A Comprehensive on Global Gender Parity

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/04/06

Irina Tsukerman, a New York-based attorney and strategic advisor on human rights and security, explains that while international indices—such as those from the WEF, UNDP, and OECD—provide useful metrics for gender equality, the real challenges lie in the social, legal, and economic conditions that shape women’s lives. She contrasts extreme examples like Afghanistan’s oppressive gender apartheid and China’s One-Child Policy—which led to forced abortions, skewed gender ratios, and long-term economic instability—with more progressive policies seen in Nordic countries. Policies that restrict reproductive freedom, enforce traditional gender roles, or impose financial penalties for childlessness have consistently resulted in unintended negative consequences, including declining birth rates, higher maternal mortality, and economic hardship. Both agree that demographic challenges cannot be solved solely through statistical mandates or top-down interventions. Instead, they advocate for enhancing personal agency, improving work-life balance, and providing affordable childcare and robust parental leave. Ultimately, Tsukerman emphasizes that having and raising children is a personal choice and that practical, community-based policies must be supported rather than imposed through coercive state measures.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Today, we are joined by the highly intelligent Irina Tsukerman. Irina is a New York-based national security and human rights attorney who leads Scarab Rising, Inc., a strategic advisory firm. She was admitted to the New York State Bar in 2009 and has been a practicing attorney. Irina holds a Juris Doctor (J.D.) degree from Fordham University School of Law. She works extensively on foreign affairs, Middle East policy, counterterrorism, intelligence, cybersecurity, and international security.

Her writings have been featured in numerous international publications, including The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Kyiv Post, and Trends Research & Advisory. She has provided expert analysis for various media outlets and think tanks. The Jewish Week named her a “36 Under 36” honoree, recognizing her leadership. Irina is fluent in multiple languages.

Her expertise includes cybersecurity, energy security, influence campaigns, intelligence analysis, strategic communications, and global media. She has also made numerous media appearances and published extensive analyses on these subjects. Today, we will discuss some of these key topics. Thank you for joining me in this perennial and highly relevant conversation.

Numerous organizations, rankings, and indexes are designed to assess gender parity across different countries. While these are qualitative rather than absolute measures, they provide useful indicators. Some of the most well-known include:

• The World Economic Forum (WEF) and its Global Gender Gap Index
• The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and its Gender Inequality Index
• UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) and its Gender Parity Index
• The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) and its Gender Equality Index
• The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and its Social Institutions and Gender Index
• Equal Measures 2030 and the SDG Gender Index
• UN Women, which works on gender-related policy research but does not publish a specific Global Gender Parity Index

Many organizations and individuals globally are deeply invested in gender equality. Even in countries with repressive policies or cultural norms that restrict both women and men, awareness of these issues continues to grow.

With that in mind, when you think about these metrics and gender parity as a whole, what comes to mind? How do you view qualitative measurements like those I just mentioned?

Irina Tsukerman: Generally, when discussing gender parity and women’s rights, several key factors come into play. The most fundamental is equal protection under the law—the ability of women to access employment opportunities, including roles in government and senior private-sector positions.

Other essential considerations include gender-based violence, legal protections against discrimination, and policies affecting education, healthcare, and economic empowerment. Social and cultural influences also shape women’s access to education, professional opportunities, and personal freedoms.

However, gender equality is defined differently by different people. There are diverse political and ideological perspectives on the issue—even among women. Some argue that gender should not be used as a primary category of analysis, while others believe that these metrics remain essential for tracking progress and addressing disparities. I do believe these indices have value. Measuring specific factors is important, but the methodology used to measure them is equally critical in ensuring accuracy and meaningful analysis.

Jacobsen: But some things—like legal protections, gender-based violence issues, and similar matters—are pretty cut and dry. I do not think they should be particularly controversial. However, cultural, national, and regional differences exist in how people view these issues.

What do you make of these cultural, national, and regional differences regarding what we might call the question of women or the status of women, where different cultures, countries, and regions tend to provide different answers?

Tsukerman: The first question is to what extent women can participate in decision-making processes concerning their status. Women’s ability to engage in these discussions is severely restricted in some cultures and societies.

To use the most extreme example, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan enforces absolute gender apartheid. Women are denied basic rights, including access to healthcare, education, and even the ability to appear in public spaces without severe restrictions. The entire country is subject to laws that fundamentally erase women from public life. While this is an extreme case, we can contrast it with countries like Finland and other Scandinavian nations, where strict provisions ensure women’s representation in government positions and corporate leadership, mandating female participation in key decision-making.

Most countries in the world fall somewhere between these two extremes. The United States is a particularly interestingexample because women’s status can be analyzed through multiple dimensions, such as political participation, economic opportunities, healthcare access, cultural norms, and public opinion trends. Urban versus rural divides, ethnic and religious backgrounds, and regional differences create a complex landscape for assessing women’s rights. In many ways, the US is a microcosm of the broader international debate on gender equality.

Women in the United States fare well compared to many other places worldwide. By most metrics, they rank in the upper tier. However, socioeconomic disparities remain a concern, particularly for women in lower-income brackets who face challenges related to healthcare, economic stability, and educational opportunities. Gender-based violence and abuse, while present in all social classes, tend to be more prevalent among lower-income communities, which is a pattern observed globally.

Despite economic fluctuations over the years, the US has a large and growing middle class, and women have continued to rise in social, financial, and political influence. Women’s representation in leadership roles—whether in business, politics, or other areas—has increased steadily. By most global standards, the US ranks relatively high in these categories.

Jacobsen: Beyond statistical metrics, there are also key international legal frameworks that outline women’s rights. Some of the most important documents include:

• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
• The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1979)
• The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) is updated periodically every five years, this year being one of the update years.

These documents establish international principles regarding gender equality, but their implementation varies widely across different countries. Some nations fully embrace these standards, while others reject or only partially enforce them.

While significant progress has been made, women’s global status remains highly dependent on political will, economic structures, and cultural dynamics.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) has conventions on gender equality. There is also the Equal Remuneration Convention, the Discrimination Convention, and the Violence and Harassment Convention. Additionally, gender equality is incorporated into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which succeeded the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

So, at an international level, we have various declarations and frameworks to promote gender equality. At the very least, many countries commit to these goals through policy initiatives or rhetorical support.

From a geopolitical perspective, do most countries that support these principles genuinely intend to implement them? Or do they merely pay lip service to these ideals without taking meaningful action, even if progress is slow?

Tsukerman: That is a key question, and two separate issues are at play. First, the concept becomes diluted when everything is framed as a “right”—whether a human right, a woman’s right, or another category. Suppose too many goals and priorities are stacked into broad, aspirational categories. In that case, achieving them all becomes difficult—if not impossible. Even when efforts are well-intentioned, overcategorization leads to a fragmentation of focus and resources. The result is that little progress is made on any front.

Second, while many developing countries genuinely try to improve gender equality, the definition of “improvement” varies significantly across cultures, economic conditions, and political systems. Some nations prioritize certain reforms over others, depending on historical context, economic constraints, and social attitudes.

That said, there are clear cases of bad-faith actors—countries where governments officially endorse gender equality while simultaneously enforcing repressive laws that severely restrict women’s rights. In these cases, rhetoric is used as a public relations tool while state policies actively disenfranchise women. These countries tend to be easy to identify because their laws—whether restricting women’s movement, employment, education, or civil liberties—speak for themselves.

I would give the benefit of the doubt in cases where no formal legal restrictions exist. However, cultural, economic, or structural barriers still hinder progress. Some governments may lack the resources or struggle with deeply ingrained cultural norms, making reforms difficult to implement despite genuine efforts. These countries may be slow-moving in their progress, but at least they are trying to find practical pathways forward.

