Irina Tsukerman on International Media Freedom

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/04/24

In this wide-ranging interview, Irina Tsukerman, a human rights and national security attorney, analyzes the global implications of the closure of Voice of America (VOA) and the pro-Russia media shift in U.S. politics. She discusses how these developments undermine U.S. soft power, weaken democratic values, and empower adversarial propaganda from Russia, China, and Iran. Tsukerman warns of escalating information warfare and the collapse of independent journalism, noting the rise of state-aligned influencers, AI-powered disinformation, and elite-driven, authoritarian sympathies. She emphasizes that media suppression, geopolitical instability, and policy inconsistency threaten U.S. global leadership and democratic resilience at home.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: So today, we are here with Irina Tsukerman. She is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm.

Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she holds the position of Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association.

She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Thank you for joining me again today. I appreciate it.

Irina Tsukerman: I’m glad to be here.

Jacobsen: Today, we will discuss the closure of Voice of America (VOA), U.S. information warfare efforts, Russia, attacks on Canada and other allies, and the broader pro-Russia shift in U.S. relations with NATO, Europe, and others. This will include commentary on leadership, transactional versus selfishness, intelligence sharing, and military concerns. Gender parity may also come up, given the recent Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) event. So, how do you interpret the closure or scaling back of VOA services in certain regions?

Tsukerman: It represents quite a paradigmatic shift in the global media narrative and, of course, in U.S. leadership and its role in information warfare. Voice of America has been operational since 1942, when it was explicitly created to counter Nazi propaganda. It played an important role throughout the Cold War as a beacon of truthful, factual, and accurate information, providing a U.S. perspective to the Soviet bloc. It offered information to families behind the Iron Curtain, including my grandparents, who listened clandestinely to Voice of America and Radio Free Europe on the radio to get past government censorship and propaganda. It gave them an accurate view of the U.S. and what it was doing and saying about world events.

When the Trump administration decided to close it, it was operational in 49 different languages. To be clear, it is not as though Voice of America never had any problems. There had been complaints for years that some of the stations—such as VOA Persian—were infiltrated by pro-Iranian regime apparatchiks and that many of these VOA stations were failing to reflect U.S. interests and perspectives. Instead, they were advancing propaganda promoted by various foreign assets that had managed to get their foot in the door.

There was a push by many people to clean out some of these stations from those types of influences. However, what we are talking about now with the closure of VOA is altogether different. Think of it as one of the world’s most prominent government-funded international broadcasters. It has been central in delivering U.S. policies, values, and perspectives to audiences worldwide—especially in regions with limited access to independent news sources.

It was a huge opportunity for the Trump administration to communicate its message. For instance, during the inauguration, Trump emphasized that a new golden age of the U.S. was coming. Imagine how powerful such a message would have been on international airwaves. Instead, Trump decided to shut it down completely.

So, from a geopolitical and informational standpoint, the closure has huge implications for U.S. soft power, media freedom, and global information warfare. Because it was a state-funded broadcaster, it was a pillar of U.S. soft power. It shaped international public opinion by providing news analysis and cultural programming to align with democratic values, human rights, and free-market principles, which the U.S. strongly advocates.

There was a huge uproar recently over Jeff Bezos shifting The Washington Post to align with those values. So why would the U.S. not want to do the same to reinforce its messaging? If these newspaper publishers are returning to their roots in local reporting, why would the U.S. not want to broadcast its core values to the world?

Part of the Trump administration’s anti-neoconservative agenda has been the claim that neocons were allegedly trying to forcibly export democracy and U.S. values around the world in a way that was not compatible with the reality on the ground. But broadcasting is exactly the opposite of that. Broadcasting offers messaging that people can listen to—and then make their own decisions. Nobody is forcing them to do anything.

Some people argued that the messaging had become muddled or unclear—that the U.S. was exporting far-left agendas that were demeaning to cultures around the world or harmful to specific populations because of their extremeness. But again, any administration is free to change the messaging.

The closure eliminated the mechanism for delivering any messaging to anyone. The closure of U.S. operations in strategic areas—namely the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe—is a huge blow to the United States’ ability to project its ideals abroad, whatever those ideals may be. Politics may change, but certain constitutional ideas remain inherently American.

I am concerned that part of the message these audiences may take away is that the U.S. no longer stands for its constitutional or Declaration of Independence values. Maybe the Trump administration is not merely upending mechanisms and policies but also changing—or reflecting—a completely different set of values that no longer represent a shared American culture or a common American principle.

For years, the U.S. operated as a counterweight to the influence of state-controlled media outlets—such as those from Russia, China, and Iran—which often pushed alternative narratives that undermined democratic values and presented authoritarian governance as a viable model.

Trump has been gravitating toward the leaders of authoritarian countries, including Russia, China, North Korea’s Kim—whom he praised repeatedly—Turkey’s Erdoğan, Qatar, and many others. And perhaps it is precisely because he is sympathetic to authoritarian, and especially anti-American authoritarian regimes, that he is now doing exactly the opposite of what would normally be done.

Rather than continuing to stand up to them, even in a different way, he is disengaging from the only mechanism that could provide a counter to this authoritarian model. Perhaps Trump is disposing of VOA because he believes that an authoritarian model is preferable to democracy. Maybe he wants the U.S. to become more like those countries. And certainly, he wants those countries to win—to be seen as stronger and more preferable—while democracy is seen as weak.

That has been a consistent Russian narrative: that democracy is weak, inherently polarized and divisive, and that it cannot stand because it destroys traditional values. And this is exactly what Trump is feeding into with this policy.

The closure weakens the U.S. ability to provide a balanced perspective in regions where the information landscape is otherwise dominated by heavily censored or propaganda-driven content. We are seeing this in Turkey, where there are major political protests against the arrest of the popular Istanbul mayor, İmamoğlu, on entirely politicized grounds.

Not only is the government shutting down internet channels and social media and trying to drive people off the streets, but Elon Musk is also shutting down accounts commenting on political protests—and VOA is no longer available. VOA Turkish can no longer provide a running commentary on what is happening. Without U.S. output, local populations in these regions are most susceptible to disinformation campaigns. That further strengthens the influence of adversarial states like Russia and China, which aggressively deploy state-controlled media to shape perceptions in their favour.

They are doing exactly the opposite. So, by reducing its media presence, the U.S. risks diminishing its leadership in the global fight for information freedom and political transparency. Countries like Russia and China have long leveraged their state-controlled media apparatus to push their foreign policy agendas.

