Ask A Genius 1436: Nuclear Ambiguity, Global Instability, and the Risk of Miscalculation: Uranium, Warheads, and AI
Author(s): Rick Rosner and Scott Douglas Jacobsen
Publication (Outlet/Website): Ask A Genius
Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/07/02
Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Rick Rosner explore Iran’s uranium enrichment, nuclear weapons technology, Cold War infrastructure, and the precarious nature of deterrence. The discussion connects historical context, personal experience, and AI ethics with the global risks of nuclear ambiguity, accidental or deliberate launch, and destabilizing power shifts in future governance.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: There is much global debate — especially in the U.S. — about whether Iran is enriching uranium to build nuclear weapons.
Rick Rosner: This speculation has been ongoing for over 40 years. People have often said Iran is “weeks away” from having a nuclear weapon.
Whether Iran is actively building nuclear bombs remains uncertain. However, it does appear they have amassed enough uranium enriched to around 60% purity. If they chose to, they could potentially further enhance it to 90%, which is weapons-grade.
I guess you use uranium enriched to 90% or more — that is weapons-grade. You can use that in nuclear bombs. I have not read the entire Wikipedia page on the subject so that I may be slightly off on the exact figures. However, as I understand it, 60% enriched uranium can be used in some research reactors, while 90% is typically used for bombs.
It is the difference between uranium-235 (U-235) and uranium-238 (U-238). U-235 has fewer neutrons and is more fissile — its nuclei are more prone to splitting apart. It takes less energy to initiate a chain reaction.
You hit a U-235 nucleus with a stray neutron, and it will split, releasing energy and more neutrons, which then hit other nuclei — if you have enough U-235, it cascades into a full-blown chain reaction.
Moreover, in that reaction, a small fraction — about 1% of the mass — is converted directly into energy, per Einstein’s E=mc², which is enough to produce a blast in the kiloton range. That is how a uranium bomb works.
Reactor-grade uranium typically contains only 3–5% U-235, which is not nearly fissile enough for a bomb. Weapons-grade uranium is enriched to over 90% U-235. That is what makes it “bomb material.” So, basically: 60% enrichment might have uses, but it is not yet weapons-grade.
The method for making a uranium bomb involves bringing two subcritical masses of U-235 together — often as two hemispheres or a plug and ring — to form a critical mass. Once you hit that point, a rapid, uncontrolled chain reaction occurs, and it explodes.
A plutonium bomb works on the same principle, but with a different configuration. You start with a hollow sphere of plutonium — typically Pu-239 — and place explosives evenly around it. When detonated, the sphere implodes, causing the plutonium to reach a supercritical state.
There is also usually a neutron reflector or tamper in the center to bounce neutrons back into the core, making the explosion more efficient. It is complex, but conceptually similar: you compress fissile material until it reaches a critical state.
Moreover, get this — the place where they made those plutonium cores, the “pits,” was only about seven miles from my house when I was growing up—Rocky Flats, in Colorado. From the time I was four until I was 26, they were manufacturing nuclear triggers there. That is the same Rocky Flats that has been a controversial site for decades.
Moreover, that ties into something else. My dad died of thyroid cancer. He also smoked cigars, so I am unsure if Rocky Flats had any connection to it. Boulder is situated at an elevation of approximately 5,400 feet and is built on granite, which naturally emits radon gas. So, between altitude, granite, and cigars, there were numerous possible contributing factors.
Jacobsen: Was your dad involved in nuclear work?
Rosner: He was. He guarded nuclear weapons while serving as a sergeant in the U.S. Air Force. All three of my dads — my biological father, stepfather, and father-in-law — were involved in the nuclear business.
Jacobsen: All three?
Rosner: Yeah. My real dad flew nuclear bombs on a B-36 bomber. My stepdad guarded them. My father-in-law was in the Army, working in accounting — I am not sure exactly what he did, but he managed numbers related to nuclear logistics or materials.
Jacobsen: That is a remarkable cross-section of Cold War-era nuclear infrastructure, all in your family.
Rosner: Annie Jacobsen has conducted extensive reporting on secret military programs, including nuclear weapons development, and has done a significant amount of detailed historical work. There are people who struggle to grasp the concept of scale. We talked about that yesterday — people often struggle to grasp the size or scope of things.
Moreover, any time you are writing about AI, especially in speculative or near-future fiction, you almost have to mention nuclear weapons. It is clichéd, but it is also a legitimate concern.
Did I mention yesterday that about half of America’s active nuclear warheads are on submarines?
Jacobsen: Oh?
Rosner: It is not wild. Submarines are mobile and hard to detect, so they are the ideal place to hide nuclear weapons. The U.S. used to rely heavily on land-based missile silos and still does, but now a significant portion — somewhere between 720 and 960 nuclear warheads — is deployed aboard around 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines.
That matches what I have read. Russia employs the same strategy, and likely China does as well. I do not know about Pakistan or India.
However, any responsible AI — or coalition of AIs and humans — has to contend with nukes. As AI continues to gain intelligence and autonomy, global leadership will become increasingly unstable. We will likely face shifting power structures, and I cannot imagine rational humans or AIs of the future tolerating that much instability without addressing the nuclear threat.
Jacobsen: And not just accidental launches — deliberate ones, too. The term “accidental nuclear war” is too narrow.
Rosner: In Annie Jacobsen’s book, which I keep referencing, she outlines how easily a nuclear exchange could be triggered. For example, if North Korea were to launch just two nuclear missiles, the U.S. early warning system might not be able to immediately distinguish whether those missiles came from North Korea or Russia, due to trajectory and detection angles.
The shortest path for an intercontinental ballistic missile headed to the U.S. is over the North Pole, so even a North Korean missile might resemble a Russian one in flight path.
To prevent ambiguity from triggering a retaliatory launch against Russia, when in fact it was North Korea. That turns a regional act into a global catastrophe. Annie Jacobsen estimates that such a misunderstanding could result in the death of three-quarters of the population in the Northern Hemisphere.
Jacobsen: Russia does not need to be irrational. The U.S. does not need to be irrational. All it takes is one rogue actor — one unstable leader in North Korea — to cause a chain reaction.
Rosner: That could lead to the U.S. launching 30 or more nuclear weapons in response. Maybe even more.
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