Jacobsen: Now, turning to the United States, we will get to the issue of “tech bro culture” shortly, but first, let’s look at the historical legal framework shaping women’s rights in the country.

The Seneca Falls Convention (1848) marked the first formal call for women’s suffrage and legal equality in the US, leading to a series of landmark legislative changes:

• The Nineteenth Amendment (1920) granted women the right to vote.
• The Equal Pay Act (1963) mandated equal pay for equal work.
• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (1964) prohibited gender discrimination in employment.
• Title IX (1972) prohibited gender discrimination in federally funded education programs and activities.
• Roe v. Wade (1973)—which established federal protections for abortion rights—was overturned by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) after 49 years.
• The Violence Against Women Act (1994) provided federal support for addressing gender-based violence.
• The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (2009) strengthened protections against wage discrimination based on gender.

So, in addition to the international frameworks, we see that even within a single country like the US, progress has been incremental—sometimes advancing and sometimes rolling back. This raises an important point: Does excessive categorization and broad aspirational language slow progress by making goals harder to achieve?

While global conversations around gender parity often rely on idealistic declarations, practical policy implementation remains uneven. The challenge is balancing ambition with feasibility, ensuring that legal protections translate into real-world impact rather than merely symbolic commitments.

We see a similar pattern internationally regarding the wealthiest countries in the world—places where one might assume that economic prosperity would naturally lead to greater freedoms and equity. While, in theory, wealth should provide more opportunities and reduce systemic barriers, wage inequality and wealth disparities still prevent the fair distribution of resources.

This leads to a familiar cycle: declarations, legislative acts, and official statements that sound promising on paper, yet their implementation remains slow and uneven in many areas. How do you interpret this pattern within the United States, where we see a domestic reflection of what happens globally?

Tsukerman: The United States relies on constitutional law as the foundation for all legal rights and protections. From the perspective of constitutional originalism, one could argue that the constitutional framework already implicitly guarantees equal protection under the law for all citizens—regardless of gender, race, or background.

If one takes that position, additional statutory provisions, such as the Equal Pay Act, may be considered unnecessary or even measures that could backfire in certain ways. Suppose equal protection is already established at the constitutional level. Further legislative interventions might be redundant or create unintended consequences in that case.

However, implementing any law depends heavily on the specific legal language and how it is applied in practice. Even within the broadest constitutional provisions, there will always be variation in interpretation and enforcement across different states and jurisdictions. Case law naturally evolves, and new technologies, social changes, and legal challenges constantly prompt reinterpretations of existing legal frameworks.

Take Roe v. Wade, for example. The central issue was privacy—a constitutional concept that became highly controversial because it was applied specifically to abortion. This led to heated debates about whether the case was truly about privacy or if abortion itself should be the focal point of the discussion.

• Those who saw it as a privacy issue argued that the ruling should extend far beyond abortion, influencing other aspects of personal autonomy and government intervention.
• Others believed that if abortion was the main concern, then more voices—including legislators, medical professionals, and even the father of the unborn child—should have a say in the matter rather than it being an issue of a woman’s sole discretion.

This illustrates how legal debates often evolve far beyond their original scope. A case that begins with one specific issue can morph into a broader ideological and legal battle—and sometimes into something entirely different from its original intent.

Additionally, when new rights are claimed, or existing rights are challenged, disputes arise about government overreach, private versus public interests, and the balance of legal protections. These debates often lead to inconsistent enforcement and uneven application of laws nationwide.

For example, what is considered a “successful” gender equality policy in Texas may be viewed as the exact opposite in New York—and vice versa. This wide divergence in interpretations and applications contributes to legal uncertainty and makes implementation highly contested and regionally variable.

Jacobsen: Now, I’d like to turn to another important aspect of this discussion: the role of ultra-wealthy individuals in shaping policy and social discourse. You have observed, and I have also noted, that there is a phenomenon among billionaires and high-net-worth individuals who own or control significant portions of high-tech industries in the United States—and, in some cases, internationally.

These individuals have a deep interest in demographics and population trends. While I have not come across explicit cases where their focus is race-based, their obsession with demographic shifts, population control, and societal restructuring raises important ethical and legal questions.

I have typically seen a strong focus on numbers in these discussions. Analysts and commentators often frame the issue regarding replacement rates, stating that a sustainable birth rate requires 2.1 children per couple—accounting for two parents plus an additional 0.1 to compensate for premature deaths.

In contrast, many developed countries report sub-replacement fertility rates—figures such as 1.5, 1.4, or even below 1.0. I was told that in South Korea, for example, the rate is as low as 0.7 or 0.8. These numbers are often discussed abstractly without addressing the sociocultural, economic, or political realities contributing to declining birth rates. Before we get into the existential implications, what do you make of this hyperfocus among technology entrepreneurs (“tech bros”) on birth rates and demographics?

Tsukerman: To be clear, technology industry leaders are not the only ones obsessed with this issue. A strong anti-Malthusian strain of thought—particularly among conservatives—argues that population decline is an existential crisis. On one side, Malthusian thinkers claim that the Earth’s resources are finite and cannot sustain continued population growth. Conversely, pronatalist advocates believe societies will face economic and social collapse if humanity does not reproduce at a certain rate.

I understand the concern. Each country is sovereign, and a high birth rate in one country does not “balance out” a declining birth rate in another. However, no government, billionaire, or ideological movement can control what individuals or families choose to do regarding reproduction, adoption, or family planning. This fixation on demographic engineering is unsettling. It raises questions about personal autonomy, social planning, and the role of government or elites in influencing private decisions.

Of course, it is reasonable for societies to discuss what policies or conditions are most conducive to family stability and child-rearing. That is a legitimate debate and part of the broader social contract between citizens and their government. Discussions about family policies, childcare support, education, and economic incentives are worthwhile.

However, when random individuals lecture others online about when and how they should marry or have children, it feels intrusive and out of place. While macro-level concerns about demographic trends are valid, individual reproductive choices are deeply personal. No amount of generalized rhetoric is going to sway people’s deeply held decisions about marriage and parenthood.

Repeating broad demographic concerns in banal, alarmist ways does not help move society in any productive direction. Suppose these advocates truly want to influence policy. In that case, they should focus on gathering data, polling the public, and understanding what practical support systems people need to feel more secure in starting families.

Short of serious policy discussions, these abstract debates achieve little. People who believe society can be planned from the top down greatly overestimate their control over human behaviour. History has proven this time and again—the Soviet Union, China, and other collectivist regimes attempted large-scale social engineering, and it backfired tremendously.

Jacobsen: Do large, centrally planned societies—like China under the One-Child Policy or the Soviet Union—tend to collapse under their weight because human societies are too complex to be pre-planned in this way?

Tsukerman: The One-Child Policy led to a massive demographic decline in China. Women were often forced to undergo abortions, and the policy created long-term economic and social imbalances.

Given the cultural preference for boys over girls, China’s One-Child Policy led to severe demographic imbalances. Families disproportionately chose to abort female fetuses, give up girls for adoption, or, in some cases, engage in infanticide. This has resulted in a highly skewed gender ratio, with millions of men unable to find partners. This long-term consequence still affects Chinese society today.

In contrast, the Soviet Union faced different pressures. While there was less direct gender-based population control, economic and social conditions made large families less desirable. The heavy burden of state control, economic hardship, and forced labour policies discouraged people from having more children.

If a society places significant financial and social burdens on individuals, people will be less inclined to have more children. So, contrary to some arguments, traditional societies did not necessarily lead to higher birth rates if economic and social conditions were unfavourable.

Jacobsen: Before we move on, do you have any final thoughts on the stability of planned economies or the long-term viability of China’s demographic policies?