VOA’s closure creates a void that adversaries are too eager to fill, allowing them to deepen their sway in key strategic areas abroad—not just at home. We have seen Russian and Chinese propagandists applaud, praise, and celebrate the closure, and this is the last thing anyone should be proud of.

In areas like the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central Asia—where VOA offered independent news and consistently reliable analysis—its absence presents a gap that other media outlets will inevitably fill. In many of these regions, where political instability and censorship already constrain the free flow of information, the loss of an independent and authoritative news source could lead to further reliance on media networks that are partisan or state-influenced—and certainly not friendly to the United States.

As Russia, China, and Iran have demonstrated with outlets like RT (Russia Today), Sputnik, CGTN, and Press TV in Iran, state-backed media can be powerful tools for disseminating anti-American and hostile narratives that challenge Western democratic norms.

For instance, in Africa and the Middle East, Russia’s RT and Sputnik have managed to attract audiences with tailored content that often criticizes Western interference and promotes an anti-imperialist stance. This strategic media expansion by adversaries directly challenges U.S. influence and the ideals of free and independent journalism that VOA once represented.

Moreover, it has a significant impact on foreign policy.

Due to this concerted propaganda, West African countries have had a major anti-Western shift. This has led to coup d’états by military juntas and created a security vacuum, where jihadist groups are clashing with Russia-backed and anti-democratic regimes, while U.S.-aligned democratic allies are imprisoned and, in some cases, even tortured.

We are also seeing all sorts of other foreign-backed media propaganda—such as Qatar’s Al Jazeera and China’s Xinhua—proliferate without any serious competition. In addition, the rise of these narratives, backed by Russia, China, Iran, and assorted anti-democratic movements, continues to erode the credibility of U.S. democratic institutions and foreign policy.

U.S. programming—which offered reliable reporting on U.S. democracy and regularly challenged the U.S. government on numerous issues, including Ukraine, human rights, and governance—had the power to counterbalance authoritarian narratives portraying Western powers as imperialistic or hypocritical. In other words, offering internal critique, investigative journalism, and questioning American leaders from both political parties on all kinds of issues demonstrated that the United States can withstand scrutiny.

This was the opposite of countries where people were imprisoned for criticizing or questioning government policies. It provided hope and inspiration for people around the world.

With VOA no longer operating in key regions, there is a risk that these narratives—about the U.S. and adversarial governments—will become less contested, allowing manipulation of public opinion in critical areas of global interest.

Of course, the global information environment is increasingly viewed as a battlefield, with the U.S. and its adversaries vying for influence over public opinion through digital media, news outlets, and social media platforms.

VOA was a significant player in that space. It was part of the broader U.S. information warfare strategy, which shaped the dynamics of this competition. Its absence gives adversarial states more room to shape global narratives without challenge.

The U.S. is becoming deaf, blind, and mute as a result of recent policies—shutting down VOA, shutting down USAID, and eliminating critical intelligence-gathering units within the State Department and the Pentagon.

Effectively, it is cutting itself off from the ability to engage in critical counter-information efforts against hostile propaganda and intelligence operations. The U.S. is unable to withstand active measures because it lacks the information needed to form coherent policies in regions where Russia, China, and Iran are actively expanding their media presence.

The absence of VOA—and related operations like Radio Free Europe—allows these powers to dominate the media, which means they dominate public perception and intelligence narratives.

Russia, for example, has been particularly adept at leveraging state-backed media to influence political movements, sway public opinion during elections (for what they are worth), and undermine democratic processes in European countries. We are seeing this play out. We have seen aggressive meddling in Moldova and Romania, where Russia has tried to push fake candidates—such as reviving the image of Ceaușescu—through TikTok-driven movements and propaganda.

By closing VOA operations, the United States effectively gives up one of its key strategic advantages in the battle for hearts and minds—an essential component of information warfare. This leaves a vacuum that adversaries are already exploiting.

Furthermore, this shift in the global information balance has geopolitical—not just informational—ramifications. It influences U.S. foreign policy and the policies of its adversaries in many conflict zones, where access to information is often limited or tightly controlled. Ukraine and the Middle East are both prime examples.

The availability of independent news sources was crucial in providing reliable updates and holding governments accountable. With VOA’s closure, the role of media as a tool for transparency and accountability is weakened. This allows authoritarian regimes to manipulate public perception and solidify their grip on power freely.

Of course, internally within the United States, the closure of VOA raises significant concerns about the future of media freedom and government interference in journalism. Notably, just before the VOA shutdown, the U.S. fired a Ukrainian journalist who had been known for questioning both the Biden administration and the Trump administration about their respective policies toward Ukraine.

It was a sign that the United States fears critical questions that make officials uncomfortable about their policies. The U.S. government-funded VOA operated independently, adhering to journalistic standards and ensuring that its reporting was fair and balanced. The closure is increasingly seen as part of a broader trend of curbing independent, publicly funded media outlets—particularly those that challenge the prevailing political climate.

If the closure of VOA signals a broader shift in U.S. media policy and reflects an erosion of commitment to supporting independent journalists, it could set a troubling precedent. And at a time when the United States is facing an increasing threat of disinformation from foreign adversaries and domestic sources—including, by the way, Tulsi Gabbard, who is regularly reposting comments from denialists and various Russian trolls—the dismantling of a key pillar of information integrity risks further enhancing the influence of partisan media, eroding public trust in democratic institutions, and shifting the information war effort in favour of U.S. adversaries. It is vulnerable to foreign meddling in the U.S. information landscape, allowing public opinion to shift toward propaganda messaging and disinformation.

The impact of this decision may resonate not only internationally but also domestically because media independence remains a cornerstone of political and civic engagement. It also reflects a shift in the U.S. government’s media strategy on a broader scale. There is growing recognition that traditional forms of broadcasting, such as radio and television, may no longer be the most effective ways to engage global audiences—especially with the rise of social media and digital platforms. Elon Musk’s role with X (formerly Twitter) outright shifting the U.S. election conversation in favour of Trump is one example of this new dynamic.

In light of this, the United States may focus on more targeted, digital-first approaches to information dissemination through social media and podcasting. However, much of this podcasting has become heavily favourable to Russia. It has provided unquestioned, highly subjective content that mirrors pro-Russian narratives, conspiracy theories, and anti-expertise rhetoric. While the U.S. government could adapt to these new consumption habits and potentially reach younger, more tech-savvy audiences, these platforms have become vehicles for disinformation by foreign adversaries. This happens through largely unvetted networks where there is little to no fact-checking.

