Purposes in Geopolitics for Prisoner Exchanges

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/04/11

Irina Tsukerman, a national security and human rights lawyer, discusses prisoner swaps between the U.S. and Russia reflect broader geopolitical struggles, with Russia using wrongful detentions as leverage. These exchanges, often involving civilians traded for spies or criminals, highlight Russia’s use of hostage diplomacy. Russia benefits from strategic public relations, manipulating domestic and international narratives. Concerns about Russia’s stability, demographic decline, and growing dependence on China persist. Intelligence penetration favours Russia, as its counterintelligence is highly effective, while U.S. institutions remain vulnerable. Cryptocurrency crimes, including money laundering via BTC-e, remain a tool for Russian illicit activities. Western enforcement efforts are often inconsistent, shaped by political priorities rather than law.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: There are geopolitical impacts of prisoner swaps, U.S.-Russia relations, the Ukraine conflict, etc. What are the implications or signals of these exchanges regarding Russia’s willingness to negotiate broader geopolitical issues? Recently, there was a peace summit in Saudi Arabia, but whether or not it will be widely accepted is another question. There might be some political follow-up from that, potentially affecting prisoner exchanges. What do prisoner exchanges mean for Russia’s relations with other countries, particularly those with whom it engages in these swaps?

Irina Tsukerman: These are not standard prisoner exchanges. This is not a situation where prisoners of war are exchanged under agreed-upon protocols, as we see with Russia and Ukraine exchanging military prisoners. Nor do these exchanges follow Geneva Convention norms. What we are witnessing is hostage diplomacy. Russia, along with other states that engage in similar tactics, detains civilians on politically motivated or entirely fabricated charges to extract political or financial concessions from the United States and other countries.

The more these nations accommodate Russia, the more it will continue this practice. A key question is why U.S. citizens and dual nationals can still travel to Russia. Why has the State Department not imposed a travel ban, as it did with North Korea following the Otto Warmbier case, which resulted in the torture and death of a U.S. citizen? That is a valid policy question that should be directed at the administration. What is clear is that Russia is using these detentions as leverage, attempting to blackmail and pressure the U.S. government into making political concessions.

The impact of this extends beyond Russia. Other authoritarian states may be encouraged to adopt similar tactics. Paying political or financial ransoms grants Russia undeserved geopolitical leverage, allowing it to tie these exchanges to broader political issues, as we recently saw in Riyadh. The latest release of a young American, who was arrested for alleged marijuana possession, was explicitly linked to broader diplomatic efforts. Had the U.S. not agreed to allow the return of Russian personnel under diplomatic cover—many of whom are suspected intelligence operatives—the fate of that individual could have been much worse, similar to others still imprisoned in Russia.

Jacobsen: What about information warfare? Does that play a role here as well?

Tsukerman: Absolutely—strategic public relations is a key factor. Russia uses these exchanges to shape its domestic narrative, portraying itself as negotiating from a position of strength. It normalizes abductions and politically motivated detentions while manipulating public perception. It also shapes Western public opinion by exploiting the expectation that democratic governments must do everything possible to bring their citizens home.

Essentially, Russia is turning this fundamental democratic norm into a vulnerability and a political bargaining chip. Without this ability to manipulate public opinion in the United States and other Western nations, Russia—an isolated, heavily sanctioned state that has suffered military losses in Ukraine and elsewhere in recent years—would not be able to secure many of the concessions it currently receives.

It certainly normalizes the idea of exchanging high-value prisoners for civilians, which is new and different from previous exchanges. During the Soviet era, prisoner swaps typically involved spies, intelligence operatives, diplomats, or individuals connected to government service. While these exchanges happened occasionally, they followed established rules of engagement. Now, however, Russia is trading civilians with no political affiliations for criminals, terrorists, and spies. This ballgame is entirely different—it challenges public opinion and represents Russia’s significant information warfare victory.

Jacobsen: These are political moves in the long term, but they also reflect a larger question about the Russian state’s viability. Given its internal challenges, how stable is Russia? Is it possible for this system to continue operating under Putin and the Kremlin, even though Putin, along with many of his key allies, is aging?