Tsukerman: The failure of planned economies and social engineering is critical. China’s One-Child Policy was not just a policy failure—it was a demographic catastrophe. Beyond the obvious gender imbalance, the policy created long-term economic instability, an aging population, and a shrinking workforce.

The issue was not just that China mismanaged its economy—it was also the misery index of life under authoritarian rule, coupled with rigid social controls, that made family expansion undesirable.

Historically, China’s agrarian economy required large families to work in the fields. The high child mortality rate and lack of medical advancements meant that families had to have multiple children to ensure that some survived into adulthood. Additionally, sons were preferred because they were expected to carry on family names and provide for aging parents. This cultural norm continued well into the 20th century, reinforcing gender disparities.

In contrast, the Soviet Union had a more mixed economy—some regions remained agrarian, but urbanization and industrialization changed population dynamics. Unlike China, territorial expansion and militarization were major in population growth.

For much of its history, the Soviet Union was either at war or preparing for war, leading to an emphasis on military-age male populations rather than balanced demographic policies. Additionally, harsh living conditions, forced collectivization, and political purges contributed to population instability.

Despite its large territorial expanse, much of the Soviet Union was difficult to inhabit—regions like Siberia were sparsely populated due to harsh climates and poor infrastructure. Meanwhile, economic and political power was highly concentrated in Moscow, leaving other regions underdeveloped and fueling competition for urban living spaces. This uneven distribution of resources, prestige, and opportunities led to high social stratification and further discouraged large families.

Jacobsen: In China and the Soviet Union, government policies failed to account for long-term demographic sustainability. Centralized attempts to engineer population growth or suppression often backfired, proving that human societies are too complex to be rigidly pre-planned.

Despite these failures in gender equity and population control, did these societies achieve anything positive regarding gender parity? While there were issues with sex-selective abortion, family name traditions, and patrilineal inheritance, were there any notable advances for women in these systems?

Tsukerman: Confucian traditions in China historically fostered strong family units. The emphasis on filial piety created a deep respect for elders and contributed to community cohesion, making society more durable and stable—at least outside government-imposed population control policies.

I don’t necessarily agree with the Confucian hierarchy, but it provided a certain level of protection for older people and ensured social continuity for a long time. The emphasis on tradition, respect, and structure made Chinese society resilient. However, it also reinforced cultural conservatism, which often placed women in subordinate roles.

When communism took over, it theoretically promoted gender equality—but in reality, it did not necessarily improve conditions for women. While the Communist Party outwardly claimed to champion women’s rights, its political and social structures remained deeply patriarchal.

For example, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the inner circle of the most powerful figures in China consists entirely of men. Women who had been rising through the ranks of government and party leadership have been systematically purged.

Jacobsen: When you say “eliminated,” do you mean purged politically?

Tsukerman: Yes, purged in a political sense. I am not suggesting that these women were murdered, but politically, they were removed from power and denied further advancement.

In contrast, in the Soviet Union, World War II created both opportunities and necessities for women to enter the workforce. The perception that women had greater equality was not due to progressive ideology—it was simply a byproduct of war and necessity.

Millions of Soviet men were killed on the battlefield, many due to Stalin’s reckless military strategy, which relied on human wave attacks—sending vast numbers of undertrained and ill-equipped soldiers into battle to overwhelm the enemy through sheer numbers. This cost millions of lives but ultimately contributed to the Soviet victory in World War II.

Because of these massive losses, women had to take up jobs in factories and essential industries, filling roles that men had previously held. However, this was not a result of cultural progressivism or genuine gender equality initiatives—it was a direct consequence of wartime labour shortages.

Despite communist rhetoric about equality, women were denied access to prestigious institutions, such as KGB training academies, until the 1960s or later. In elite circles, women were often discouraged from divorcing Communist Party members because divorce was seen as a political liability for male officials.

Jacobsen: So, was divorce essentially social suicide for women married to men in high-ranking positions?

Tsukerman: Exactly. Women were often trapped in marriages where their husbands were unfaithful, career-obsessed, or heavy drinkers. Yet, divorce was discouraged because it could damage the man’s political career. This left many women with few options outside of domestic responsibilities. While they did participate in the workforce, their social standing and opportunities remained limited compared to men.

Even where legal equality existed on paper, massive wealth disparities between Communist Party elites and the general population meant that women in lower social classes faced harsh living conditions. Unlike in the United States, Soviet women could not access modern household appliances that could ease domestic labour, making daily life far more difficult. Ultimately, while communist regimes claimed to promote gender equality, their actual policies often reinforced gendered divisions, particularly in elite circles where men retained overwhelming control.

Household appliances like washing machines and dishwashers arrived in the Soviet Union much later than in the West. This meant that women had to do laundry by hand, wash dishes manually, and handle all household chores without modern conveniences.

In addition, child-rearing responsibilities fell almost entirely on women. Mothers were expected to help children with schoolwork and manage household affairs, while men were rarely expected to contribute.

As a result, women essentially worked two full-time jobs—one in the formal workforce and one at home. There was also a strong cultural expectation that they had to be accommodating to their husbands in all ways, including tolerating infidelity.

Divorce was rarely a viable option, as women often received minimal alimony (if they were lucky) and faced significant economic hardships due to low wages. This system trapped many women in unhappy marriages, making it difficult for them to achieve any real financial or social independence.

This system was not beneficial for women in any real sense.

Jacobsen: We mentioned the One-Child Policy in China. I did not realize that it ran from 1979 to 2015—literally decades. That policy has now created China’s current demographic crisis.

India is a country geographically contiguous with China. Although India is not often discussed in the same breath as China, it also ranks poorly in many gender-related metrics, including women’s participation, equality, and personal safety.

India has a massive population—the only country in the billions still experiencing population growth. China, by contrast, reached its peak population in 2021 and is now declining.

What about practices like dowry, child marriage, high rates of sexual violence, and low female labour force participation?

By formal economy, I mean the paid workforce since women primarily do a huge amount of unpaid labour in most societies.

Tsukerman: India is extremely diverse, with many cultures and traditions clashing within a single national framework. While some harmful gender-based practices are being phased out, progress remains slow and uneven.

The Indian government has taken steps to combat child marriage, which used to be widespread. In some segments of society, widows were historically expected to die after their husbands, often through ritual self-immolation.

Jacobsen: Is that Sati?

Tsukerman: Yes, that is the historical practice of Sati, where widows were burned alive on their husband’s funeral pyres. While Sati has been banned, it was once a real and horrifying phenomenon that the Indian government actively worked to eliminate—with relative success.

That said, sexual harassment and sexual violence remain serious issues. These problems require far more resources and enforcement, but they have not been a top priority for the government.

Instead, India’s primary focus has been economic growth, deregulation, and business development. This has taken precedence over social issues like gender-based violence and legal protections for women.

In addition, India has one of the most bureaucratic governments in the world. This slows progress in nearly every area—not just gender equality. The government is not necessarily deliberately keeping women down; its priorities have been elsewhere, focusing on economic expansion over social reform.

There has not been sufficient incentive to focus on the greater inclusion of women in India’s workforce. However, as educated women in Western countries like the UK and the US form stronger professional and cultural ties with India, this will likely improve over time.

India’s rapid economic growth—especially in sectors like the digital economy—creates new opportunities for women. In industries where remote work is an option, such as technology, digital retail, and online services, women may find it easier to participate without facing traditional social and mobility restrictions. As India modernized, many of these barriers could be overcome relatively quickly.

Addressing sexual violence, however, requires far more resources. It demands extensive community engagement, legal reforms, law enforcement training, education initiatives, and cultural shifts. This is not something that can be changed overnight. Still, progress is possible through international cooperation, best practice sharing, and local grassroots efforts.