This shift demands a recalibration of how the United States communicates its values abroad—one that embraces modern technologies and reaches people where they are most active: on mobile devices and online platforms. But the problem is that X has become an unmitigated propaganda machine for assorted foreign trolls and hate narratives. Anti-Semitism, racism, and misogyny proliferate there freely. We are clearly at a pivotal moment in the evolution of global media dynamics. In general, people increasingly do not trust traditional media platforms.

However, VOA was one of the few remaining media outlets that maintained public trust precisely because its reporting was objective, challenging, and reflective of the traditional journalism standards we have historically upheld. The space VOA leaves behind will likely be filled by adversarial media, which will further tilt the balance in the ongoing information warfare. That warfare has become a key battleground in contemporary geopolitics. This shift moves that battleground in favour of U.S. adversaries and toward the values the United States once stood against—and now, apparently, is beginning to embrace.

Jacobsen: We have the shifting dynamics of White House media representation regarding who is given front-row seats and who is not, who is allowed to ask questions and who is not, and who is given preference for questioning. We have the cancelling of VOA. We have a proliferation of appearances on outlets like Fox News. We also have, as you noted, the growth of voices on platforms like X—many of which are not only anti-Semitic but also deeply entrenched in conspiracy-laden political theories.

We’ve covered anti-Semitism—that took a little while—but other conspiracy theories span a wide range of subjects. You can find your “Alex Joneses” of various types offering a para-media or quasi-mainstream media presence. These are typically less critical, shorter in format, and more entertainment-focused. So, what do all of these broader cultural, political, and institutional shifts tell you about the current administration?

Tsukerman: Well, the administration claims to be more in tune with social trends—namely, moving away from relying exclusively on one or two authoritative sources and promoting the democratization of the media environment to encourage broader engagement and more diverse perspectives. They also say they are trying to reflect more on what the public wants.

But I am not entirely convinced that it works as the administration claims. For instance, giving preference to particular journalists over others or packing the room with pro-administration voices does not necessarily reflect broader public opinion trends. In fact, it is quite the opposite. It limits perspectives and controls the landscape of who gets to ask questions and who gets a seat at the table. That is anti-democratic.

It sets strict boundaries on who is included rather than ensuring equal opportunity for diverse views. Even the inclusion of streamers and podcasters in press briefings may seem progressive. Still, these content creators are not required to be even remotely objective or to adhere to any ethical standards of journalism. They can say whatever they want without fact-checking; much of their content plays to confirmation bias. It does not challenge or critique anything—it only contributes to echo chambers and erodes critical thinking among audiences.

Suppose the administration aims to create a friendly, unchallenging environment with little to no pushback. In that case, this is the way to do it. That does not mean we should return to a Walter Cronkite model where one figure dominates the media landscape. However, it also does not mean there should be no diversity and critical reflection on the narratives being put forward, especially as the White House shapes those narratives. That is unfair to the public.

Claiming that “this is what the public wants” is a convenient and self-serving justification for imposing government perspectives on the media rather than letting the public choose organically from a free, competitive media environment. This points toward increased control over the media landscape—not its democratization.

One revealing example came up when a U.S. official was asked about the potential for a recession due to tariff-oriented economic policies. He responded, “I can’t tell you what will happen a year from now, and I can’t even tell you whether the journalist asking this question will still have his program a year from now.” To me, that sounded like a threat.

Jacobsen: Crazy. Oh, it was. So, what’s with the pro-Russian lean in media coverage now?

Tsukerman: It reflects the overall pro-Russian shift in the broader policy strategy. The media coverage is starting to align with that shift, mirroring U.S. government positions more and more. It is becoming less independent—less about critique and inquiry—and more about reflecting, echoing, and amplifying the government’s explanations and justifications for its policies.

Trump was described as a populist when he came to power, but I am not entirely sure that’s accurate. This pro-Russian shift is not broadly popular—it is not some groundswell of populist demand. Rather, it is an elite-level realignment that is now trickling down into the media narrative, and we are watching it happen in real-time.

And the only way this kind of narrative can become popular is if the U.S. and its allies—such as Elon Musk—continue to dominate the media landscape with so much pro-Russian content that there is no space for alternative perspectives, and people gradually become indoctrinated. But setting that aside, polls consistently show that Americans support Ukraine, that they want more assistance sent to Ukraine, and that they are not in favour of Russia, China, or authoritarianism. So, the policies we see are not populist—they are anti-populist. They are not even popular.

These policies are being imposed on the public and then justified as populist—not because they reflect broad public support, but because of louder engagement by trolls and media personalities who have adopted a populist tone and are popular with the public for other, unrelated reasons. These individuals are not necessarily speaking to issues of democratization or authoritarianism. We are witnessing a kind of political horseshoe: a convergence between the formerly fringe left and fringe right, now increasingly becoming mainstream.

We have podcasters with enormous audiences—thirty-two, thirty-nine million listeners—proliferating conspiratorial, anti-establishment content. But how anti-establishment is it when the establishment promotes the same content? What we see is essentially forced indoctrination—leading the public in a particular direction not because the public demands it but because those in power want it.

They are using media contacts to advance their agendas, just as previous administrations did, regardless of popularity. The difference now is the scale, reach, and intensity with which this is happening.

Jacobsen: Biden was more about bilateral and multilateral relations in a non-zero-sum or growth-oriented context. That was his grounding in trade, economics, and probably media. How do you see the Trump administration’s orientation? Is it zero-sum transactionalism or something else?

Tsukerman: It is a crossover. It is zero-sum transactionalism with allies, for sure. We saw that with the European Union, Canada, Mexico, and some Latin American allies.

But we do not see transactions with these new “friends”—such as those in North Korea and Russia. We see interventionism favouring those countries and a willingness to build quasi-long-term, relationship-oriented arrangements. Russia is even considered a potential mediator with Iran. There has also been outreach to North Korea about cultivating positive, long-term relations. Trump is clearly pursuing these relationships despite receiving very little in return.

And Trump is putting up with much disrespect from these authoritarian leaders. Putin once made him wait for a phone call for an hour and a half—something unprecedented and highly disrespectful. Meanwhile, Trump made the Polish president wait three hours for a ten-minute meeting after the president flew in from Poland.

So when Putin does the same or worse, instead of walking away, Trump waits patiently, says nothing about the delay, and then declares the meeting a success—even though Putin lied to him and rejected the U.S.-backed ceasefire proposal outright. This is not transactionalism. This is Trump actively chasing the approval of authoritarian leaders, making concessions, and giving away promises—such as those concerning Ukraine—that he cannot deliver, especially as Ukraine is not willing to accept major curbs on its sovereignty.

