosen for loyalty over competence, which leaves critical security gaps and undermines institutional knowledge that has taken decades to build.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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