Women must be equipped with tools to advocate for themselves in civil society and within political parties, coalitions, and local governments. Change must happen at the grassroots level and through top-down policy initiatives. More importantly, it must be a decision society makes, including local communities.

One of the biggest challenges in India is the vast disparity between highly educated urban populations and rural villages still struggling with basic infrastructure—such as sanitation, clean drinking water, and reliable electricity. When so many fundamental survival issues remain unaddressed, issues related to women’s empowerment often take a backseat.

Jacobsen: The next most populous country in the world is the United States, which we have already covered to some extent. Let’s turn to Indonesia, a country where traditional customs often limit women’s public participation. In many regions, women are far less visible in public life, making representation a significant challenge.

Not everyone needs to see themselves in leadership or public roles to feel motivated or inspired. However, representation is crucial for some in shaping aspirations and personal development. For those individuals, seeing women in leadership positions matters significantly. For others, it may not be a deciding factor in their ambitions.

Like India, Indonesia also faces issues related to child marriage and early marriage, as well as wage inequality and employment discrimination. These challenges are not unique to Indonesia, but they are structural obstacles that require policy intervention.

Another critical issue is access to comprehensive reproductive healthcare services. This factor is particularly impactful because a lack of reproductive autonomy can lead to lifelong consequences that restrict a woman’s choices and opportunities. Without control over their reproductive health, many women face social and economic constraints that dictate the trajectory of their lives. Given this broader context, what is your perspective on Indonesia’s gender landscape?

Tsukerman: Several factors shape gender dynamics in Indonesia. One of the most significant influences is the growing power of conservative religious parties, which have gained substantial influence in wider political discussions—particularly in certain provinces.

At the same time, Indonesia’s rapidly expanding technology sector presents new opportunities for women. Despite underrepresentation in STEM fields, women can thrive in digital retail, e-commerce, and online services, which provide alternative pathways to financial independence.

Although women’s overall representation remains low, I expect significant growth in female participation within Indonesia’s tech sector. Innovation-driven industries are more flexible and can offer women more opportunities to succeed than traditional sectors that cultural and structural barriers may still influence. When discussing traditional societies, healthcare and essential services are the most urgent and easiest areas to address. This is because health directly impacts the entire family unit.

If a mother does not have access to healthcare, she cannot adequately care for the household. This leads to negative ripple effects—the family structure weakens, children suffer, and overall well-being declines. Healthcare is a fundamental necessity and is often the most effective entry point for broader societal improvements.

From a policy and advocacy standpoint, the best approach in traditional societies is to start with basic survival needs, such as healthcare and sanitation, and then gradually expand to education and economic empowerment. Ensuring that women—especially those who are divorced, widowed, abandoned, or responsible for elderly parents—have access to education and financial stability is essential.

In my experience, pragmatic arguments tend to be far more persuasive in traditional societies than ideological debates about rights, gender equality, and human dignity. While abstract ideals are important, practical, community-based solutions resonate more effectively with local populations and policymakers.

The most effective strategy is to begin with tangible, immediate improvements, such as increasing access to healthcare, and then work with local legislators, grassroots organizations, and female advocates to expand the conversation toward long-term reforms.

Jacobsen: Now, shifting focus to Pakistan. We often hear about high-profile cases, such as Gulalai Ismail and Saba Ismail, who have been prominent figures in women’s and children’s rights activism.

Gulalai Ismail and Saba Ismail have played a key role in advocating for marginalized women and girls. After facing persecution, Gulalai fled Pakistan.

These are extraordinary cases—young activists who founded women’s rights organizations as teenagers and have remained deeply involved in human rights efforts ever since. However, their stories do not exist in isolation; they reflect a broader societal context in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Pashtun population, which makes up a large minority, has historically been at the center of cultural and political controversy. Women in tribal and rural areas often face systemic marginalization due to deeply entrenched patriarchal norms.

Some of the most pressing gender-based issues in Pakistan include:

• Restricted mobility and social exclusion due to tribal and feudal structures
• Violence against women is often disguised under the term “honour” killings.
• Educational barriers, particularly for rural girls, who face lower school enrollment rates
• Legal discrimination, particularly in inheritance laws and court testimony, where women’s rights are significantly weaker than men’s

At first glance, Pakistan shares some similarities with India and Indonesia in terms of women’s rights challenges. However, its sociopolitical structure makes it unique.

Tsukerman: Yes, Pakistan’s gender inequality landscape is similar to India and Indonesia, but it is also distinct in several key ways.

One major difference is Pakistan’s deep tribal divisions, which have more influence over governance than in India. While India also has tribal communities and inter-group conflicts, they do not play as dominant a role in shaping women’s rights and regional governance as they do in Pakistan’s tribal belts.

Pakistan has large, semi-autonomous tribal areas where the government has little authority. Some of these areas operate under Taliban-like structures, where extremely conservative tribal customs dictate women’s roles.

In these regions, government intervention is minimal, and women face extreme restrictions on education, work, and personal freedoms. These areas have been historically difficult to govern, making it challenging for national policies on women’s rights to take hold.

Unlike in India and Indonesia, where governments have at least made stronger legal commitments to women’s rights, Pakistan’s legal system remains highly restrictive, with significant barriers to gender equality under both civil and religious law.

Ultimately, the combination of feudal power structures, religious conservatism, tribal autonomy, and government inaction makes women’s rights progress in Pakistan particularly complex.

In addition to tribal and feudal structures, religion plays a significant role in shaping women’s rights and societal expectations in Pakistan.

A conservative, fundamentalist form of Islam is practiced in many parts of the country, particularly in rural and tribal areas. However, in major cities, the atmosphere is somewhat more open, allowing greater flexibility for women in professional and social spaces.

Despite these challenges, women in Pakistan participate in traditional professions, such as teaching, nursing, and medicine. Compared to Afghanistan, Pakistan is far less restrictive, but deeply ingrained traditional expectations still limit women’s freedom and career options.

Interestingly, one of the most effective ways for women to advance professionally is through security and military roles. Women in these sectors are often highly committed to proving their worth, much like the “tech bro” phenomenon in the tech industry. Serving in the security sector allows women to demonstrate patriotism, dedication, and competence, earning them respect in conservative circles that might otherwise be denied.

Ironically, many women who rise to prominence in government and security roles tend to be more conservative than their male counterparts. This is likely because they feel an added pressure to demonstrate ideological loyalty to be accepted and taken seriously.

The government and military sectors provide the most room for growth for women in Pakistan, and some of the most visible female figures emerge from these fields. However, Pakistan’s political landscape is highly fractured, making systematic reform difficult.

Tsukerman: Unlike India, which—despite being a messy democracy—has clear political parties with defined positions, Pakistan’s political system is much more fragmented.

Pakistan operates more like a collection of competing factions, almost resembling “states within a state.” The intelligence services, military, and private sector are intertwined, with various power centers controlling different aspects of governance and business.

Foreign influence further complicates the situation. Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, Turkey, and Qatar all exert influence over Pakistan’s political and economic landscape. Additionally, the military is divided into factions, often working against one another rather than presenting a unified front.

This fractured governance structure makes it extremely difficult to implement nationwide reforms related to women’s rights. Policies are often introduced inconsistently, enforced unevenly, and sometimes backfire due to conflicting power struggles.

Even Pakistan’s Supreme Court has been unpredictable, attempting to advance progressive rulings in some cases while also upholding regressive laws, such as blasphemy laws, in others. This contradictory legal and political system hinders social development and stability.

At the same time, Pakistan’s growing tech sector, fueled by young entrepreneurs, is pushing for social liberalization in certain areas. However, the country’s massive debt, deep political polarization, and economic instability make any systematic change—whether related to women’s rights or other reforms—difficult to implement shortly.