And he is doing all of this in exchange for nothing. Russia is making no concessions. Putin has made it clear he will not be making concessions, and in some cases, he has even stated that the U.S. is not asking for any. This is far from a transactional approach. It is more like a one-sided infatuation—a teenage crush on authoritarianism—where Trump endures humiliation, provocations, endless red lines, and envelope-pushing to stay in their good graces.

Jacobsen: Will the Europeans be aggressive and defensive militarily, independent from the United States moving forward?

Tsukerman: They are pursuing a more independent course of action. But how long it will take them to reorient themselves fully is another matter—it will take longer than many expect. There is significant interdependence on the intelligence and defence levels, and building capacity takes time. Changing public opinion also takes time. Some European countries are dissatisfied with the pro-Russian politicians they previously elected, but removing them is difficult. In the meantime, those figures continue to do political damage within the EU and NATO.

There is growing unity within the European Union, but agreement that Trump is bad for EU security and interests is insufficient. It takes more than that to develop a coherent strategy and the military forces necessary for a centralized pan-European army—or even regional deployments. For example, when that was discussed, the British did not have enough personnel to send peacekeepers to Ukraine. Italy opposed the peacekeeping proposal entirely.

Europe’s defence industry is booming, with stock prices soaring. There will likely be a major shift away from defence purchases from the U.S., and that transition is already moving quickly. U.S. defence stocks are plummeting. Trump recently announced he would be selling low-grade weapons to allies and added that “these countries may not be allies in the future.” That kind of messaging is not encouraging for the U.S. defence sector. But it does mean that Europeans and the Japanese, South Koreans, and others are now buying more from each other and expanding defence cooperation.

That said, defence trade and defence agreements are two very different things. I am not sure that the European Union and NATO can become fully viable independent security actors within the next four years—which covers the rest of Trump’s current term. Some countries may progress faster than others. There has been talk of developing a European “nuclear umbrella.” Poland, for instance, is planning to more than double its standing army—from 200,000 to 500,000—and aims to train every male citizen in military service. Other countries are exploring semi-voluntary conscription policies. We are already seeing moves in this direction in places like Denmark and Sweden. There is also a greater focus on preparing elite units and offering citizens various roles to support national defence.

And yet, we still see signs of unpreparedness. Baltic states and Poland are leaving agreements like the landmine convention and are actively mining their borders to deter Russia. But they are still unable to prevent Russian intelligence operations and sabotage within their borders—such as the recent arson attacks in Lithuania and Poland.

The European Union still cannot effectively respond to Russian and Chinese sabotage of critical infrastructure, including underwater internet cables, which is increasing in frequency and severity. Despite efforts to build a stronger defense posture, current strategies remain ineffective. Europe lacks an offensive strategy and the political will to confront Russia and China directly.

There was an incident involving a Chinese ship that was confronted, but ultimately, nothing happened, and there were no consequences for the sabotage. So, while the EU and NATO members are becoming more strategic and assertive, they are still far from being truly independent—either from the U.S. or in an absolute sense. They are not yet ready to stand up to the coalition of adversaries forming between Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, terrorist organizations, and private actors who are enabling this new axis of power.

This is not just about Russia acting alone. It is not conventional warfare alone. We are witnessing a sophisticated and expanding form of asymmetrical warfare—serious cyberattacks and subversion requiring coordinated responses. And now, the U.S. is actively forcing this European independence. For instance, the U.S. has ended its cooperation with Europe on Russian cyberattacks. It will not take action against such attacks internally or through international partnerships.

This puts many European countries in a difficult position, as the U.S. remains a global leader in cybersecurity. France, which has its national cyber capabilities, is now stepping up and looking to become the cybersecurity leader for Europe—but how quickly that transition can happen remains to be seen.

Jacobsen: There was talk about an Iron Dome for the United States.

Tsukerman: Yes, they renamed it the Golden Dome.

Jacobsen: So for the Golden Dome—it’s ironic because many of the images associated with “gold” and Trump tend to be toilets. What about the rocket technology that funds that system? Who is likely to be behind the rockets? Will it be a Musk-backed government venture where he gets hundreds of billions of dollars to compensate for his current financial losses?

Tsukerman: Up until now, Iron Dome production has been a joint U.S.-Israeli technology venture. The goal is to create something exclusive for the U.S., but the problem is that there is no clear defence consensus that this is an optimal technology for U.S. strategic needs. Theoretically, the Pentagon should lead on this, but it is currently trying to downsize its purchases. Presumably, this project is one of the priorities—but the decision has not yet been finalized.

I don’t know how Musk would fit into this. He has zero experience producing this specific type of weaponry. He could be taught, and he does have the necessary security clearance to be involved. However, none of his current businesses are optimized for producing missile defence systems. Commercial aerospace and defensive missile technology are two very different domains. His companies have no track record in this area.

The contract would go to companies with experience in Iron Dome production in cooperation with Israel. That would be far more efficient and make much more sense. Alternatively, Musk could subcontract the work to those companies, even if he were given nominal administrative control to profit from it. But in terms of actual execution, I do not see him capable of leading it.

Jacobsen: How effective has the U.S. adapted to modern information warfare strategies?

Tsukerman: Terribly. The Global Engagement Center—already woefully ineffective—was one of the only official U.S. government mechanisms designed to address information warfare independently. It had limited offensive capabilities. As a State Department project, it was limited to targeting foreign audiences. The Department of Justice has no internal program to counter foreign disinformation or other forms of domestic information warfare.

The Biden administration attempted to partner with private companies, but that raised significant constitutional concerns, which led to congressional hearings. Meanwhile, Elon Musk has become a major problem by actively boosting malign foreign influence efforts on X. Voice of America was one of the few other leaders in this space—mainly by providing accurate, factual reporting. But VOA was not designed for hearts-and-minds operations or active information warfare. It was there to report the truth, not to counter propaganda strategically.

There has been no cohesive information warfare strategy. The U.S. military does have some capabilities in this area, but with the broader policy trend leaning away from state-building and toward global disengagement, these types of efforts are being phased out. I have not seen any new initiatives in this space.

There has been no response to the proliferation of Hamas propaganda or Russia’s and China’s growing influence in the Middle East. For example, China’s Huawei controls telecommunications in Saudi Arabia and throughout Latin America, yet there has been no U.S. strategic response. The U.S. is actively blinding and deafening itself in the information domain—and dismantling its capacity for information warfare.