Tsukerman: Russia’s political bureaucracy is designed to perpetuate itself in some form or another. However, there are several viable scenarios in which Russia could experience significant internal instability or fragmentation. This could result from internal rebellions, depending on the coordination and resources of internal opposition groups, or from external factors, including foreign assistance to these movements.

If Western states saw it in their interest to encourage internal destabilization in Russia—mirroring what Russia does around the world—Russia could face serious consequences. The Kremlin has a long history of fomenting separatism and supporting extreme factions in other countries, even when their grievances are minor. If the United States and its allies applied the same strategy to Russia, in my opinion, the Russian Federation would have collapsed long ago.

The conditions for instability already exist. Russia is home to numerous ethnic, geographical, religious, and political groups that experience tensions, discrimination, and competing power interests. These groups could be strategically leveraged to weaken Russia, foster instability, and promote secessionist movements.

Jacobsen: Is Russia concerned about becoming a long-term vassal state of China?

Tsukerman: There is a genuine concern about this possibility, but it is not discussed nearly enough in Western policy circles. There is deep-seated distrust between Russian and Chinese intelligence services. Both countries harbour racial prejudices against each other and have unresolved historical grievances. China is strategically interested in appropriating Russian intellectual property, particularly in defence sectors. There are also territorial disputes—China has historical claims to certain Russian regions.

Both countries are experiencing demographic crises, but Russia’s decline is particularly severe, making it vulnerable to external pressures, including from China. A growing ideological movement in Russia, led by figures like Alexander Dugin, also promotes “Eurasian unity.” This vision calls for a borderless geopolitical structure. It even romanticizes the Mongol invasions, arguing that Russia was never truly conquered but voluntarily integrated into the Mongol empire. This narrative undermines Russian nationalism and could ultimately serve China’s interests rather than Russia’s.

These narratives benefit China far more than they benefit Russia in the long run because China is the stronger party by every measurable standard—its population size, upkeep and modernization of its military, and overall global position. Over time, Russia will suffer from anti-Russian nationalism and the promotion of pan-Eurasianism. This ideological shift does not serve Russia’s interests, especially in Central Asia, where it has historically held influence. Russia is steadily losing ground to China in this region for clear economic reasons. While many actors take advantage of sanctions loopholes and export-import control gaps, they are not necessarily aligned with Russia’s ideological vision. Instead, they exploit the ongoing power struggle between Russia and China. China is poised to win that game in the long run because it has more to offer.

Jacobsen: Is this a case where Russia secures short-term political victories through prisoner swaps—such as exchanging civilians for spies, intelligence operatives, or terrorists—and uses these moments as political currency in diplomatic affairs? Does it also serve a domestic function by convincing the Russian public that they still influence the world stage?

Tsukerman: Absolutely, Russia uses these exchanges to present itself as a diplomatic power capable of negotiating with the West. But in the larger scheme of things, these are short-term wins within much broader, long-term trends that signal decline.

Jacobsen: Do these types of states—Russia, China, or other authoritarian systems—perpetuate themselves indefinitely due to the inertia of bureaucratic systems, or do they tend to self-destruct over time due to systemic neglect?

Tsukerman: Partially, yes. The Russian population is both actively and passively resisting the state’s demands. Many avoid military service by fleeing the country or simply not reporting for duty. There is no real replacement for the losses sustained in Ukraine. Russia is using soldiers in human-wave assaults against Ukrainian forces that are far better equipped, leading to massive, preventable casualties. Other long-term issues, such as alcoholism, infrastructure collapse, medical failures, widespread nihilism, the unchecked spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS (which is exacerbated by medical disinformation), and overall state neglect, are further eroding societal stability. Russia is not a country driven by a strong will to live—it is plagued by systemic dysfunction.