Jacobsen: Now, moving to Nigeria—an entirely different region and culture with gender-related challenges. In Nigeria, women’s issues seem less systematically embedded in legal or tribal structures and more individually impactful. Some of the most pressing concerns include:

• High rates of domestic violence
• High rates of sexual assault
• Economic barriers preventing girls from accessing education
• Limited financial resources and economic opportunities for women

In many ways, these issues mirror the concerns emphasized in North American gender equality discourse, but in far more extreme forms—particularly when it comes to violence and economic disparity. How do you interpret Nigeria’s gender dynamics, particularly when considering the differences between the northern, Muslim-majority regions and the southern, Christian-majority regions?

Tsukerman: Nigeria presents a unique gender crisis that is not as common in other countries we’ve discussed—the issue of mass abductions of girls. Mass abductions of girls in Nigeria are still happening today. In most cases, the situation is resolved through negotiations and ransom payments, leading to the eventual release of the victims. However, these incidents continue to occur, primarily due to ongoing raids on villages, a weak law enforcement system, rampant corruption, and poor security infrastructure.

This lack of protection is not limited to specific regions—it is a nationwide issue. Nigeria is also deeply polarized along ethnic, religious, and economic lines, which further complicates efforts to address gender-based violence and inequality.

The Christian-majority regions of the country contain most of Nigeria’s natural resources, which has fueled separatist movements with foreign involvement. Many Christian communities feel economically and politically marginalized, especially when it comes to resource distribution and government representation.

At the same time, Iranian influence has been increasing, with attempts to convert segments of Nigeria’s Muslim population to Shia Islam, further exacerbating religious tensions. Additionally, external tribal groups from peripheral areas attempt to expand their influence within Nigeria, adding another layer of instability.

Nigeria also faces a deep divide between rural and urban populations. In tribal areas, traditional customs restrict women’s roles. In contrast, in urban centers, highly educated, ambitious men and women pursue opportunities in business and politics. Many of these individuals immigrate to the West for education. Some return to Nigeria to assume high-ranking positions but are typically from wealthier families. Lower-income families, in contrast, lack these opportunities, reinforcing economic inequality.

At the heart of Nigeria’s challenges are systemic government corruption, a lack of political will for reform, and minimal foreign investment in resolving social issues. While the US, Arab states, and China consider Nigeria a key security and trade partner, none of these major players have prioritized addressing Nigeria’s internal gender and economic disparities. This neglect has allowed many of the country’s deep-rooted problems to persist without meaningful intervention.

Jacobsen: Moving to Brazil, the largest country in Latin America, we see a different gender-based crisis. Unlike Nigeria’s mass abductions, Brazil is distinguished by its alarmingly high rates of femicide.

Gender-based violence in Brazil manifests in several ways:

• Femicide rates are among the highest in the world, with thousands of women murdered each year due to gender-based violence.
• Women earn less than men and hold fewer leadership positions—a common global issue but still significant in Brazil.
• Abortion laws are extremely restrictive, leading to unsafe and illegal procedures, despite sufficient national wealth to provide safe and equitable access to reproductive healthcare.

Brazil presents an interesting paradox—economic resources exist to support gender equality initiatives, yet legal and cultural barriers continue to restrict women’s rights. The combination of high rates of femicide and lack of reproductive autonomy creates a particularly difficult environment for women.

How much of this do you attribute to machismo culture, and what other key factors shape these dynamics in Brazil?

Tsukerman: Government corruption is a significant cause of Brazil’s gender-based issues. Both major political parties have been involved in scandals and power struggles, preventing meaningful policy progress on gender-related issues.

For example:

• President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) previously served time for corruption before re-election.
• Former President Jair Bolsonaro failed to deliver on economic promises and attempted a January 6-style coup and is now under investigation and barred from leaving the country.

Brazil’s political landscape has become increasingly polarized, with little room for moderate or reform-driven efforts. Instead, much of the country remains trapped in economic instability, crime, and ineffective governance.

One of the most pressing social issues—the favelas (informal settlements plagued by poverty and gang violence)—has been largely ignored by successive governments. Without serious economic and security interventions, these areas remain dangerous environments for women, where gender-based violence, economic precarity, and lack of access to healthcare continue unchecked.

Ultimately, while machismo culture plays a role in reinforcing gender inequality, the bigger issue in Brazil is government corruption and institutional failure. Until these structural problems are addressed, it will be difficult to make sustained progress in protecting women’s rights and improving gender equity.

Organized crime is one of the biggest obstacles to gender equality in Brazil. The presence of powerful criminal syndicates across the country reinforces systemic discrimination against women while also amplifying the most extreme and toxic aspects of machismo culture.

When criminal organizations exert significant influence over society, violence becomes normalized—including violence against women. In this context, femicide is not just an act of domestic violence but a power move, reinforcing male dominance within criminal structures. The devaluation of women in these environments is not just cultural—it is a direct consequence of a lawless system that thrives on brutality and impunity.

Education and economic restructuring are necessary to dismantle this cycle. Brazil’s vast informal settlements—the favelas—serve as incubators for entrenched criminal cultures, where poverty, lawlessness, and lack of upward mobility prevent meaningful change. Without systematic efforts to address these socioeconomic conditions, these deep-rooted problems will persist.

Despite the urgency of these issues, there is little political will to address them. Neither major political faction in Brazil has seriously emphasized reforming these social structures. Instead, Brazil’s political landscape has been shaped by populism, corruption, and short-term electoral strategies, which benefit from maintaining an easily manipulable electorate rather than enacting long-term structural changes.

Another complex layer in Brazil’s sociopolitical environment is the weaponization of indigenous activism by various interest groups. This complicates efforts to balance indigenous rights with national economic and political concerns, creating tensions that further distract from gender equality issues.

Ultimately, Brazil’s social fabric is shaped by corruption, criminal influence, and populist governance, making it difficultto implement systematic reforms in women’s rights and broader societal progress.

Jacobsen: Moving to Bangladesh, we see similar gender-related issues to those in Pakistan, India, and Indonesia. Traditional norms often confine women to domestic roles, and early marriage is common, even though there are legal prohibitions against child marriage.

Some of the major gender concerns in Bangladesh include:

• Poor working conditions and low wages—a global issue but particularly severe in Bangladesh
• High rates of domestic violence
• Acid attacks, which are especially unique and devastating

Acid attacks stand out as a particularly brutal form of violence. The only other time I have encountered similar cases was through a colleague working to support individuals accused of witchcraft in parts of Africa.

In those cases, witchcraft allegations—often made against women and children—led to horrific attacks where perpetrators would throw acid on their victims, believing they were possessed or practicing sorcery. What makes acid attacks in Bangladesh different from these witchcraft-related assaults?

Tsukerman: Acid attacks in Bangladesh are a distinct phenomenon from the witchcraft-related violence seen in parts of Africa.

In Bangladesh, acid attacks are often a form of calculated, passive-aggressive violence rooted in deeply ingrained social hierarchies and suppressed hostility. Women are the primary targets, and men do not always perpetrate these attacks. In some cases, older women, such as mothers-in-law, are responsible.

This type of violence is unique because it is designed to destroy a woman’s life completely—both physically and socially. The perpetrators—whether bitter family members, rejected suitors, or individuals seeking revenge—use acid as a weapon to disfigure and isolate their victims permanently.

While Bangladesh’s government has historically been authoritarian, it has not actively encouraged acid attacks. Instead, this violence stems from a cultural structure where resentment, strict social hierarchies, and suppressed anger manifest in extreme forms of punishment.

Bangladesh’s legal system has taken steps to combat acid attacks. Still, enforcement remains weak, and social attitudes have slowly changed. Addressing this issue requires legal reforms and a fundamental shift in cultural attitudes toward women, power, and social status.