This is part of the strategy being implemented by DNI Tulsi Gabbard. She oversees 18 U.S. intelligence agencies, none of which have been tasked with developing serious information warfare plans. Instead of using U.S. intelligence to shape the information space, Gabbard has promoted and amplified Russian trolls. That is the current U.S. information warfare strategy—helping adversaries mislead American and global audiences by promoting their talking points and disinformation.

It is deeply concerning. The Pentagon has also shut down key information centers that had been active since the Cold War and were vital to gathering intelligence and countering propaganda. Those centers are now gone. So, the U.S. is not only failing to engage in information warfare but deliberately dismantling the infrastructure that once enabled it to do so.

Reestablishing that infrastructure would be extremely costly, difficult, and politically controversial. It would also be logistically and technically complex. If the next administration decides to rebuild the capabilities destroyed under the Trump administration, it will have to start from scratch.

Jacobsen: What does Putin want? What does China want, ultimately?

Tsukerman: Both of them?

Jacobsen: With the United States, with the world, with their region, with their populations.

Tsukerman: Both Russia and China, when it comes to the United States, want to see nothing more than a weakened, divided, and ultimately destroyed America. Russia is more chaotic and nihilistic in its approach—they want the U.S. subjected to complete internal destruction. A civil war in the United States would be ideal for them. Their strategy is not rooted in economic logic; they want to watch the world burn, even if it does not bring them measurable gains.

China, on the other hand, is more pragmatic. They still have significant financial interests in the U.S., but they, too, want to see America defeated. As intelligence reports show, the Chinese strategy is clear: they want to become the world’s sole superpower. Xi Jinping is an extreme nationalist who uses the communist system to pursue a vision of global domination—not of a collaborative global system but of a world ruled by China.

Together, Russia and China are focused on exploiting and exacerbating U.S. weaknesses—polarization, political extremism, and cultural fragmentation—because an internally divided U.S. helps them advance their ambitions. By fostering division, they make it easier to dominate regions of strategic interest and displace U.S. influence.

As for their populations, neither government values human life. In both China and Russia, standards of living are deteriorating. China faces significant economic troubles and enforces social control through re-education camps and a draconian social credit system that severely limits the quality of life. In Russia, there are widespread public health crises—rampant AIDS and hepatitis, crumbling infrastructure, poor hospital services, substance abuse, despair among youth, high abortion rates, and a population engaged in widespread self-destructive behaviour. All of this is preventable, but the leadership does not care. The citizens are not motivated to live well, and the system provides no support.

Beyond their desire to weaken the U.S., Russia also has specific geopolitical ambitions. It wants to be a dominant power in the Middle East—an ambition rooted in its history from the days of Tsarist Russia through the Soviet Union. The security services, which have long been the real power in Russia, have maintained a consistent foreign policy. Russia also seeks to turn the European Union into a Russia-friendly bloc and to “colonize” as much of it as possible, allowing the kleptocratic leadership to extract resources while building a legacy through war.

The war in Ukraine, however, is proving to be extremely costly. It has resulted in loss of life, economic sanctions, and immense financial strain. Russia cannot afford to win the war because victory would require long-term occupation, maintenance, and rebuilding—something it simply cannot do. Crimea turned out to be a major economic and strategic failure. It lost access to Ukraine’s broader infrastructure, including clean water and natural resources. Even tourism—once a lucrative stream for Crimea with three million visitors annually—is gone.

Russia continues to operate at a tremendous loss. It has grand imperial ambitions but lacks the military genius of a Napoleon, the organizational skills, or any ideological or institutional structures that would make empire-building feasible or even remotely beneficial. Instead, it is a collapsing empire clinging to the aesthetics of domination without the substance or resources to support it.

Jacobsen: Where does this geopolitical situation—and the media landscape that enables or reflects it—leave independent media, international freelance journalists, and others? What happens to their voices when they no longer have the institutional pillars that act as tent posts for freedom of expression?

Tsukerman: So-called “independent” Russian media is doing quite well and proliferating rapidly, largely because it is cheap to operate. They can run troll forums and hire writers or hacks-for-hire from virtually anywhere at a very low cost. They take low-paid individuals, pull them out of obscurity, give them a modest stipend, and as these individuals gain prominence, they start to receive additional income from mainstream institutions and media outlets—eventually becoming mainstream themselves.

Someone like Candace Owens, for instance, was getting paid by The Daily Wire and conservative organizations. She was not necessarily paid directly by Russia, but Russia is willing to invest money to elevate these individuals, helping them build visibility and institutional credibility. Sometimes oligarchs fund this; other times, third-party allies do. Regardless of the method, Russia always finds ways to fund these figures—and once they become well-known, their alternative income sources kick in: crypto, sponsorships, paid appearances, and more.

As a result, pro-Russian networks are proliferating. With AI, trolls can generate endless content across social media platforms for even less money. Elon Musk helps them significantly through his ownership of X, where the algorithmic amplification of such voices is widespread.

Independent journalists, on the other hand, are in real trouble. They do not have access to the same funding sources to sustain that kind of output. Traditional media collapsed because of flawed business models and the shift in information consumption. Unless you are willing to do corporate writing—focused on non-political topics like finance or business—you are at a disadvantage.

Media outlets are increasingly engaged in self-censorship, particularly when avoiding criticism of Trump or his allies. Any serious critique of Trump or his interests is difficult to get published and increasingly difficult to get paid for—even if you are willing to write it for free. That is because there are limits to what media platforms are willing to accept now that crossover figures are entering journalism and reshaping the industry.

By “crossover,” I mean individuals who support Trump but are not traditionally conservative. Some come from the radical left or have an incoherent ideological background. Their appeal is often social or aesthetic—the animus and outrage appeal to them—not rooted in a principled political stance. As a result, true independents—critical thinkers, classical liberals, traditional conservatives, and centrists—are marginalized. They do not have many places to publish in the United States anymore.

Some may find more receptive audiences in the UK, but European media is also difficult to access because it often requires payment to be published. So, the media landscape is becoming increasingly fractured and dominated either by adversarial powers or by extremely wealthy interests—corporations, billionaires, and institutional actors who can afford to shape the discourse.

This shift makes it harder for independent voices to publish thoughtful, informed analyses—voices outside the Beltway and the Washington bubble who focus on traditional foreign and domestic policies without the partisan spin. Platforms like The Free Press by Bari Weiss offer a slightly more diverse range of thought but still promote a specific group of thinkers. Much of what it publishes is not journalism—it is opinion writing. It is not investigative, fact-checked, boots-on-the-ground journalism.