In China, we see similar trends. The state’s policies have contributed to a demographic crisis. Still, other factors, such as economic downturns, ethnic tensions, and increasing autocracy, are also at play. These factors discourage different groups from wanting to have children, either due to economic uncertainty, political repression, or social marginalization. Corruption, state neglect, and poor access to healthcare shorten lifespans, further exacerbating population decline.

Jacobsen: Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, how many major prisoner swaps have taken place?

Tsukerman: There have been several significant exchanges. One of the most well-known involved Viktor Bout, a notorious arms dealer—famously depicted in Lord of War—who was exchanged for a group of civilians. Another major exchange last year involved a large number of Russian opposition figures and other civilians in return for spies, terrorists, and individuals tied to Russian state interests.

What is particularly interesting is what happened after some of these Russian opposition figures were released. Many of them started to express mildly pro-Russian rhetoric, with some even defending Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Some had already been sympathetic to the Kremlin’s position, but others shifted their stance more openly after release. This raises serious questions about how they ended up in detention in the first place and what might have happened to them while they were imprisoned.

There is speculation that some of these individuals were Russian agents of influence who were reactivated after the exchange. Others may have been subjected to psychological conditioning or coercion while in Russian custody, leading them to change their rhetoric. These cases demonstrate how Russia not only uses prisoner exchanges for immediate political gains but also potentially as a tool for long-term influence operations.

Jacobsen: How do prisoner swaps impact U.S. policy regarding wrongful detentions? How do they influence negotiations for those detained abroad, such as Paul Whelan and Evan Gershkovich? What are the legal and security risks in releasing individuals like Alexander Vinnik, who are implicated in financial crimes and cyber operations? Russia has cultivated a reputation for being adept at cyber warfare despite weaknesses in other areas.

Tsukerman: Russia always claims that no detention is unlawful because they manufacture crimes to justify imprisonment—for example, the case of Brittney Griner, the basketball player who exchanged for Viktor Bout.

Russia claimed that she was smuggling marijuana, even though the amount was negligible and the punishment was vastly disproportionate—something that would never happen in a Western country. Drug use is rampant in Russia, and unlike in places such as Singapore or Thailand, where drug offences carry severe penalties, this case was clearly politicized and aimed specifically at detaining an American.

Russia also fabricates other charges, such as espionage, as seen in the case of Evan Gershkovich. The Russian government claims that legitimate journalism is a form of spying and has criminalized otherwise innocuous activities to create “criminals” where none exist.

The U.S. may declare these detentions wrongful, but Russia dismisses such claims, arguing that these activities violate Russian law. At the same time, laws elsewhere violate Russian law, which presents a problem. Another recent case involves a former ballerina imprisoned for making a small donation to Ukraine—her only “crime.” The U.S. recognizes this as a wrongful detention, but ultimately, it carries no consequences for Russia. No Russian officials have been sanctioned or criminally punished for these absurd distortions of justice.

Jacobsen: What effect do these prisoner swaps have on NATO and European perceptions of the United States and Russia?

Tsukerman: It certainly does not look good when the U.S. repeatedly allows Russia to exchange civilians for high-value targets and criminals, many of whom return to activities that threaten global security. Take Viktor Bout, for example. After his release, he contributed to advancing Russian arms sales, including to Houthi militants, who then used those weapons to attack Western ships operating in the Red Sea.

However, many NATO countries engage in practices similar to those of states like Iran. Hence, they are unlikely to criticize the U.S. for these exchanges. Some European nations have also swapped civilians for spies or terrorists in politically motivated deals.

Jacobsen: What has been the most consequential prisoner exchange in the past three years?

Tsukerman: In terms of Russia, it is a close tie between the release of Viktor Bout—one of the most notorious arms traffickers in modern history—in exchange for Brittney Griner, a private U.S. citizen with no political significance, and another major exchange involving several Russian opposition figures and civilians for a large number of Russian spies.

While some of these spies were not as well known as Bout, their return to Russia collectively represented a major intelligence and security threat. Some analysts have even compared Bout’s strategic value to a Prigozhin-like figure regarding his ability to operate on Russia’s behalf. These exchanges highlight the vastly unequal nature of these deals, reinforcing Russia’s ability to leverage hostage diplomacy for disproportionate gains. That’s a close call between those two.