Acid attacks in Bangladesh are not just random acts of violence but part of a larger cultural problem that has been allowed to persist due to a lack of strong legal intervention and societal condemnation.

This phenomenon is rooted in a deeply ingrained culture of hostility, insecurity, and vindictiveness. There has not been a serious or sustained effort to confront and eradicate this toxic, spiteful behaviour, nor has it been legally exposed and made socially unacceptable to the degree necessary to deter future incidents.

It continues because it works—it instills fear, despair, and suffering; for some individuals, that is their only way of exerting power or deriving satisfaction. A society in which violent emotional outbursts are normalized as acceptable forms of conflict resolution is not healthy.

In most places, deliberately throwing acid on someone’s face would be seen as an extreme sociopathic act. However, in Bangladesh, it has become culturally normalized in some circles, turning it into a broader social issue rather than just isolated criminal behaviour.

To address this problem, targeted measures are needed, including stronger legal repercussions, increased social awareness campaigns, and efforts to shift cultural attitudes toward rational discourse and nonviolent conflict resolution.

Jacobsen: One more country: Mexico. In Mexico, a key cultural framework shaping gender roles is Marianismo—which venerates women for their virtue, purity, and devotion to traditional roles.

Many of the previous cases we’ve discussed—such as machismo-fueled violence, economic deprivation, and social inequality—involve forms of sexism that are overtly harmful and restrictive. Marianismo, by contrast, seems to align more with benevolent sexism, where women are exalted but simultaneously confined to rigid societal roles.

Mexico, like other Latin American nations, has high rates of gender-based killings (femicide), as well as:

• Gender pay gaps
• Limited leadership opportunities for women, despite recent high-profile female politicians
• Restrictive and inconsistent access to reproductive healthcare and abortion

What are your thoughts on Mexico?

Tsukerman: Much of Mexico’s gender structure resembles medieval Europe before the Enlightenment. While Marianismo is a reverence for women, it does not necessarily benefit them. Historically, societies that “exalted” women this way often punished them harshly when they failed to live up to idealized roles.

Women were expected to embody purity, sacrifice, and selflessness, but whether they “succeeded” in this role was not up to them—society determined it. They had no control over their fate. Instead, a judgmental community decided whether they had fulfilled their prescribed “higher purpose.” Those who failed or deviated faced ostracization, violence, or even death.

This rigid societal expectation still manifests in modern Mexico, particularly in cases of gender-based violence. In societies where individual rights are not the foundation of governance—where emotion, tribalism, and social conformity outweigh rationality and legal protections—gender-based violence tends to be higher.

The more a society embraces reason, individual autonomy, and equal rights, the less gender-based violence it experiences. Education plays a crucial role, as does a broader cultural shift toward valuing logic and fairness over emotion-driven retribution and power struggles. 

Jacobsen: I bring up these prior discussions on international contexts, powerful figures, and economic and social conditions to emphasize a crucial point:

Many of the most vocal figures discussing birth rates and demographics—all of whom are men—approach the issue purely from a statistical and economic perspective, completely disregarding the lived realities of the individuals who give birth.

Women disproportionately bear the burden of child-rearing, care work, and family responsibilities. Yet, these discussions rarely engage with the reasons why women make the reproductive choices they do. Instead, the conversation is reduced to abstract numbers, devoid of human context.

Some of the most well-known figures who have spoken about declining birth rates and demographic concerns:

• Elon Musk (entrepreneur, pronatalist advocate)
• Pavel Durov (founder of Telegram)
• Mark Andreessen (venture capitalist)
• J.D. Vance (Vice President of the United States)
• Simone and Malcolm Collins (pronatalist activists)
• Kevin Dolan (organizer of Natalist conferences)
• Nigel Farage (British politician)
• Donald Trump (former US President)
• Fumio Kishida (Prime Minister of Japan)
• Vladimir Putin (President of Russia)

Additionally, South Korea has made policy shifts, including downsizing its Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, reflecting broader institutional changes regarding gender policies and population concerns. The central question remains: Why do these discussions focus solely on statistics and economic models while ignoring the people’s real circumstances and personal choices behind the numbers?

Tsukerman: I would put Kishida and Putin in a slightly different category from the others but for distinct reasons. Japan’s demographic crisis is undeniable. Japan has one of the lowest birth rates in the world, and its population is shrinking rapidly. From both a social and economic perspective, this is a genuine crisis.

It is reasonable for a Japanese Prime Minister to be concerned about this trend. However, I am not convinced that any prime minister—even over multiple terms—can fully reverse such a long-term demographic shift. Policies can incentivize higher birth rates, but reversing deep-rooted social and economic trends is far more complicated than simply encouraging people to have more children.

Putin’s concern about demographics is also rooted in numbers, but his motives differ significantly. Russia has been in a state of war since 2014, and its current military engagement in Ukraine has cost over 800,000 lives. Beyond Russia’s broader demographic decline, Putin needs a continuous supply of non-disabled young men to fight in a war that may last for decades—outlasting even his own rule.

For this reason, Russia’s demographic concerns are directly linked to military strategy and national security. Putin’s policies are not just about keeping birth rates high—they are about ensuring a long-term supply of soldiers.

Jacobsen: What about the rest of the figures on the list, such as Trump, Vance, Farage, and Musk?

Tsukerman: With the rest of them, I am not convinced that their concern over birth rates is rooted in an actual crisis—at least not how it is for Japan or Russia.

Take Donald Trump, for example. The United States remains one of the most populous countries in the world. While the birth rate has fallen, it is nowhere near the demographic decline seen in Japan, South Korea, or the Czech Republic.

The US has a much slower population decline and benefits from higher immigration rates, making an immediate demographic collapse unlikely. While birth rates are falling, this is not an existential crisis for the US like other countries. I categorize the concerns of figures like Musk, Vance, and Farage as more ideological than urgent. 

Jacobsen: While some may genuinely believe in the importance of reversing demographic trends, their framing of the issue often ignores the key question—why are people, particularly women, choosing not to have children in these numbers? Without addressing economic barriers, work-life balance, gender inequality, and access to healthcare, their rhetoric remains disconnected from reality.

Tsukerman: Whether Donald Trump’s policies will address declining birth rates remains to be seen. So far, I have not seen any concrete policy measures—aside from his recent support for easing access to IVF procedures—that would significantly impact demographic trends.

For families struggling with infertility, making IVF more accessible could certainly help. However, are infertility and the high cost of fertility treatments the primary driver of declining birth rates? Probably not. The issue is far more complex, and a single policy change—such as expanding IVF access—is unlikely to solve a broader demographic crisis.

Most of the other figures involved in this conversation have no policymaking authority.

• Elon Musk and Pavel Durov are technocrats, not government officials or policy advisors.
• Kevin Dolanis is personally passionate about the issue. However, his impact on policy is unclear.
• Other figures like Nigel Farage and Mark Andreessen may have strong ideological views. Still, they are not directly involved in shaping demographic policies.

It is unclear why these individuals are so fixated on birth rates and how familiar they are with the socioeconomic factors behind these trends.

In the case of Pavel Durov, there is also an entirely separate concern—he has allegedly fathered over 100 children as a sperm donor. This raises ethical and biological concerns, particularly regarding the risk of genetic inbreeding if these children unknowingly marry and reproduce with each other. Unless there is a well-documented system in place to track biological relationships, this could create serious long-term medical issues.

Ultimately, while these individuals may have personal concerns about declining birth rates, they lack policymaking expertise and have not proposed any serious, data-driven solutions.

Jacobsen: The most effective solutions to declining birth rates appear to focus on removing restrictions on women’s agency rather than simply incentivizing childbirth.