We are facing an uphill battle. Even in podcasting—which is supposed to be a democratized medium—the same types of people dominate. Most successful podcasters are already famous for something else: comedians, MMA fighters, athletes, celebrities, or traditional journalists who transitioned into the format.

So, even in this supposedly accessible environment, average people struggle to build an audience. There is too much content and too much competition. Audiences gravitate toward a few well-known names or individuals who have the money to boost visibility and manipulate the algorithm. And in this quasi-populist, quasi-pro-Russian media environment, the same types of voices keep getting amplified—just in more sophisticated and coordinated ways.

Jacobsen: What about the limitation on information sharing and other concerns? The European Union is slowing down its information sharing at the same time—or right after—the United States has begun slowing down or stopping its information sharing.

Tsukerman: There are two distinct areas to look at: intelligence sharing and media-related information sharing. These are happening simultaneously, and both are worrying. The slowdown in intelligence sharing is deeply concerning because it leaves all parties—both in the EU and the U.S.—less secure, less capable of reacting to threats, and less able to develop comprehensive, preemptive strategies. And this is happening while the threats are not diminishing, just because the EU and U.S. are currently in disagreement.

This situation benefits adversarial actors who thrive on disunity. The less cohesive the Western alliance, the more likely we are to see successful terrorist attacks, drug smuggling operations, and political meddling from countries like Russia, China, and others. These developments increase the likelihood of serious damage occurring without adequate early warning, as the channels of communication that might otherwise prevent such threats are breaking down.

We are also seeing major losses in terms of media and social media cooperation. The European Union tends to be more restrictive in handling digital regulation, but there has also been a complete breakdown in dialogue between EU institutions and their American counterparts. This lack of mutual understanding leads to ignorance about each other’s regulatory, political, and technological environments.

Now, there are potential regulatory issues involving big tech companies that may lead to platforms like X (formerly Twitter) being pushed out of the EU due to non-compliance with privacy and security regulations. Elon Musk has refused to meet key European standards, which could lead to a total ban of X within the EU. That would create a massive vacuum for public commentary—particularly among journalists and public figures who rely on the platform.

We are increasingly seeing a fractured global communications environment. The less the Europeans and Americans engage in direct, consistent communication, the more room for false perceptions to grow. That makes it far easier for adversaries to spread disinformation, sow division, provoke antagonism and polarization, and manipulate public narratives in both directions. The long-term result could be the death of the transatlantic alliance—not just politically but on personal, business, and cultural levels. The breakdown of high-level political relationships could also mean the collapse of everyday cooperation between people across the Atlantic.

Jacobsen: So how would you describe Trump’s strategy—the big question—about the media?

Tsukerman: What did you ask? How would I describe Trump’s strategy regarding media? Yes, that is the big question. His approach has evolved. During his first term, it was mostly chaotic. He did not know what he was doing. He was reactionary. His strategy, such as it was, revolved around attacking the media, attacking Biden, attacking political opponents, and even attacking other Republicans.

Now, however, the strategy is more deliberate. It is consolidated and centralized. There is a clear method involving systematically bullying critics into submission. This goes far beyond the typical White House strategy of coaxing or pressuring the media through access manipulation—something we saw, for example, during the Obama administration. With Trump, it is not just about incentivizing loyalty through access; it is about threatening, attacking, and overwhelming critics until they fall in line.

We have seen this pattern with Biden, and we have seen it to some extent with every president. However, with Trump, it goes far beyond the usual tensions or isolated incidents of journalist intimidation. We are likely to see a full-scale, systematic attack on the media. We are already witnessing a lot of media outlets becoming significantly less critical.

As part of this adjacent effort, Jeff Bezos has noticeably reoriented The Washington Post toward priorities he believes may be more appealing to Trump. We are seeing similar trends in other outlets like Forbes, which are softening their criticism of major political figures to avoid conflict or controversy. Many outlets are already engaging in self-censorship.

Meanwhile, conservative media is doubling down on its pro-Trump stance—more so than before. Interestingly, Fox News and The Wall Street Journal have pushed back more than expected, but Trump has publicly attacked them, accusing them of being corporate, corrupt, and dishonest due to their ownership structure. His strategy is clearly to shape an information space that is friendly to him—one that follows his lead and supports his political goals.

Trump’s goal is not only to consolidate conservative media—much of which is already aligned with him—but to neutralize or co-opt all media. He wants to eliminate serious investigative criticism, especially anything probing into his inner circle, family, or business associates. What remains would be toothless reporting focused on banal topics, serving to distract rather than inform.

We are already seeing Republican officials use social media to bypass journalists, sometimes trying to charm the public or push products—like Teslas—instead of addressing serious policy issues. Some officials have even fought with journalists during press briefings, refusing to take questions from reporters they deem unfavourable.

Jacobsen: Like saying, “You’re not allowed to ask that.” “Sit down.”

Tsukerman: Exactly, him, Fox News, it’s a whole thing. And not everyone is going to tolerate that. Even some conservative publications are starting to express concern because they know it will be bad for business. For example, we have seen Newsmax and Fox side with journalists responding to AP’s exclusion from the press room.

Jacobsen: So, is it bad for them and their business?

Tsukerman: It damages their credibility, and they know they could suffer the same fate if they cross Trump on any issue in the future.

Jacobsen: Do you think Trump will pass away by the end of his term?

Tsukerman: It is hard to say. I am not a prophet. He is in reasonably good health. Anything is possible—he is getting older. I do think he appears more vigorous than Biden was, and Biden still made it through his term. Many people predicted Biden would not last four years, but he did. Trump seems in better physical and perhaps even mental shape than Biden.

He has made some of the same verbal gaffes, but he is not completely out of it. Could there be a violent incident, given that there have already been two previous assassination attempts? Anything is possible. Will that lead to more robust security efforts? Hard to say. I do not anticipate anything unusual, barring a natural or unpredictable event. He is in relatively good health, and I would not count on anything unexpected. In that sense, I expect a fairly conventional four years.

Jacobsen: Do you think the world is losing insight into slow-moving but existential threats—like climate change—as media freedom collapses and geopolitical tensions rise?

Tsukerman: Absolutely. The U.S. has historically been the global leader in media freedom. It will take time for the international community to understand the shift’s extent fully. Most of the world is used to more restricted media environments, so the idea of losing freedom of the press in the U.S. may not hit them immediately.