Jacobsen: Do you think Putin will ever face a criminal trial? And this isn’t just an East-West issue—do you think Western leaders who have committed crimes under international law would also face criminal trials?

Tsukerman: It will be difficult for a couple of reasons.

First, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been delegitimized by internal politics, and Russia has exploited this to its advantage. Many people no longer take the ICC seriously because of its history of politicized investigations. It has pursued cases based on complaints from dubious and highly politicized NGOs, making any legitimate investigation into figures like Putin nearly unenforceable. We have already seen several countries ignore ICC-issued warrants.

So, in terms of international legal practice, it is unlikely that the international legal structure will be overhauled and rebuilt unless there is a major change.

The only other scenario would involve a country arresting Putin or other Russian officials for crimes committed on its soil. However, Russian officials are highly unlikely to travel to jurisdictions where they could face arrest—unless there is a significant change in the Russian government. Lower-ranking officials would be more vulnerable to such legal action, but even that is rare. Ukraine has attempted to arrest a few individuals. Still, Russian officials generally avoid travelling to countries where they risk imprisonment.

So far, no country has made a serious effort to pursue these officials. That is likely due to a mix of inertia and competing priorities. The only realistic scenario where Putin faces prosecution is if he is removed from power by a rival who uses the legal process to consolidate power. In that case, it would be a political maneuver rather than an act of justice.

Jacobsen: Do you think Western agencies are infiltrating Russian affairs more, or is Russian intelligence penetrating American affairs more? This is normal geopolitical activity, but I’m curious about your take.

Tsukerman: Without question, Russian intelligence has had greater success infiltrating American affairs than the other way around.

Of course, the U.S. intelligence community operates in Russia. There have been vocal American critics of the Russian government, and some Russian opposition groups have benefited from U.S. assistance through organizations like USAID, particularly in targeted campaigns. However, U.S. support for opposition movements is often disorganized, inconsistent, and sometimes ineffective. Many of these opposition figures end up compromised, or they turn out to be controlled opposition directed by the Kremlin. Even the limited efforts to provide support for Russian opposition projects tend to have minimal impact because Russia’s counterintelligence and suppression tactics are highly effective.

By contrast, the U.S. has far more transparent institutions and weaker counterintelligence measures, making it much easier for Russia to conduct political interference. Russia has been running coordinated influence campaigns in the U.S. for decades, contributing to today’s political landscape.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has failed to penetrate Russian public opinion—let alone its institutions. Russian public sentiment still largely supports Putin, even if there is some discontent over the war in Ukraine. However, opposition to the war is often driven by practical concerns, such as military losses and economic hardships, rather than ideological opposition to Putin’s policies. To the extent that Russian public opinion on Ukraine has shifted, it has been more influenced by Ukrainian information operations than by U.S. or Western efforts.

The U.S. has not been helpful in the information space.

Jacobsen: What does Vinnik’s release mean for cryptocurrency crime enforcement, particularly regarding money laundering and BTC-e?

Tsukerman: Russia has been extremely agile in using cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and its state-created digital assets for money laundering, funding separatist movements, and facilitating other illicit operations. The U.S. has cracked down on cryptocurrency exchanges, targeted money-laundering networks, and worked to identify wallets linked to criminal enterprises.

However, political interests often dictate legal enforcement. We saw this with the Silk Road case involving a Russia-affiliated drug and contraband exchange platform. President Trump recently released the founder of Silk Road, with significant support from figures like Elon Musk, who seem to favour Russia-affiliated, so-called libertarian—but criminal—social media and crypto exchange operators. These platforms essentially provide safe havens for illicit activities, including organized crime, terrorism, and Russia-driven financial operations.

Jacobsen: Irina, thank you for your time today. I appreciate it.

Tsukerman: Thank you. 

Jacobsen: Excellent. Thank you so much. Take care. Bye.

Tsukerman: You too. Bye.

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