Some of the most successful policies—seen in Sweden, Norway, and Finland—include:

• Generous paid parental leave for both mothers and fathers
• Financial incentives for families, including child allowances and tax deductions
• Housing subsidies to ease the cost of raising children
• Job security and economic stability, ensuring parents do not fear financial hardship when having children
• Flexible work arrangements, such as remote work and part-time options, to help parents balance careers and family life

These policies are less extreme, less invasive, and more practical than urging people to have more children. More importantly, they can be swiftly implemented through policy changes without requiring cultural overhauls or coercive measures.

Other successful policies—as seen in France and Nordic countries—include:

• Affordable and accessible childcare reduces the financial and logistical burdens of raising children.
• A stronger emphasis on work-life balance and equal parenting responsibilities to mitigate the “motherhood penalty” that often hurts women’s careers

When governments adopt these measures, birth rates tend to stabilize. Instead of pressuring women to have more children, these policies holistically support families, making parenthood more viable and appealing.

Tsukerman: Exactly. The issue of declining birth rates is not strictly economic—it is also about personal priorities and life choices.

In the United States, there is immense societal pressure on families—especially on women, but also on men—to structure their lives in a specific way when they have children.

The prevailing expectation is that before having children, individuals must:

• Achieve financial stability
• Own a home
• Have a well-established career
• Provide an optimal standard of living for their family

This creates significant pressure, leading many people to delay parenthood or opt-out altogether. If society treats child-rearing as an overwhelming burden rather than a natural life stage supported by practical policies, then it is no surprise that fewer people choose to have children.

Ultimately, these technocrats and politicians want to reverse declining birth rates. In that case, they need to address the barriers that make parenthood difficult—not just talk about abstract demographic trends while ignoring the human factors behind them.

There is great competitive pressure surrounding education and parenting in the United States, which greatly discourages larger families.

The highly competitive and expensive school system focuses on academic achievement, extracurricular activities, and structured child development. Parents feel enormous pressure to enroll their children in top-tier schools, pay for costly extracurriculars, and maintain an active role in school-related responsibilities.

Beyond school choice, there is also pressure related to parental leave. The lack of robust maternity and paternity leave policies makes it difficult for parents to balance career progression with family life. The expectation of a child-centred lifestyle in the US is particularly intense. Once a family has children, their entire lives are often expected to revolve around them, making it harder for parents to maintain previous interests, social lives, and professional goals.

In many cases, the demands extend far beyond basic childcare. Parents are expected to participate in countless school-related activities, including extracurriculars for the child and mandatory school participation, parent-teacher conferences, fundraisers, and social events.

By contrast, in countries like France, you rarely hear about an endless cycle of school activities. Aside from graduations and occasional school events, parents are far less expected to be constantly involved in structured educational or extracurricular obligations.

This constant pressure on American parents creates significant barriers to having a family. It reduces parents’ free time, limits their ability to plan vacations, and makes career progression more difficult. Helicopter parenting culture adds to this stress, making parents feel like they are always falling behind or not doing enough compared to others.

As a result, many people feel that parenting in the US is not enjoyable or sustainable, discouraging them from having larger families or children. These social factors play a much larger role in declining birth rates than many people acknowledge.

Jacobsen: Then we have Israel, where birth rates are rising, not only among highly religious or traditional populations but across the board. What are the key differences?

Tsukerman: Israel presents a fascinating contrast to other developed nations. Unlike most Western countries, Israel has a strong culture of community support, which helps ease the burdens of parenting.

While some social pressure exists to have children, it is not necessarily negative. Instead of parents being expected to micromanage every aspect of their child’s life, there is greater accommodation for fertility issues, a supportive cultural environment, and a more organic balance between structured and unstructured family activities.

Another major factor is the sense of early responsibility placed on children. From a young age, Israeli children are encouraged to be more independent, which reduces the burden on parents compared to cultures where parents are expected to do everything for their kids well into adulthood.

This combination of social support, cultural expectations, and practical independence helps parents feel more confident and less overwhelmed, making it easier to have larger families without the same stress level seen in the US or parts of Europe.

Jacobsen: So you’re suggesting that even if strong economic policies are in place, people won’t choose to have larger families without the right cultural framework.

Tsukerman: Exactly. Even if you provide financial incentives, tax breaks, and paid parental leave, it will never fully offset the cost of raising children—especially in highly developed countries like the US and Western Europe.

In theory, countries like Sweden, Norway, and Finland have some of the best policies in the world to encourage parenthood. Yet, Europeans tend to have even fewer children than Americans. While some things—like cheaper healthcare or subsidized childcare—help, they do not completely solve the issue. Economics alone is not the deciding factor. Social expectations and cultural attitudes play a much larger role than many policymakers acknowledge.

It ultimately comes down to a personal cost-benefit analysis. People recognize that having more children comes with expenses and challenges but also consider the emotional and social benefits. In societies where having children is seen as a fulfilling, communal, and integrated part of life, people tend to be more open to larger families. In societies where parenting is seen as an overwhelming, competitive, and restrictive obligation, birth rates decline—even when financial incentives are provided.

This is why purely economic policies will never be enough to reverse declining birth rates without shifting cultural attitudes toward parenting and family life. There is a strong connection between community support, cultural mindset, and quality of life regarding family planning and birth rates.

In the US and many other developed countries, raising a family is increasingly viewed as a burden rather than a fulfilling or natural part of life. In contrast, societies that balance economic flexibility, cultural values, and supportive work environments maintain higher birth rates without coercion.

Jacobsen: However, the “magic number” of 2.1 children per woman, representing a replacement-level fertility rate, has not been universally sustained in most developed nations. Looking at various countries and demographic trends, we can see that certain societies have found localized solutions that work within their contexts. However, there is no universal formula for sustaining population growth while preserving individual freedoms.

Population growth tends to be high in societies where women’s rights and autonomy are restricted—where they have limited access to education, healthcare, and career opportunities. In these societies, traditional gender roles remain rigid, leading to higher birth rates at the cost of personal freedom and economic mobility.

That is my observation. What is your take? Do you believe there is a set of concrete policies that could be applied universally to address population sustainability?

Tsukerman: We have never been in a better position economically, socially, and technologically than now. Across the world, more people have access to education and careers than at any other point in human history.

For women, this is the best period in history regarding economic and social opportunities—with some exceptions in specific countries. However, as societies develop, people prioritize personal freedom, time, and individual goals over social expectations. That is the trade-off of modern progress—the more freedom and economic stability people have, the less likely they are to prioritize reproduction as a societal duty.

So, the challenge is not simply financial incentives or government policies—it is about aligning individual choices with broader societal needs. However, forcing people into having more children is not an option. Once people are free to choose, they will not necessarily prioritize what is best for society—they will prioritize what is best for their personal lives.

This varies by individual, but generally speaking, if you want a successful career and a balanced lifestyle, you are likely to limit the number of children you have. Unless you are extremely wealthy and can afford a team of nannies and household staff, having many children is not practical for most people in modern society.

Jacobsen: And that brings us back to Musk and Durov, who have exceptionally large children—but under unusual circumstances.

• Elon Musk has 13 children with four different women (that we know of).
• Pavel Durov has over 100 children in approximately 12 countries but as a sperm donor, not an active father.

Neither of these men is deeply involved in parenting or actively raising their children. In Durov’s case, he is not involved at all. He is simply a sperm donor with no direct responsibility for the children he has fathered. This further reinforces the original point—the conversation about birth rates and demographics is framed purely in statistical and economic terms rather than acknowledging the legal, social, and policy realities that influence family planning.

Their approach treats people as abstract numbers rather than individuals making real-life decisions. Women’s agency, economic pressures, career considerations, and work-life balance are often ignored in these discussions, making the entire pronatalist argument feel detached from reality.