That is not to say the U.S. media was ever perfectly objective—it had its own biases and moments of self-censorship. But overall, it was the most open, willing to challenge power, ask hard questions, and host a diversity of viewpoints. The U.S. media environment allowed for more robust government scrutiny than the European Union.

It will take time for people to forget the U.S. as a beacon of media freedom. But now, the U.S. appears to be moving in a direction much less favorable to freedom of the press—and ironically, many international observers may be slower to react because they are accustomed to criticizing the U.S. for having too much freedom.

Then, when the shift goes fully in the opposite direction, and the world finally catches up to the reality of what is happening in the U.S., it will be a huge shock. People will realize what they did not appreciate about the U.S. free media environment—that the alternative is far worse once it collapses. Having too much freedom, too many loud opinions about government—that is far preferable to the suffocating silence of media suppression.

We are facing a contentious four years ahead. Political tensions will be high. It is not easy to decouple from global alliances fully, but Trump is doing everything he can to erode trust and dismantle those partnerships. Even if the next administration is fully committed to restoring those ties, it will be incredibly difficult. And if someone like J.D. Vance follows him into power, we may look at a long-term situation that will be nearly impossible to repair.

Frankly, the U.S. was a positive example for the world in many ways—its media environment being one of them. Of course, it had shortcomings. There were real concerns about journalistic ethics and the erosion of integrity. But until recently, the U.S. media ecosystem was by far the most intellectually diverse and self-critical. And that will be missed. It will leave a gaping hole that will be very hard to fill.

Fortunately, British and French publications have stepped up with solid investigative work on the Ukraine issue. But they have their blind spots on other global issues. The U.S., for all its flaws, was still more willing to critically examine both domestic governance and major foreign policy questions seriously.

Jacobsen: Which media organization do you think has been the best—rated highest in detail, factuality, prominence, and so on? Based on the kind of work Associated Press reporters do, are you one of those analyzers?

Tsukerman: The Wall Street Journal stands out for having a comprehensive, objective, and unsensational approach to news. Bloomberg is also strong, but in my view, it has a serious blind spot on China, and that skews much of its coverage. That said, both publications have individual journalists who have, unfortunately, become overly dependent on certain”trusted” sources—particularly government or intelligence sources—which can lead to skewed reporting on international issues.

It is easier to be misled on foreign affairs than domestic ones because journalists are less familiar with the nuances of those countries, cultures, and political environments. I have seen this happen repeatedly—not just at WSJ or Bloomberg, but at many other outlets I have been tracking.

Even so, those two publications remain among the more reliable ones. Of course, any major media outlet will have issues—governments leak information for strategic reasons, intelligence agencies manipulate narratives, and corporate interests get involved. You always have to read between the lines. But even with those limitations, The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg generally have people trying to do a conscientious job, covering stories thoroughly and seriously. That matters.

Jacobsen: So you’re saying they become victims of their sources. The analogy that comes to mind—humorously, I might add—is the philandering husband who goes to the same prostitute repeatedly and starts speaking reverently of the “Lady of Joy,” becoming a victim of his exposure to a single, compromised source of opinion.

Tsukerman: Fair.

Jacobsen: o, what do we make of these Russia-U.S. or Kremlin-American discussions about “peace”? Is there any chance these talks are legitimate? Or are they just buying time for a country spending one-third of its budget on the military?

Tsukerman: Russia is absolutely buying time. Not only that—they are trying to manipulate the U.S. into giving them a lifeline at a time when they are hemorrhaging money, lives, and political capital. The European Union is consolidating against them. Globally, Russia is becoming deeply unpopular.

The U.S., by entertaining these discussions and pulling leverage away from Ukraine, is inadvertently helping Russia survive longer than it otherwise might. Without this lifeline, Russia would likely collapse on multiple fronts. But beyond the geopolitical stalling tactic, these so-called “peace talks” are also part of a broader Russian goal: destroying the U.S. image on the global stage.

Undermining U.S. credibility is central to Russia’s larger war effort. This is not just about controlling Ukrainian territory. It is about weakening the global perception of the U.S. as a leader and moral authority.

These talks are a major inflection point in global diplomacy. The U.S. has long portrayed itself as a champion of democracy—or, at the very least, of Enlightenment values, constitutional principles, international law, national sovereignty, and a rules-based order. Right now, the U.S. is walking a very fine line between maintaining that role and compromising it under the pressure of adversarial manipulation.

Let’s put it this way: the U.S. currently manages its evolving role in multilateral negotiations that include third-party mediators like Saudi Arabia. At the heart of this diplomatic drama is a battle for influence. Russia and Ukraine have opposing objectives. Russia seeks to legitimize its territorial gains, while Ukraine aims to restore sovereignty fully.

The U.S. has been inaccurate in claiming that Ukraine has no victory strategy or its undefined goals. Full restoration of sovereignty is, in fact, a clear military objective. The U.S. has been coy in denying that fact. While it may not be directly participating in some of these indirect talks, it has a profound interest in their outcomes—particularly in how they affect U.S. credibility, soft power, and its standing in the global geopolitical order. This is not just about conflict resolution but prestige and influence.

The involvement of neutral powers like Saudi Arabia raises serious questions about how these developments will reshape U.S. relationships—with both allies and adversaries. Historically, the U.S. has positioned itself as a defender of democratic rights, a rules-based order, and national sovereignty on the global stage. Its strong support for Ukraine, both militarily and diplomatically, reaffirmed that role.

Now, while the Biden administration can be criticized for not decisively pursuing a Ukrainian victory, for slow-rolling aid, or for applying undemocratic pressure on Zelensky, there is a broader picture. The American population has shown immense public support for Ukraine—support that has, in many ways, pushed values of democracy further than the U.S. government was willing to go. However, these ongoing indirect Russia–Ukraine talks complicate that dynamic.

As nations like Saudi Arabia take the lead in mediation, some observers question whether the U.S. is losing its leadership position. While the U.S. still claims to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, comments from the Trump camp are casting increasing doubt. The U.S.’s role in these third-party negotiations now appears inconsistent with its long-standing image as the global arbiter.

This new isolationism is not just about avoiding foreign conflicts. It is also about stepping back from leadership roles in diplomacy—roles that do not even tax U.S. resources or taxpayers. If these talks result in a compromise or peace process in which the U.S. has little influence, the perception of American power could take a significant hit. That perception is already weakening. The fact that the U.S. is voluntarily giving away leverage has not been properly addressed in public discourse.

The West’s traditional dominance in international negotiations is visibly weakening. The U.S. risks being sidelined in favour of emerging diplomatic powers like Saudi Arabia—or, in some cases, even Russia. If, on the other hand, these talks yield a ceasefire or lasting diplomatic outcome, then U.S. support in the broader process could enhance its image as a promoter of peace—even if it is not directly involved in every phase. But that would require tangible results, and we are not seeing those so far.

To benefit from these talks, the U.S. would need to carefully balance national interests with respect for the multilateral process being led by the Saudis. If it refuses to acknowledge the role of non-Western actors, that could be seen as a reluctance to share diplomatic influence in a world that many—like Senator Rubio—now describe as multipolar. That shift in perception, largely driven by Russia and China, is a psychological and information-warfare victory for Moscow, even though it is not grounded in actual geopolitical strength.

China may support the idea of multipolarity through its economic clout. But Russia? Russia is not a dominant geopolitical player. The fact that it is being treated as one is already a major win for its disinformation and diplomatic strategy.

There is also the question of how these developments affect U.S. relationships with its European allies. Many European countries, which have strongly supported Ukraine, view U.S. support for third-party mediation as either a sign of strategic flexibility or a troubling indication of unreliability. They are particularly uncomfortable with the fact that key discussions on Ukraine’s future are happening outside of NATO and the EU and without their involvement.

Russians argue that Europeans could choose to participate—that they are excluding themselves. They claim the U.S. did not have to include them either. However, no one in Europe considered talking to Putin a good idea, and they still do not. So, to the extent the U.S. engages in a process perceived as detrimental to European security, they want a seat at the table. This directly affects their future.

Meanwhile, Russia sees the involvement of countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey as an opportunity to frame the entire situation as evidence of global dissatisfaction with U.S. and NATO policies. They are using this moment to argue that the U.S. can no longer dictate global terms and is losing moral authority.

Russia is using this as a diplomatic victory. It undermines the U.S. position on international law, sovereignty, and the rules-based order. The U.S. image as the leading force behind those principles is eroding—especially as Russia promotes the idea that non-Western mediators are better equipped for global peace negotiations.

But that is only part of the issue. The deeper problem is that Russia is portraying the U.S. as morally equivalent—or worse. Trump’s rhetoric, such as calling for the invasion of Greenland or joking about making Canada the 51st state, only reinforces the Russian narrative that the U.S. is no better than them.

If the U.S. can leverage its alliances and promote a united Western stance behind Ukrainian interests, it could enhance its image globally. For that to happen, Trump must abandon his current strategy and recognize that it is failing. Such a pivot would send a clear message to the world that despite recent challenges, the U.S. remains a dominant force in global diplomacy and security—capable of shaping outcomes through indirect influence, even when direct engagement is off the table.

Saudi Arabia’s role as a co-mediator in these talks marks a shift in global diplomatic power dynamics. While the U.S. has long been an important partner to the Saudis, the kingdom’s increasing participation in global peace processes puts it in direct competition with U.S. influence.

Saudi engagement in the Ukraine conflict—whether through these indirect talks or broader regional diplomacy—signals its growing role as an independent global actor. That is beneficial for Saudi Arabia but not necessarily for the U.S. On the one hand, Washington may welcome Riyadh’s role in fostering peace, particularly if it promotes stability in regions where the U.S. has strategic interests. Trump himself has encouraged Saudi involvement as a mediator.

However, Saudi Arabia’s rise as a diplomatic power suggests the U.S. faces growing competition in conflict mediation. If Saudi Arabia succeeds in these negotiations, it could significantly diminish America’s role as the world’s leading peace broker—especially outside the Western sphere. And that is part of the goal.

The U.S. might argue that it wants to avoid military entanglement in conflicts, but that does not explain why it would willingly forfeit its image as the top global diplomat. There is no strategic reason to surrender that role.

This shift could also have lasting consequences for U.S.–Saudi relations. Historically, the U.S. has relied on Saudi Arabia as a key partner in the Middle East. But as the kingdom asserts its independence in diplomacy—especially in the Russia–Ukraine talks—it may prompt Washington to reevaluate the relationship.

In the future, the U.S. may have to recalibrate its alliances and diplomatic strategies to maintain influence in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. This situation could spiral if the U.S. regrets giving away diplomatic leverage—even to an ally. For now, the arrangement is functional. But what happens if the U.S. and Saudi Arabia diverge significantly in how the negotiations should proceed—or who benefits?

That leads to a broader issue: these talks are not simply about a regional conflict. They reflect deeper transformations in global governance. As multilateral negotiations unite increasingly diverse actors—including powers from the Global South—the U.S. must confront a new reality: its previous dominance in shaping global narratives is no longer guaranteed.

Adding to that, the U.S.’s troubling flirtation with Russian propaganda is diminishing its capacity to craft and control its messaging on the world stage.

Jacobsen: Any final thoughts on American attitudes—internally—toward the media and dissent?

Tsukerman: There is growing concern outside of the hardcore MAGA circles. Even moderate Republicans—what remains of them—are worried they may be silenced. Some MAGA and MAGA-adjacent figures now gaining power believe they are finally “restoring” or “depoliticizing” the media environment, at least in their favour.

But the more government intervention and authoritarianism in the media, the less space there will be for independent voices—even those who agree with the overall strategy. In the long run, this will not be good for anyone.

Jacobsen: Irina, thank you again. I appreciate your time.

Tsukerman: That’s fine. Thank you.

Last updated May 3, 2025. These terms govern all In Sight Publishing content—past, present, and future—and supersede any prior notices. In Sight Publishing by Scott Douglas Jacobsen is licensed under a Creative Commons BY‑NC‑ND 4.0; © In Sight Publishing by Scott Douglas Jacobsen 2012–Present. All trademarks, performances, databases & branding are owned by their rights holders; no use without permission. Unauthorized copying, modification, framing or public communication is prohibited. External links are not endorsed. Cookies & tracking require consent, and data processing complies with PIPEDA & GDPR; no data from children < 13 (COPPA). Content meets WCAG 2.1 AA under the Accessible Canada Act & is preserved in open archival formats with backups. Excerpts & links require full credit & hyperlink; limited quoting under fair-dealing & fair-use. All content is informational; no liability for errors or omissions: Feedback welcome, and verified errors corrected promptly. For permissions or DMCA notices, email: scott.jacobsen2025@gmail.com. Site use is governed by BC laws; content is “as‑is,” liability limited, users indemnify us; moral, performers’ & database sui generis rights reserved.