That is a key issue—many technocrats and political figures discussing demographics do so without engaging with the lived experiences of the people making these decisions.

This discussion highlights the gap between policy theory and real-world decision-making regarding population sustainability.

As commonly referred to, these Tech Bros present themselves as technocratic, ‘meritocratic,’ and futurist-minded individuals. Many of them align with transhumanist ideals, which you have previously drawn my attention to as an important factor in their worldview.

Much of this thinking originated with the law of accelerating returns and theories stemming from Moore’s Law, which hypothesized continuous exponential growth in computing power. However, according to experts like Sam Altman and others, we are now in the era of scaling laws, where AI and technological advancements have an almost incomprehensible multiplicative effect.

Given their futurist perspective, what solutions do they propose for this demographic crisis? They see fertility rates below 2.1 as an existential threat and react with panic, fearing civilization’s decline.

What exactly do they see as the transformative solutions for this posed problem?

Tsukerman: Their “solution”—if you can call it that—is to donate their sperm and spread their seed as widely as possible.

For example, Pavel Durov has allegedly fathered over 100 children as a sperm donor, which sounds like a grand contribution to human survival—until you realize that, on a global scale, it is statistically irrelevant. In a world of billions of people, 100 extra births make no meaningful difference to overall demographic trends.

Furthermore, this approach could lead to serious medical crises. If these biologically related children are unaware of each other and end up reproducing together, it could result in genetic disorders and significant health risks. Then there is Elon Musk, who has 13 children with four different women. While this may be more than most people, it is still nowhere near enough to reverse any global demographic decline.

Even beyond numbers, there is a psychological and social aspect to consider. Suppose some of Musk’s children grow up traumatized by his absence, parenting style, or the public scrutiny surrounding him. In that case, they may actively choose not to have children themselves. Suppose his approach to fatherhood leads to broken families or generational dysfunction. In that case, his contribution is not necessarily a net positive regarding long-term societal stability.

More importantly, none of these men have real policy prescriptions. They reproduce for the sake of reproducing, but they offer no real guidance on:

• How to create a society where people genuinely want to have more children
• What needs to change in terms of policy, social structures, or work-life balance
• How to make family life more appealing and sustainable for modern individuals

Their only real argument is that people should sacrifice their desires for collective social needs, which historically has been a dangerous ideological path.

Jacobsen: Fascist regimes, such as Ceausescu’s Romania, also pushed aggressive pronatalist policies, forcing people to prioritize national interests over personal freedom. This is a well-documented historical failure, yet these Tech Bros seem oblivious to that reality.

However, people in developed democratic nations—such as the U.S., Canada, and Western Europe—are not living under totalitarian regimes and have no interest in being forced into state-controlled family planning initiatives. Western societies fought against fascism, Nazism, and communism precisely to avoid government-dictated economic and reproductive policies.

There is a massive gap between their proposed vision and any realistic path to achieving it. Their ideas are detached from reality, failing to address the lived experiences of people making family planning decisions.

It is essentially a dilettante’s guide to demographics—a simplistic, surface-level take on an incredibly complex subject.

Their approach mirrors large language models, where they systematize and statistically analyze data but lack a deep understanding of the human thought processes that generate those outputs.

It is akin to skimming the surface of a vast ocean while ignoring everything beneath it. They identify a statistical concern but completely miss the intricate social, economic, and emotional realities that shape human decision-making.

This is why their solutions feel hollow—they fail to address the messiness of human relationships, cultural values, and economic structures that influence birth rates.

Tsukerman: People don’t forget that throughout human evolution, from its early beginnings—whatever they happen to be—until this point, family and family structure took on and evolved as well. It was never completely static. What people idealized as an ideal family was never quite as clear an idea as people think. A lot of the time, nobody asked those people what they wanted. Now we have the choice.

So unless people want to sacrifice democracy and the ability to formulate their own choices, which are protected by the constitution and so forth, for a society where people are forced to marry, settle down with whomever their families choose, and stay there for the rest of their lives, they’re going to have to admit that there’s no clear-cut pathway to any of this, and it’s going to be messy. 

The more freedom people have, the more choices they have, and the messier it will be. But unless you want to eliminate choice from the question, you’ll have to figure out how to get people to make better choices and define a better choice in a way that makes sense. 

Jacobsen: Here are dumb ‘solutions.’ Poland, Iran, and the US post-Roe v. Wade: Limiting reproductive choice to increase birth rates somehow. It does not. It results in more unsafe versions, higher maternal mortality, and economic hardship for women. Dumb.

A childlessness tax during the Soviet Union was 6% of a person’s salary for adults without children. Many avoided legal marriages to escape the tax. Dumb.

Romania, Ceausescu issues Decree 770: In 1966, Romania banned abortion and contraception, forcing pregnancies to boost the population. State doctors regularly monitored women to ensure they weren’t terminating pregnancies. Maternal mortality rates soared. Unwanted children went to orphanages under horrific conditions, and birth rates plummeted again once Ceausescu was overthrown. Dumb.

Reducing women’s educational and career opportunities (Afghanistan, some Middle Eastern countries): You mentioned Afghanistan earlier. Increased early marriages and birth rates are up in the short term. Still, as with the Romanian example, this leads to higher poverty rates, worse child health and mortality, and overall economic decline. So, therefore, dumb.

Marriage restrictions and incentives for younger marriages—Iran post-2021 and China discouraging divorce—fail because Iran banned sterilization and restricted access to contraception while encouraging married women to marry early. China increased restrictions on divorce to keep families together, supposedly leading to higher birth rates because nothing signifies intimacy like acrimonious marriages stuck together by the state. Outcome: Young people avoid marriage altogether. Birth rates are still declining. Dumb.

Encouraging only traditional gender roles. South Korea, with its previous policies. Historically, women were discouraged from working after childbirth. There was an emphasis on patriarchal traditional family structures.

The result, women avoided marriage and children because there was a lack of support for working mothers. So, they have now shifted to gender-equal policies. However, the birth rate remains one of the lowest in the world. Encouraging traditional gender roles did not work in the South Korean case. Dumb.

Nationalist and ethno-exclusive policies are a rising tide of ugliness—to make an aesthetic appraisal. Hungary, Russia, and Poland are promoting birth incentives for particular national or ethnic groups, highly exclusionary to immigrants. This policy has failed because population growth requires both native births and immigration. It did not work—i.e., it was dumb.

So, these are very steadfast examples of not working in our prior discussion. On the other hand, the Nordic model of work-life balance, affordable childcare, and parental leave—like France and Sweden—and the absence of discrimination against working mothers or restricted access to family planning and forced births seem like reasonable solutions, far more than the prior—or just creepy commentary by techno-bros.

Do you agree or disagree? What are your closing thoughts, Irina?

Tsukerman: There needs to be an acknowledgment that having children is a deeply personal choice, and it is not easy. It is certainly not easy for women who have to bear those children. It is certainly not easy for anyone who has to raise those children—more importantly than simply being a biological producer of children.

Even if, somehow, there were a way of developing children externally in a machine that does not require any serious commitment from women—even if you eliminate the biological factor—raising the actual child remains the biggest part of the job.

And this is not something you can force anybody into. You can force them to give birth and have the child. You cannot force them to raise them or be a good parent.

People should focus less on how many children people have and more on ensuring better examples of good parenting—and more on it. Because of the number of broken families we are seeing, the numbers of horrific social phenomena—drug overdoses, broken communities, covered-up sex scandals, and abuses—none of that brings about healthy societies, healthy families, or children who grow up to be functional adults.

We need to shift our focus to that. Then there is the demographic crisis—healthy communities will lead to healthierchoices, resolving the crisis independently.

Jacobsen: Thank you so much for your time today.

Tsukerman: I appreciate it, Irina. Thank you so much.

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